PLATO

PROTAGORAS

TOWLE

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PROTAGORAS

WITH THE COMMENTARY OF
HERMANN SAUPPE

TRANSLATED WITH ADDITIONS
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INTRODUCTION.

1. LIFE AND TEACHING OF PROTAGORAS.

Protagoras was the first to call himself a Sophist,—that is, a teacher of wisdom,—and gained applause, admiration, and influence to an extraordinary degree. Of his personal history very little has come down to us.¹ He was born on the southern shore of Thrace, in the Ionian city Abdera, which the inhabitants of Teos had founded some two generations before. For the purpose of teaching and gaining wealth and fame, he travelled in Greece, Sicily, and Lower Italy. In Athens especially he tarried often and long, as this city was the focus of intellectual life, the resort of all who cultivated art and science and sought the recognition of their attainments. Before he accompanied the colonists to Thurii in 443 B.C., he must have gained the confidence of Pericles in a somewhat extended acquaintance, as this statesman appointed him to draw up a code of laws for the new community; and we find him again, not long before the breaking out of the Peloponnesian war, intimately associated with Pericles (about 432 B.C.). During the plague (430, 429 B.C.) he was a witness of the magnanimity of Pericles; for he says, in the only fragment of any length which is preserved from his writings (in Plut. Mor. 118e), τῶν γὰρ νεκρῶν καὶ καλῶν, ἐν ὅκτῳ δὲ τῷ πάσην ἡμέραν ἀποθανότων, νηπευθέως ἀνέκτησεν. εὐδοκία γὰρ ἐχεῖτο· εἰς ἣς πολλὰς ὄρεστις κατὰ πᾶσαν ἡμέραν εἰς εὐποτιμίαν καὶ ἀνωτέρων καὶ τὴν ἐν τούτῳ πολλούσιν δόξαν· πᾶς γὰρ τίς μὲν ἄρεων τὰ ἐννοτοὺς πένθεα ἐρωμένως φέροντα μεγαλόφρονα τε καὶ ἀνδρήτων ἐδόκεε εἶναι καὶ ἐννοτοῦ κρέσσω, κάρτα εἰδὼς τὴν ἐννοτὸν ἐν τοιούτῳ πράγματι ἄμηχανήν. Furthermore, according to Athenaeus, the Kolakes of Eupolis² (brought out in

¹ See further, Zeller, Philosophie der Griechen, i. 862³ ff. (Eng. trans. ii. 407 ff.); Schanz, Beiträge zur vorso- eratischen Philosophie aus Platon, i. 20 ff.

² Eupolis was born, according to Suidas, 424 B.C., and was a rival of Aristophanes, with whom he vied in elegance. Following the example of
the spring of 421 B.C.) showed that Protagoras had been in Athens during its composition and public performance,—some time, therefore, after 422 B.C. We can hardly suppose, however, that he remained in Athens from this time until his death. It was probably on a later visit to that city that he was accused of impiety on account of one of his books, which began with the declaration, \( \pi\epsilon\iota\mu\varepsilon\ \mu\varepsilon\ \theta\epsilon\iota\nu\ \omega\iota\kappa\iota\nu\xi \\varepsilon\iota\delta\varepsilon\iota\nu\ai\iota\nu\ \iota\omicron\upsilon\iota\nu\ \iota\omicron\upsilon\iota\nu\ \varsigma \\iota\omicron\upsilon\iota\nu\xi \\varepsilon\iota\sigma\iota\nu \cdot \pi\omicron\lambda\lambda\alpha \ \gamma\varphi \ \tau\alpha \ \kappa\omicron\lambda\iota\omicron\nu\omicron\tau\alpha \ \varepsilon\iota\delta\varepsilon\iota\nu\ai\iota\nu\). To escape condemnation he fled, but only to perish upon the sea.¹

When did this flight and death take place? The statement in _Meno_ 91 e \( \alpha\iota\mu\iota \ \gamma\varphi \ \alpha\upsilon\tau\omicron\nu \ \alpha\iota\tau\omicron\delta\alpha\iota\nu\epsilon\iota\nu \ \varepsilon\gamma\gamma\upsilon\varsigma \ \kappa\alpha\iota\iota \ \varepsilon\beta\delta\omega\mu\acute{\iota}\kappa\omicron\nu\tau\alpha \ \varepsilon\tau\eta \ \gamma\gamma\omicron\omicron\nu\omicron\tau\alpha \ \tau\epsilon\sigma\sigma\alpha\rho\acute{\alpha}\kappa\omicron\nu\tau\alpha \ \delta\varepsilon \ \varepsilon\nu \ \tau\upsilon\acute{\eta} \ \tau\acute{\epsilon}\chi\nu\eta \ \omicron\nu\tau\alpha \), must be received as correct, and was undoubtedly followed by Apollodoros of Athens, when he says, according to Diogenes Laërtius, ix. 56, \( \tau\epsilon\lambda\epsilon\nu\omicron\tau\acute{\iota} \ \alpha\upsilon\tau\omicron\nu \ \beta\iota\omicron\omicron\upsilon\sigma\alpha\tau\acute{\iota} \ \varepsilon\tau\eta \ \cdot \ \varepsilon\beta\delta\omega\mu\acute{\iota}\kappa\omicron\nu\tau\alpha \, \sigma\omicron\phi\omicron\sigma\tau\acute{\omega}\tau\epsilon\sigma\iota \ \delta\varepsilon \ \tau\epsilon\sigma\sigma\alpha\rho\acute{\alpha}\kappa\omicron\nu\tau\alpha \). When now we hear Protagoras say ( _Protag_ 317 e) that in age he might be the father of any present, thus including Socrates, who was born about 468 B.C., we might infer that Plato considered him as at least seventeen to twenty years older than Socrates; and we might conclude that he was born between 488 and 485 B.C., and died 418 to 415 B.C. With this, to be sure, the statement in Diogenes Laërtius, ix. 54, does not agree: \( \kappa\alpha\theta\gamma\gamma\omicron\acute{\iota}\rho\acute{\iota} \sigma\iota \ \delta\\alpha\upsilon\tau\omicron\nu \ \Pi\nu\theta\delta\omega\varphi\omicron\nu \ \Pi\omicron\lambda\nu\acute{\iota}\chi\acute{\iota} \\omicron\lambda\omicron\nu, \ \epsilon\iota\varsigma \ \tau\omicron\nu \ \tau\epsilon\rho\alpha\kappa\omicron\sigma\iota\omicron\varsigma \ \omicron\iota\nu\), which can only mean that he was indicted in the time of the Four Hundred (in the summer of 411 B.C.). For, according to this statement, the year of his birth would have been 481 B.C., and he would have been only some thirteen years older than Socrates. This is entirely possible, if we assume that Plato represents him as wishing to seem the more venerable, and so as making himself a little older, and Socrates a little younger. Still, the relation to Prodicus and Hippias, who equalled Protagoras in fame, yet were in-

¹ Euripides alluded to this in _Ixion_ (Philochorus in Diog. L. ix. 55), as does Plato in _Theaet_. 171 e (Müller-Strübing, _Jahrbb. d. Philol._ cxxi. 96).
cluded with the rest in his expression, argues a greater age for Protagoras. Furthermore, judicial proceedings for impiety would certainly not have been brought against a foreigner under the Four Hundred, since these oligarchs, during their brief term of power, had much more urgent cares. Diogenes may easily have misunderstood some remark of the authority whom he quoted, to the effect that Pythodorus, the accuser of Protagoras, was the same one who afterwards belonged to the Four Hundred; or, in condensing, he may have misquoted. In the spring of 415 B.C. the trials for the mutilation of the figures of Hermes were held, and with this time, into which falls also the condemnation of Diagoras, the charge of impiety against Protagoras very well agrees. Apparently, then, this must be regarded as the date of the death of Protagoras.\(^1\)

Protagoras accepted the doctrine of Heraclitus\(^2\) that there is no permanent being, but all things are in unceasing motion and transformation. Man perceives the existence and qualities of things only in so far as they come into contact with his senses, and thus arises a reciprocal interaction of the percipient subject and a perceived object. What the senses perceive is true. But the senses of different men apprehend differently, as also those of the same man at different times; correction of the perceptions is impossible, for one is as true as another; the work of the teacher

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\(^2\) Heraclitus of Ephesus, who flourished about 500 B.C., was called δ ὁ σκα
tεῦδος on account of the obscurity of his style. His view of Being was the opposite of that of Parmenides, whose Real or Absolute was extended and continuous, indivisible and unchangeable. Heraclitus used various symbols to convey the thought of the universal change; especially fire and the motion of a river. Generation and destruction were ceaseless and identical, nothing was permanent but the endless transition. There was indeed a certain measure of fixity in the particulars, but this was only a brief halt, and was itself an encroachment. No individual, nor any number of individuals, can gain truth: this is possessed alone by the All.
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is only to bring to the senses of his pupil the good and the useful. This is the meaning of the Protagorean principle, \( \pi\'\nu\tau\omega\nu\ \chi\rho\eta\mu\alpha\tau\omega\nu\ \mu\epsilon\tau\rho\nu \ \alpha\nu\theta\rho\omega\pi\nu\).

Protagoras, however, boasted that his teaching did not, like that of the other sophists, end in a barren knowledge, but that it led immediately into life, it fitted men for domestic and civil duties. He did not push to its logical consequences his doctrine respecting human knowledge and truth, which must have extinguished all virtue and morality,\(^1\) replacing them with the concern of the individual for what is good and useful for himself alone; but he followed in his ethics the current ideas of virtue and piety. Now it is by discourse that men are influenced, and the prizes of life are gained, and, for securing proficiency in this, men looked pre-eminently to the sophists (*Protag*. 312\( \alpha\)). Discourse was therefore with Protagoras a prime object of attention. He taught \( \delta\rho\theta\epsilon\tau\epsilon\alpha\), i.e. he distinguished the grammatical genders, tenses, and kinds ('question,' 'answer,' 'command,' 'wish') of sentence. Thus he became the founder of Grammar, and the jests of Aristophanes in the *Clouds* (*Nub*. 659 ff.) evince the striking impression which he thus produced. From these grammatical studies, his pupils advanced to the art of oratory, Protagoras setting forth the same subject from opposite sides, teaching them to discover grounds of probability for the improbable (\( \tau\omicron\ \nu\pi\tau\omicron\ \lambda\omicron\gamma\omicron\nu\ \kappa\rho\epsilon\ita\tau\omicron\ \pi\omicron\epsilon\epsilon\in\) Arist. *Rhet*. ii. 24, p. 1402 Bk.), developing their dexterity in the treatment of general questions, and furnishing as models for their imitation his own treatment of general propositions.

A keen and active intellect, engaging powers of speech, self-confidence, and a sagacious estimate of the desires and needs of the men of his day, won for him everywhere large numbers of pupils; and the deep and abiding effects which his teaching had left upon the thought and the moral views of men could not be denied. For this reason Plato devoted two dialogues to the statement and refutation of his doctrines — in the *Theaetetus* attacking his theory of knowledge, in the *Protagoras* his doctrine of virtue.

\(^1\) Peipers *die Erkenntnisstheorie Platos*, p. 44 f.
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With the finished art of the dramatist, and with the sparkling humor of the comic poet, Plato describes for us, in the most fresh and picturesque way, the house of Callias, where the conversation takes place.

One of the ancient priestly families of nobility in Athens was that of the Κύρπυκες, who carried back their origin to Triptolemus. The honors of the sacred herald and of the torch-bearer at the Eleusinian mysteries were hereditary with them. The function of the Daduchia, the tie of public hospitality with Lacedaemon, and boundless wealth, established their renown, and a succession of generals and ambassadors increased their fame. To this family belonged Callias and Hipponicus: Hipponicus, a frugal, quiet man, who, as general-in-chief, had gained the victory at Tanagra (in the summer of 426 B.C.), had died a short time before the representation of the Κόλακες of Eupolis (spring of 421 B.C.). He left, as heir to his wealth, Callias, who gave himself up to all sensual pleasures as unrestrainedly as he devoted himself passionately to the sophists and their fascinating occupation. When these visited Athens, they found a welcome at his house, and those who wished to associate with them and listen to their discourses gathered there freely. Eupolis included Protagoras and other sophists, as he portrayed in his Flatterers the practices in the house of Callias, the weak vanity of the host, and the swarm of venal parasites devouring his wealth.

This house of Callias we enter with Socrates early in the morning, and find, in the porticos at either end of the court, and in one of the adjoining rooms, Protagoras, Hippias, and Prodicus, each surrounded by his disciples, and already actively engaged in teaching: Protagoras is walking, Hippias answers from a high seat the questions propounded to him, the pupils of Prodicus are gathered about his bed. Of the sophistic leaders, we miss Gorgias alone, probably because Plato regarded his activity as so significant and

1 Meineke, Com. Gr. i., pp. 131 ff.; 2 Athen. v. 218 b.
peculiar that he preferred to treat his method in a separate work, rather than to give him here a subordinate position.

Around the sophists are gathered, besides Socrates and Callias, an array of persons who, at that time or soon after, were prominent in literary or public life. All belong to the most cultured circles of Athens: Xanthippus and Paralus, (the sons of Pericles and half-brothers of Callias,) Eryximachus the physician, Agathon the later poet; Alcibiades, between boyhood and manhood, here eighteen or nineteen years old; Critias, who later became one of the Thirty; Phaedrus, Pausanias, Andron, Plato's uncle Charmides, Philippides, two by name of Adimantus,—all citizens of Athens; and Antimoerus of Menda, who himself had already gained reputation as a sophist. Around these, who almost all appear in other dialogues as zealous adherents of the new doctrines, are grouped many other citizens and foreigners. Although we cannot assert that an actual occurrence lies at the foundation of the Platonic dialogue, yet it is certain that similar gatherings and conversations had frequently occurred in the house of Callias, and that, to the mind of contemporaries, there was no improbability in the introduction of any one of those named. The impression made by the lavish, pretentious, noisy behavior in Callias's house, is deepened by the contrast of the simplicity and quietness with which the domestic life of Socrates meets us in the preliminary conversation with Hippocrates,—a symbol of simple truth contrasted with the delusive glare of external display.

3. Time in which the Scene is laid.

In attempting to derive the date from allusions in the dialogue, we are involved in a contradiction, to which Athenaeus has already called attention.\(^1\) On the one hand, Pericles and his sons, who died in 429 B.C., are referred to as still living in 315 a; 319 e; 328 e; on the other hand, the \(\Lambda\gamma\rho\rho\alpha\) of Pherecrates is mentioned in 327 d as a play of the previous year, while, according to Athenaeus, it was brought out during the Lenaean festival of 420 B.C.; again, 315 a certainly presupposes the death of Hipponicus, who

\(^1\) Cf. v. 218 b; xi. 505 f.
yet cannot have died long before 421 B.C. But here, as in the other dialogues, we must distinguish between the events of primary and those of secondary importance. Only where occurrences form the ground of the picture, does Plato adhere to the history; incidental matters he freely adds, even with violence to historical truth, when they serve to give life or completeness, or afford an apt comparison or a witty allusion. Shakspere and others in their tragedies take the same liberty.

The death of Pericles and of his sons were events so weighty in themselves, and so linked with the memory of the dreadful pestilence in the early part of the fatal war, that their impression must still have been most vivid in the minds of those for whom Plato wrote. This compels us to place the scene of the dialogue in 433 or 432 B.C.,¹ before the opening of the war, to which it contains not the slightest allusion. This date is sustained by the following points in the dialogue. Hippocrates says in 310e that he was a boy when Protagoras first visited Athens. Protagoras had left Athens in 443 B.C.; if we suppose Hippocrates to have been then thirteen or fourteen years old, he was now a young man of twenty-three or twenty-four, just as he appears in the dialogue. Again, the youthfulness of Socrates is referred to in 314b, 317c, 361e; this has no meaning, if we place the time of the dialogue later, but agrees fully with Grecian ideas, if he was (432 B.C.) thirty-six years old. Protagoras, then, is fifty-three (if we consider him as born in 485 B.C.), and can properly speak of his advanced age. Furthermore, Alcibiades is called in 309d ἡπτήνυφτης, and, his birth falling in about 451 B.C.,² his age at this time is nineteen. Agathon is called in 315d νέον ἐτὶ μετράκιον, and, the date of his birth being 448 or 447 B.C.,³ we find him here sixteen or fifteen years of age. The allusion to Phidias in 311c as still living, does not conflict with 432 B.C., since the assumption that he died in that year is erroneous.

¹ So Schleiermacher, Stallbaum, Steinhart, in their Introductions. J.S. Kroschel also agrees with this, de temporibus rerum, quae in Platonis Protagora habentur, constituentis (Erfurt, 1859), pp. 15 ff., and preface to his edition, pp. 30 ff.
² Vischer, Alkib. und Lysander, p. 52.
³ Ritschl, de Agathonis Vita, p. 17 (Opusc. Philol. i. 428).
As opposed to the agreement of these circumstances, the cursory allusion to the play of Pherocrates is wholly without weight. The difficulty is more serious, that Callias is introduced in 432 B.C. as already heir and master of the house, when Hipponicus died ten years later.¹ But here Plato preferred the ideal truth to historical precision; the house of Callias, by the usage of many years, and by the cutting wit of the Κόλακης of Eupolis, had become, in the minds of the Athenians, dedicated to the sophists as a rendezvous. Besides, people could scarcely remember, nor did they care, precisely when Callias became heir to the property of Hipponicus.

The vexation of the old porter in 314c, and the malicious remark in 315a that Callias had sophists in the treasury, instead of Hipponicus’s treasures, simply force us to the view that Hipponicus had been dead for some time, and that the proceedings in the house of Callias were not altogether new. To the readers of the Protagoras, however, the remark above mentioned must have seemed the more apt, as the prodigal frivolity of Callias had doubtless, when Plato wrote the dialogue, already squandered the greater part of his paternal inheritance.


A. Introduction to Socrates’s Narrative, 309a to 310a.

Socrates, in a public place, perhaps in a palaestra or a portico (a point not clearly indicated), is asked by an acquaintance whence he comes, and, on replying that he has just had an interview with Protagoras, is begged to recount it to those present. This he expresses himself as quite willing to do.

¹ To be sure, Schleiermacher, p. 220, Kroschel, (in the Zeitschr. f. d. Gymnasialwesen, 1857, p. 562, and in the dissert. previously quoted, p. 21) have assumed that, when the dialogue took place, Hipponicus was not dead, but for some reason was absent. But this is opposed by 311a, and indeed by the whole style in which Callias and Hipponicus are referred to. The conjecture of Kroschel, preface pp. 30, 32, that Hipponicus had given over to Callias his city residence, and himself dwelt in the Peiraeus, does not help the matter. See Zeller über die Anachronismen in den Platon. Gesprächen (Abh. d. Berl. Ak. d. Wiss. 1873), pp. 83 ff.
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B. Recital of Socrates, 310a to the end.

I. Introductory conversation with Hippocrates, 310a–314c.

Hippocrates, the son of Apollodorus, a young Athenian of good family, fine abilities, high aspirations, pure and modest mind, and accustomed to visit Socrates daily, came to his house at the early dawn, with the request that he would introduce him to Protagoras. Socrates rose, and, until it became day, walked in the court with Hippocrates, seeking to ascertain just what he desired from Protagoras. It appears that Hippocrates does not know what he desires. He does not wish to become a sophist; the idea of oratorical power presents itself to him in rather an obscure way, but what object this is to gain, to what subject to devote itself, he confesses he has no idea. Socrates holds up to him the levity with which the youth throw themselves into the arms of the sophists, and proposes, in company with him, to ask Protagoras concerning the aim and contents of his teaching.

II. Interview with the sophists at Callias’s house, 314c to end.

a. Portrayal of the scene and introduction of the dialogue, 314c–317e.

Socrates and Hippocrates pass in through the porch, pausing, unnoticed by the others, to survey the scene. They then approach Protagoras; and Socrates, making known the wish of Hippocrates to become his pupil, asks Protagoras whether he prefers to set forth the nature of his art to themselves privately, or in the presence of the others. Protagoras is gratified with the opportunity of displaying himself, and declares that he has no hesitation in professing himself a sophist. All who are present gather about them, and the discussion between Socrates and Protagoras begins.

b. The question is set forth, 317e–320c.

Socrates repeating his question, What will Hippocrates gain from Protagoras, the latter first replies that he will become better, then, more particularly, that he will become a better citizen, able in the administration of domestic and civil affairs. Socrates replies that he had not supposed previously that this skill could be taught; because, in the first place, in public assemblies, upon matters which are deemed capable of being learned, the people allow those
only to speak who are proficient in these, while, upon matters which pertain to civil administration, they listen to all without distinction; and because, in the second place, the best and wisest men do nothing themselves to impart their virtue to their children, nor do they commit this training to others. He begs Protagoras to explain this.

c. Myth and discourse of Protagoras, 320c–328a.

Protagoras treats three points: first, the question why the Athenians allow all, without exception, to speak upon justice and civil virtue (πολιτική ἄρετή); secondly, the fact that they nevertheless hold that this virtue can be taught; thirdly, the question why, notwithstanding all the pains which state and parents devote to the education of the youth, the sons of excellent fathers do not always turn out well.

To the first question he replies by a myth. The race of men was left destitute by Epimetheus, but received from Prometheus technical skill, without civil virtue. They were therefore unable to found a state, and were exposed in their isolation to destruction, until Zeus caused Hermes to endow them, without exception, with justice and mutual respect. Thus all have received and possess political virtue, and so all can speak concerning it.

The second point he proves by the fact that the Athenians never rebuke one who lacks merely natural gifts, while those who are destitute of virtue, they reprove, punish, and even banish.

Upon the third point, he reviews at length the course of education in Athens, and explains away the apparent miscarrying of the sons of excellent fathers, by the view that, because of a more limited capacity, notwithstanding all the pains spent upon them, they reach, in comparison with others who are more gifted, only an inferior degree of virtue; and, since all men must possess virtue, and there is thus no opportunity of comparison with such as have none, this inferior degree is mistaken for an entire lack of virtue.

d. First dialogue between Protagoras and Socrates, 328d–333d.

Socrates professes himself satisfied with the answer, only he does not know whether Protagoras distinguishes different virtues, or regards virtue as something indivisible. Protagoras replies that
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justice, piety, temperance, wisdom, and courage are parts, and in fact—qualitatively, in their nature and working,—distinct parts of virtue. Contrary to this, however, Socrates brings him to admit, first, that since justice can be nothing impious, nor piety anything unjust, piety and justice must be nearly alike; secondly, that since folly is the opposite of wisdom and of temperance, while every concept can have one opposite only, temperance and wisdom are one and the same.

e. Intermezzo, 333d-338e.

Socrates takes up another line of reasoning, in order to show further that temperance and justice coincide; but Protagoras, who sees himself at a disadvantage in these discussions, withdraws in a long, irrelevant discourse upon the relativity of the useful. Socrates, saying that he does not understand long discourses, wishes to drop the debate; but those present urge its continuance: viz., Callias, Alcibiades, Critias, Prodicus, who introduces and distinguishes a collection of synonyms, and Hippias, who, in magniloquent complimentary speech, proposes to institute a contest and to appoint an arbiter. Socrates and Protagoras finally accede to the general request; but Socrates decidedly rejects Hippias's proposal, and will have only a simple dialogue with Protagoras.


Protagoras assumes the part of questioner, and, since the interpretation of the poets is an essential requisite of true culture, points out a contradiction in a poem composed by Simonides in honor of Scopas,—the poet himself saying that it is hard to become good, and then criticizing the saying of Pittacus that it is hard to be noble. Socrates says in the first place, that many, to resolve this difficulty, would appeal to Hesiod, and there find the thought that virtue is difficult to gain, but easy to maintain. Protagoras declaring that this contradicts the general experience, Socrates next beguiles Prodicus into the explanation that Simonides, in quoting from Pittacus the word χαλεπός, difficult, took it in the sense of κακός, bad. But to this Socrates opposes the words of Simonides which immediately follow; and now, thirdly, he gives his own interpretation. It was (he says) the purpose of Simonides, in the en-
tire poem, to combat the wisdom of Pittacus, which was condensed, after the manner of the oldest philosophers, especially of the Lac- daemonians, who were the greatest philosophers. Simonides says, therefore, that for man to become good, whether for a shorter or a longer time, is difficult, but possible; while to be good permanently is not difficult, but impossible. Socrates is able also to find in the poet his own conviction, that virtue is the knowledge of the good, while vice is the lack of this knowledge, and that no man voluntarily does wrong. Hippias approves of this interpretation, but wishes to bring forward still another of his own. This is deferred by Alcibiades, and Socrates sets forth how little in general is gained by such exposition of poetry.

g. Second dialogue between Protagoras and Socrates, 348b-360e.

Although reluctant, Protagoras now consents once more to make replies, and Socrates resumes the former discussion. He asks Protagoras whether he still considers the five special virtues as the five distinct parts of the one virtue; but the latter now states it as his doctrine, that justice, temperance, wisdom, and piety closely resemble one another, while courage is wholly distinct. But Socrates shows that courage as a virtue is always admirable, but that to courage belongs daring, and daring without knowledge is folly, and thus disgraceful; consequently courage cannot exist without knowledge, and wisdom and courage coincide.

Protagoras will not admit this conclusion, since, besides the daring which arises from knowledge, courage requires a certain natural endowment. Socrates, therefore, without taking up this objection, goes farther back in tracing the argument. He shows that, since the agreeable and the good, the disagreeable and the evil, are in their nature the same, no one knowingly chooses the evil and avoids the good; but that, when this seems to occur, it is owing to ignorance of the true good and evil; and that, consequently, the correct choice of the good and the competent avoidance of the evil rest upon knowledge. Accordingly, courage and fear must have knowledge as their foundation; therefore courage and wisdom coincide.
Socrates wonders that the course of their investigation has brought them both to views the reverse of those with which they started: he, who previously doubted whether virtue could be taught, now argues that it is wisdom, in which case it of course can be taught; while, contrariwise, Protagoras, who at the outset professed to be a teacher of virtue, now places it at the farthest remove from knowledge, involving the necessary consequence that it cannot be taught. He desires, therefore, very much to discuss carefully once more with Protagoras the question as to the nature of virtue. Protagoras commends Socrates's zeal, and expresses himself as ready for this discussion at another time; now he is otherwise engaged.

5. The Artistic Element.¹

Dramatic Art. — In few dialogues is the dramatic form so skilfully maintained, without being overborne by the philosophical development, as in the Protagoras. By the changing scenes, the variety in the treatment of the theme, the intermezzo, the repeated participation of the others present, and by the abrupt conclusion, the picture of a scene from real life is vivaciously sustained.

Noticeable, too, is the number of vividly elaborated characters: Socrates, ever genial, ready for a contest, clear, and, in his intellectual superiority, toying, under the guise of modest deference, with the shallow conceit of his opponents. Hippocrates, of noble character, but yielding blindly to a vague zeal for knowledge. Protagoras, in the consciousness of his reputation, and with vain confidence in his wisdom and virtue, disdainful towards the other sophists, condescending towards Socrates; always intent on display (as exhibited in his desire to discourse before the other sophists, in the myth, and in the exegesis of Simonides), impatient of contradiction, nettled when worsted, and yet, without foresight, entering upon Socrates's train of thought, which, simple as it seemed, involved his certain discomfiture; with no appreciation of

the decisive importance of which the discussion with Socrates has led, but imagining, like a true sophist, that it has been only a common contest of words. Prodicus, sickly, hollow-voiced, his mind surcharged with synonymic wisdom, and, thus fettered, liable to the greatest misconceptions. Hippias, pretentious and imposing, seeing, without appreciation of truth, in the exposition of the poem of Simonides, a mere opportunity for the display of his art. Finally, the impetuous Alcibiades and the tranquil Critias.

Many slighter touches enhance the vividness of the whole: ἐπι-ψηλαφήσας 310e, since it was dark; Socrates noticing the blush of Hippocrates 312a, ἡδη γὰρ ὑπέφαυνε τό ἡμέρας, their standing awhile before Callias’s house, so that the porter takes them for sophists; their pausing in the porch, in order to survey and to be able to describe the scene within; the chorus about Protagoras, Hippias’s high seat, Prodicus in bed, the words καὶ ἀμα ἐἰς τὸν ἑπιάν ἀπέ-βλαψε (sc. Protagoras) 318e.

Here belong, too, the parody of Protagoras’s description of the antiquity of sophistry, in Socrates’s remarks upon the philosophy of the Lacedaemonians; the skill in the imitation of Protagoras’s half-poetical tone, in the myth, and of his verbosity; in the imitation of Prodicus’s pedantic rage for synonyms, and of the pomposity of Hippias’s language.

Narration of the Dialogue. — Why does Plato here, as in many other dialogues, bring the conversation before us, not directly, but indirectly in a narration, in this case by Socrates? Cicero refers to the form as inconvenient, Tus. i. 8 sed quo commodius disputationes nostrae explicentur, sic eas exponam, quasi agatur res, non quasi narretur. We see, in Plato, Socrates’s fondness for this form of treatment frequently go so far that in conversation he throws the development of some thought of his own into the form of another conversation, held, or supposed to be held, with others, and rehearsed by himself. Here apparently we must assume that Plato followed a peculiar habit of Socrates, and ascribe to this the recital of

1 Cf. Phaedo, Symp., Theaet., Parm., Charm., Lys., Rep. On the other hand, the dramatic form is used in Crito, Gorg., Crat., Phaedr., and others.
entire dialogues. This is the allusion of the passage in *Theaet.* 143b ἐγραφάμην δὲ δὴ οὗτῳ τὸν λόγον, οὐκ ἐμοί Σωκράτη διηγούμεν, ὡς διηγεῖτο, ἀλλὰ διαλεγόμενον οἷς ἐφη διαλέξθηναι. By the interlocutory form of his writings, Plato aimed to avoid the appearance of theoretical coldness and exclusiveness, in his investigation of the highest concerns of men; and rather to connect this investigation, through Socrates, with daily experience, and thus to represent it as closely related to common life; he also sought, in the modest garb of social conversation, to bring his reasonings to general comprehension, and to commend them to general acceptance. Moreover, by this form of recital, he avoided the impression of arbitrary invention, gained the effect of real occurrence, and gave an obvious reason for the fact that the memory of such a conversation here retained details more accurately and fully, there recalled only the more weighty portions.¹

*The Myth.*—Plato not infrequently yielded to the poetic impulse within him, giving in myths symbolical glimpses of thoughts which seemed to lie beyond the realm of human knowledge, and the proof of which was as yet unattained by the philosopher; or, again, connecting through myths the results of speculation with the faith of the fathers. From these myths that of Protagoras is to be clearly distinguished. The sophists do not aim at truth and conviction; they will rather catch and control men's minds by the arts of persuasion. Anything which will please is sought. Knowing well the charm of the legend, the mythical poem, they make it their method to dazzle by the brilliant coloring of the myth. However agreeable the narrative of Protagoras sounds, it has little symbolical depth; its intended lesson, that all men have a share in virtue, is not conveyed by the character of the narrated events, but rests merely upon an arbitrary command, which is put into the mouth of Zeus.² When, however, Protagoras is made to express many thoughts in themselves true and admirable, as upon the contrast between man's intellectual pre-eminence and his physical helplessness, between mental resource and moral endowment, upon the nature and object of punishment, upon painstaking in

¹ Peipers, *die Erkenntnisstheorie Plato's*, pp. 689 f.
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education, this is not done with the object of introducing elements essential to the fundamental idea of the dialogue; it is done from the necessity of pointing out, in its main features, the inferior point of view adopted by Protagoras, a prominent and sensible man; a point of view not involving absolute falsehood, but for that very reason the more dangerous, because the errors are mixed with truth.

Some have supposed that Plato borrowed the substance of the myth, or derived hints of it, from some writing of Protagoras.\(^1\) This would not agree with the purpose, everywhere manifest in this dialogue, to paint Protagoras, not as in actual appearance, but in ideal truth. We must therefore believe that, following a common custom of Protagoras and other sophists (e.g. Prodicus's Hercules), Plato himself invented the myth in the spirit and method of Protagoras. He adopts, with free changes, the tradition of the forming of men by Prometheus,\(^2\) and the ideas which Aeschylus has wrought out in his Prometheus trilogy.\(^3\)

THE POEM OF SIMONIDES.\(^4\)

Next to myths, the sophists were fond of introducing the discussion of famous poems into their discourses, in order to give these zest; they took special pride, too, in showing their own acuteness in masterpieces of interpretation, and in pointing out contradictions or errors in the poets. Thus Plato, who had no idea of giving Protagoras the victory in a dialectic contest with Socrates, makes the sophist propose for discussion a poem, doubtless at that time famous, by Simonides, whose renown filled Athens and all Greece. Protagoras, amid general applause (339d), points

\(^1\) Zeller, Philos. d. Gr. i. 775 r.
\(^2\) Preller in Philologus, vii. 58 ff.
\(^3\) Schömann zu Aesch. Prometheus, pp. 51, 131.
out a contradiction in this poem. How entirely such discussions of poetic passages fail to bring out clear conceptions, Socrates sets forth vigorously. Why then does Plato here represent him as entering into such a discussion? In order to understand this, we must first ask, what was the true meaning of the poem of Simonides? and, secondly, is the exposition given by Socrates meant to be taken in earnest?

The portion of the poem which Plato gives is all that remains to us, and we cannot be entirely sure of the order of the parts; that, however, is probably the true order, which, partly following hints of Schleiermacher, G. Hermann proposed in the following metrical scheme:—

**STROPHES.**

\[ \begin{array}{c}
\times \times \times \times \times \\
\times \times \times \times \times \\
\times \times \times \times \times \\
\times \times \times \times \times \\
\times \times \times \times \times \\
\end{array} \]

**EPODE.**

\[ \begin{array}{c}
\times \times \times \times \times \\
\times \times \times \times \times \\
\times \times \times \times \times \\
\times \times \times \times \times \\
\times \times \times \times \times \\
\end{array} \]

**Στροφὴ α'.**

άνδρ' ἀγαθὸν μὲν ἠλαθέως γενέσθαι χαλεπὸν, χερσίν τε καὶ ποσὶ καὶ νόοι τετράγωνον, ἄνευ ψόγου τετυμμένον.

(Five verses are wanting.)

**'Αντιστρ. α'.**

οὐδὲ μοι ἐμμελέως τὸ Πιττάκειον νέμεται, καίτοι σοφὸν παρὰ φωτὸς εἰρημένον ἡ χαλεπὸν φάτ' ἐσθλὸν ἔμμεναι.

5 θεὸς ἄν μόνος τούτ’ ἔχοι γέρας: ἄνδρα δ’ ὁ δικ ἐστὶ μὴ οὐ κακὸν ἔμμεναι,
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'Επωδὸς α'.

10 ἔμοιγ' ἐξάρκει
ὅς ἂν μὴ κακὸς ὑ
μηδ' ἄγαν ἀπάλαμνος, εἰδὼς γ' ὄνησίπολιν δίκαι, ἔγνη ἄνήρ.
οὐ μιν ἐγὼ μωρήσομαι·
οὐ γὰρ ἐγὼ φιλάμωμος·
15 τῶν γὰρ ἕλθὼν ἀπείρων γενέθλα.
pάντα τοι καλά, τοίσι τ' αἰσχρὰ μὴ μέμικται.

Στροφὴ β'.

tοῦνεκεν οὔ ποτ' ἐγὼ τὸ μὴ γενέσθαι δυνατὸν
dιξήμενος κεναίν ἐς ἀπακτὸν ἐλπίδα μοῦραν αἰῶνος βαλέω
πανάμομον ἄνθρωπον, εὐρυέδοις ὅσοι καρπὸν αἰνύμεθα χθονὸς·
20 ἐπὶ τ' ύμμιν εὐρίων ἀπαγγελέω.
pάντας δ' ἐπαίνημι καὶ φιλέω,
ἐκών ὅστις ἔρθῃ
μηδὲν αἰσχρὸν· ἀνάγκα δ' οὐδὲ θεοὶ μάχονται.

Bergk (Poetae lyrici Graeci, 4th ed., or Anthologia Lyrica, 3d ed.) does not recognize an epode, but arranges the lines as follows: ¹—

Στροφὴ α'.

ἀνδρ' ἀγαθὸν μὲν ἄλαθέως γενέσθαι
χαλεπὸν χερσίν τε καὶ ποσὶ καὶ νόῳ ἑτράγωνον, ἀνευ ψόγου τετυγμένον.

¹ Blass has followed the same order, only that he believes that of the first strophe only vv. 1, 2 remain, and of the second, vv. 1, 2 are lost; and that, with the exception of these five verses of the first, and two of the second, the entire poem in its four strophes is quoted by Plato. This view seems untenable. For, apart from the ex-
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The poem could hardly have been an epinician ode, as there is not the slightest expression indicating this, while its entire contents are such as to be scarcely reconcilable with the victor's praise. It is rather a Scolon, a table-song, performed by a chorus at a feast of Scopas, like the Pindaric Frag. 99 ff. Bgk.

very opening of the poem were also addressed to Pittacus. The discriminating remark of Schleiermacher also sustains the former order, viz. that when Socrates 346 d, after the words πάντα τοι καλά, τούτι τ' αἰσχρά μη μέμκται, continues καὶ οὐ ἐγὼ κτ. the sequence of vv. 17 ff. following v. 16 appears manifest. That τὰ ἐπίθυμα 345 e has no bearing, is shown by 344 a. The words τολλὰ μὲν γὰρ ἔστι κτεῖ. 344 a b make it improbable that the greater part of the poem is preserved.

1 V. 3, 'emendavi ὅς ἂν ἢ κακὸς deleta negatione μη, quae facile ex sequentibus repeti potest.' Bergk.

2 Blass, p. 332.
It embodies the thought that we should be mild in our judgment of men’s deeds. To be always good is a prerogative of the gods. Man is often ensnared in guilt by overpowering fate; it is difficult for him, even for a moment, to show himself perfect. He must content himself with moderate attainments, if only he fall into no shameful deeds. Thus Polybius also understood the poem, xxix. 7 a (p. 1043 Bk.), ὅστε καὶ λίαν ἄληθὲς φαίνεσθαι τὸ ῥῆθὲν ὑπὸ Σιμωνίδου "χαλεπὸν ἐσθλὸν ἐμμεναί." ἔχειν μὲν γὰρ ὀρμᾶς εἰς τὰ καλὰ καὶ μέχρι τινὸς ἀντιποίησασθαι τούτων εὔμαρες, ὁμαλύσαι δὲ καὶ κατὰ πᾶσαν περίστασιν ἐπίμονον γένεσθαι τῇ γνώμῃ, μηδὲν τοῦ καλοῦ καὶ τοῦ δικαίου προφηγαίτερον τιθέμενον, δυσχερές.

Socrates has interpreted correctly most of the poem, bringing out with entire justice the antithesis of γενέσθαι and ἐμμεναί in Simonides, and the pregnant meaning which Simonides, himself misinterpreting, put into the ἐμμεναί of Pittacus, while the latter certainly intended his χαλεπὸν ἐσθλὸν ἐμμεναί as synonymous with ἀνδρ᾽ ἄγαθον γενέσθαι χαλεπὸν. We can, however, by no means agree in all points with Plato’s exegesis. The relation of the μὲν, the connecting of ἀλαθέως with χαλεπὸν, the separation of ἐκών from ἔρην, the taking of the words ἐμοιε ἐξαρκεῖ κτέ. as in opposition to Pittacus, we must hold to be absolutely erroneous.

When now we consider that in the language of common life one might very easily speak of one as ἀλαθέως ἄγαθός, while, to the keenness of the Socratic thought, this must of course seem foolish (343 ε); that, furthermore, by the separation of ἐκών from ἔρην a thought is removed which ran counter to Socrates’s most characteristic conviction, namely, that no one does wrong of his own free will; and that, on the contrary, by connecting ἐκών with ἐπαινημα (346 a) a thought is gained which is in perfect harmony with the fine moral sense of Socrates; we are brought unavoidably to the conviction that Plato was not throughout entirely in earnest in his exposition. True, at this early stage of grammatical exegesis, as it was brought into activity by the sophists, errors, even on Plato’s part, would be nothing strange. Still, Socrates wholly condemned the extreme use and abuse of the exposition of the poets by the sophists; and, while refuting the opinions and explanations of the latter, and replacing them with those more tenable, it is wholly
consistent with his view, that he does not aim everywhere to draw out the meaning of the poet, but exerts himself to discover in the poem his own ideas, or even skilfully to interpolate and superimpose them. In fact, Socrates believed that in such study of poetic passages, people always explained them according to their wish, and recognized in them their own views. To this endeavor to discover characteristic Socratic ideas, belongs noticeably the working out of the thought (345b) that the loss of knowledge alone lies at the root of moral deterioration. Socrates now proceeds to explain the poem cited by Protagoras, in order to show how easily he, too, after the manner of the sophists, can support his views by such a method. With the very purpose of showing how such exposition adapts itself to every requirement, and how every man can foist his opinion into a poem which does not properly contain it, Socrates himself must, through skilful interpretation, find here striking ideas of his own. His explanation commands general assent; and thus, through the ethical principles discovered in the poem, he has gained important support in the question at issue between himself and Protagoras, and has shown himself superior to the latter with this weapon also of the sophistic art.


Expositors formerly gave it as the aim of the Protagoras to point out the method of the sophists as vicious and inadequate, which indeed is manifestly true in relation to the concept of virtue, — the subject which they were most wont to treat. Or, again, the task of the dialogue was regarded as a double one, to exhibit the ignorance of the sophists upon the very subject of their teaching, — namely, virtue, — and also the perversity of their method.

Recently, however, there has been an increasing tendency to ascribe to the dialogue, not merely this negative purpose, but, as

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a positive aim, the scientific treatment of virtue, which consists in tracing it back to knowledge, and in showing that it is a unit and can be taught; and this view of virtue proves its correctness by the exposure of the absurdities and contradictions of the opposed sophistic method.

Nevertheless, when we take into account the large portion devoted to the exposition of the sophistic method, showing how it is fitted to secure outward effect and applause, but does not strive for clear conceptions by rigorous and orderly thought; how it may dazzle the mind by intellectual glitter, but cannot produce calm conviction; we are forced to recognize the negative and polemical side as the predominant one. We are therefore brought to the recognition of the purpose of the dialogue as the statement and refutation of the empty and perverted doctrine of virtue held by Protagoras, in both form and contents. Naturally, much of the argument applies at the same time to the sophists in general.

The Greeks regarded virtue as incapable of being taught, as says Theognis, vs. 429 ff.,

\[ \text{φίσαι καὶ θρέψαι ἰδὼν βροτόν, ἥ φρένας ἐσθλάς} \]
\[ \text{ἐνθέμεν· οἴδεις τῷ τούτῳ γ' ἐπεφράσατο,} \]
\[ \text{ὁ τις σώφρον ἔθηκε τῷ ἀφρονα κακ κακοῦ ἐσθλόν.} \]
\[ \ldots \ldots \ldots \ldots \ldots \ldots \ldots \ldots \ldots \ldots \ldots \ldots \]
\[ \text{ἀλλὰ διδάσκων} \]
\[ \text{οὐ τοτε ποιήσεις τὸν κακὸν ἀνδρὶ ἀγαθὸν,} \]

and it must have seemed so, since virtue appeared to rest only upon an obscure moral feeling. When now Protagoras and the sophists announced themselves as teachers of virtue, they did this either through conceit, believing they could teach and produce results by high-sounding and plausible exhortations; or through a confusion of thought, substituting for morality mental quickness and rhetorical skill, while making a show of teaching purity of soul. This had a most pernicious influence on the general morals. For this reason Socrates sought, and Plato in this dialogue seeks, to expose the hollowness and vanity, in both matter and form, of this sophistic teaching, which as yet always lay at the basis of the popular views. Obviously this can be accomplished only by contrasting with the doctrine thus attacked something positive, which the conflict shall bring out into increasing clearness. So it
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happens that Socrates, starting from the common view of the nature of virtue, has at the outset denied that it can be taught, but at the end of the discussion, maintains, in opposition to Protagoras, that it can. For he has pointed out, in his discussion with Protagoras, another and a higher virtue, which rests upon knowledge, upon a clear apprehension of the good, and which, for the very reason that it rests upon this ground, must be a unit.

The dialogue closes with the hint that the inquiry is not yet concluded, but needs a more thorough investigation and a broader foundation. The points which seemed to Plato most to need further examination, were, probably, the determination of the true nature of knowledge (357b εἰσαῖδις σκεφόμεθα), since the propriety of the co-ordination and interchange of the terms σοφία and ἐπιστήμη, while tacitly accepted, has not been demonstrated; again, the question wherein the nature of virtue itself is to be recognized; how the special virtues, justice, wisdom, temperance, courage, piety, are related to one another and to the one virtue; with what right, good and agreeable, evil and disagreeable, have been assumed as coextensive ideas.

7. TIME OF THE COMPOSITION.

The exact time at which Plato wrote this dialogue can be as little determined as can the dates of most of the others. But, observing the negative indications, we notice the admission of piety as a fifth virtue, in which Plato here follows Socrates, although later he allows only four special virtues. Furthermore, Plato here still recognizes with Socrates only philosophic virtue (μετ' ἐπιστήμης), while he afterwards admits also civic virtue (μετ' ἀληθῶς δόξης) as valid in a certain way. We notice finally that he still brings forward the Socratic view of the simple coincidence of the concepts good and agreeable, while later he has defined and developed the concept of the good far more profoundly. We can therefore with certainty, so far as certainty is attainable respecting the time of the composition of Plato's dialogues, determine that the Protagoras is one of the earliest of the writings of Plato.

Bonitz has recently shown (Hermes, iii. 447 ff., and see on 321 c) that Aristotle was acquainted with the dialogue.
ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ
ΠΡΩΤΑΓΟΡΑΣ.
ΤΑ ΤΟΤ ΔΙΑΛΟΓΟΤ ΠΡΟΣΩΠΑ.

(In the Introductory Conversation.)

ΕΤΑΙΡΟΣ.         ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ.

(In the Narrated Dialogue.)

ΠΠΟΚΡΑΤΗΣ.      ΚΑΛΛΙΑΣ.
ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ.        ΚΡΙΤΙΑΣ.
ΠΡΩΤΑΓΟΡΑΣ.      ΠΡΟΔΙΚΟΣ.
ΑΛΚΙΒΙΑΔΗΣ.      ΠΠΙΔΑΣ.
ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ ΠΡΩΤΑΓΩΡΑΣ.

I. ΕΤΑΙΡΟΣ. Πόθεν, ὦ Σώκρατε, φαίνει; ἣ δῆλα δῆ ὦτι ἀπὸ κυνηγεσίας τοῦ περὶ τὴν Ἀλκιβιάδου ἄραν; καὶ μὴν μοι καὶ πρώην ἴδοντι καλὸς μὲν ἐφαίνετο ἄνηρ ἐτὶ, ἄνηρ μέντοι, ὦ Σώκρατε, ὡς γ’ ἐν αὐτοῖς ἥμιν εἰρήθησαι, καὶ 5 πώγωνος ἤδη ὑποποιμαῖμενος.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Εἴτε τί τούτω; οὐ σὺ μέντοι Ὀμήρου ἐπαινετήσεις εἰ, ὃς ἐφή χαριστάτην ἥβην εἶναι τοῦ υπηνήτου, ὃν τὸν Ἀλκιβιάδης ἔχει;

309 I. 1. Cicero translated (Prisc. vi. 63), Quid tu? unde tandem appa-
res, o Socrate? an id quidem non dubium est, quin ab Alci-
biaede? — φαίνει: make one’s appearance (cf. 315 e) was used popularly in the sense of ἱκεν, παρείναι. Cf. Xen. Mem. ii. 8. 1 πόθεν, ἐφή, Ἐθήρε, φαίνει;— δῆλα: sc. ἐστί, here used adj. (cf. 330 a); not the particle δηλαδή.

2. κυνηγεσίαν: all languages apply the terms of the chase to the pursuit of love. Cf. Soph. 222 ὁ τῶν ἐρώτων θήρα τὸν νοῦν ὀπίσω προσέσχει, Xen. Mem. i. 2. 24 Ἀλκιβιάδης δ’ αὖ διὰ μὲν κάλλος ὑπὸ πολλῶν καὶ σεμνῶν γυναικῶν θηρίων. — This subst. is without a preceding art., just as though the following attribute τοῦ ἄραν were lacking. See H. 668 a.

3. καλὸς ἄνηρ: pred., cf. 341 a. Others would read ἄνηρ, as subj.; but this anticipates the following ἄνηρ μέντοι. The youth in Athens, on the completion of his eighteenth year, became legally ἄνηρ (ἐπείδ’ ἐις ἄνδρας δοκιμασθεὶς Isocr. vii. 37) by registration in the roll of the citizens of his deme.

4. ὃς … εἰρήθησαι: for the inf. abs. see G. 268; H. 956. Cf. 330 e. — The slight blemish should receive a bare allusion.— ἀὑτοῖς: in such connections is nearly equiv. to μόνοις. Cf. Parm. 137 ἐπειδ’ ἐκ αὐτοῦ ἔσμεν, Xen. An. ii. 3. 7 αὑτοῖς τοῖς ἀνδράσι … ἢ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις, Ar. Ach. 504 αὑτοὶ γὰρ ἔσμεν, we are by ourselves. Cf. 320 a-d, 337 c.

5. τί τούτω: sc. ἐστιν, cf. 310 d. An elliptical formula of daily life, nearly equiv. to τί τούτω διαφέρει; 331 c. — οὐ … μέντοι: the more common declaration, οὐ μέντοι ἐπαινετήσεις εἰ, you surely agree with, is expressed interr. with οὐ. Cf. Theaet. 163 e μήμην οὗ λέγεις μέντοι τι; Phaedr. 229 b, οὐκ ἐνθένδε μέντοι ποθὲν λέγεται ὥ Boréas τὴν Ὀρείθυμον ἄρταςα; Charm. 159 b οὐ τῶν καλῶν μέντοι ἢ σφοδροτύπη ἐστὶ; 7. Cf. Hom. Ω 347 of Hermes, βῆ b ὢ ἵναι κόιρος αἰσθανμητήρι (a princely
Et. Τί οὖν τὰ νῦν; ἢ παρ' ἐκείνου φαίνει; καὶ πῶς
10 πρὸς σὲ ὁ νεανίας διάκειται;

Σ. Ἕδη, ἔμοιγε ἐδοξεῖν, οὐχ ἥκιστα δὲ καὶ τῇ νῦν ἡμέρᾳ.
καὶ γὰρ πολλὰ ὑπὲρ ἐμοῦ εἶπε, βοηθῶν ἐμοί· καὶ οὖν καὶ
ἀρτί ἀπ' ἐκείνου ἔρχομαι. ἀτοπον μέντοι τί σοι ἐθέλω
εἰπέων παρόντος γὰρ ἐκείνον οὔτε προσέκουσι τὸν νοῦν
15 ἐπελαυνθανόμην τε αὐτοῦ θαμά.

Et. Καὶ τί ἂν γεγονὸς εἰη περὶ σὲ κάκεινον τοσοῦτου;
οὐ γὰρ δῆπον τῶι καλλίων ἐνέτυχε ἄλλως ἐν γε τῇ
tῷ πόλει.

Σ. Καὶ πολὺ γε.
20 Et. Τί φῆς; ἀστῶ ἢ ξένῳ;

Σ. Ξένῳ.

Et. Ποδαπτῶ;

Σ. Ἀλφιδήρτη.

Et. Καὶ οὔτω καλὸς τυς ὡς ξένος ἐδοξεῖ σοι εἶναι, ὡστε
25 τοῦ Κλεινίου νιεός καλλίων σοι φανῆναι;

youth) ἐξωκάς, | πρῶτον ὑπηνήτη, τοῦ
πέρ χαριεστάτη ἢβην. So κ.279. These
verses, from which the sculptors
afterwards derived the type of the
statues of Hermes, are here peculiarly
apt, since Alcibiades himself had
served as a model for such statues.
kai oi λιθοδοχοῖ ποὺς Ἑρμᾶς Ἀθήνησι
πρὸς Ἀλκιβίαδην ἀπεικαζόν.—Since
the words are quoted from Homer,
the customary Attic art. (χαριεστά-
την τὴν ἢβην) is wanting.—ὑπηνή-
tου: that this even without πρῶτον
indicates the first bloom of youth,
is shown by Photius, Lex., ὑπηνήτης: ἀκμαίως ἀρτί γενειάων, and Pollux ii.
10, ὑπηνήτης, ἐν ἥρι τῆς ἑρας, ἐν ἀκμῇ,
ἐν ἀγαθῶν.
9. τί . . . νῦν: reverting to the origi-
nal question.

12. καὶ οὖν καὶ ἀρτί: Socrates an-
swers the first question last, and in
truth I have just, etc. See H. 1048, 2.
—ὑπὲρ ἐμοῦ εἶπε: cf. 336 b; 348 b.
14. παρόντος . . . θαμά: this ἀτοπον
τί serves to excite the wonder of the
ἐταυρος and whets the curiosity of
the reader.—οὔτε, τε: for the correla-
tion, cf. 347 e, 361 e. See II. 1044 a.
18. ἐν τῇ ἡδε τῇ πόλει: i.e. in Athens. ἡ
δε ἡ πόλις (like ἐνθάδε, τῇδε) refers
to the city in or near which is the
speaker; ἐν ἀρτι τῇ πόλει, relatively,
to the city previously mentioned; cf.
Gorg. 468 e.
19. πολύ γε: sc. καλλίων ἐνέτυχον.
γε is freq. used in answers, strength-
ening the thought of the question,
and may often be rendered yes.
24. τίς: sometimes, as here, adds
indefiniteness to the meaning of
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**29**

\[ \text{Σα. Πῶς δ' οὐ μέλλει, ὃ μακάριε, τὸ σοφότερον κάλλιον φαίνεσθαι;} \]

\[ \text{Ετ. Ἄλλῳ ἦ σοφῷ των ἡμῶν, ὃ \text{Σώκρατες, ἐντυχὼν πάρει;} \]

**30**

\[ \text{Σα. Σοφωτάτῳ μὲν οὖν δήποτε τῶν γε νῦν, εἰ σοι δοκεῖ \text{α σοφῶτατος εἶναι Πρωταγόρας.}} \]

\[ \text{Ετ. *ἀλί* τι λέγεις; Πρωταγόρας ἐπιδεδήμηκεν ζ/} \]

\[ \text{Σα. Τρίτην γε ἡδή ἡμέραν.} \]

\[ \text{Ετ. Καὶ ἄρτι ἄρα ἐκείνῳ συγγεγονῶς ἥκεις;} \]

**35**

\[ \text{Σα. Πάνυ γε, πολλὰ καὶ εἰπών καὶ ἀκούσας.} \]

\[ \text{Ετ. Τί οὖν \text{οὐ διγγηγήσω ἡμῖν τὴν ἔννοιαν, εἰ μὴ σὲ τι κωλύει, καθισόμενος ἐνταυθὶ, ἐξαναστήσας τὸν παῖδα τουτοῦ;} \]

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**300**

adjs. and advs., thus enlarging and strengthening them, as the Lat. quidam. Cf. Xen. Mem. i. 3. 12 ὡς δεινὴν τινα λέγεις δύναμιν τοῦ φιλήματος εἶναι, how dreadful indeed, etc., Thuc. i. 138. 3 (Θεμιστοκλῆς) διαφερόντως τί... ἄξιος ἀναμένασαι, in a remarkable degree, etc.

**26. τίς οὖν μέλλει: why should not?** This and τί οὐ μέλλει are common phrases with Plato.—τὸ σοφότερον... φαίνεσθαι: the words have a proverbial sound (as e.g. Sappho said δὲ κάγοθος αἰτία καὶ κάλλος ἔσεται Frag. 101 Bkg.), the personal application being made only in the following σοφός and σοφωτάτῳ μὲν οὖν. The new κάλλος is in a different realm from that of Alcibiades, σοφότερον not necessarily implying that Alcibiades is in any true sense σοφός.

**30. μὲν οὖν: immo vero, nay rather.**

**31. Πρωταγόρας:** the delay in uttering the name intensifies its effect.

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**310**

**36. τί... οὗ διηγήσομαι:** cf. 317 d;

**31a**

\[ \text{ἐν συμπ. 172b τί οὖν, ἐρή, οὗ διηγήσομαι μοι; Phaedo 86d εἶ οὖν τις ἡμῶν εὐπρότερος ἐμοῦ, τί οὖν ἀπεκρίνατο; The surprise that the action has not already taken place contains an urgent exhortation to its performance (GMT. 19, s. 6), but ei μὴ σὲ τι κωλύει here and οὐκ ἐπακούσωσιν 317d, show that the expression has become a mere formula of exhortation. So the pres. in 310e τί οὗ βαδίζομεν;}

**37. We may picture a scene like the one in Charm. 155b.** Socrates is invited by some friends (ἡμῖν, ἀκούστε) who are sitting in a palaestra or a lesche, 'to take a seat and discourse to them. An Athenian would hardly walk abroad without at least one slave, while the wealthy had many, and those who owned none frequently attempted to conceal their poverty by hiring attendants. The manners of these slaves are described in [Xen.] Rep. Ath. i. 10 τῶν δοῦλων... πλείεστη ἐστὶν Ἀθηναίων ἀκολούθα, καὶ οὕτω πατάξαι ἔξεσθιν αὐτόθι, οὕτε ἕπεκ- στήσεται σοι (give place to you) ὁ δῶ- λος, Ar. Nub. 7 οὔδε κολάδα ἔξεστι μοι τοὺς οἰκέτας. Socrates evidently must secure his own seat.
II. Τῆς παρελθούσης νυκτὸς ταυτησί, ἐτι βαθέος ὀρθροῦ, Ἰπποκράτης, ὁ Ἀπολλοδώρου νίὸς Φάσωνος δὲ ἄδελφός, τὴν θύραν τῇ Βακτηρία πάνυ σφόδρα ἐκροῦε, δ καὶ ἐπειδὴ αὐτῷ ἀνέωξε τις, εὐθὺς εἰσώ ἦν ἐπειγόμενος, καὶ τῇ φωνῇ μέγα λέγων, ὩΣ Σώκρατες, ἑφη, ἐγρήγορας ἡ καθεύδεις; καὶ ἐγὼ τὴν φωνὴν γνώς αὐτοῦ, Ἰπποκράτης, ἑφη, οὐτος· μὴ τι νεώτερον ἀγγελλεῖς; Οὐδέν γ', ἡ δ' ὅς, εἰ μὴ ἀγαθὰ γε. Ἐν ἂν λέγοις, ἦν δ' ἐγὼ· ἐστι

310 42. διπλὴ κτὲ.; proverbial, cf. Soph. Ph. 1370 χοῦτώ διπλὴ ἐν εἰς ἐμὸν κτῆσις χάριν (you will gain double thanks), διπλὴ δὲ πατρός.

II. 1. From this point to the end of the dialogue Socrates narrates the circumstances of his interview with Protagoras.—βαθέος ὀρθροῦ: cf. Crito. 43. ὀρθρος βαθος.

2. δὲ ἄδελφος: in such double specifications, the Greek regularly uses δὲ, without μὲν in the former member. Cf. Xen. An. 1. 7. θομεν καὶ Πανεσθίδος παῖς, ἑμὸς δὲ ἄδελφος, Aesch. Pers. 150 μὴρ Βασιλέως, Βασιλεία δ᾽ ἐμῆ, Hdt. vii. 10 πατρὶ τῷ σῷ, ἄδελφει δὲ ἐμῷ, Δαρείῳ, ἡγέον. Isea. ix. 23 ἔμε γὰρ νῦν ἄνα Θεόφραστον σαῦν δὲ ἄδελφον ἀποστείρῃς ὧ μοι οἱ νόμοι ἔσωσαν.

4. τὰς: Socrates, of course, had no special τυρπόσ. Cf. 314. εὐθὺς κτὲ.; he bursts in, without asking whether Socrates is awake, or decorously waiting to be announced.

6. Ἰπποκράτης οὐτος: not an address, since this would not be suited to the situation; but Socrates, who only hears his approaching visitor, without seeing him, remarks That is Hippocrates. Similarly Hippothendilas in Plutarch de genio Socr. c. 18 ἄκολος, ἑφη, νὴ τῶν Ἡρακλέα· φεῦ, μὴ τι χαλεπώτερον συμβεβηκε; Alcibiades in Symp. 213 δ τοῦ τί ἢν; Σωκράτης οὐτος; Shakspeare Jul. Cas. i. 3 'Casca, by your voice.'

7. νεώτερον: the comp. in the questions of the curious Athenians (τι νεώτερον;) is familiar. The conservative view, 'The new is rarely good,' often allowed νεώτερος and νέος to stand as euphemistic expressions for κακός. Compare the uses of νεώτεριζεν. Cf. Eur. Med. 37 δηδοκα δ᾽ αὐτὴν μὴ τι βουλεύσῃ νέον, Soph. Ant. 242, Ph. 784. Ας μὴ disclosed this sense in Socrates's question, Hippocrates hastened to allay his apprehension.

8. εὖ ἂν λέγοις: not positive, like Apol. 24 εὖ λέγεις, but like our "That were well." Cf. Soph. O. C. 647 μέγ' ἂν λέγοις δάφνημα τῆς ἐννοουσιας.
δὲ τί, καὶ τοῦ ἕνεκα τηνικάδε ἀφίκου; Πρωταγόρας, ἐφη, 10 ἢκει, στὰς παρ’ ἐμοὶ. Πρῶην, ἐφην ἐγώ· σὺ δὲ ἂρτι πέπυσαι; Νὴ τοὺς θεοὺς, ἐφη, ἐσπέρας γε. καὶ ἀμα ἐπιγαλάς ἁμα τὸν σκίμποδος ἐκαθέζετο παρὰ τοὺς πόδας μου καὶ εἶπεν. Ἐσπέρας δὴ, μάλα γε ὦ ἄφικόμενος εἰς Οἰνόνης. ὁ γάρ τοι παῖς με ὁ Ζάτυρος ἀπέδρα· καὶ 15 δήτα μέλλων σοι φράζειν, ὦτι διωξοῦμην αὐτόν, ὑπὸ τῶν ἄλλων ἐπελαθόμην. ἐπειδὴ δὲ ἦλθον καὶ δεδειανκότες ἦμεν καὶ ἐμέλλομεν ἀναπαύσειν, τότε μοι ἄδελφος λέγει,
Plato's Protagoras.

310. oti heke Protagorac. kai eti men enecherhisa evthia para se leivai, epistata moi livan porro eidoxe tov nuktov elnav. a 20 epieido de tachistata me ek tou koton ou upnoys anheken, evthia anastas, outw deuro eporevymen. kai evw ginonwskon autov tyn andreian kai tyn ptoimov, Ti oivn sou, h' de evw, touto; mouv tis se adikei Protagorac; kai os gelasas, N' tovs theous, efhi, o Sowrates, oti ge monos 25 esti sofos, eme de ou poiei. 'Alla naia ma Dia, efhi evw, an autw idios argyron kai peithes ekeinon, pouiesei kai se sofom. Ei yap, h' de os, o Zeu kai theoi, en

310. 18. eti men . . . epata: cf. Xen. An. vi. 2. 15. Ξενοφόντων δὲ έτι μὲν επεχείρησεν . . . έκπλευται, θυμονύφα δὲ αὐτῷ . . . έκθιμυνεν ο θεός . . . συστατεύεσθαι. Strictly, Xen. still wished to sail away, when, etc.; or, paratactically, Xen. still wished to sail away, but, etc.; i.e. at first Xen. wished to sail away, but then, etc. Hell. ii. 4. 11 oi de apó phulhs eti men epexheirhasan mh anivnai auvtous, epei de megas h kublos an polhhs fylakhs eidokei deivnai kte. Elsewhere also epista, like menoi, toivn, atafor, and other adversative conjs., is correl. with men.


23. adikei: adikein is often equiv. to ηδικηκέναι, άδικον είλαι. The wrong continues in its effects, and so still exists. Similarly, αἰνων be victor, ηττωσαι be vanquished, διώκειν be prosecutor, φευγεῖν be an exile, ήκειν have come, οίκεσθαι have gone. Cf. 324 c. See G. 200 n. 3; II. 827.

26. autw, ekeinon: both refer to the same person (Protagoras). Cf. Phaedo 111 b τας δὲ άρας αὐτοὶς κράσιν (temperature) εχειν τοιαύτην, αντε εκείνους ἀνόσους ελναι.—αν αὐτῳ . . . σοφον: an ironical assurance, as though the payment of money were the sole condition needful. The receiving of money by the sophists for their instruction seemed to the best minds to be mercenary, and unworthy of the free and cultured Athenian. Cf. 311 b d, 325 b, 349 a, Ar. Nub. 98 ουτοι διδάκτους, ἀργύριον ήν τις διδάσ.

27. en . . . eia: would that it depended on that. Cf. 319 c, 354 e, 356 d, 357 a, 313 a with acc. and inf.
ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ ΠΡΩΤΑΓΟΡΑΣ.

28. ὃς: causal. Cf. 335 d. See GMT.
29. ὑπὲρ ἑμῶν ἐπιλέπτωμαι: suffer to be lacking, omit; commonly intrans. Cf. Phil. 52 a τί ποτ’ ἀρα, δι’ ἑκατέρων ἐρωτάτων βουλόμενος; Μηδὲν δὲ Ἐπίταρχε ἐπιλείπεις ἐλέγχου ἡδονῆς τε καὶ ἐπιστήμης, 26 b καὶ ἄλλα δὴ μωρία ἐπιλείπτω λέγων. For the thought, cf. 313 b.
30. τὸν φίλον: cf. 311 d καὶ τὰ τῶν φίλων προσαναλίσκοντες, 313 b, Σύμπ. 218 a καὶ εἰ τι ἄλλο ἢ τῆς οὐδέτερης τῆς ἐμῆς δεδομένης ἢ τῶν φίλων τῶν ἐμών. — To avoid τῶν τῶν φίλων (the gen. of τὰ τῶν φίλων) one art. is omitted. — αὐτὰ ταῦτα: for this very purpose.
31. Ἐπικράτειος never thinks of raising the preliminary question, whether it is best to place himself under the teaching of Protagoras, — little dreaming of the opinions of his friend Socrates.
32. ἀκήκοα οὐδέν: sc. αὐτοῦ, cf. 313 b ὥστε διελέξαι οὐδεπώστε. He has never heard Protagoras discourse.
33. ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν: cf. Porphyry. on Ημ. ε 533 τῶν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂν ἂ

St. p. 310.
40 γὰρ τὰ πολλὰ Πρωταγόρας ἔνδον διατρίβει· ὡστε θάρρει, καταληψόμεθα αὐτὸν, ὡς τὸ εἰκός, ἔνδον.

III. Μετὰ ταῦτα ἀναστάντες εἰς τὴν αὐλὴν περιῆμεν. καὶ ἐγὼ ἀποπειρώμενος τοῦ Ἱπποκράτους τῆς ρώμης b διεσκόπουν αὐτὸν καὶ ἥρωτων, Εἰπέ μοι, ἐφην ἐγώ, δ Ἱπποκράτες, παρὰ Πρωταγόραν νῦν ἐπιχειρεῖς ἱέναι, ἀργύριον τελῶν ἐκείνῳ μισθὸν ὑπὲρ σεαυτοῦ, ὡς παρὰ τίνα ἀφιξόμενος καὶ τίς γενησόμενος; ὡσπερ ἄν εἰ ἐπενόεις

311 40. θάρρει, καταληψόμεθα: cf. Menex. fin. θάρρει, οὐ κατερώ, Xen. Cyr. vii. 3. 13 ἄλλα θάρρει, ἐφη, ὃ Κῦρε, οὐ μὴ σε κρύφω. — Protagoras's constant life within doors contrasts strongly with the habits of Socrates.

a III. 2ff. By way of preparing his young friend for the interview, Socrates wishes to awaken in his mind a question as to the real value of the costly instruction of Protagoras; a question which the vehement Hippocrates was in no mood to entertain. First, therefore, Socrates will elicit from him the vagueness of his quest; then, humbled by this discovery, Hippocrates is ready for the consideration of the main question.—ρώμης: relates generally to physical strength, but here to strength of will, fixedness of purpose. Cf. Polit. 250e πρὸς τὴν τῆς ψυχῆς σύνεσιν καὶ ράμην.

3. διασκόπουν καὶ ἥρωτων: combining both in one act. Cf. Apol. 21e διασκόπων οὖν τοῦτον καὶ διαλεγόμενος αὐτῷ, 18d ὑμῶν τοὺς πολλοὺς ἑπειθῶν τε καὶ κατηγόρουσαν ἐμοὶ.


6. Illustrations of a general question or of an abstract principle by particular examples, introduced by ὡσπερ ἄν, belong in such a marked way to the peculiarities of the style of the Platonic Socrates, that one may reasonably see in them a practice of the actual Socrates. In these passages it is no rare thing to find several members with ei, inserted one into another, and 'anacolutha,' in which the ὡσπερ is forgotten. We have here a prot. ei ... ἐκεῖνῳ; then the apod. consisting of ei ... ἤρετα, ... ἀπεκρίνω. — The Athenians generally classed together physicians, sculptors, painters, flute-players, and sophists, as men whose professions were necessary and to be adopted only through necessity. — Cf. 312b, Gorg. 512d, Luc. Somn. 9 ei δὲ καὶ Φείδιας ἤ Πολύκλειτος γένοιο, τὴν μὲν τέχνην ἄπαντες ἐπαινέονται, οὐκ ἔστι δὲ δαίσι τῶν ἱδώντων, εἰ νῦν ἔχοι, εὔξετο οὖν σοι ὑμοίοι γενέσθαι· οἷος γὰρ ἄν ἤ, βάναυσος καὶ χειρῶνα καὶ ἀποχειροβιῶτος νομισθῇ (you will be considered a mechanic and an artisan, living by manual toil).

Cf. Plutarch Pericles 2 for nearly identical language: ἡ δ' αὐτογραφία τῶν ταπεινῶν τῆς εἰς τὰ καλὰ ῥαθυμίας μάρτυρα τῶν ἐν τοῖς ἀρχάγγελοι πάνω παριχεῖται καθ' αὐτῆς· καὶ οὕδεις εὐφόρης νέος ἡ τοῦ ἐν Πίθο θεασάμενος Διὰ γενεσθαι Φείδιας ἐπεθυμησαν ἡ τῆν Ἑραν τῆν ἐν "Ἀργεί Πολύκλειτος, οὐδ' Ἀνακρέων ἤ Φιλήμων ἢ Ἀρχίλοχος ἵσθες αὐτῶν τοῖς τοις τοίμασιν."
παρά τὸν σαυτῷ ὁμώνυμον ἐλθὼν, Ἰπποκράτη τὸν Κρών, τὸν τῶν Ἀσκληπιαδῶν, ἀργύριον τελείω ὑπὲρ σαυτοῦ μισθὸν ἐκεῖνῳ, εἰ τίς σε ἦρετο, Εἰπέ μοι, μέλλει τελείν, δ' Ἰπποκράτει μισθὸν ὃς τίνι ὄντι; τί ἄν ἀπεκρίνω; Εἰπον ἄν, ἐφη, ὦτι ὃς ἵατρῷ. Ἡ ὥς τίς γενησομενος; Ἡ ὥς ἵατρός, ἐφη. Εἰ δὲ παρὰ Πολυκλεῖτον τὸν Ἀργείον ἦ Φειδίαν τὸν Ἀθηναίον ἐπενεοῦς ἀφικόμενος μισθὸν ὑπὲρ σαυτοῦ τελείω ἐκεῖνοι, εἰ τίς σε ἦρετο,

15 Τελείω τούτῳ τὸ ἀργύριον ὃς τίνι ὄντι ἐν νῷ ἔχεις Πολυκλεῖτω τε καὶ Φειδία; τί ἄν ἀπεκρίνω; Εἰπον ἄν ὃς ἀγαλματοποιοῦσ. Ἡ ὥς τίς δὲ γενησομενος αὐτὸς; Δὴλον ὦτι ἀγαλματοποιοῦσ. Εἰεν, ἢν δ' ἐγώ· παρὰ δὲ δὴ Πρωτα-γόραν νῦν ἀφικόμενον ἐγώ τε καὶ σὺ ἀργύριον ἐκεῖνῳ μισθὸν ἐτοιμοὶ ἐσόμεθα τελείω ὑπὲρ σοῦ, ἄν μὲν ἐξικνή-

7. Hippocrates of Cos, the founder of the science of medicine, belonged to the family of the Asclepiadæ, in which family the priesthood of Asclepius and the practice of medicine were hereditary. See also Phaedr. 270 c ei μὲν 'Ἰπποκράτει γε τῷ τῶν Ἀσκληπιαδῶν δεῖ τι πιθέσαι.

10. ἀπεκρίνω: see on 313 a.

11. ὁτι: see on 313 a. μελλὼν τελείω 'Ἰπποκράτει μισθὸν.

12. Phidias, son of Charmides, the Athenian, whose creative works produced ideals of the gods, and Polyclitus (cf. 328 c) of Argos, unequalled in the expression of human beauty, represent together the culmination of Greek plastic art. They were older contemporaries of Socrates.

13. τὸν Ἀθηναίον: is added in contrast with Ἀργείον.

18. δελ: a particle related to εἰ, not to the opt. εἴη or εἴεν. It marks a conclusion and transition, and is much used by Plato.
PLATO'S PROTAGORAS.

St. p. 311.

tai tā ἡμέτερα χρήματα καὶ τούτοις πείθωμεν αὐτῶν,—
ei ἰδὲ μῆ, καὶ tā tōn φίλων προσαναλίσκοντες. ei oūn
τις ἡμᾶς περὶ ταύτα oútw σφόδρα σπουδάζοντας ἔρειοι,
Eipé mou, ὁ Σώκρατες τε καὶ Ἰππόκρατες, ὡς τινὶ ὄντι
25 τῷ Πρωταγόρᾳ ἐν νῷ ἔχετε χρήματα τελεῖν; τί ἰν αὐτῷ
ἀποκριναίμεθα; τί ὄνομα ἄλλο γε λεγόμενον περὶ Πρω-
tαγόρου ἀκούομεν, ὡσπερ περὶ Φειδίου ἄγαλματοποιοῦν
καὶ περὶ Ὄμηρον ποιήτην; τί τοιοῦτον περὶ Πρωταγόρου
ἀκούομεν; Σοφιστὴν δὴ τοι ὄνομάζονυ γε, ὁ Σώκρατες,
30 τὸν ἄνδρα εἶναι, ἐφη. 'Ως σοφιστὴ ἄρα ἐρχόμεθα τε-
λούντες τὰ χρήματα; Μάλιστα. Εἰ οὖν καὶ τούτῳ τίς σὲ
προσέροιτο, Αὐτὸς δὲ δὴ ὡς τίς γενησόμενος ἔρχει παρὰ
τὸν Πρωταγόραν; καὶ ὃς εἶπεν ἐρυθριάσας — ἡδὴ γὰρ
312
υπέφαινε τι ἡμέρας, ὡςτε καταφανὴ αὐτῶν γενέσθαι—

311 24. eipte mou: the inv. sing. is used
before several vocs. when one person
is prominently addressed. Cf. Euthyd.
283 δ eipte mou, ἐφη, ὁ Σώκρατες τε καὶ
ὑμεῖς οἱ άλλοι.

312 26. ἀλλο: "as Phidias is termed sculpt-
tor, Homer poet, what other name do we
hear similarly given to Protagoras?"

27. ἀγαλματοποιοῦν: sc. ὄνομα. With
verbs of naming, the name itself is
generally in appos. with ὄνομα, ἐπώνυ-
μια, or some similar word; the latter
subst. may, however, be omitted. Cf.
315 ε, Rep. ii. 309 a ταύτῃ τῷ ξυνικῷ
ἐθέμεθα πόλιν ὄνομα, Hdt. vi. 63 ἄμα-
ρητον αὐτῷ ὄνομα ἐθέτο.

29. ὄνομάζοντι ... εἶναι: cf. 325 a,
Lach. 192 a ὃ ἐν πᾶσιν ὄνομάζεις ταχυ-
τῆτα εἶναι, Phil. 13 b τι ἐνὸν πᾶσας ἡδο-
νᾶς ἄγαθῳ εἶναι προσαγορεῖσι; a freq.
const. with verbs of naming or calling.

30. ἐρχόμεθα: more vivid than μέλ-
lομεν, emphasizes the partic. Cf.
313 a, Theaet. 198 ε, Hdt. i. 5 ἐγὼ δὲ
περὶ μὲν τούτων οὐκ ἐρχομαι ἔρεων. The
Eng. has the same idiom, 'we are go-
ing to pay,' i.e. 'we purpose to pay.'

31 30. eἰ προσέροιτο: sc. τι ἰν ἀποκρι-
ναιο; or τι ἰν φαίη; cf. Crat. 392 c
eἰ τις ἐροῦτε σε, πότερον οὐεὶ θρότερον
καλεῖν τὰ ὄνομα τοὺς φρονιμωτέρους ἢ
tοὺς ἄφρονωστέρους; HERM. ἰνδλον δὴ
ὅτι τοὺς φρονιμωτέρους φαίη ἰν συ-
ποσε one should ask whether you think
the wise or the unwise likely to give
names the more correctly (what would
you reply ?), etc. — ἐρυθριάσας: syn-
chronous with εἶπεν. See G. 204, n. 2;
II. 856 b. On the passage, cf. Demet-
trius peri ἐραμνελας 218 in Spengel
I.Rhet. Gr. iii. 309 ὅπερ δὴ δ Πάλαιν
φησιν ἐπὶ τοῦ Πρωταγόρου, ἐρυθριάσας
... γενέσθαι, ὃτι μὲν ἐναργεστάτους ἐστί,
pantὶ δὴ λον. ὁ δ ἐνάργεια γέγονεν ἐκ
tῆς φροντίδος τῆς περὶ τῶν λόγων καὶ τοῦ
ἀπομνημονεύσα, ὃτι νῦκτορ πρὸς αὐτὸν
εἰσήλθεν δ' Ἰππόκράτης. — ὑπέφαινε τι
ἡμέρας: there was a glimmer of daylight.
35 Εἰ μέν τι τοῦς ἐμπροσθεν ἔοικε, δῆλον ὅτι σοφιστής γενησόμενος. Σὺ δὲ, ἢν δ’ ἐγώ, πρὸς θεῶν, οὐκ ἂν αἰσχύνοι εἰς τοὺς Ἑλλήνας σαυτῶν σοφιστήν παρέχων; Νὴ τὸν Δία, ὦ Σώκρατε, εἶπερ γε ἀ διανοοῦμαι χρὴ λέγεω. 'Αλλ’ ἢρα, ὦ 'Ἰππόκρατε, μὴ οὐ τοιαύτην ὑπολαμβάνεις.

36 σον τὴν παρὰ Πρωταγόρου μάθησιν ἔσεσθαι, ἀλλ’ οἶα ἦν περ ἡ παρὰ τοῦ γραμματιστοῦ ἐγένετο καὶ κυθαριστοῦ καὶ παιδοτρίβου; τούτων γὰρ σὺ ἐκάστην οὐκ ἔπι τέχνη ἐμαθες, ὡς δημιουργός ἐσόμενος, ἀλλ’ ἐπὶ παιδεία, ὡς τὸν ἰδιώτην καὶ τὸν ἔλευθερον πρέπει. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν 45 μοι δοκεῖ, ἐφ’ οὔτη τοιαύτην μᾶλλον εἶναι ἡ παρὰ Πρωταγόρου μάθησις.

312 35. κ. τι... ἔοικε: with indef. subj.; a freq. turn with Plato in such reasonings; cf. 330 b. — μέν: admitting with a blush the conclusion forced by the argument, he intends making some qualification with a δὲ, but is forestalled by Socrates. See on ε, l. 8, below.

37. εἰς... παρέχων: before the Greeks. Cf. 349 a, Thuc. vi. 31. 4 ξυνῆθες ἐς τοὺς ἄλλους Ἑλλήνας ἐπίδειξιν εἰκασθῆναι it came about that it looked like a display before the other Greeks.

— σαυτὸν: cf. 348 ε.

39. "But then, since you do not wish to become a sophist." Cf. Euthyd. 290 a ἀλλ’ ἢρα, ὦ πρὸς Δίας, μὴ δ’ Κτήσιππος ἢν δ’ ταῦτ’ εἴπων; Apol. 25 a ἀλλ’ ἢρα, ὦ Μέλητε, μὴ οὐ δὲν τῇ ἐκκλησίᾳ διαφερέσθαι τοὺς νεώτερους; — μὴ οὐ... ὑπολαμβάνεις: μὴ indicates properly a depend. question after an implied verb of fear or caution; οὐ is const. with τοιαύτην. (I question) whether you do not mean that... will be not of this sort, but, etc.; i.e. doubtless you mean that, etc. See II. 867; GMT. 46, n. 4 and n. 5 a.

Cf. Meno 89 ε ἵσας νὴ Δίας ἀλλὰ μὴ τοῦτο οὐ καλῶς ὑμολογήσαμεν;

41. γραμματιστοῦ κτῆτο: cf. 325 d ff. b

42. εἰπερ τέχνη: cf. 315 a; to practise it as an art, to make it a profession.

43. εἰπερ παιδεία: for the sake of general culture. Cf. Gorg. 485 a φιλοσοφίας μὲν ὅσον παιδείας χάριν καλὸν μετέχειν.

44. τὸν, τῶν: generic arts. See H. 659. — ἰδιώτην: here contrasted with δημιουργός (one who pursues the art, cf. 327 e), elsewhere with ποιητής, ἰατρός etc. Cf. 322 c, 327 c, 344 c, 345 a; ἰδιωτεύειν 327 a. — ἔλευθερον: ἱλιεραλίσ, superior in dignity to the money-getting class. See on 311 b. — πάνυ μὲν οὖν: emphatic form of assent.

45. It seems, then, that Hippocrates does not know what he wishes to obtain from Protagoras. The question naturally follows, what a sophist is, essentially; whether he has anything of value to impart, and whether it is a safe experiment to throw oneself precipitately (cf. 313 b) under his instruction, without previously ascertaining its precise nature.
IV. Οίσθα νοῦν ὁ μέλλεις νῦν πράττειν, ἡ σε λανθάνει; ἠν δ' ἐγώ. Τοῦ πέρι; "Οτι μέλλεις τὴν ψυχήν τὴν σαυτοῦ παρασχέων θεραπεύσαι ἀνδρί, ὃς φης, σοφιστή; ὦ εἰ τί δὲ ποτε ὁ σοφιστής ἔστι, θαυμάζομεν ἂν εἰ οἶσθα. 5 καίτοι εἰ τοῦτ’ ἀγνοεῖς, οὔτε ὅτι παραδίδως τὴν ψυχήν οἴσθα, οὔτ’ εἰ ἀγαθῷ οὔτ’ εἰ κακῷ πράγματι. Ὁμιαί γ’, ἐφη, εἰδέναι. Λέγε δὴ, τί ἦγεῖ εἰναι τὸν σοφιστήν; 'Εγώ μέν, ἢ δ' οὐς, ὅπτερ τούνομα λέγει, τούτων εἶναι τῶν τῶν σοφῶν ἐπιστήμονα. Οὐκοῦν, ἦν δ’ ἐγώ, τούτο μὲν ἕξι-10 εστὶ λέγει καὶ περὶ ζωγράφοι καὶ περὶ τεκτόνων, ὅτι οὗτοί εἰσον οἱ τῶν σοφῶν ἐπιστήμονες· ἀλλ’ εἰ τις ἔροιτο α ἡμᾶς, Τῶν τί σοφῶν εἰσον οἱ ζωγράφοι ἐπιστήμονες; εἶπομεν ἄν που αὐτῷ, ὅτι Τῶν πρὸς τὴν ἀπεργασίαν τήν τῶν εἰκόνων, καὶ τάλλα οὕτως. εϊ δ’ ἔκεινο ἔροιτο

15 'Ο δὲ σοφιστής τῶν τί σοφῶν ἐστι; τί ἰν ἀποκρινοίμεθα

Hippocrates seems to speak with more confidence here than in a above.

9. In σοφιστής Hippocrates thinks he recognizes the stem ἵστ-, ὁς τὰ σοφᾶ ἐπι-ἵστ-αται, as Crat. 406b Ἀρτεμίς is explained as ἅρτης ἅρτωρ, and 407e Ἡφαιστος ὡς ὁ φάεος ἅρτωρ.

12. τί: depends upon τῶν σοφῶν. τὰ τί σοφᾶ; i.e. the knowledge relating to what? in the next line the thought is completed, τὰ πρὸς τὴν ἀπεργασίαν τὴν τῶν εἰκόνων that which relates to the portrayal of forms.

14. καὶ τάλλα οὕτως: sc. εἶπομεν ἄν. So freq, with καὶ τάλλα a verb is to be supplied from the context, e.g. 319b καὶ τάλλα πάντα οὕτως sc. ποιοῦσαι, Symp. 170a καὶ τάλλα τὰ νομίζομεν sc. ποιήσας, Gorg. 500 e δευτέρων δὲ τὴν του δευτέρου κακοῦ (sc. βοθείαν) καὶ τρίτην τὴν του τρίτου, καὶ τάλλα οὕτως (sc. ἔχειν).

15. ἕστι: sc. ἐπιστήμων from the previous context.
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αὐτῷ; ποῖας ἐργασίας ἐπιστάτης; Τί ἂν εἶπομεν αὐτῷν εἶναι, ὃ Σῶκρατες; ἣ ἐπιστάτην τοῦ ποιῆσαι δειών λέγειν; Ἡσιως ἂν, ἢν δ' ἐγώ, ἀληθῶ λέγομεν, οὐ μέντοι ἰκανῶς γε· ἐρωτήσεως γάρ ἔτι ἡ ἀπόκρισις ἡμᾶς δεῖται, 20 περὶ ὅτου ὁ σοφιστὴς δειών ποιεῖ λέγειν· ὡσπερ ὁ κυ- e θαριστὴς δειών δῆποι ποιεῖ λέγειν περὶ οὕτε καὶ ἐπι- στήμονα, περὶ κιθαρίσεως· ἡ γάρ; Ναὶ. Εἶπεν· ὁ δὲ ἡ σοφιστὴς περὶ τίνος δειών ποιεῖ λέγειν; ἡ δῆλον ὁτι περὶ οὕτε καὶ ἐπιστάται. Εἰκός γε. Τί δὴ ἔστι τούτο, 25 περὶ οὐ αὐτὸς τε ἐπιστήμων ἐστὶν ὁ σοφιστὴς καὶ τὸν μαθητὴν ποιεῖ; Μᾶ Δί', ἔφη, οὐκέτι ἔχω σοι λέγειν.

V. Καὶ ἔγω εἶπον μετὰ τούτο. Τί οὖν; οὐσθα εἰς 313 οἶον των κίνδυνων ἔρχει υποθήσων τὴν ψυχήν; ἡ ἐἰ μὲν τὸ σῶμα ἐπιτρέπειν σε ἐδει τῷ, διακυνδυνεύοντα ἡ χρη-

312 16. ἐπιστάτης: here equiv. to ἐπι- sτήμων, as comes out clearly in Crito 47 b τῷ ἐπιστάτη καὶ ἐπαινεῖ. — τι... ἢ: equiv. to τί θὰλα... ἢ.

17. At first Hippocrates replied confidently (ἐγὼ μὲν κτῆ.), now, with less assurance, he yet gives a somewhat fitting answer (ἡ... λέγειν); finally, however, he has no longer any reply to urge. For οὐκέτι, cf. 321 d, Phaedo 100 d οὐ γάρ ἔτι τούτο διασχυρίζομαι.


24. περὶ οὕτε: follows also ἐπι- στατας, which here is equiv. to ἐπιστή- μων ἐστίν.

313 V. 2. ἔρχετε: cf. 311 e.—ἵ ἐ μὲν κτῆ.: the sent. εἰ μὲν... πολλὰ ἀν περιεσκέψω is in its thought subord., as a concessive (while), to the following sent. ὃ δὲ κτῆ., as is often the case in sent. with μὲν. In such cases the former member properly does not belong to the main argument, but is introduced to emphasize the latter by ἔρχετε.

a contrast. Cf. Dem. de Cor. 160 αἰ- σχρόν ἐστιν εἰ ἐγὼ μὲν τά ἔργα τῶν ὑπέρ ὑμῶν πάνω ὑπέμεινα, διεισὶς δὲ μηδὲ τούς λόγους αὐτῶν ἀνέξεσθε it is shame- ful if (while) I bore the burden of the toils in your behalf, but you will not tolerate even the recital; where only the latter fact is shameful. Rarely the clause with μὲν is the main, and that with δὲ the subord. clause, cf. Xen. Mem. i. 2. 9. Similar in Latin are paratactic interr. clauses, as Cic. Tusc. 5.90 an Scythes Anachar- sis potuit pro nihilo pecu- niam ducere, nostrates phil- osophi facere non poterunt. This whole period, with its repetitions, its pleasing, free, conversational style, doubtless vividly recalled the manner of Socrates.

3. Διακυνδυνεύοντα: const. here with acc. and inf.; in Thuc. vii. 1, with the simple inf. εἶτε διακυνδυνεύσωσιν ἐπιλέουσα, as freq. κυνδυνεύειν. — There
plato's protagoras.

313 were no qualifications legally prescribed for physicians, and the patient in ancient times 'ran a considerable risk.' Cf. Gorg. 514 d; Pliny N. H. xxix. 1 discunt (medici) periculos nostri, et experimenta per mortes agunt.

4. περισσεύεσθαι, παρεκάλεσαι: the ideas of saying, answering, considering, in such hypothetical sents., Plato very often puts into the aor. (cf. 311 b c), prob. to indicate the momentary occurrence or beginning of the action. Cf. Theae. 144 e ει μνή εκόντων εκατέρου λόγαν εφη ατάς ήμοδια ομοίος (if each of us held a lyre, and he said they were tuned alike), πάτερον ευθύν των επιστεύωμεν ή επεσκεψάμεθ' αν, ει μοισικός αν λέγοι; See GMT. 49, 2, n. 5.

7. τὴν ψυχήν: explanatory of δ κτέ. Cf. 330 a, 351 a, 354 e, Rep. ix. 583 e δ μεταξ ἄρα τιν δή ἀμφοτέρων ἐφαμεν εἶναι, τὴν ἴππων, τοῦτο παντε ἀμφοτέρα ἔσται, λύπη τε καὶ ήδουν so then that which we termed the intermediate state, namely, rest, will be both pain and pleasure.

8. εν οὖ: see on 310 d.

9. περὶ δὲ τοῦτο: cf. 325 b f. ἐρ χάν δὲ . . . ταῦτα δ ἄρα. So when two periods consisting of prot. and apod.

are united in a larger period by μὲν . . . δὲ, the μὲν and δὲ of the protases are freq. repeated in the apodoses. Cf. Apol. 28 d e.

11. ἀτε καὶ εὖ: in the second member of a depend. alternative question (whether . . . or not) ὅ and μή are used indifferently; cf. 1.15 below; but in depend. nominal questions, distinguishing between what is and what is not, μή is used when the verb is not repeated, otherwise either ὅ or μή. For examples of nominal questions, cf. 314 a (I. 47), Xen. Mem. iii. 6. 10. See G. 283, 1, n.; II. 1022 a.—τῷ . . . ξένῳ: when a subst. with the art. takes an attrib. modifier, a dem., esp. οὕτω, may be inserted after the modifier and before the noun. Cf. 338 a τὸ ἀκριβῆς τοῦτο εἶδος, Dem. vi. 21 at πρὸς τοῦς τυράννους αὐταί Λαν διαλλαί, Plato Phil. 50 b ἐν τῷ τὸν βλου ἐνέπασα τραγῳδία. From the point of view of the Athenians, ξένῳ places in a clearer light the inconsiderateness of Hippocrates, and here by its position it intensifies the reproach of Socrates.

13. ὀρθρίος: temporal adj. for adv. Cf. Thuc. ii. 49. 4 διεκθέουντο οἱ πλείοντα εναταίοι κα κύριοι οὐ τοῦ εντὸς καύματος (on the ninth and the
λόγον οὐδὲ συμβουλὴν ποιεῖ, εἰτε χρή ἐπιτρέπει τε καί τὰ τῶν φίλων χρήματα, ὡς ἡδη διεγγυώκως, ὅτι πάντως συνεστέον Πρωταγόρα, ὃν οὔτε γιγνώσκεις, ὡς φῆς, οὔτε διειλέξαι οὐδεπώποτε, σοφιστὴν δ' ὄνομάζεις, τὸν δὲ σοφιστὴν, ὃ τί ποτε ἐστί, φαίνει ἀγνωσίν, ὃ μέλλεις σαυ- 

c tov επιτρέπειν; Καὶ δ' ἀκούσας, Ἑοκέν, ἐφη, ὃ Σώκρατες, εξ δ' ὑν ὑν λέγεις. Ἀρ' οὖν, ὃ Ἰππόκρατες, 

19. σοφιστηὴν: a case of 'prolepsis' or anticipation; in which, to give it greater emphasis, a subst. is transferred from a depend. to the principal clause, usually with change of case. 


(sc. αὐτῶς ὑφελεύσας κτλ.). So in many places, where Ἑοκέν forms the answer.

22. ἐμπερὸς ἡ κάπηλος: wholesale or retail dealer. This comparison often appears in Plato (cf. Soph. 223 d, 224 d, 231 d) and in later writers. On the terms, see Rep. ii. 371 d ὡς καπήλους καλοῦμεν τοὺς πρὸς ἄνδραν 

23. ψυχή: the art. (not merely generic) may be omitted with ψυχή, σῶμα, and their parts. Before γαρ in answers, yes or no may easily be supplied; we might render certainly. Cf. Soph. Phil. 755 δεινὸν γε τοῦπισαγμα τοῦ νοσήματος (the burden of the disease) Phil. δεινὸν γαρ οὐδὲ ἔρημαν, Plato Rep. 

502 c ἐπιμβάλετε γαρ, ἐφη. Hippocrates was ready to purchase, at any price, what Protagoras brought. The comparison was therefore at once obvious to him; still, as he had before shown that he had no clear conception of what he could...
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ge toou'tos tis: trefetai de, o Sókrates, psuxh' tin; 313 25 Math'mastoi de'mon, h' n' e'x. kal opws ge m', o' etaire, o sofisth' epainwv a' pwelei exapathisei h'mas, oster per o' peri thn tov swmatos trophe, o epmoros te kai ka-

pilos. kal gar o'to' pou oyn agounsw agounymwv ouste a autw diasw o ti xhrhst'ou h' pouhroo peri to s'ma, oynovusin de panta pwoohnetes, ouste o' oinonumenoi par'

auton, eavn m' ths tvxh' gvmnastikos h' iatros' oyn. oynw de kai o' ta math'mata perianontes kath' tais poleis kai

pwoohnetes kal kapheleontes tow aei epivymwnti epain-

vouis mev panta a' pwoohni, tacha d' an tines, o' ariste,

kal tovtwv agnoiein oyn pwoohnsw o ti xhrhst'ou h' pouh-

r'ou pros thn psuxhn' o'w d' autws kai o' oinonumenoi par'

e 313 learn from Protagoras, he now makes the further confession of his igno-

rance concerning the nature of this substance by which the soul is nour-

ished. Socrates responds to his question with the intelligible but indefi-

nite math'mata, in order at once to add the warning against seeking the in-

struction of the sophists before he has ascertained precisely what math-

'mata are to be derived from them. The words opws ge m' kth' cannot be sepa-

rated from those which precede them, and must therefore be the utter-

ance of Socrates, as must also math'masi de'mon, h' n' e'x.

26. exapathisei: the Mss. read exapath-

th'g, but such exhortations and warn-

ings with opws and opws m' take only the fut. See II. 886; Kr. Spr. 54, 8, 7. But see for oppos. view Kuhn. 552, n. 6.

d 28. kal gar o'to' kth': the ignorance of the trader is more fully set forth in Gorg. 517 d ff. tovtwv gar (sc. avtwv, potwv, iamatwv kth') poristikon

eivai h' kapheqon otna h' emyron . . ., ovd'en thummatos estin oyna tovto'ton d'xai kal autw' kal tois allh'v zeparetun h'vin swmatos, pant' tv m' eido'ti, oti esti tis pari ta'tas tvxh' gvmnastikhn te kai iatric, h' dv tv otni esti swma-

tos zeparetia. — oyn . . . agounymwv: de-

pend. on d ti following.

29. peri to s'ma: with reference to

the body. In such expressions the prep. with the acc. brings out the quality of the adj. more distinctly and independently than would a sim-

ele gen., and is preferred by Plato, with whom however it becomes almost a mannerism. Cf. pros thn psuxhn below, Gorg. 517 e eidenai o ti th xhrh-

st'ou kal pouhrov twv aitwv h' potwv estin els areseth'wv swmatos.

33. oel: often means in each case, every time.— epainovus: as Protagoras afterwards does, cf. 318 a e, 328 b.

36. o'w d' autos: after Homer less e

freq. than o'ma'tos de. Even when de intervenes, the o'w is not accented, although it stands for o'ma'tos.— oly

'noymenon: sc. agnoiein av.
40 Πρωταγόρου καὶ παρ’ ἄλλου ὅτονον· εἰ δὲ μὴ, ὅρα, ὁ μακάριε, μὴ περὶ τοῖς φιλτάτοις κυβεῦσι τε καὶ κυνδυ-νεύσι. καὶ γὰρ δὴ καὶ πολὺ μείζων κύνδυνος ἐν τῇ τῶν μαθημάτων ὑπὸ ἢ ἐν τῇ τῶν συντίων. σιτία μὲν γὰρ καὶ ποτὰ πριάμενον παρὰ τοῦ κατήλου ἐξέστων ἐν ἄλλοις
45 ἀγγείοις ἀποφέρειν, καὶ πρὶν δὲξασθαι αὕτα εἰς τὸ σῶμα πιόντα ἡ φαγόντα, καταθέμενον οὐκάδε ἐξέστι συμβουλεύσασθαι, παρακαλέσαντα τὸν ἔπαοντα, ὡς τε ἐδεστέον ἡ ποτέον καὶ ὁ τι μὴ, καὶ ὀπόσον καὶ ὀπότε· ὥστε ἐν τῇ ὑπὸ οὐ μέγας ὁ κύνδυνος. μαθήματα δὲ οὐκ
50 ἐστιν ἐν ἄλλῳ ἀγγείῳ ἀπενεγκεῖν, ἀλλ’ ἀνάγκη, καταθέντα τῇ τῆς τιμῆς, τὸ μάθημα ἐν αὕτῃ τῇ ψυχῇ λαβόντα καὶ

313 38. τυγχάνεις ἐπιστήμων: Plato rarely uses τυγχάνειν without a partic. Cf. Phaedr. 230 a εἴτε τι θηρίον τυγχάνω Τυφώνος πολυπλοκότερον (more complex), Rep. ii. 369 b ἐπειδὴ τυγχάνει ἡμῶν ἕκαστος οὐκ αὐτάρκης, ἀλλὰ πολλῶν ἐνδέχεται, παρακαλέσαντα τὸν ἔπαοντα, τι τι τε ἐδεστέον ἡ ποτέον καὶ ὁ τι μὴ, καὶ ὀπόσον καὶ ὀπότε· ὥστε ἐν τῇ ὑπὸ οὐ μέγας ὁ κύνδυνος. μαθήματα δὲ οὐκ
314 40. τοῖς φιλτάτοις: these are, in Legg. i. 650 a, wife, sons, and daughters (ἐπιτέρποντα αὐτοῦ θυγατέρας τε καὶ νυεῖς καὶ γυναῖκας, ὡς εν τοῖς φιλτάτοις κυνδυνεύσαντα imperilling one’s dearest interests), here ἡ ψυχή, its well-being, i.e. virtue, wisdom; similarly Gorg. 513 a διὸς μὴ σὺν τοῖς φιλτάτοις (at the loss of what is dearest) ἡ ἀφεσις ἡμῖν ἐσται ταύτῃ τῆς δυνάμεως τῆς ἐν τῇ πόλει. — κυβεύσι: the Greeks sometimes compared life to a game of chance; cf. Rep. x. 604 c; Terent. Ad. iv. 7. 21 ita vita est hominum, quasi quom ludas tesseris; and used κυβεύειν τινί, περὶ τινι of a frivolous and fool-hardy risk, like our ‘stake upon the die.’ Cf. the tragic verse in Polyb. ii. 63 δεὶ τὴν ταξιστὴν ἐκκυβεύον τοῖς ἄλοις, Polybius in Suidas, s.v. κύβος, οἱ μὲν ἀλογισταῖς καὶ μανὶ ἑφασαν εἶναι τὸ παραβάλλεσθαι καὶ κυβεῦνει τῷ βίῳ. — καὶ κυνδυνεύσι: literal and figurative expressions are sometimes combined, the literal expression following and explaining the former. Cf. 334 d συντετευκμοῖο μοι τὰς ἀποκρίσεις καὶ βραχυτέρας πολεῖ, Acta Apost. xiv. 17 ἐμπλω ὁ τροφῆς καὶ εὐφοροῦντος τὰς καρδιὰς ὑμῶν.
44. ἄλλοις: i.e. other than the body.
45. ἀποφέρειν: sc. το ἑπίρμενον, the purchaser, from the preceding circumst. partic.
50. καταθέντα: cf. 328 c.
51. τὸ μάθημα ... λαβόντα: corresponds to δέξασθαι εἰς τὸ σῶμα above,
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μαθόντα ἀπείναι ἡ βεβλαμμένον ἡ ὄφελημένον. ταῦτα οὖν σκοπώμεθα καὶ μετὰ τῶν πρεσβυτέρων ἦμῶν· ἡμεῖς γὰρ ἔτι νέοι ὡστε τοσοῦτον πράγμα διελέσθαι. νῦν μὲν 55 τοι, ὡσπερ ὀρμήσαμεν, ὡμεν καὶ ἀκούσωμεν τοῦ ἄνδρός, ἐπειτα ἀκούσαντες καὶ ἄλλοις ἀνακοινωσόμεθα· καὶ γὰρ οὐ μόνον Πρωταγόρας αὐτόθι ἐστίν, ἀλλὰ καὶ Ἰππίας ὁ Ἥλειος· οἶμαι δὲ καὶ Πρόδικον τὸν Κέιον· καὶ ἄλλοι ε ἀπὸ τοῦ καὶ σοφοί.

VI. Δόξαν ἡμῖν ταῦτα ἐπορεύομεθα. ἐπειδὴ δὲ ἐν τῷ προθύρῳ ἐγενόμεθα, ἐπιστάντες περὶ τινος λόγου διελεγόμεθα, ὃς ἡμῖν κατὰ τὴν ὁδὸν ἐκέπεσεν· ἢν οὖν μὴ ἀτελῆς γένοιτο, ἀλλὰ διαπερανάμενοι, οὕτως ἐσώμεν, 5 στάντες ἐν τῷ προθύρῳ διελεγόμεθα, ἐως συνωμολογησάμεν ἄλληλοις. δοκεῖ οὖν μοι, ὁ θυρωρός, εὐνοῦχος τις,

and καὶ μαθόντα το πάντα ἡ φαγόντα, hence, on learning and so receiving into the soul.

54. νέοι ὡστε κτὲ.: too young to determine. Yet not the degree of the quality but the quality itself is declared to be unsuited to the end, which is put in the inf., or inf. with ὡστε. Cf. Menex. 239 d ὁ χρόνος βραχύς διηγήσασθαι, Eur. Andr. 80 γέρων ἑκέινος ὡστε σ' ὄφελεῖν παρὼν. See G. 201, 1; II 642. — Contrast the less modest expression of Protagoras 317 c.

56. ἀνακοινωσόμεθα: cf. 317 d.

58. οἷμα δὲ... Κέιον: sc. αὐτόθι εἶναι. Cf. 316 d ἡ ἑσθημα, sc. προκαλυπτεσθαι, Symp. 176 a χαλεπῶς ἔχω ὅπο τοῦ χθες πότου, οἷμα δὲ καὶ ἕως τοὺς πολλούς, Apol. 25 e ταῦτα ἐγώ σοι ὑπο πειθομα, οἷμαι δὲ οὐδὲ ἄλλων ἀνθρώπων οὐδένα. The words are parenthetical.

VI. 1. δόξαν ταῦτα: after the analogy of δοκεῖ ταῦτα. Cf. Xen. An. iv. 1. 13 δόξαν δὲ ταῦτα ἐκφυεῖαν οὕτω ποιεῖν. Plural in Andoc. i. 81 δόξαντα δὲ ὑμῖν ταῦτα ἐξελεβε ἄνδρας εἴκοσι, Xen. Hell. iii. 2. 19 δόξαντα δὲ ταῦτα καὶ περαγόντα τὰ στρατεύματα ἀπῆλθε. See G. 278, 2; II 974 a.—ἐπειδὴ δὲ κτὲ.: in order to represent the porter as behaving in a manner so characteristic, Plato makes the conversation come to an end before the house; as Socrates when alone, in Symp. 175 a concludes his meditations ἐν τοῖς προθύροις. Doubtless this was a familiar habit of Socrates.

2. προθύρῳ: for this porch, see Becker Char. ii. 132; Hermanin Griech. Privatalt. § 19.

6. δοκεῖ μοι: so οἷμα, οἷδα is sometimes inserted parenthetically without ὡς, ὦτι. Cf. Menex. 236 b ὢτε μοι δοκεῖ συνεκτθεῖ τὸν ἐπιτάφιον λόγον ὅτε, as I believe, she composed the funeral oration, Thuc. i. 3. 1 δοκεῖ δὲ μοι, οἴδη τούνομα τοῦτο ξύμπασα πω ἐξεν, Soph. O. C. 1615 σκληρῶν μὲν, οἴδα, also 300 b, 323 d, 327 b.—ὁ θυρωρός: in the house of the wealthy there was
always at that time a porter, whose duty it was in his thurereion to watch all that passed in and out, to open the door which was usually closed, and to announce visitors (eisageliein or prosageliein). Not infrequently these porters were surly (cf. Philodem. peri kakion § 9, prosageliein ou thelontes h skopakieis h ti toioitou emplegetontes), but here the reluctance of the faithful old eunuch points to the senseless doings in the house of his young master. Socrates, to be sure, he might have known; but this is another touch of Plato's, to show that Socrates was a beginner as yet.

10. ou σχολη αυτω: a customary announcement to unwelcome visitors. In Cic. de Senec. 10, Cato remarks nemo adhuc convenire me voluit, cui fuerim occupatus. Symp. 212d, when a company of revellers knocks at the door late at night, Agatho bids his servants, _ios mev tis tonv epistheilin ; kaleite; ei de μη, λέγετε, δι' ου πίνομεν, άλλα ἀναπαυμέθα (have gone to bed) ἱδη. — αυτω: himself; so slaves called their masters, pupils their teachers, parasites their patrons. Cf. Poll. iii. 74 'Aristophanes μενοι κατα την των πολλων συνθειαν των δεσποτην αυτων κέκληκεν, also the autēs ἐφη, ipse dixit of the pupils of Protagoras.

17. μοις κτ.: with difficulty the man was finally persuaded. Cf. Theaet. 160e toitō molis potete egenhismen Thuc. vii. 40 molis potete antanριγοντο, also mois pws 328 d, Apol. 21 b mois πάνω επι ζητησαν αυτου ετραπόμενον after a long struggle I gave myself to an investigation, etc.

20. προστφω: a narrow passage (thurereion, thrain, poslov) led from the house-door to the porticos (to periostulon), which surrounded the court on all four sides, and which, as they lay before the different rooms, were termed prosstha. As nothing is said
PLATO'S PROTAGORAS.

St. p. 314.

Here of the right or left, Protagoras is to be imagined as in the front and Hippias in the rear portico. Socrates and Hippocrates tarry a few moments in the passage, where, themselves unnoticed, they can survey the interior, including an adjacent room in which Prodicus is lying, cf. 315.d.

21. ἐκ τοῦ ἐπὶ θάτερα: on one side, cf. Thuc. vii. 37; ἡ γυμνητεία ἐκ τοῦ ἐπὶ θάτερα προσήχει τῷ τείχει (advanced to the wall from the opposite side), Xen. An. v. 4. 10. This use of the art. in such expressions is freq. with the Attic writers; cf. Euthyd. 207c, ἐκ τοῦ ἐπὶ ἀριστερά, Phaedo 112b, εἰς τὸ ἐπὶ ἐκείνα Thuc. viii. 104, ἐν τῷ ἐπε-κεῖνα, id. 1. 32; iv. 72 ἐν τῷ πρὸ τοῦ.

22. Πάραλος: ἦν μὲν γὰρ αὐτῷ (Pericles) γυνὴ προσήκουσα μὲν κατὰ γένος, συνφιλικινία δ' Ἰππονικῷ πρότερον, ἐξ οὖν Καλλίαν ἔτεκε τὴν πλούσιον ἔτεκε δὲ καὶ παρὰ τῷ Περικλεῖ Ξάνθιππον καὶ Πάραλον. Plutarch Pericles 24.

23. Χαρμίδης: brother of Plato's mother; see the dialogue which bears his name.

24. The family of Philippides and Philomelus of Lower Paeonia can be traced through many generations.

See Boeckh Seewesen Urgunden, pp. 24 and 252 f.

25. Antimocrus owes his immortality to this single passage.—Even though the passage marks no clear distinction between μαθηταὶ and ἐπίκου, evidently those who walk nearest Protagoras are his more intimate pupils.

26. ἐπὶ τέχνη: see on 312b.

27. Const. οἱ δὲ ὑπίσθεν τοῦτων ἥκολοθοὺν.

29. Cf. 316b; and regarding Gorgias, Prodicus, and Hippias, Apol. 19e τοῦτων γὰρ ἐκάστος ἦν εἰς ἐκάστην τῶν πόλεων τῶν νέων, οἷς ἔξεται τῶν ἑαυτῶν πολίτων προῖκα ἔννειαι ὣν ἀν βοῶλωνται (the young men, who may associate freely with whomsoever of their own citizens they desire), τούτων πεῖθους τάς ἐκεῖνων ἐννοούσια ἀπολποῦτας σφιξὶ ἔννειαι χρήματα διδότας καὶ χάριν προσεϊδέαν (paying them money and giving them thanks besides).

30. κηλῶν τῇ φωνῇ: Protagoras charms through the form, not the content, of his teaching.—οἱ δὲ ἔπονται: while they follow, a free extension of the rel. clause ovs ἀγεί. The correl. of μὲν l. 28 is δὲ l. 31.
32. χορός: the tragic chorus, as it entered the theatre, was generally arranged in three rows (στοιχοι, cf. στίχοι), each consisting of five choreutae, the middle choral in the row nearest to the spectators being the Coryphaeus. Similarly, here Protagoras is in the middle of a row of seven, the others walking behind these.

33. Socrates ironically admires the skill shown in keeping out of Protagoras’s way.

34. τῷ: const. with πρὸςθεν Πρωταγόρου after ἐν. See G. 141, n. 3. f.; II. 666.

35. ἐπικοιν.: mere silent listeners.

36. εἰς . . . κάλλιστα: took their positions in the rear in the most graceful manner.

VII. 1. τὸν δὲ μετ’ εἰσενόησα: these familiar words, and also καὶ Τάνταλον εἰσείδον, would instantly, in the minds of Plato’s contemporaries, shift the scene to Hades; for in the Homeric Νέκυια Odysseus recounts, with these words, that he saw in Hades, among other shades, those also of Hercules and Tantalus. Cf. Hom. ι. 601 τὸν δὲ μετ’ εἰσενόησα βίην Ἰρακλησίν, ἤβ. 582 καὶ μὴν Τάνταλον εἰσείδον χαλέπ’ ἐλγε’ ἐχοντα. So then we are in the realm of shades; Protagoras, Hippias, Prodicus are famous names,—rather an outward form than a reality. The comparison to Tantalus is applied to Prodicus because of his sickly condition, in which he appeared χαλέπ’ ἐλγε’ ἐχον. To find, however, an allusion to Prodicus’s greed or love of luxury, to see in Hippias a Hercules by reason of his combativeness, or to seek to find in the wise Protagoras a Sisyphus, would be frivolous, and would impair the humor of the comparison. Timon of Phlius had also parodied the Νέκυια, as have Schiller, and Goethe in the Ξενία (332–414).

3. θρόνος, βάθρα: both words are c suggestive of a boys’ school. θρόνος, the high armchair, was, at least in later times, the accustomed seat of the rhetorician or sophist. Cf. Plut. περὶ τοῦ ἀκούειν, c. 12 ἀναστάντες γὰρ ἀπὸ τοῦ θρόνου καὶ ἀποθέμενοι τὰ βιβλία . . . μικρὸι φαῦνονται (sc. οἱ σοφισταί). βάθρα are the school benches, cf. 325 e.—Eryximachus, an intelligent physician of reputation, appears also in Phaedr. 268 a and Symp. 176 b ff.; with regard to Phaedrus, see the dialogue which bears his name; these two are everywhere represented as inti-
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te ο' Ακομμενού καὶ Φαίδρος ο Μυρρωνόςιος καὶ Ἄνδρων
5 ο' Ανδροτίωνος καὶ τῶν ξένων πολιταί τε αὐτοῦ καὶ ἄλλοι τινές. ἐφαίνοντο δὲ περὶ φύσεώς τε καὶ τῶν μετεωρών ἀστρονομικά ἄττα διερωτῶν τῶν Ἱππίαν, ὦ ὁ ἐν θρόνω καθήμενος ἐκάστοις αὐτῶν διέκρινε καὶ διεξήμε ἃ ἐρωτώμενα.

10 Καὶ μὲν δὴ καὶ Τάνταλόν γε εἰσεῖδον. ἐπεδήμει γὰρ ἄρα καὶ Πρόδικος ο Κείως. ἦν δὲ ἐν οἰκήματι αὐτῶν, ϑ ἐπὶ τού μὲν ὡς ταμιεύω ἐχρῆτο Ἱππόνικος, νῦν δὲ ὑπὸ τοῦ πλῆθους τῶν καταλυόμενων ο Καλλίας καὶ τοῦτο ἐκκενώσας ξένως κατάλυσιν πεποίηκεν. ὦ μὲν οὖν
15 Πρόδικος ἐτι κατέκειτο, ἐγκεκαλυμμένος ἐν κωδίοις τισι

mate friends. Andron is mentioned also in Gorg. 487 e as eagerly occupied with philosophy; he was afterwards perhaps one of the Four Hundred; probably the orator Androton, against whom Demosthenes spoke, was his son.

7. Cf. 318 c; Hipp. Ma. 285 b ὧν (Hippias) κάλλιστα ἐπιστασαί, τὰ περὶ τὰ ἀστρα περὶ τὰ στρα ὑπὲρ ψηφανί διάθ. Astronomy was devoted to the investigation of the motions, nature, and origin of the heavenly bodies, and the general constitution of the universe,—ἡ φύσις.

8. διέκρινε: Hippias pronounced his verdicts, like the judge or the schoolmaster, from his high seat. Cf. Rep. i. 348 b καὶ ἡδύ δικαστῶν τινῶν τῶν διακρινόμενων δεισόμεθα.

d 11. ἄρα: refers to 314 b. So also ἐπεδήμει, although at the time when Socrates is relating his story, Prodicus is still there. They found Socrates's conjecture respecting him (ibid.) correct.—οἰκήματι: any room or chamber. Cf. Poll. ix. 45 οἰκήμα τὰ ἀστρα τοῖς Ἀττικοῖς ἀπλῶς τὸ οἰκήματι τῇ γὰρ Πλάτων ἐν τῷ Πρωταγόρα ἐρήμι ὥσαν ὄ d 315 ... ἐχρῆτο; Symp. 217 d οἴκηματι ἄλλος καθήμεν ἡ ἡμείς.

12. ὡς ταμιεύω: cf. Thuc. vii. 24 ὅπερ γὰρ ταμιεύω χρωμανῶν τῶν Ἀθηναίων τοῖς τείχοις. The changed contents of the store-room, and the ἐκκενώσας, taken with the vexation of the eunuch, complete the picture of the state of things in Callias's house.

15. κωδίοις: cf. Poll. n. 16 δέρμα τοῦ προβάτου κωδίοι. Cold weather, sickness, and effeminacy, caused people to wrap themselves in all sorts of skins and coverings. Cf. the description of the hopeful son, Ar. Nub. 10 ἐν πέντε σιθύραις ἐγκεκαλυμμένος wrapped up in five skins. Prodicus is represented as sickly, cf. 317 e, Plut. el προσβυτ. πολιτευμένου p. 791 e Προδικοῦ τὸν σοφιστὴν ἢ Φιλητὴν τὸν ποιητήν ... νέους μὲν, ἵσχυναις δὲ καὶ νοσάδεις καὶ τὰ πολλὰ κλίματες δὲ ἀρρωτήτων ὄντας (thin and sickly, and for the most part confined to the bed by their ailments).—τισι ... καὶ μάλιστα πολλοῖς: τινὲς πολλοὶ and similar combinations are not uncommon. Cf. Ar.
καὶ στράμασι καὶ μάλα πολλοΐς, ὃς ἐφαίνετο· παρεκάθηντο δὲ αὐτῷ ἐπὶ ταῖς πλησίον κλίνας Παυσανίας τε ὁ ἐκ Κεραμέων καὶ μετὰ Παυσανίου νέον τι ἔτι μειράκιον, ὃς μὲν ἐγώμαι, καλὸν τε κἀγαθὸν τὴν φύσιν, τὴν δὲ οὖν ε 20 ἰδέαν πάνυ καλός. ἔδοξα ἀκοῦσαι ὅνομα αὐτῷ εἶναι Ἀγάθωνα, καὶ οὐκ ἂν θαυμάζομε, εἰ παιδικὰ Παυσανίου τυχ-χάνει τώ, τοῦτ ἦν τὸ μειράκιον, καὶ τῷ 'Ἀδειμάντων

19. δ' οὖν: contrasts with a previous statement of conceded uncertainty, one as to which there is no doubt; but at any rate, sed certe. Cf. Χρ. An. 1. 2. 12 and 22, 3. 5; Πλατ. Απολ. 17 a, 34 e εἰ μὲν θαρραλέως ἐγὼ ἤχω πρὸς βάναυσον ἡ μη, ἄλλος ἄλγος, πρὸς δ' οὖν δόξαν κτέ., whether I can face death bravely or not is another matter, but certainly in view of our reputation I do not think it best, etc.

20. καλὸς: with μειράκιον, παιδικά, etc., the natural gender prevails. Cf. Λαχ. 180 e τὰ γὰρ μειράκια τάδε πρὸς ἄλληλους οἴκου διαλεγόμενοι βαμα ἐπιμέμνηται Σωκράτους. — ἔδοξα: "if I rightly remember." Cf. Θεατ.
VIII. The son of Cepis is unknown; but the son of Leucolophides appears also in Ar. Rem. 1513; he is the general who was charged with treachery in the affair of Aegos Potami. Cf. Xen. Hell. ii. i. 32; Lys. xiv. 38. His property was confiscated; C. I. Att. i. 274, 275, 276.

25. ἔχων: ἔχειν with an adv. of condition is equiv. to εἰσάχθην with an adv. 


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316 2. ὃς φήσῃ σὺ κτ.: cf. Symp. 186e ὃς φασίν ὦδε οἱ ποιηταὶ καὶ ἐγὼ πείθομαι. 212b ταῦτα δὴ ἐφή μὲν Διο-τίμα, πέπεισμαι δὲ ἐγώ.

3. Κριτίας: well known as the leader of the Thirty Tyrants. His father and Plato’s maternal grandfather were brothers. He gave himself diligently to the study of philosophy, and appears in several of Plato’s dialogues.

6. τοῖ: indicates with emphasis b the person addressed; most freq. with prons. Cf. Ar. Av. 406 ὦ ἐστο (ἱοο-ροε), σὲ τοῖ καλῶ, Plut. 1100 σὲ τοῖ λέγω, ὃς Καρλῶ, ἀνάμεινον. Here, in the presence of Callias and others, this directness is necessary.
13. ἐνάμιλλος εἰσαί: cope with, am a match for one. Cf. Rep. iv. 433 d ἐνόμιλ-
λον ἃρα πρὸς ἄρετὴν πόλεως τῇ τε σοφίᾳ ἀὐτῆς καὶ τῇ σωφροσύνῃ καὶ τῇ ἄνδρεῖᾳ ἡ τοῦ ἔκαστον ἐν ἄυτῇ τὰ ἄυτον πράττειν 
δόναμις then that each individual in the state should do his own work contrib-
utes as much toward the excellence of a city as its wisdom, temperance, and courage.

15. ἄν: always stands with the aor. inf. after verbs signifying to hope, ex-
pect, promise, suppose, and the like, when the governing verb does not make the reference to the fut. un-
mistakable. Cf. 318 a, 348 d, 353 b. See GMT. 22, 2, n. 3; 41, 3.

16 μόνος: is const. with οἷς, being attracted into agreement with the subj. of the latter, while, according to the sense, we should expect μόνον agreeing with the subj. acc. of dia-
lέγεσθαι. So regularly in οἷς μεῖν, χρῆναι and similar expressions, the const. is unaffected by the impers. inf. Cf. Isocr. ix. 30 οἷς ἤγισαστο δεῖν χω-
ρίων ἄχρινον καταλαβὼν περιμεῖν, Dem. 
xxi. 17 αὐτὸς διδάσκειν χέτο δεῖν τὸν χωρίν. See G. 138, n. 8; II. 944; 940.

17. Protagoras always displays his art in long and ornate discourses, aiming at thoughts which are striking rather than true. He does this here, in what he boastfully says of the antiquity of the sophistical art. The support for his statement he finds in the fact that all whom he quotes were eminent in the wisdom of practical life, which he maintains to be the essence of his own art. Socrates afterwards shows (cf. 342 a ff.) that this method of grouping may be made very convenient. The supposed προμήθεια of Socrates serves perfectly the end of enabling Protagoras to declare his own fearlessness and to eulogize his profession. In fact, however, when he had offered to Socrates the decision as to the pres-
ence of others at the colloquy, Socrates had disclaimed any preference.

19. See on 315 a.

21. οἰκεῖων... νεωτέρων: note the ὄμοιοστέλευτα.

23. τὸν ταῦτα πράττοντα: emphati-
cally sums up the preceding accs., as does freq. οὗτος alone. The clause is equiv. to χρῆ εὐλαβεῖσθαι τοῦτον, but has more rhetorical dignity.
οὐ γὰρ σμικρὸι περὶ αὐτὰ φθόνοι τε γίγνονται καὶ ἄλλαὶ
25 δυσμένειαι τε καὶ ἐπιβουλαί. ἐγὼ δὲ τὴν σοφιστικὴν τέ-
χνην φημὶ μὲν εἶναι παλαίων, τοὺς δὲ μεταχειρίζομένους ἀυτὴν τῶν παλαίων ἄνδρῶν, φοβούμενους τὸ ἐπαχθεῖς ἀυτῆς, πρόσχημα ποιεῖσθαι καὶ προκαλύπτεσθαι τοὺς μὲν ποίησιν, οἶνον Ὄμηρον τε καὶ Ἡσίοδον καὶ Σιμωνίδην, τοὺς
30 δὲ αὐτὲς τελετάς τε καὶ χρησμωδίας, τοὺς ἀμφὶ τε Ὀρφεά καὶ Μούσασκαίον. ἐνίοις δὲ τιναὶ ἅσθημαι καὶ γυμναστικὴν, οἰον Ἰίκκος τε ὁ Ταραντῶν καὶ ὁ νῦν ἔτι ὄν οὐδένους ήττων σοφιστῆς Ἡρόδικος ὁ Σηλυμβριανός, τὸ δὲ ἀρχαῖον εἰ Μεγαρεύς. μονικὴν δὲ Ἀγαθοκλῆς τε ὁ υμέτερος πρό-

316 24. ἄλλαι δυσμένειαι: moreover entities. So freq. a new class is intro-
duced by ἄλλος. Cf. Apol. 36 b στρατηγιῶν καὶ δημηγορίων καὶ τῶν ἄλ-
λων ἄρχων, where see Stallbaum, Gorg. 519 c τοὺς τε μισθοὺς ἀποστρεφόντες καὶ ἄλλην χάριν ὅπως ἀποδιδόντες (and turning no thanks either), Phaedr. 232 b. See G. 142, 2, n. 3; H. 705.

28. ποιεῖσθαι . . . προκαλύπτεσθαι: in a clause with ἵπτι the impf. would have been used. The pres. inf. and partic. belong also to the impf. See GMT. 15, 3; 16, 2; H. 853 a; 856 a.

29. οἶον: attributed to the case of the antec.; see G. 153, n. 5; H. 1002. —Σιμωνίδην: Protagoras’s preference for Simonides appears thus early. Cf. 339 a ff.

30. The names of Orpheus and Musaeus were connected with various solemn rites and prophetic say-
ings; after the collection and arrange-
ment of their poems by Onomacritus, the poets were often mentioned to-
gether.

32. Ἰίκκος: cf. Paus. vi. 10. 2 Ἰκ-
κος δὲ ὁ Νικόλαις Ταραντῶν τὸν τε Ὁλυμπιακῶν στέφανον ἐσχεν ἐπὶ πεντά-
θλῷ καὶ υπεροῦ γυμναστῆς ἄριστος λέ-
γεται τῶν ἐφ’ ἐαυτὸ γενόσθαι. According to Steph. Byz., s. v. Τάρας, he was victorious, Ol. 77, 472 b.c. So Legg. viii. 840 a he is extolled ὡς διὰ φιλο-
νικίαν καὶ τέχνην καὶ τὸ μετὰ τοῦ σω-
φρονεῖν ἄνδρειν ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ κεκτημένος be-
cause of his zeal for the games and
skill in them, and of possessing in his soul courage combined with temperance.

—οὐδένος ήττων: see on 324 d.

33. Herodicus was a teacher of e

34. Agathocles is mentioned also in

Lach. 180 d, and Pythoclines had in-
structed Pericles in music (acc. to
Plato's dialogue, Protagoras, is a work that explores the nature of human and divine knowledge. This page contains a discussion of the musician Damon, who, along with Pericles, was a friend of Plato's. Plato, through Damon, explains the relationship between music and politics, emphasizing the importance of education and the role of the statesman in society. The dialogue also touches on the idea of free speech and the public's right to express opinions, reflecting Plato's broader concerns about the role of philosophers in governance.
οὐδὲν αἰσθάνονται, ἀλλ' ἀττ' ἀν οὕτωι διαγγέλλωσι, ταῦτα ύμνοῦσιν. τὸ οὖν ἀποδιδράσκοντα μὴ δύνασθαι ἀποδρά-
ναι, ἀλλὰ καταφανῇ εἶναι, πολλὴ μωρία καὶ τοῦ ἐπιχείρη-
ματος, καὶ πολὺ δυσμενεστέρους παρέχεσθαι ἀνάγκη τοὺς ἀνθρώπους· ἢγούνται γὰρ τὸν τοιούτον πρὸς τοῖς ἄλλοις καὶ πανοῦργον εἶναι. ἕγω οὖν τούτων τὴν ἑναντίαν ἀπα-
σαν ὦδὸν ἑλήλυθα, καὶ ὀμολογῶ το σοφιστής εἶναι καὶ
παideύειν ἀνθρώπους, καὶ εὐλαβεῖαν ταύτην οἴμαι βελτίω
εἰκεῖνς εἶναι, τὸ ὀμολογεῖν μᾶλλον ἢ ἐξαρνὸν εἶναι: καὶ
ἄλλας πρὸς ταύτη ἐσκεμμαί, ὡστε, σὺν θεῷ εἰπεῖν, μὴδὲν

317 43. οὐδὲν αἰσθάνονται: for the thought, cf. Crito 48 c τῶν βαθίων ἀπο-
κτινύπτων καὶ αναβιωσθεῖν σ' ἐν, εἰ ὑπ' ἥσαν, οὐδὲν εἰν
τούτων τῶν πολλῶν these selfish considerations are
characteristic of those who recklessly kill
and would bring to life again if they
could, these unreasoning common people.
—οὕτωι: i.e. οἱ πράττεν δυνάμενοι.—
διαγγέλλωσι: proclaim, issue as an order.

44. ύμνοὺσιν: have in one’s mouth, take
up in chorus, cf. 343 b.—τὸ: const.
with both δύνασθαι and εἶναι.—We
expect shows great folly, etc.

45. καταφανῇ εἶναι: getting caught.
—καὶ (even) τοῦ ἐπιχείρηματος: em-
phatically repeats with anacoluthon
the thought already contained in ἀπο-
κτινύπτων, —as this denotes (since
the failure is declared at the outset),
only the attempt to escape. Cf. Menex.
244 ε ἐκ ταύτης τῆς πόλεως, ἥν προηγούμε-
σταν ἀπόκλιθαν which he eagerly sought to ruin.

b 46. παρέξεσθαι: sc. τὸ ἐπιχείρημα.
48. ἀπασαν: strengthens ἑναντίαν,
i.e. directly the opposite way. Cf. Thuc.
vi. 21 ἐκ ἀλλοτρίων πᾶσαν ἀπαρτίζοντες
removing to a land completely for-
eign, vi. 37. 3 ἐν πάσῃ πολεμίᾳ (entirely
hostile) Σικελίᾳ.—The gen. τοῦτων does
not stand for τῆς τούτων, but depends
upon ἕγω ἑλήλυθα τῆς ἑναντίας ὦδον, in
the sense of “in contrast with them,”
i.e. “I, in contrast with these, have
taken directly the opposite course.”
With πᾶς, ἔστω thus used, the art. is
lacking.

52. ἄλλας: sc. εὐλαβεῖας other pre-
cautions. Protagoras reflects with sat-
isfaction that in other respects also
his methods are of such a sort that
he has no occasion for apprehension.
—σὺν θεῷ εἰπεῖν: deprecates any ill
consequences of a boastful expres-
sion, to say it with the favor of the gods;
like our ‘thank God’ with reference
to the past, cf. Theaet. 151 b καὶ, ἕν
θεῷ εἰπεῖν, πάνω ἰκανώς τοπάζω (I can
judge pretty accurately); and ‘by God’s
help,’ with reference to the future, cf.
Eur. Med. 625 ὕσος γὰρ, ἕν θεῷ δ' εἴρησαται, ἵ
γαμοι τοιούτοι οὕτε σ' ἀρ-
νείαθα γάμον for perhaps— with leave
of heaven be it said—you will contract
such a marriage as you will be just to
disown.—ὡστε . . . πάσχειν: “there
is nothing to be feared from the mul-
titude because οὐδὲν αἰσθάνονται, but as
ὄν δυνάμενοι πράττεν cannot be eluded,
it is safer not to attempt this, there-
fore I avoid the danger.” Contrast
the attitude of Socrates, Crito 48a

οὐκ ἄρα πάνω ἴμαν ὄστω φροντιστέων, τί ἐρώσθων οἱ πολλοὶ ἴμας, ἀλλ' ὃ τι ὁ ἐπάλον περὶ τῶν δικαίων καὶ ἄδικων, ἢ εἷς, καὶ αὐτὴ ἢ ἀδίκεια. οὔ τὸ ζῆν περὶ πλείονον ποιητέων, ἀλλὰ τὸ εὗ ζῆν.

54. ἐν τῇ τέχνῃ: ἐν τινὶ εἶναι, be engaged in anything. Cf. Meno 91e

οἵμα χάρα αὐτὸν (Protagoras) ἄποθετειν ἐγγὺς καὶ ἐβδομήκοντα ἐτή γεγονότα, τεσσαράκοντα δὲ ἐν τῇ τέχνῃ ὑπάρχει. Rep. vii. 531b ταῦτα γὰρ ποιοῦσα τοῖς ἐν τῇ ἀστρονομίᾳ, Soph. Ο. T. 532 τόν ὁ μάντις ὄστος ἢν ἐν τῇ τέχνῃ;—

τὰ ξύμπαντα: the years of his entire life, contrasted with those spent in studies. Cf. Hdt. v. 120 πεσόντων δὲ τῶν πάντων πολλῶν μάλιστα Μιλήσιοι ἐπιλήγησαν, but while many fell from all the forces engaged, the Milicians suffered most severely. See Introd. p. 2.

55. οὐδενός κτῆ.: in a confirmation of what has preceded, the asyndeton is common. See G. 153, x. 4; H. 1003 a for inverted assimilation. Similar pleonasm in Dem. xx. 3 οὔ γὰρ ἔστιν ἐφ' ὅτου τοῦτο οὐ πεπόνθατε τῶν πάντων.

56. ὥστε: i.e. “the former great

57. ἀπάντων: const. with τῶν ἐνδον ὄντων.

58. καὶ ἔγω κτῆ.: cf. 335 a, Euthyd. 302 a καγώ — ἠθί γὰρ ὅτι κτῆ.

59. ἐνδείξασθαι καὶ καλλωπίσασθαι: i.e. ἐνδείξαμεν καλλωπίσασθαι, see on 333 d.

60. οὐ... ἐκάλεσαμεν: see on 310 a.

61. οὐ... ἐκάλεσαμεν: see on 310 a.

62. βούλεσθε... κατασκευάσωμεν: for the ‘deliberative’ subjv. see G. 250; H. 866, 3.

63. συνέδριον: a word of much dignity.—καθιζόμενοι διαλέγομεν: i.e. καθιζόμενοι καὶ διαλέγομεν. Cf. Phaedr. 228 e ἀλλὰ τοῖς δὲ βούλει καθιζόμενοι ἀναγνώμεν;
65 γησθε; 'Εδοκει χρήναι. ἀς μενοι δὲ πάντες ἡμεῖς, ὡς ἀκον- 
σόμενοι ἀνδρῶν σοφῶν, καὶ αὐτοὶ ἀντιλαβόμενοι τῶν βά-
θρων καὶ τῶν κλων κατεσκενάζομεν παρὰ τὸ 'Ἰππίων ἐκεῖ γὰρ προὔπηρχε τὰ βάθρα. ἐν δὲ τούτῳ Καλλίας τε καὶ Ἀλκιβιάδης ἥκετν ἀγοντε τὸν Προδίκον, ἀναστήσαν-
70 τε ἐκ τῆς κλώνης, καὶ τοὺς μετὰ τοῦ Προδίκου.

IX. Ἐπεὶ δὲ πάντες συνεκαθέζομεθα, δ' Προταγόρας, Νῦν δὴ ἂν, ἐφη, λέγοις, ὡ Σῶκρατες, ἐπειδὴ καὶ οἶδε πάρεισι, 
περὶ ἃν ὅλιγον πρότερον μνείαν ἔποιεν πρὸς ἐμὲ ὑπὲρ 
τοῦ νεανίσκου. Καὶ ἐγὼ εἰπὼν ὅτι 'Η αὐτὴ μοι ἄρχῃ 5 
ἐστω, ὡ Προταγόρα, ἦ περ ἄρτι, περὶ ἃν ἀφίκομην. Ἔπ- 318 
ποκράτης γὰρ ὅδε τυγχάνει ἐν ἐπιθυμίᾳ ὅπως σῆς συν-
ουσίας· ὃ τι ὅνων αὐτῷ ἀποβῆστε, ἐὰν σκοιεῖ, ἡδέως ἂν φησι πυθέσθαι. τοσοῦτοι ὃ γε ἡμέτερος λόγος. Ἄρο-
λαβὼν ὃνδ' Προταγόρας εἰπεν· Ὄ νεανίσκε, ἔσται τοῖνυν 
10 σοι, ἐὰν ἐμῷ συνῆς, ἂν ἡμέρα ἐμὸ συγγένη, ἀπέναι 
οἰκάδε βελτίων γεγονότι, καὶ τῇ ὑστεραίᾳ ταύτα ταύτα, καὶ ἐκάστης ἡμέρας ἂει ἐπὶ τὸ βέλτιον ἐπιδιδόναι. Καὶ 

317 66. καὶ αὐτοὶ: the plan so pleased 
d all, that they did not, as Callias would 
naturally have preferred, wait for the 
ervants to arrange matters, but pro-
ceeded to do this themselves. When 
Callias sees that this is in progress, 
he goes, as becomes the host, into the 
adjacent room, to assist Prodicus to 
come and join the party. 

e 69. ἥκετν ... ἀναστήσαντες: cf. 
Euthyd. 273 a eἰσελθόντες δὲ περιπα-
tεῖτην, δ ἐγελασάτην ὅσι ἄμφω, βλέ-
παντες εἰς ἄλλαξαν. So often in 
Plato. Also Ar. Plut. 429 ό γὰρ δει-
νότατα δεδράκατον ἐγελασάτες κτέ. 

IX. 2. ἂν λέγοις: for the potential 
opt. used in a mild command, see G. 
226, 2, n. 1; H. 872 d. Here there is 
a polite invitation. Cf. Soph. Phil. 
674 χαροῖς ἂν εἰσώ, Ἔλ. 637 κλῶν 
ἂν ἢδη, φοίβε προστατήριε. 
4 f. Socrates does not mention 
again the family of Hippocrates, and 
the specific expectation of the latter 
in resorting to Protagoras (ἐλλόγιος 
γενέσθαι ἐν τῇ πόλει). 
9. ὃ νεανίσκε: the formal address 
prepares the mind for an important 
statement. — ἔσται: an apod. having 
for its prots. ἐὰν ... συνῆς, ἂν ... 
συγγένη, (ἐὰν τῇ ὑστεραίᾳ συγγένη) (ἐὰν 
ἐκάστης ἡμέρας συγγένη). The subs. 
of ἔσται are ἀπίεναι, the same verb 
implied in ταύτα ταύτα, and ἐπιδιδόναι. 
11. γεγονότι: contains the leading 
idea.
13. μέν: we expect δέ with a request for a specific reply; but the form changes 1. 22 ff.

14. καί σύ . . . άν γένοιο: καί and ὠσπέρ before εἴ δι freq. draw to themselves the καί of the apod., which is usually repeated after the verb or some other important word of the apod. The first καί shows the conditional character of the coming sentence; the last, esp. when several words have intervened, is felt to be needful as a resumption as well as to give emphasis. Cf. Menex. 230 d ὡστε καὶ ὄλγον, εἴ με κελεύοις ὅρχήσασθαι, χαρισάμουν ἢν so that, if you should bid me dance, I would almost gratify you, Gorg. 417 d, Apol. 31 a. See G. 212, 3; Π. 864.

16. μὴ οὕτως: do not answer so! Cf. 331 e μὴ μοι, άν δ' ἐγώ, Meno 74 d ἀλλὰ μὴ μοι οὕτως, Ar. Vesp. 1179 μὴ μοι ὑπ' ἡμῶν, Dem. iv. 19 μὴ μοι μυρίους μὴ διασώμωρους ἕνους. Supply ποίει, λέγε.

17. αὐτίκα: to begin with, for example. Cf. 359 e, Rep. i. 340 d ἐπεὶ αὐτίκα ἑαυτῶν καλεῖς σὺ τὸν ἐξαιρητάνοντα (making mistakes) περὶ τοὺς κάμποντας; Lach. 195 b.

19. Nothing is known of a painter Zeuxippus. Yet our passage shows that he had attracted attention. But since Zeuxis also was from Heraclea (probably the one in lower Italy) and Plato mentions him, Gorg. 453 e (cf. Xen. Mem. i. 4; Oec. io. 1; Symp. 4. 63), there is much to favor the conjecture that he is here meant. Zeuxis was originally only a pet form for Zeuxip- nos, as Herodianus (Etym. M. 85, 50) cites "Ἀμφίς for 'Ἀμφιάραος from Αἰσχύλος, and Ῥίς for 'Ηγυένεα (Lycochr. 320). See Fick d. Griech. Personennamen, pp. xxviii. and 32.

24. ἐποίη τὸν: an apod. following εἴ the three prods. εἴ ἐπιθυμήσει, (εἰ) ἀκούσειν, εἴ ἐπανέριος.

25. Orthagoras was, according to Aristoxenus, Epaminondas's teacher upon the flute. Thebes was famous for its flute-players.
PLATO'S PROTAGORAS.

St. p. 318.

318 32. ἐπὶ τῷ, καὶ περὶ τοῦ: with peculiar, almost comical emphasis, the proper subject of the question is placed at its close. The opening words, repeated with humorous earnestness from Protagoras himself, appear thus, in spite of their fair sound, really empty of meaning.

34. χαίρω ἀποκρινόμενος: I enjoy answering. For the pred. partic. see GMT. 112, 1; II. 983.

37. τὰς τέχνας κτὲ.: the branches pursued in the boys' schools, γραμματική, λογιστική, κιθαριστική, — thus about the same thought as ἐκ διδασκάλων ἀπαλλαγέντας (cf. 326 e).

38. ἀκοντας, ἀγοντες: note the paradoxomasia.

39. λογισμοῦς κτἐ.: here Protagoras refers unfavorably to those who teach these specialties as not being sophists in the best sense (λοβόταντα τούς νέους above); while, according to 316 d, such specialists have ever been true sophists; but the different purpose of the two arguments is obvious. The circle of the studies belonging to a complete education was enlarged just at this time; to γραμματική were added arithmetic, geometry, astronomy, and music; but as Callicles in Gorg. 485 a advises the pursuit of philosophy only ὅσον παιδείας χαίρω, so the sophists warned against all that diverted from practical life, all mere theory. So Isocr. xv. 208 διατριβάω μὲν ὅν περὶ τὰς παιδείας ταῦτας χρόνων τών συμβουλεύσαμ' ἀν τοῖς νεωτέροις, μη μέντοι περιδείην τὴν φόσιν τὴν ἑαυτῶν κατασκευευθείαν (not however to suffer their constitution to be impaired) ἐπὶ τούτοις, δεῖν δὲ (Ὡγούμαι) τοὺς πρὸβργον τι ποιεῖν βουλομένους (those wishing to make some real progress) καὶ τῶν λόγων τῶν ματαιῶν καὶ τῶν πράξεων τάς μηδὲν πρὸς τὸν βιον φεροῦσας ἀναμείνεις ἔξ ἀπασῶν τῶν διατριβῶν (to put away from their whole life vain words, and deeds which bring no profit).

40. Ἰππίαν: cf. 315 e.
βλέψε· — παρ' δ' ἐμὲ ἀφικόμενος μαθήσεται οὐ περὶ ἀλλοῦ τοῦ ἡ περὶ οὐ ἤκει. τὸ δὲ μάθημα ἔστιν εὐβουλία περὶ τῶν οἰκείων, ὅπως ἂν ἄριστα τὴν αὐτοῦ οἰκίαν διοικῇ, καὶ περὶ τῶν τῆς πόλεως, ὅπως τὰ τῆς πόλεως διωνύστατος ἂν εἰη καὶ πράττει καὶ λέγειν. Ἄρ' ἐφη 319 ἐγὼ, ἐπομαί σου τῷ λόγῳ; δοκεῖς γὰρ μοι λέγειν τὴν πολιτικὴν τέχνην καὶ ὑπισχυόσθαι ποιεῖν ἀνδρὰς ἁγαθὸν πολίτας. Αὐτὸ μὲν οὖν τούτῳ ἔστιν, ἐφη, ὁ Σώκρατες, τὸ ἔπαγγελμα, ὁ ἐπαγγέλλομαι.

Χ. Ὁ καλὸν, ἢν δ' ἐγὼ, τέχνην ἁρα κέκτησαι, εἴ περ κέκτησαι· οὐ γάρ τι ἀλλο πρός γε σὲ εἰρήσεται ἢ ἂ περ νόῳ. ἐγὼ γάρ τούτο, ὃ Πρωταγόρα, οὐκ ἁμὴν διδακτὸν εἶναι, σοὶ δὲ λέγοντι οὐκ ἔχω ὅπως ἀπιστῶ. οἶδεν δὲ αὐτὸ ἃ 5 ἡγούμαι οὐ διδακτὸν εἶναι μηδ' υπ' ἀνθρώπων παρα-

318 42. The sophists professed to teach ἀρετή (cf. παρὰ τοῦτος τοὺς ἑπισκοποῦ-

319 47. ἄγαθος πολίτας: not to be taken as pred. of ἀνδρας, but the three words together form the pred. of an obj. to be supplied (αὐτοὺς, "those who come to you"). Expansions with ἄνθρωποι seldom have an adj. added. Cf. Thuc. i. 74 ἄνθρωποι στρα-

4. ὅπως ἀπιστῶ: it is quite in b Socrates's style for him to say that he does not know what he ought to believe. He had thought that virtue could not be imparted by instruction, but now he does not venture to doubt the authority of Protagoras, who holds that it can; cf. 320 b. ἃν, which the Mss. have after ὅπως, cannot stand with the subjv. of deliberation, cf. I. 197 a. οὐδ' αὐτὸς ἔχω ἄτι ὑπ' ἀπιστῶ.

5. οὐ, μηδὲ: usually ἤγοιμαι (cf. 328 e), λέγω and similar verbs take with the inf. the objective neg. οὐ, more rarely μή, which places the negation in the thought of the subject. Both are used together also, Soph. Phil. 1058 ἐγὼ θ', ὃς ὅμαι σοῦ κάκιον οὐδέν ἂν τούτων κρατήσῃ, μηδ' ἐπι-

X. 2 f. γάρ, γάρ: the former introduces the reason for the expression of the doubt εἰ περι κέκτησαι, the latter for the existence of the doubt.
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σκευαστῶν ἀνθρώπων, δίκαιος εἰμι εἰσεῖν. ἐγὼ γὰρ Ἀθη

ναῖος, ὦ σωτῆρας καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι Ἑλληνες, φημὶ σοφοὺς εἶναι.

ὅρων οὖν, ὅταν συλλεγόμεν εἰς τὴν ἐκκλησίαν, ἐπειδὴ μὲν

περὶ οἰκοδομίας τι δέη πράξαι τὴν πόλιν, τοὺς οἰκοδόμους

10 μεταπεμπόμενος συμβούλους περὶ τῶν οἰκοδομημάτων,

ὅταν δὲ περὶ ναυτιγιάς, τοὺς ναυπηγοὺς· καὶ τάλλα πάντα σε

οὕτως, ὅσα ἥγουνται μαθῆτά τε καὶ διδακτά εἶναι. ἔαν

δὲ τις ἄλλος ἐπιχειρή αὐτοῖς συμβουλέειν, ἃν ἐκεῖνοι μὴ

οἴονται δημιουργὸν εἶναι, κἂν πάνυ καλὸς ἢ καὶ πλούσιος

15 καὶ τῶν γενναίων, οὐδέν τι μᾶλλον ἀποδέχονται, ἄλλα

καταγελῶσι καὶ θορυβοῦσι, ἔως ἢ ἂν ἂν ἂς ἂποστῇ ὁ

ἐπιχειρῶν λέγειν καταθεμηθείς, ἢ οἱ τοξῶν ἂν ἂυτὸν ἅφελ-

319 Cf. Rep. iii. 407 e οὐκον φῶμεν καὶ

6. δίκαιος: includes both the right and the duty; cf. 531 e.— We have here the pers. const., where the less

freq. impers. const. might have been used, δίκαιον ἐστι with the acc. and inf.; the latter corresponds to the

Eng. idiom. See H. 944 a.— ἐγὼ . . .

διὰ: shows why the Athenians can be cited in proof; the clause giving the reason with γὰρ comes first, as

often in Greek. See on 347 a, and compare a freq. use of ἄλλα γὰρ. See H. 1050, 4.— Hippias 337 d calls

Athens τῆς Ἑλλάδος αὐτὸ τὸ πρωτα

νείον τῆς σφαιρᾶς. And in fact it was

only the recognition of her real superi-

ority, with which recognition Socrates,

ironically enough, expresses his

agreement, if the Greeks yielded to

Athens the pre-eminence in all culture,

art, and science. Cf. Hdt. i. 60. ἐν

Ἀθηναῖοι τοῖς πρώτοις λεγόμενοι εἶναι Ἑλλήνων σοφῆν, Thuc. ii. 41

λέγω (says Pericles) τὴν πάνταν πόλιν

τῆς Ἑλλάδος παῖδευσιν εἶναι.

319 9. πρᾶξαι περὶ: take action with re-

319 10. μεταπεμπόμενοι: mid., sc. as

11. καὶ τάλλα πάντα οὕτως: sc. e

17. At that time the Prytanes had the

conduct of the general assemblies,

exercising their function through the

ἐπιστάτης of the day. It was his duty,

in case any speaker behaved unbec-

ominingly, to have the police if neces-

sary remove him (ἐκεῖνον) from the

bema, and put him out of the assem-

bly, (αἰρεῖν, ἔξαιρεῖν), cf. Poll. viii. 131.

These policemen, slaves of the state,

were called from their weapons τοξά-

ται, and from the nationality of the

most of them Σκύθαι. Boeckh, Staatsh.

i. 291 f. Cf. Ar. Eq. 665 καθ' ἐλ-

κον αὐτὸν οἱ πρωτανεῖς χώ τοξῶν τι

the Prytanes and the police began to drag

him out, Eccl. 258 ἐκεῖνο μόνον ἄκε-
κύσωσιν ἢ ἐξαίρωνται κελεύοντων τῶν πρυτάνεων. περὶ μὲν οὗν δὲ οὐνται ἐν τέχνῃ εἶναι, οὕτω διαπράττονται. 20 ἐπειδὰν δὲ τι περὶ τῶν τῆς πόλεως διοικήσεως διὰ βουλευσασθαί, συμβουλεύει αὐτοῖς ἀνυστάμενοι περὶ τούτων ὁμοίως μὲν τέκτων, ὁμοίως δὲ χαλκεὺς σκυτότιμος, ἔμπορος ναύκληρος, πλουσίος πένης, γενναίος ἁγεννής, καὶ τούτους οὐδεὶς τοῦτο ἐπιπλήττει ὡσπερ τοῖς πρότερον, ὥτι 25 οὐδαμόθεν μαθῶν, οὐδὲ οὕτος διδασκάλου οὕδεν αὐτῷ, ἔπειτα συμβουλεύει ἐπιχειρεῖ· δῆλον γάρ, ὅτι οὐχ ἤγονται διδακτὸν εἶναι. μὴ τοίνυν ὅτι τὸ κοινὸν τῆς πόλεως οὕτως

319 πτολ. ἢν οὐκ ἔρξαι ἐλκωσιν, ὅτι ὅρᾳ. ἡμεῖς δὲ γ', ἢν ἀλατιν, εἶν κελεύσομεν that alone is unconsidered, if the police try to drag you away, what you will do. But we, if they take you up, will bid them let you alone. Aeh. 54 such a scene is described. The mid. (ἐξαραυνται) occurs only here.

18. Const. ταύτα, περὶ οὗν οὐνται ἐν τέχνῃ εἶναι, οὕτω διαπράττονται. Things before termed ὅσα μαθητα καὶ διδακτά are now designated as those περὶ οὗν ἐν τέχνῃ εἴτε, see on 310 d. — Socrates reasons thus: “when the Athenians believe a matter to turn upon professional knowledge, they allow only professional men to speak upon it; but on matters connected with the civil administration they listen to all without distinction; this ἀρετή therefore, which relates to civil administration, in the view of Athenians is not a matter of art, and so cannot be learned.” Cf. 322 d e.

d 20. Socrates says, with reference to 318 e, διοίκησις τῶν τῆς πόλεως. This form is entirely correct, since διοίκησις τῆς πόλεως and such general expressions, like διοίκησις, freq. stand without the art. Cf. Polit. 296 e τῶν ὄρων ὀρθὴς πόλεως διοικήσεως the princi-
εχει, ἀλλὰ ἵδια ἡμῖν οἱ σοφότατοι καὶ ἀριστοὶ τῶν πολιτῶν ταύτην τὴν ἁρετήν ἣν ἔξουσιν οὐχ οὗτοι τε ἄλλοις παραδοναι. ἐπεὶ Περικλῆς, ὁ τούτων τῶν νεανίσκων πατήρ, τούτους ἃ μὲν διδασκάλων εἴχετο καλῶς καὶ εὗ ἐπαίδευσεν, ἄ δὲ αὐτὸς σοφός ἔστω, οὔτε αὐτὸς παίδευε οὔτε τῷ ἀλλῳ παραδίδοσι, ἄλλ' αὐτοὶ περιώντες νέονται ὡσπερ ἄφετοι, εάν που αὐτόματοι περιτύχωσι τῇ ἁρετῇ. εἰ δὲ
35 βουλεῖ, Κλεινίαν, τὸν Ἀλκιβιάδου τούτων νεώτερον ἀδελφόν, ἐπιτροπεύων ὁ αὐτὸς οὕτως ἀνήρ, Περικλῆς, δεδιός περὶ αὐτοῦ μὴ διαφθαρῇ δὴ ὑπὸ Ἁλκιβιάδου, ἀποσπάσας ἀπὸ τούτου, καταθέμενος ἐν Ἀρίφρονος ἐπάδευεν.

319 not to say a private individual, even the great king would find, etc. The expression is elliptical, see II. 1035.
31 e 31. In many places Socrates in Plato laments that the great men of Athens have not trained their sons to wisdom and virtue; in Meno 93 d ff. besides Pericles, he adduces Themistocles, Aristides, and Thucydides the son of Melesias. Both sons of Pericles died young of the plague; that Xanthippus was a worthless fellow is said by Plutarch, Pericles 36. Cf. 328 c. — εἴχετο: with gen., be in close connection with, pertain to a thing. διδασκάλων cf. 324 d, Meno 94 b διὰ τέχνης εἴχεται, Theaet. 145 a καὶ ὅσα παιδείας ἐξεταί.
320 33. νεομονταί: many temples had herds of cattle belonging to them, which roamed at will over the sacred fields. Cf. Plutarch Lucull. c. 24 βδές ἵερα νέομονται Περίοις Ἀρτέμιδος: χρώνται δὲ ταῖς βουλαὶ πρὸς θυσίαν μόνον, ἄλλως δὲ παλάζοντα κατὰ τὴν χώραν ἄφετοι, Arrian An. vii. 20. 4 νέομονται τε τὴν νήσου αἰτὶ τε ἀγγείας καὶ ἐλάφοις καὶ ταύτας ἀνείσαν (let range) ἄφετοι τῇ Ἀρτέμιδι, Periplus Ponti Eux. 22 καὶ τῶν ἵερων τα μὲν καταθεῖεν, τὰ δὲ ἄφεταν τῷ Ἀχιλλεῖ. Hence ἄφετον νέομονται means range at will without oversight. Cf. Plato Rep. vi. 498 ε τότε ἑδὲ ἄφετοις νεομονταί καὶ μηδὲν ἄλλο πράττειν.
36. Clinias, the father of Alcibiades and Clinias, fell at Coronea 447 b.c. The guardianship of these sons was assumed by Ariphron and Pericles, whose mother Agariste was first cousin to Megacles, the father of Clinias’s widow, Dinomache (cf. Plut. Alc. 1). The sons probably lived, however, with their mother Dinomache in their father’s house. Pericles directed the separation on Alcibiades’s coming of age, in 433 b.c.
37. δὴ: indicates (with a good-natured thrust at Alcibiades who was present) that the apprehension of Pericles was quite natural and reasonable.
38. καταθέμενος: deposit, place in one’s keeping. Cf. 314 a, Legg. xi. 913 c & μὴ κατέθου, μὴ ἀνέλη, Thuc. i. 115. 3 Ἀθηναίοι δὲ ὑμήρους ἐλαβον καὶ κατέθεντο ἐς Λήμνον. — ἐν Ἀρίφρονος: for the ellipsis, see on 326 c.
καὶ πρὶν ἐξ μὴνας γεγονέναι ἀπέδωκε τούτῳ οὐκ ἔχων δ’
tο χρήσασθαι αὐτῷ. καὶ ἄλλους σοι παμπόλλους ἔχω λέγειν, ἃ
οἴ αυτοὶ ἀγαθοὶ οὔτε οὐδένα πώς τοι βελτίων ἐποίησαν
οὔτε τῶν οὐκείων οὔτε τῶν ἄλλοτριῶν. ἔγω οὖν, ὁ Πρω-
ταγόρα, εἰς ταῦτα ἀποβλέπον οὐχ ἤγοομαι διδάκτον εἶναι
ἀρετήν. ἐπειδή δὲ σοῦ ἀκούω ταῦτα λέγοντος, κάμπτομαι
καὶ οἴμαι τὶ σε λέγειν διὰ τὸ ἡγεῖσθαι σε πολλῶν μὲν
εἴμεπουρον γεγονέναι, πολλὰ δὲ μεμαθηκέναι, τὰ δὲ αὐτῶν
ἐξηνηκέναι. εἰ οὖν ἔχεις ἑναργέστερον ἡμῖν ἐπίδειξιν, ὃς
διδάκτον ἑστὶν ἡ ἀρετή, μὴ φθονήσῃς, ἀλλ’ ἐπίδειξιον. ε
’ Ἀλλ’, ὁ Σώκρατες, ἐφή, οὐ φθονήσω. ἀλλὰ πότερον
50 ἡμῖν, ὡς προσβύτερος νεώτεροι, μυθὸν λέγων ἐπίδειξιν

39. καὶ: paratactic. “Although
Pericles had separated Clinias from
Alcibiades, yet he soon gave him back
to him.” καὶ is often thus used. Cf.
Soph. O. T. 413 σὺ καὶ διδορκας, καῦ
βλαπεῖς ἤ’ εἶ κακοῦ (i.e. although you
have sight, you see not in what evil you
are involved). — γεγονέναι: of time,
elapse. Cf. Rep. x. 616 b ἐπείδη δὲ
tοίς ἐν τῷ λεμαίων (meadow) ἐκάστοις
ἐπὶ ἡμέρα γένοντο, Phaedo 108 c ἔὼς
ἀν δὴ τίνες χρόνοι γένονται. — ἀπέδωκε
τούτῳ: sc. Pericles to Alcibiades.
For the prominent thought is the
failure (ἀποστάσας ἀπὸ τοῦτον) of Peri-
cles to carry out the education of
Clinias.

40. χρήσασθαι: opt. of indir. disc.
derived from the deliberative subjv.
Cf. 321 c. See G. 244; Π. 932, 2.

44. κάμπτομαι: am led to waver. Cf.
Lach. 192 c εἶ τις ἱερὸς ὄν μὴ καμ-
πτοτοι ἄλλα καρποί, Ρεπ. vi. 494 c ἐὰν
δ’ οὖν εἰς αἰθανύται τέ πῃ καὶ κάμ-
πτηται καὶ ἐλκηται πρὸς φιλοσοφίαν but
suppose, further, one has some perception
of the truth, and is led to waver and is
drawn towards philosophy,

46. Socrates distinguishes between
three sources of knowledge: “Protagor-
as has had much experience, has
learned much from others, and has
thought out much for himself.”

48. διδάκτον ... ἀρετή: this is the
c proposition to be proved, and we nat-
urally expect at the outset a defini-
tion of ἀρετή. — μὴ φθονήσῃς: po-
litely urges the request. Cf. Gorg.
489 a μὴ φθάνει μοι ἀποκρίνασθαι τοῦτο.

50. μῦθον ἡ λόγος: Protagoras gives
both story and argument. He first,
after the manner of the sophists, tells
a story, drawn in part from the popu-
lar myths concerning Prometheus and
aboriginal man, and embellished by
his free invention; a method, as he is
aware, much more acceptable to the
people than dry disquisition; and from
this myth he draws various concu-
sions. Then, after 324 d (οὐκέτι μῦθον,
ἄλλα λόγον), he develops an argument
which he contrasts as real (λόγος)
with the fictitious (μῦθος).
With similar contrast, Socrates says in Phaedo
61 b ἐννοήσας ὅτι τὸν ποιήσῃ δεῖν πο-
εῖν μῦθον ἄλλ’ οὐ λόγους (fictions, not
320 realities), Gorg. 523 a ἐκοινο ὅμη μᾶλα καλοῦ λόγου, ὄν ς μὲν ἄγγα μέδον, ἐγὼ δὲ λόγον.

51. διεξελθὼν: we should expect διεξερχόμενος, but cf. Theaet. 167 d ἀμφωσὶ̣βητεῖ, λόγῳ αὐτιδιεξελθῶν dispute it, traversing it in an argument.

53. χαριστερον: an element of value, provided the argument be not impaired.

XI. 1. In the first part of the discourse, the myth, Plato represents Protagoras as imitating the tone of old legends, as indeed he may very likely have done in similar narratives. This appears in the whole tone of the recital, the simple construction, the selection of words and phrases peculiar to poetry (γῆς ἐνδον, ἀπλων φύσιν, σμικρότητι ἡμιπασχε, πτηνῶν φυγῆν, ἀνυσταθεῖ, ἀληθοφαρίων, σχοῖνων, πόλεων κόσμων τοι καὶ δεσμίων, φιλίας συναγωγοῖ, νόσον πόλεως κτλ.), and the freq. omission of the art. (esp. with ἀνθρωπος). The very beginning was common in legends. Cf. Stasinus Cypr. Frag. 1 Ἡν ὄτε μυρία φίλα, Critias in Sext. Empir. ix. 54 Ἡν χρόνος, ὄτε Ἡν, Theocr. vii. 1 Ἡς χρόνος, ἀνὰ ἐγώ.

3. ἐνδον: with the gen. survives in prose only in the old-fashioned Antiphon v. ἐνδον ὧν αὐτῷ καὶ μὴ περιβεβήνοι. — Parmenides held that fire and earth were the original elements of the sensible world; Empedocles first inserted between these as elements, air and water, which combine with fire and earth. That men originally sprang from the earth was the ancient belief of many peoples, and upon this belief rest the Greek autochthonic myths (Preller's Gr. Mythol. i. 363). To this Plato attaches also the myth in Polit. 272 a c.

4. τῶν: the art. before rel. clauses is freq. in Plato. Cf. Rep. vi. 510 a τὰ ἐν τοῖς θύσαι φαντάσματα καὶ ἐν τοῖς ὅσα πυκνά τε καὶ λεία καὶ φανὰ ξυνέστηκε the reflections in water, and in whatever bodies are solid, smooth, and polished, Phaedo 75 b ὄργεται τοῦ ὁ ἅσιν ἵσον ἄσπειρον aspires to that which is equal (i.e. abstract equality).

7. παρατείται: beg as a favor, cf. Apol. 27 a ἄπερ κατ' ἄρχαὶ υἱὰς παρηπτησάμην, Critias 106 c ταύταν καὶ τῶν ἐγὼ τούτο παρατούμαι. Instead of the acc. of the thing, here the inf. νείμαι is used. Otherwise below, 358 a.
αὐτὸς νεῖμαι. Νείμαντος δ’ ἐμοὶ, ἔφη, ἐπίσκεψαι. καὶ οὗτῳ πείσας νέμει. νέμων δὲ τοῖς μὲν ἵσχυν ἀνευ τάχους εἰς προσήπτε, τὰ δ’ ἀσθενέστερα τάχει ἐκόσμει· τὰ δ’ ὡπλίζε, τοῖς δ’ ἀσπλον διδοὺς φύσιν ἄλλην τῳ’ αὐτοῖς ἐμηχανάτο δύναμιν εἰς σωτηρίαν. ἃ μὲν γὰρ αὐτῶν σμικρότητι ἡμιπ- σχε, πτηνὸν φυγὴν ἡ κατάγειν οἰκήσιν ἐνεμευ· ἢ δὲ ηὐξε μεγέθει, τῷ δε αὐτῷ αὐτὰ ἐσφεζ’ καὶ τάλλα οὕτως ἐπαν- 15 ισών ἐνεμε. ταῦτα δὲ ἐμηχανάτο εὐλάβειαν ἐχων μή τι γένος ἀιστωθεί. ἐπειδὴ δὲ αὐτοῖς ἀλληλοφθοριών διαφυ- γας ἐπηρκέσε, πρὸς τὰς ἐκ Δίος ὀρας εὑμάρειαν ἐμηχα- νάτο ἀμφίενντα αὐτὰ πυκναὶς τε θριξὶ καὶ στερεοὶς δέρμα- σιν, ἱκάνοις μὲν ἀμώναι χειμώνα, δυνατοῖς δὲ καὶ καύματα, 20 καὶ εἰς εὐνάς ιοῦσιν ὅπως ὑπάρχοι τὰ αὐτὰ ταῦτα στρω- μνη ὁικεία τε καὶ αὐτοφυὴς ἐκάστῳ, καὶ ὑποδῶν τὰ μὲν βόπλαίς, τὰ δὲ δέρμασι στερεοὶς καὶ ἀναίμοις. τούντευ- θεν τροφὰς ἄλλους ἄλλας ἐξεπόριζε, τοῖς μὲν ἐκ γῆς βο- τάνην, ἄλλους δὲ δειδρων καρποὺς, τοῖς δὲ ρίζας· ἐστι 25 δ’ οἰς ἐδωκεν εἴναι τροφὴν ζώων ἄλλων βοράν. καὶ τοῖς μὲν ὀλυγογονίων προσήψε, τοῖς δ’ ἀναλυσκομένοις ὑπὸ τούτων πολυγονίων, σωτηρίαν τῷ γένει πορίζων. ἀτε δὴ ὦν οὐ πάνυ τι σοφὸς ὁ Ἔπιμηθείς ἐλαθεν αὐτὸν κατ- αναλώσας τὰς δυνάμεις, λοιπὸν δ’ ἀκόσμητον ἐτι αὐτῷ καὶ ἡν τὸ ἀνθρώπων γένος, καὶ ἠπόρει ὅ τι χρήσατο. ἀπο- 21 14. τῶδε: for τοὔτοις is another touch of poetic and archaic expression, in addition to those mentioned above (see on l. 1). Still others are the dat. θριξὶ with ἀμφεμνόν, instead of the acc. (cf. Symp. 219 b), αὐτοῖς ἐμη- χανάτο after τοῖς δ’, and αὐτὰ ἐσφεζ’ after ἢ δέ. See G. 164; Π. 724. 19 f. The purpose of clothing the animals with τρίχες and στερεὰ δέρματα is given in changing construction, first ἱκανοῖς and δυνατοῖς, then καὶ ὅπως ὑπάρχοι. 24. ἐστὶ δ’ οἰς: cf. 316 ε ἱστὶν οὐς. b In the nom., however, according to prevalent Attic use, 342 ε εἶσιν οἶς. See G. 152, n. 2; Π. 998. 27. σωτηρίαν: safety, continuance. 28. οὐ πάνυ τι: ‘lilotes,’ not very wise, i.e. very unwise. So often οὐ πάνυ τι, οὐ μᾶλα, οὐ σφόδρα, like οὐχ ἡμιστα ete.
connected to the nature of the physical life, in contrast with the political, which is the ground of the social life and of all culture.
πλατωνοσ πρωταγορας.

67

41. ἐσχε, ἐξεν: obtained, had; for the inceptive use of the aor., see G. 200, n. 5b; H. 841.

42. Protagoras represents Olympus as resembling a city of the Greek heroic age; the ruler occupies the citadel, the people the lower city.

43. οὐκέτι: he could no longer go forward, and enter the citadel itself.

44. φυλακαὶ: prob. Bia and Kratos are meant, whom Hesiod Theog. 385 ff. calls the inseparable attendants of Zeus, and whom Aeschylus (Prometheus ad init.) introduces as his ever-compliant beadles.

45. Hephaestus and Athena were closely associated in the Attic belief; see the legend of Erichthonius, the feasts Χαλκεία and Ἀπατοῦρα, and the Ἀθηναία Ἑφασμία recently established by inscriptions. Preller's Gr. Mythol. i. 146 f.

46. ταῦτα μετέσχε μοῖρας, πρῶτον μὲν διὰ τὴν συγγένειαν ζώων μόνον θεοὺς ἐνόμισε καὶ ἐπεχείρη βαμοῦς τε ἱδρύεσθαι καὶ ἀγάλματα θεῶν· ἐπείτα φωνήν καὶ ὄνομα ταχὺ δημηθρώσατο τῇ τέχνῃ,

47. XII. Ἐπειδή δὲ ὁ ἄνθρωπος θείας μετέσχε μοῖρας, πρῶτον μὲν διὰ τὴν συγγένειαν ζώων μόνον θεοὺς ἐνόμισε καὶ ἐπεχείρη βαμοῦς τε ἱδρύεσθαι καὶ ἀγάλματα θεῶν· ἐπείτα φωνήν καὶ ὄνομα ταχὺ δημηθρώσατο τῇ τέχνῃ,

48. 1. θείας ... μοῖρας: received a share in divinity. — πρῶτον, ἐπείτα: indicate, not temporal sequence, but the different points of view, from which the imparting of that which belonged to the gods worked advantageously to men.

2. μόνον: neut. adj., identifies ὁ ἄνθρωπος as one of τὰ ζώα. — ἐνόμισε: inceptive aor., took up the belief in the gods.

4. ἐπείτα: correlative with μέν. — δημηθρώσατο: the technical term for articulation; articulated speech and thus formed words. Language therefore, acc. to Protagoras, did not arise at the beginning with man, but he immediately fashioned it, from the sounds derived from nature, through the skill bestowed upon him by Prometheus (cf. Symp. 191a τὰ στήθη διήθρου sc. ὁ Απόλλων).

5. κλοπῆς δίκη: technical term from the Attic criminal process; a prosecution for theft pursued Prometheus.
5 καὶ οἰκήσεις καὶ ἐσθήτας καὶ υποδέσεις καὶ στρωμάτας καὶ τάς ἐκ γῆς τροφὰς ἡμετε. οὐτὼ δὴ παρεσκευασμένοι κατ’ ἀρχὰς ἀνθρώποι οἵκους σποράδην, πόλεις δὲ οὐκ ἦσαν. ἀπώλλυτο οὖν ὑπὸ τῶν θηρίων διὰ τὸ πανταχῇ αὐτῶν ἀσθενέστεροι εἶναι, καὶ ἡ δημιουργική τέχνη αὐτοῖς πρὸς μὲν τροφὴν ἴκανή βοηθὸς ἦν, πρὸς δὲ τῶν τῶν θηρίων πόλεμον ἐνδείξει. πολιτικὴ γὰρ τέχνην οὖπώ εἰχον, ἢς μέρος πολεμική. εἴητον δὲ ἀθροίζεσθαι καὶ σφύζεσθαι κτίζοντες πόλεις. οὐ’ οὖν ἀθροίζεθειν, ἦδικον ἀλλήλους ἄτε οὐκ ἔχοντες τὴν πολιτικὴν τέχνην, ὡστε
10 πάλιν σκέδασσάμενοι διεφθείροντο. Ζεὺς οὖν δείσας περὶ τῷ γένει ἤμων, μὴ ἀπόλοιτο πάν, Ἐρμῆν πέμπει ἄγοντα εἰς ἀνθρώπους αἰδῶ τε καὶ δίκην, ἐν εἰεν πόλεων κόσμοι τε καὶ δεσμοί, φιλίας συναγωγοί. ἐρωτᾷ οὖν Ἐρμῆς Δία, τίνα οὖν τρόπον δοῦν δίκην καὶ αἰδῶ ἀνθρώποις.
15 Πότερον ὡς αἱ τέχναι νενεμήνται, οὖτω καὶ ταύτας νείμω; νενεμήνται δὲ ὁδε. εἰς ἔχων ἰατρικὴν πολλοῖς ἴκανος

322 8. πανταχῇ: in every respect.
9. ἀσθενέστεροι: pred. nom. See G. 136, x. 3; H. 968, 940.
11. θηρίων: subjective gen. Cf. Xen. An. ii. 5. 7 τῶν γὰρ θεῶν πόλεμον οὐκ οἴδα ἀπὸ πολλοῦ ἔμειν ἐκ νῶν 
17. αἰδῶ, δίκην: often represented as the protecting spirits and the underlying conditions of all social and civilized life, "reverence for divine and human law." Cf. Tyr. xii. 39 f. (= Theogn. 937 f.) γηράσκων ἀστοίσι μεταπεπεί (growing old, he is distinguished among the citizens), οὐδέ τις αὐτῶν | βλάπτειν (deprive him of) οὐρ’ αἰδῶς οὔτε δίκης ἑθελεί, Theogn. 291 f. αἰδῶς μὲν γὰρ ὀλωλεν, ἀναιδείγ δὲ καὶ ὑβρισ (shamelessness and insolence) | νικήσασα δίκην γὰρ κατὰ πᾶσαν ἔχει, Hes. "Ėργα 192 δίκη δ’ ἐν χερσὶ καὶ αἰδῶς οὐκ ἔσται, and similarly 1b. 200 αἰδῶς καὶ νέμεσις.
18. δεσμοί: cf. Tim. 31 ο δεσμῶν γὰρ ἐν μέσῳ δεῖ τινα ἀρωιάν εὐναγωγῶν γλυτεθαι for there must be some bond between them uniting them both. The words are perhaps borrowed from some poet. The paronomasia κόσμοι, δεσμοί is noticeable.
19. οὖν: in a dependent question, cf. Ὀντ. 219 ὡστε οὖθ’ ὅπως οὖν ὄργυοικα εἶχον so neither therefore could I be angry with him. So ἀρα Phaedr. 228 δ ἔδειγα γε πρῶτον τι ἀρα ἐν τῷ ἀστερᾶ π’ ἔχεις. — For a similar sudden transition to dir. disc., cf. 320 δ, 325 δ, 338 b.
ιδιώταις, καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι δημιουργοὶ. καὶ δίκην δὴ καὶ
αἰδὼν οὕτω ὦν ἐν τοῖς ἄνθρωποις, ἢ ἐπὶ πάντας νεῖμο;·
Ἔπι πάντας, ἐφή ὁ Ζεὺς, καὶ πάντες μετεχόντων· οὐ γὰρ ἄ
25 ἄν γένοντο πόλεις, εἰ ολίγοι αὐτῶν μετέχοιες ὡστε
ἀλλων τεχνῶν. καὶ νόμον γε θές παρ’ ἐμοῦ τὸν μὴ δυνά-
μενον αἰδοὺς καὶ δίκης μετέχειν κτείνειν ὃς νόσον
πόλεως.

Οὕτω δή, ὦ Σώκρατες, καὶ διὰ ταῦτα οἱ τε ἄλλοι
30 καὶ Ἀθηναῖοι, ὅταν μὲν περὶ ἄρετῆς τεκτονικῆς ἢ λόγος
ἡ ἄλλης τυός δημιουργικῆς, ολίγοις οὐσιοί ποιεῖν
συμβουλής, καὶ εάν τις ἐκτὸς ὑπ’ ὧν τῶν ὀλίγων συμβουλεύῃ, εἰ
οὐκ ἀνέχονται, ὦς σὺ φής· εἰκότως, ὦς ἐγὼ φημι· ὅταν
δὲ εἰς συμβουλὴν πολιτικῆς ἄρετῆς ἴωσιν, ἢν δὲι διὰ
323
35 δικαιοσύνης πᾶσαν ἴέναι καὶ σωφροσύνης, εἰκότως ἄπαντος

22. καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι δημιουργοὶ: is loosely appended; sc. πολλοίς ἰκανοῖς ἰδιώταις. We should have expected καὶ εἰς ἐκαστὸς τῶν ἄλλων δημιουργῶν ἰδιώτας. Cf. 328 c.

24. This is the culmination of the myth, which was to show that virtue can be taught (see on 320 c); while it really only asserts that all men possess virtue, and this with an important saving qualification (line 26). If virtue is purely a gift, and is so vitally important, there is no reason why Zeus should not have bestowed it upon all, instead of leaving exceptions who were to be destroyed as pests. If virtue is not a gift, the myth proves (asserts) nothing whatever. The importance to Protagoras, however, of the exception, is that it leaves room for the argument upon responsibility and punishment (323 c f.).

27. νόσον: used only poetically of persons. Cf. Aesch. Prom. 1068 f. τῶν προδότας γάρ μισεῖν ἐμαθον, καὶ κοιν

22. Ἀθηναῖοι: pl. proper names of peoples generally take the art, but may omit it. This omission here is easier because of the ὦ τε ἄλλοι, cf. 324 e. — ἄρετῆς τεκτονικῆς: “a matter involving the builder’s art”; cf. 319 b.

31. μετείναι συμβουλής: have a right to give counsel.

34. πολιτικῆς ἄρετῆς: objective gen. after συμβουλήν, “a matter involving political science.” — ἵνα: sc. ἄρετὴν, subj. of ἴέναι.

35. ἴέναι διὰ: take one’s way through a thing, “follow the path of,” “act in the sphere of”; used by Plato in many connections. Others use similarly χωρεῖν, πορεύεσθαι, ἔρχεσθαι διὰ. Cf. Xen. An. iii. 2. 8 εἰ μὲν οὖν βου-

λευόμεθα πάλιν αὐτοῖς διὰ φιλίας ἴέναι, ...

. . . καὶ τὸ λοιπὸν διὰ παντὸς πολέμου αὐτοῖς ἴέναι. — σωφροσύνης: must here
andros anexontai, ws panti prosochon taútis, ge metéchein tis arêtis, h mē einai pòleis. autê, o Swókrates, tou-
tou aitia.

...Iva de mē oûi apatásithai, ws tâ ònti ãgyontai 40 pântes anârhoipoi pânta andra metéchein dikaiosúnês te
cal tis ãllhs politikês arêtis, tôde aû labe tekmîrion.

'En yap taís ãllais ãretauîs, õôspér ou légéis, ëáv tis fê
âgyathos avlhtís einai, h ãllhn ãntiwôn têchnh, hî mē
êstîn, h katagelôswîn h ã kalepaimounai, kai oi oîkeôi prôs-
b 45 iôntes voutheoutôiws òws maînomênou. én de dikaiosûnh kal
eîn tî ãllhn politikê ãrethê, ëáv tîa kai eídôswîn, oti
âdikôs êstîn, èáv oûtos autôs kal' autôn tâlthê légh:
êanntion pollôn, ò ekêî sôphrosûnh ãgyontô einai, tâl-
thè légen, êntaudha maînian, kai fasi pântas deîn fànai
50 ëainai dikaious, ëán te òswîn èáv te mē, h maînesthai tòn

323 have the sense of aïdôs. — eikôtos... a
anexontai: the emphasis is on both
the adv. and the verb (cf. 322 e).
"In view of the facts contained in
the myth (ouût dhî, cal da taûta),
the Athenians, and with good reason,
listen to every man," — i.e. they believe
every man to possess virtue; a con-
cclusion which Protagoras goes on to
confirm.

37. h: sc. anagkaiôn èn from proso-
kov, cf. Phaedr. 245 d tûto ðè (i.e. the self-moving) ou't aûllâsvai ou'te
gînveštia dvnaton, h pânta te oufrón
pàsdâ te gîneôss swmpetousan sfhînu
(else the whole heaven and all created
things must collapse and come to a stand-
still) where anagkaieron is supplied from
dunaton. Conversely, Rep. vi. 490 a
hî (sc. âlhthian) diôkên autôn pàntos
kal pânta ëdêî, h âlaxhî (an impostor)
ûnti miûdâmî meteînai philosophia âlhthi-
vîs (sc. dunaton hî). For h, otherwise,
or else (aliaquin), see 323 b bis, 323
325 a etc. — ãyai: exist. Cf. 327 a.
39. ãs: apparently might depend
upon apatásâthai, equiv. to met' apâthês
peîthethai, cf. Crat. 413 d tîsas yap
ân se kai tâ ãplîstia èxasththasai, òws
ôuk âkrikous lége, and so often. But
here tî ònti shows that ãs depends
rather upon the following tôde... têkmîrion.
Cf. 324 e.
42. õôspèr ou' légèes: cf. 319 e.
48. èkeî: i.e. èn taís ãllais ãretauîs. b
— ãgyontô: a general truth, but impf.
as referred to a previous illustration
or observation. Cf. Crito 47 d diaphê-
roûmen èkeîno kai laðhstómeba, ò tî û
dikaiô phêtton ègînegu, tî de âdikô
âplalluto.
49. êntaudha maînian: sc. ãgyontai.
Thus the universality of virtue is
proved by the fact that men will not
tolerate the truthful confession of
its lack.
πλατωνος πρωταγόρας.

71

μὴ προσποιούμενον δικαιοσύνην. ὡς ἀναγκαῖον οὐδένα ὄντων οὐχὶ ἀμωσγέπως μετέχειν αὐτῆς ἢ μὴ εἶναι ἐν εἰ ἀνθρώποις.

XIII. "Ὅτι μὲν οὖν πάντ' ἄνδρα εἰκότως ἀποδέχονται περὶ ταύτης τῆς ἀρετῆς συμβουλον διά τὸ ἡγεῖσθαι παντὶ μετέχειν αὐτῆς, ταῦτα λέγω· ὅτι δὲ αὐτὴν οὐ φύει ἡγοῦνται εἰναι οὐδ' ἀπὸ τοῦ αὐτομάτου, ἀλλὰ διδακτὸν τε καὶ 5 εὖ ἐπιμελείας παραγίγνεσθαι ὡς ἀν παραγίγνηται, τούτῳ σοι μετὰ τούτῳ πειράσομαι ἀποδείξαι. ὅσα γὰρ ἡγοῦνται ἀλλήλους κακὰ ἔχειν ἀνθρώπων φύει ἡ τύχη, οὐδεὶς θυ- 

α ὑποτά σου οὐδὲ νοθετεῖ οὐδὲ διδάσκει, οὐδὲ κολάζει τοὺς ἑαυτὰ ἔχοντας, ἢν μὴ τοιοῦτοι ὃσιν, ἀλλ' ἐλεεῦσον. οἷον 10 τοὺς αἰσχροὺς ἢ σμικροὺς ἢ ἀσθενεῖς τίς οὕτως ἀνόητος ὡστε τι τούτων ἐπιχειρεῖν ποιεῖν; ταῦτα μὲν γὰρ, οὕμα, ἱσασιν ὅτι φύει τε καὶ τύχη τοὺς ἀνθρώπους γίγνεται τὰ κακὰ καὶ τάναντια τούτοις· ὅσα δὲ εὖ ἐπιμελείας καὶ ἀσκήσεως καὶ διδαχῆς οἴονται γίγνεσθαι ἄγαθὰ ἀνθρώ-

323 51. δικαιοσύνην: cf. Thuc. i. 137. 4 b ἦν ἴσως προσεποίησατο, Aeschin. II. 166 τὴν φήμην οὐ προσεποίησα. Everywhere else Plato uses the inf. after προσποιούθηκαί. — ὡς: sometimes followed by the simple adj. absolutely, while usually ἦν is added; cf. Rep. v. 449 c ὡς ἀρα παντὶ δήλον, Gorg. 495 c ὡς ἐτερον τὴν ἀνδρείαν τῆς ἐπιστήμης (on the ground that courage differs from knowledge) δῦο ταῦτα ἔλεγες; — οὐδένα ὄντων: see on 317 c.

c XIII. 1. According to rhetorical principles, the part which has been proved is brought to a separate close, here and 324 c, and what remains to be proved is stated; finally 328 e the whole is brought to a regular conclusion. Protagoras was himself a teacher of rhetoric.

3. οὐ φύει κτ.: but cf. ἐπὶ πάντας νείμων 323 e. It is now necessary to show that virtue is not an original possession of all.

4. ἀπὸ τοῦ αὐτομάτου: equiv. to τύχη below.

6. μετὰ τούτο: freq. in Plato; in the next place, when one point is finished and another is to be taken up. Cf. 355 a ὡς μετὰ τούτο as subst., the next point. Now follows the second division of the speech of Protagoras.

10. αἰσχροὺς ἢ σμικροὺς: the d Greeks regarded beauty and stature as qualities which were never separated. — For the acc. of the person after ποιεῖν τι, see G. 165; II. 725 a.

13. τὰ . . . τούτοις: follows ταῦτα epexegetically.
15 ποις, εάν τις ταύτα μη ἔχῃ, ἀλλὰ τάναντια τούτων κακά, ε
ἐπὶ τούτως ποι ὦ τε θυμοὶ γίγνονται καὶ αἱ κολάσεις καὶ αἱ νουθετήσεις. δὲν ἐστὶν ἐν καὶ ἡ ἀδικία καὶ ἡ ἁσέ-
βεια καὶ συλλήβδην πάν τὸ ἐναντίον τῆς πολιτικῆς ἀρε-
τῆς. ἐνθα δὴ πᾶς παντὶ θυμοῦται καὶ νουθετεί, δῆλον
20 ὦτι ὡς ἐξ ἐπιμελείας καὶ μαθήσεως κτητῆς οὕτως. εἰ
γὰρ ἐθέλεις ἐννοῆσαι τὸ κολάζειν, ὦ Σόκρατε, τοὺς ἁδι-
κούντας τὶ ποτὲ δύναται, αὐτὸ σε διδάξει, ὦτι οὐ γε ἄν-
θρωποι ἡγοῦνται παρασκευαστὸν ἐνώ ἁρετήν. οὕτεις
gὰρ κολάζει τοὺς ἁδικοῦντας πρὸς τοῦτῳ τὸν νοῦν ἐξων
25 καὶ τοῦτον ἑνεκα, ὦτι ἡδίκησεν, ὦστεις μὴ ἄσπερ θηρίον ἡ
ἀλογιστῶς τιμωρεῖται. ὦ δὲ μετὰ λόγου ἐπιχειρῶν κολά-
ζειν οὐ τοῦ παρεληνυθότος ἑνεκα ἁδικήματος τιμωρεῖται
— οὐ γὰρ ἄν τὸ γε πραπαθὲν ἀγέννητον θεία — ἀλλὰ τοῦ

323 17. ἁσέβεια: cf. 322 a. Since men
worshipped the gods before receiv-
ing ἁρετή πολιτικῆ, Protagoras be-
gins here to enlarge his definition of
virtue, cf. 325 a, 329 c, 330 a.
324 a 19. δῆλον ὦτι: this expression, as
well as οἶδ᾽ ὦτι, is often added to a
clause or inserted in it with the force
of an adv., evidently, certainly. See
H. 1049, 1 a.
420 δ ὥστε ὃιν ἄγειν τὸ παράπαν
οὐκ ἐστὶν, ὥστε τοῦτο σοι δύναται ο λόγος;
Euthyd. 286 e τούτο γὰρ δύναται ο λό-
γος. — αὐτὸ σε διδάξει: the matter it-
self will teach you. αὐτὸ is not to be
referred to κολάζειν. Cf. the standing
formulae αὐτὸ δείξει (Hipp. Ma. 288 b
ei δ’ ἐπισκεφθάς ἐσται καταγέλαστος,
αὐτὸ δείξει), αὐτὸ δηλώσει (329 b, Crit. 108 c
τοῦτο μὲν οὐκ ὀδὴ ἐστὶν, αὐτὸ σοι
tάχα δηλώσει), and passages like Soph.
Frag. 352 ταχύ δ’ αὐτὸ δείξει τοῦργον,
ὡς ἐγὼ, σαφῶς.—οὐ γε ἄνθρωποι: not
necessarily all men, but all excepting
the class referred to below, ὦστεις μὴ
ἀσπερ θηρίον κτέ.
24. τοὺς ἁδικούντας, ὦτι ἡδίκησεν:
for the change to the sing., see on
319 d. — πρὸς τοῦτῳ ἐξων: equiv. to
τοῦτῳ προσέχων.
25. ὦστεις ... θηρίον: antithetical b
with ὦ τε ἄνθρωποι above.
26. μετὰ λόγου: with reason (op-
posed to ἀλογιστῶς), so that he gives
to himself, and can give to others,
account of what he does. Cf. Tim.
28 a τὸ μὲν δὴ νοῆσει μετὰ λόγου περι-
ληπτόν (to be received by the intelligence
with reason), ἀεὶ κατὰ ταύτα ὅν (being
always the same), τὸ δ’ ἄδ ὀδὴ μετ’ ἀι-
αθήσεως ἀλόγου δοξοῦσιν (but the other,
conceived by the opinion, with the help of
irrational sense), γεγραμμένον καὶ ἀπολύ-
μενον, Phaedr. 256 a ὦ δὲ πρὸς ταύτα
μετ’ αἰσθοῦ καὶ λόγου ἀντιτίθει. See
on 351 e.
28. οὐ γὰρ κτέ.: a thought widely
current among the Greeks, from which
Theognis has derived the ethical con-
μέλλοντος χάριν, ἵνα μὴ αὕθις ἀδικήσῃ μήτε αὐτὸς οὗτος
30 μήτε ἄλλος ὁ τοῦτον ἱδὼν κολασθέντα. καὶ τοιαύτῃν
dιάνοιαν ἔχων διανοεῖται παιδευτὴν εἶναι ἁρετήν. ἀπο-
tροπῆς γοῦν ἕνεκα κολάζει. ταύτῃ οὖν τὴν δοξαὶ πάντες
ἐχούσιν, ὥσιν περὶ τιμωροῦνται καὶ ἱδία καὶ δημοσία.
35 τιμωροῦνται δὲ καὶ κολάζονται οἱ τε ἄλλοι ἀνθρώποι
οὕς ἀν ὁίωνταί ἀδικεῖν, καὶ οὐχ ἤκιστα 'Ἀθηναῖοι, οἱ σοὶ
πολίται· ὥστε κατὰ τοῦτον τὸν λόγον καὶ 'Ἀθηναῖοι εἰσὶ
tῶν ἥγουμενῶν παρασκευαστὸν εἶναι καὶ διδακτὸν ἁρετήν.
Ὡς μὲν οὖν εἰκότως ἀποδέχονται οἱ σοὶ πολίται καὶ χαλ-
κέως καὶ σκυτοτόμου συμβουλεύοντος τὰ πολιτικὰ, καὶ ὅτι
40 διδακτὸν καὶ παρασκευαστὸν ἥγουνται ἁρετήν, ἀποδεδε-
κταί σοι, ὁ Σώκρατες, ἰκανῶς, ὡς γ' ἐμοὶ φαίνεται.

XIV. Ἑτὶ δὴ λοιπὰ ἀπορίᾳ ἐστὶν, ἣν ἀπορεῖς περὶ τῶν

314 tent of his words 583 f. ἀλλὰ τὰ μὲν
προβέβηκεν (that which is past) ἀμήχα-
νόν ἐστι γενέσθαι | ἀργα· τὰ δ' ἐξοπίσω,
60 τὸ γὰρ γεγενημένον οὐκέτι ἁρετὸν
(unfinished) ἔσται, Dem. iii. 6
tὰ μὲν δὴ τότε πραξάθεντα οὐκ ἂν ἄλλως
ἐχοι, Hor. Car. iii. 29. 45 ff.—τοῦ
μέλλοντος: subst., cf. Parm. 137 a
τρέμοντι τὸ μέλλον.
29. ἵνα...κολασθέντα: the theory
of prevention, which meets us also in
Gorg. 525 b and elsewhere in Plato,
prevailed more and more in the time
of the sophists as the ideas of the
state and of law lost power and sac-
credness. In former times the ideas
of retribution and of the expiation of
the violation of right and law, had
been the foundation of criminal law;
cf. Aesch. Cho. 313 δράσαστι παθεῖν, |
tριγύρων μοθὸς τάδε φωνεῖ the doer must
suffer, thus says a most ancient adage.
androu tov anagathen, ti deiptote oi andres oi agathoi ta mev alla tous auton vieis didaskouoin a didaskalovn exeTai kai sofois poiovsin, hyn de autoi arethen agathoi
5 ovdenvos baltious poiouste. toutou de peri, o Swokrates, ouketi mythin sou epero, alla logo. oide gar ennoishon.
Poterov esti ti evo ouk estin, ou anaagkaioun pantas e tous politas metechewn, ei per mellei polis einai; en touto gar authe lypetai h aporia, hyn su aporeis, h allothe ou-
10 damou. ei mhn gar esti kai touto esti to evo ou tekonikhe oude xalkieia oude kerameia, alla dikaiosunh kai sofro-
325 svnetai kai to osion einai, kai synallhbetaen en autoi prosagorein einai, andros arethen. ei touti estin ovei pantas metechewn kai metata toutou pant anp, eain ti kai allo

324 noun, since the needed definiteness is given by the rel. clause. Cf. Charm. 169a apo en toutois estin epistorh, hyn de hemis sofrosun phamen einai, Rep. iii. 413e phila aitou en agathos kal mouisois h
demavxan, Symp. 197e phojs metexonta, hyn xdei thelws joining in the song which he sings, charming, etc.—Here begins the third division of the speech.
4. exeTai: see on 310e. anagathoi: sc. eis.
5. ovdenvos baltious: lit. more excellent than no one, to excel no one. Cf. 335a, Aesch. Prom. 1016 athetaia gar ovdenvos meizon thenoi for self-will is utterly powerless, Dem. ii. 17 ovdenvos eisoi baltious, xix. 208 emou ovdenvos meizou thegoumenon estaiatai when I speak: more weakly than any other, they are discomfited. More freq. are the cases in which the comparative word has a neg. force, as in the use of eladoson, hason, evdeisteros, with a preceding ovdenvos. Cf. 316e ovdenvos hpton, he is inferior to no one, Eur.

Bacch. 777 Diunousos hason ovdenvos theon efw.
6. ouktei mython: the second part of the discourse had already been for the most part disconnected from the myth; but Protagoras now calls attention to this, in order to strengthen the impression that he is giving a fundamental demonstration from the nature of the subject itself.
8. en touto: “in the answer to this question.”
10. The following period is a typical example of imitation of oral disc., which, in its efforts at clearness, allows itself all manner of repetitions, recapitulations, and little anacolutha.
12. kal synallhbetaen kte.: inserted with anacolutha; see on 323e.
13. einai: see on 311e.
14. kal metato touto: a dem. or pers. pron. is common in such cases, after a copulative or disjunctive conj., instead of a repeated rel.
15. 

16. 

20. 

22. 

23. 

27. 

15. οὔτω: resumes μετὰ τοῦτου above.

16. τὸν μὴ μετέχοντα: cf. 323 a, 1. 40.—διδάσκειν κτῆ.: depends on δεῖ above.

20. οὔτω πεφυκότος: resumes the foregoing prot. in order to add another, containing a contradiction, and then the more emphatically to draw the conclusion σκέψαι κτῆ.

22. θαυμασίως γίγνονται: we should have expected θαυμάσιοι εἴσον οτ θαυ- 

23. This is continued from διδακτῶν of the previous line, “if it can be taught, as I have shown that people believe.”

25. τὰ μὲν ἄλλα κτῆ.: argument a minore ad majus.

26. ἡξιμα: in this use commonly has the art., “the legally appointed penalty.”

27. τέ: would be in its place, were the passage e.g. ἐδὲ ἢ τε ἡ ἡξιμα ἐστὶ 

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325. τέ: would be in its place, were the passage e.g. ἐδὲ ἢ τε ἡ ἡξιμα ἐστὶ
μη μαθοῦσι μηδὲ θεραπευθεῖσσον εἰς ἀρετὴν, καὶ πρὸς τῷ θανάτῳ χρημάτων τε δημεύσεις καὶ, ὡς ἐπος εἰπεῖν, ξυλισθησθησθαι τῶν οἴκων ἀνατροπαί, ταῦτα δ' ἄρα οὐ διδάσκονται οὐδ' ἐπιμελοῦνται πάσαν ἐπιμέλειαν; Οἴσεται γε χρῆ, δὲ Σώκρατες. ΧV. Ἐκ παῖδων σμικρῶν ἄρξάμενοι, μέχρι οὗ περὶ ἄν ξῶσι, καὶ διδάσκονται καὶ νουθετοῦσιν. ἐπειδὰν βάττον συνιῇ τις τὰ λεγόμενα, καὶ τροφὸς καὶ μητηρ καὶ παιδαγωγὸς καὶ αὐτὸς ὁ πατὴρ περὶ τούτου αὐτὸς διαμάχονται, ὅπως βέλτιστος ἔσται ὁ παῖς, παρ' ἐκαστὸν καὶ ἐργὸν καὶ λόγον διδάσκοντες καὶ ἐνδεικνύοντο, ὅτι τὸ μὲν δίκαιον, τὸ δὲ ἄδικον, καὶ τὸδε μὲν καλὸν, τὸδε δὲ αἰσχρὸν, καὶ τὸδε μὲν ὄσιον, τὸδε δὲ ἀνόσιον, καὶ Τὰ μὲν ποιεῖ, τὰ δὲ μὴ ποιεῖ. καὶ ἐὰν μὲν ἐκὼν πείθηται, 10—ει δὲ μῆ, ὡσπερ ξύλον διαστρεφόμενον καὶ καμπτόμενον ἐνθύνουσιν ἀπειλάς καὶ πληγάς. Μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα

28. μη... ἀρετήν: added epexegetically, with anacoluthon after ἔφαν.

29. ξυλισθησθησθαι: is unexpected after ὡς ἐπος εἰπεῖν, but cf. Apol. 22 δ ὡς ἐπος γὰρ εἰπεῖν ἀλίγου αὐτῶν ἀπαντεῖ οἱ παρόντες ἐν βέλτιστον ἔλεγον.—The destruction of one’s house, the extinction of one’s family, stood for the greatest possible disaster.

30. δ' ἄρα: see on 313 α, 1. 2. Cf. Crito 46 ἢ πρὶν μὲν ἐμὲ δεῖν ἀποθνῄσκειν καλῶς ἐκλέγετο, νῦν δὲ κατάδηπτος ἄρα ἐγένετο κτέ.; 50 ἢ πρὶς μὲν ἄρα σοι τὸν πατέρα οὐκ ἐξ οὐδὲν ἄρα τὸ δίκαιον (while towards your father it was certainly not right for you), πρὸς δὲ τὴν πατρίδα ἄρα καὶ τοὺς νόμους ἔξεσται σοι κτέ.

31. οἰκῆται γε χρῆ: an expression freq. in Plato in reply to a question raised by the speaker himself or a bystander. What follows is added ‘asynectically,’ because it confirms of. εσθαί δὲ χρῆ by a surprising fact.

XV. 1. On the following classical passage upon the training of the youth, see Becker Char. ii. 19 ff., Hermann Griech. Alt. iii. § 33 ff., Guhl and Koner, Life of the Greeks and Romans, §§ 50, 51.

3. ἐπειδὰν βάττον κτέ.: during the first years, nurse and mother; later, pedagogue and father.—βάττον: is rare after ἐπεί and similar particles; more freq. is τάχιστα. In Plato, besides this place, βάττον is found thus only in Alc. I. 105 a ἄνω βάττον.

6 ff. So Demea admonishes his son, d Terent. Ad. iii. 3. 63: Hoc facito.
—Hoc fugitio.—Hoc laudis est.
—Hoc viti datur.

9. πείθηται κτέ.: see on 311 d, 1. 20.

eis didaskalówνς péμποντες πολὺ μᾶλλον ἐντέλλονται ἐπι-
μελείσθαι εὐκοσμίας τῶν παιδῶν ἢ γραμμάτων τε καὶ
κιθαρίσεως. οἱ δὲ διδάσκαλοι τούτων τε ἐπιμελοῦνται, καὶ
15 καὶ ἐπειδὰν αὖ γράμματα μάθωσι καὶ μέλλωσι συνήσειν
τὰ γεγραμμένα, ὥσπερ τὸ τῆς φωνῆς, παρατιθέασιν
αὐτοῖς ἐπὶ τῶν βάθρων ἄναγιγνώσκειν ποιητῶν ἀγαθῶν
ποιήματα καὶ ἐκμανθάνειν ἄναγκαζοῦσιν, ἐν οἷς πολλαὶ
μὲν νουθετήσεις ἐνεύσι, πολλαὶ δὲ διεξόδου καὶ ἐπανοὶ 326
καὶ ἐγκώμια παλαιῶν ἀνδρῶν ἀγαθῶν, ὥν ὁ πάς ξηλῶν
μιμήται καὶ ὀρέγεται τοιούτως γενέσθαι. οὐ τ' αὖ κι-
θαρισταῖ ἐτέρα τοιαύτα: σωφροσύνης τε ἐπιμελοῦνται
καὶ ὅπως ἃν οἱ νέοι μηδὲν κακουργῶσι: πρὸς δὲ τούτοις,

gεγενηθαι συμβολῶν τῷ βίῳ τῶν ἀνθρώπων Isocr. π. 43. In part the
teachers dictated passages merely,

which were to be committed to mem-

ory; cf. Euthyd. 276 c ὡστε ἀποστο-

ματίζοι (dictated) ὡμί ν' ἀραμαμιστής,

πότεροι ἐμάνθανον τῶν παιδῶν τὰ ἀπο-

στοματιζόμενα;


viii. 4 οὐ γὰρ πάσιν μαθάνοντες (οἱ

νέοι) μετὰ λύπης γὰρ ἡ μάθησις.

19. διεξόδου: attractive tales, descrip-

tions. In 361 d, detailed exposition,

course of argument.—ἐπανοὶ: more
general than ἐγκώμια.

22. ἐτέρα τοιαύτα: sc. ποιοῦσιν, see

on 312 d. For the thought, see Ar.

Nub. 906 εἰτα βαδίζειν (sc. ἐδεί) ἐν

ταῖς ὀδοῖς εὐτάκτως εἰς κιθαριστὸν |

τοὺς κωμῆς γυμνοὺς ἄθρόους then those

of the same district had to go in good

order through the streets, in a body and

wearing only the chiton, to the school of

the harp-player.

23. ἄν: gives a shade of contin-
gency in final clauses. Cf. Gorg. 481 a

μηχανητέον ὅπως ἂν διαφύγῃ καὶ μὴ δῷ

δίκην ὁ ἔχθρος.
ēpeidān kitharίζεων μάθωσιν, ἄλλων αὖ ποιητῶν ἀγαθῶν
25 ποιήματα διδάσκοντο, μελοποιῶν, εἰς τὰ κιθαρίσματα ἐντείνοντες, καὶ τοὺς ῥυθμοὺς τε καὶ τὰς ἀρμονίας ἀναγκάζοντο σοὶ καὶ εὐφωμότεροι καὶ εὐφωμοστότεροι γιγνόμενοι χρήσιμοι δὲ τοῦ λέγειν τε καὶ πράττειν.
30 πᾶς γὰρ ὁ βίος τοῦ ἀνθρώπου εὐφωμίας καὶ εὐφωμοστίας δεῖται. ἔτι τούων πρὸς τούτων εἰς παιδοτρίβουν πέμποντον, ἦν τὰ σώματα βέλτιον ἐχοντες ὑπηρετοῦσι τῇ διανοίᾳ χρηστῇ οὐσίᾳ καὶ μὴ ἀναγκάζονται ἀποδείλιαν διὰ τὴν ποιηρίαν τῶν σωμάτων καὶ ἐν τοῖς πολέμοις καὶ
35 ἐν ταῖς ἄλλαις πράξεσιν. καὶ ταῦτα ποιοῦσιν οἱ μάλιστα δυνάμενοι μάλιστα· μάλιστα δὲ δύνανται οἱ πλουσιότατοι.
καὶ οἱ τούτων νεῖσι, πρωιάτατα εἰς διδασκάλων τῆς ἡλικίας ἀρξάμενοι φοιτάν, ὅμωσι τὰ ἀπαλάττοται. Ἐπειδὰν δὲ ἐκ διδασκάλων ἀπαλαγώσων, ἡ πόλις αὖ τοὺς τε
40 νόμους ἀναγκάζει μανθάνειν καὶ κατὰ τούτους ζῆν, ἦν δὲ μὴ αὐτῶ ἐφ’ αὐτῶν εἰκή πράττεσιν, ἄλλ’ ἀτεχνώς ωσπερ οἱ γραμματισταὶ τοὺς μῆπω δεινοῖς γράφειν τῶν παιδῶν

326 24. ἄλλων: see on 316 d, 1. 24.
25. μελοποιῶν: viz. the Aeolic and Doric lyric poets, the dithyrambic poets Cecidas, Lamprocles, Lasos, Cydias and others, besides the choral songs of the tragedians.

b 26. ἐντείνοντες: used of putting prose into metrical form, or adapting verses to musical rhythm and melody. Cf. Phaedo 60 d ἐντείνας τοὺς τοῦ Αἰσχύλου λόγους καὶ τὸ εἰς τὸν Ἀπόλλων προοίμιον.
27. ἵνα κτέ.: the Greeks ascribed to music the highest influence in moral culture. Cf. Rep. iii. 401 d κυριωτάτη ἐν μονοικῇ τροφῇ (musical training is most controlling) ὅτι μάλιστα καταδίδεται εἰς τὸ ἐντὸς τῆς ψυχῆς ὧ τε ῥυθμὸς καὶ ἀρμονία καὶ ἐρρωμενεύστατα (most mightily) ἀπτεταί αὐτῆς.
31. παιδοτρίβοιν: the teacher of gymnastics, who trained the youth in a παλαίστρα fitted up by himself or allowed him by the state.
34. ποιηρίαν: depravity, wretched condition.
39. ἐκ διδασκάλων: the subst. depending on ἐκ is omitted; cf. ἐν Ἀρίστοφρονος (320 a), the freq. εἰς διδασκάλων (325 d), εἰς παιδοτρίβου (326 b), and ἐν κιθαρίστα μεμαθηκέναι (Theaet. 206 a), Δι. Plut. 84 ἐκ Πατρικλέους ἐρχομαι, Lysistr. 701 τὴν ἑταίραν ἐκάλεο’ ἐκ τῶν γεῖτῶν.
41. ἐφ’ αὐτῶν εἰκῆ: cf. 320 a, 323 c. d
43. ὑπογράφατες γραμμάς: cf. Seneca Epistol. 94 § 51 digit i puero-rum tenentur et aliena manu per litterarum simula cere ducuntur, and Quintil. i. 1. 27 cum vero jam duc tus sequi coepe-rit (sc. puer) non inutile erit literas tabellae quam optime insculpi ut per illos velut sulcos ducat ur stilus (cf. v. 14. 31). The passages just quoted have led to the impression that Plato also refers to letters to be traced over by the boy. But γραμμάς does not mean letter, and we must therefore understand the lines within which the boys must keep their letters. The comparison is thus the more forcible. In Theaet. 172 e, Plato calls the ἀντωμοσία ὑπογραφῆς, ἦς ἐκ- τὸς ὦ ἄρην.

45. ὃς: rare in prose, cf. 338 a ὃς οὖν ποίησε, Rep. vii. 530 d κινδυνεύει, ὃς πρὸς ἀστρονομὸν ὄμματα πέπνηε, ὃς πρὸς ἐναρμονόν φορὰν ὅτα παγώναι, it is probable that as the eyes are ap- pointed for astronomy, so the ears for harmonious motions.—The slight mingling of syntactic and paratactic con-

nection, seen in ὃς δὲ after ἀσπερ, is very common in Plato, e.g. 328 a, cf. also ἄμως δὲ after εἰ 353 d.

50. εὐθύναι: to these every official e in Athens was subjected on the expiration of his term of office (Hermann Staatsalt. § 154. Schömann gr. Alterth. i. 432 a); although they apply only to ἀρχαῖ, Protagoras mentions them on account of the analogy be- tween them and the punishments of children, cf. 325 d. Compare his doc- trine of punishment, 324 a f.

52. ἔστιν: but it does not follow from Protagoras’s long argument that virtue is a thing which can be taught, but simply that it is so regarded. See on 324 c, 325 d. Moreover, the virtue taught in the Athenian schools was not at all that which was taught by Protagoras, so that the value of the former training would not prove the value of his.

53. πολὺ μᾶλλον: i.e. χρὴν θαυμά-ζειν, εἰ μὴ διδακτόν ἦν.

XVI. 1. Cf. Hom. β 276 f. χαρ τοι παῖδες ὅμοιοι πατρὶ πέλοντα, ὁι πλέο-
nes κακίους, παῖροι δὲ τε πατρὸς ἀρείους.
γίγνονται; τούτο αὖ μάθε· οὔδεν γὰρ θαυμαστόν, εἰ περ ἀληθῆ ἐγὼ ἐν τοῖς ἐμπροσθεν ἐλεγον, ὅτι τοῦτον τοῦ πράγματος, τῆς ἀρετῆς, εἰ μέλλει πόλις εἶναι, οὔδένα 327 5 δεὶ ἰδιωτεύειν. Εἰ γὰρ δὴ ὁ λέγω οὔτως ἔχει—ἔχει δὲ μάλιστα πάντων οὔτως—, ἐνθυμήθητι ἄλλο τῶν ἐπιτη- δεμάτων ὁτιοῦν καὶ μαθημάτων προελομενος. εἰ μὴ οἶνον τ' ἢ πόλιν εἶναι, εἰ μὴ πάντες αὐληταὶ ἢμεν, ὁποῖος τις ἐδύνατο ἐκαστος, καὶ τοῦτο καὶ ἱδία καὶ δημοσία πᾶς 10 πάντα καὶ ἐδίδασκε καὶ ἐπέπληττε τὸν μὴ καλῶς αὐλοῦν- τα, καὶ μὴ ἐφθονίει τοῦτον, ὡσπερ νῦν τῶν δικαίων καὶ τῶν νομίμων οὐδείς φθονεῖ οὔθ' ἀποκρύπτεται ὡσπερ λόγους εἰς ἀνθρώπους—λυσιτελεῖ γάρ, οἶμαι, ἡμῶν ἡ ἀλλήλων δικαιοσύνη καὶ ἀρετή. διὰ ταύτα πᾶς παντὶ 15 προθύμως λέγει καὶ διδάσκει τὰ δίκαια καὶ τὰ νόμιμα· — εἰ οὖν οὔτως καὶ ἐν αὐλήσει πᾶσαν προθυμίαν καὶ ἀφθονίαν εἰχομεν ἀλλήλους διδάσκειν, οἶει ἄν τι, ἐφη, μᾶλλον, ὥς Σώκρατες, τῶν ἀγαθῶν αὐλητῶν ἀγαθοὺς αὐλη- τάς τοὺς νίεις γίγνεσθαι ἢ τῶν φαύλων; οἶμαι μὲν οὐ, 20 ἀλλὰ ὅτου ἐτυχεν ὁ νῦς εὐφυεστάτος γενόμενος εἰς αὐλη-
συ, οὖτος ἄν ἐλλόγυμος ἡμέρηθη, ὦτον δὲ ἄφυης, ἀκλειής· καὶ πολλάκις μὲν ἄγαθοῦ αὐλητοῦ φαύλος ἄν ἀπέβη, πολλάκις δὲ ἄν φαύλου ἄγαθός. ἂλλ' οὖν αὐληταί γ' ἄν πάντες ἠσαν ἴκανοί ὡς πρὸς τοὺς ἰδιώτας καὶ μηδὲν αὐλή- 25 σεως ἐπιαύοντας. οὔτως ψοῦ κἂν νῦν, ὡστις σοι ἅδικώ- τατος φαίνεται ἄνθρωπος τῶν ἐν νόμοις καὶ ἄνθρωποις τεθραμμένων, δίκαιον αὐτόν εἶναι καὶ δημουργὸν τοῦτον ἀ τοῦ πράγματος, εἰ δέοι αὐτὸν κρίνεσθαι πρὸς ἄνθρωπος, οἷς μὴτε παιδεία ἐστὶ μὴτε δικαστηρία μὴτε νόμοι μηδὲ 30 ἀνάγκη μηδεμία διὰ παντὸς ἀναγκάζοντα ἀρετῆς ἐπιμε- λεῖσθαι, ἂλλ' εἶν ἄγριοι τινες, οἴους πέρυσι Φερεκράτης


23. ἂλλ' οὖν: but however that might be; stronger than δ᾽ οὖν, and often followed by γέ. This is used when previous statements are for the moment left in abeyance, while that which follows is unquestionably cer- tain. Cf. Apol. 34e ἂλλ' οὖν δεδομέ- νου γέ εστὶ τὸ Σωκράτης διαφέρειν τινι τῶν πολλῶν ἄνθρωπων, Gorg. 406d ἂλλ' οὖν τὸ γε πεινήν αὐτὸ ἀναρέην (painful).

24. τοὺς: is not repeated, since ἰδιώ- τας and μηδὲν ἐπαλώκτας relate to the same individuals. Cf. Dem. xix. 87 (ἐν) τῶν αὐτῶν καὶ παρασκευάσατα τὴν ἐξουσίαν ταύτην ἐκεῖνῳ μείζον καὶ τιμω- ρεῖσθαι you ought to hate and to punish the one who is responsible, and who se- cured this power to that one.

25. "As, in the supposed case, there would be good and bad flute players, and yet all would be flute players, so now all are upright and virtuous; but because some are more so, those who have less virtue seem to have none. Still, that these last are also really virtuous, would be clear, if they were compared with absolute savages." So Protagoras wishes to prove his view respecting those who are regarded as unjust and vicious, through what would be indisputably true in the supposed case. This lies in ψοῦ κἂν νῦν (also now, in the present case), where the question is not of flute playing, but of virtue. οὖν κἂν νῦν, the read- ing of the Mss., would be not a proof but merely an exhortation.

26. καὶ ἄνθρωποι: since, acc. to Protagoras, men must possess virtue, evidently civil and social life, legal institutions and human society, are allied conceptions, and ἐν νόμοις καὶ ἄνθρωποις can be connected as synony- mous. He has already in mind, too, the contrast between ἄνθρωπος and the ἄγαθος about to be cited.

27. αὐτῶν: not himself, but merely δ referring back to ἄγαθος.

29. μηδὲ: nor, in general.

31. ἂλλ' εἶν: belongs to the rel. clause beginning with ὥς, which it
one of the masters of the old comedy, had in the year 421–420 B.C. (cf. Ath. v. 218d ἐῳδάτην δὲ οἱ Ἁγριοὶ ἐπὶ Ἀρσιάιων ἄρχοντας) brought out a comedy, the Ἁγριοὶ, to the contents of which the surviving fragments (Meineke Frag. Com. Gr. I. 79 f., II. 254 ff., Kock Com. Att. Frag. I. 146) give almost no clue. Our passage would seem to imply that certain misanthropists (like Timon), who had fled from Athens into a wilderness, had encountered absolutely lawless and savage men, like the Cyclopes of the Odyssey, namely the Ἁγριοὶ, who formed the Chorus. These savages by their rudeness had taught them to prefer an association with even the worst types of common humanity, with Eurybatus and Phrynondas. —

πέριττις: see Introd. p. 6.

32. ὁ ποιητής: an Athenian speaker would hardly have added this qualification to an Athenian name. — ἐῳδάτην: the technical term for the training of the actors and the chorus by the poet, then in general for the bringing out of the play. — ἐπὶ Δηναίῳ: means strictly only at the Lenaean. This was a temple and sacred precinct of Dionysus south of the Acropolis, in and near which were observed the solemnities of the Lenaean, which for this reason were called Διονύσια τὰ ἐπὶ Δηναίῳ in distinction from Διονύσια τὰ ἐπὶ Ἀστεί, the Great Dionysia (C. I. Att. II. 741 A, a l. 10, b l. 4, d l. 9 from the years 333–330 B.C.). Between this and the citadel lay the Theatre of Athens, where all tragedies and comedies, on both festivals, were brought out. Consequently the formula ἐπὶ Δηναίῳ cannot designate those brought out at the Lenaean festival. Protagoras, however, uses the expression ἐῳδάτην ἐπὶ Δηναίῳ in the wider sense: such as Pherecrates put upon the stage, as contrasted with the class of men which Socrates encountered in real life. — ἐν γενόμενοι: coming among. γλυκεσθαι and εἰναι are often used with advs. of place.

33. The Ἁγριοὶ must have formed the Chorus, and ἐν τοῖς ποιητοῖς ἀνθρώποι refers to them; the μισάνθρωποι then were different persons, and in the words ἀγαπήσας ἐν, ὡσπερ οἱ κτῆς, Protagoras likens Socrates's condition, if he should ever meet beings like those Ἁγριοὶ, to that of the μισάνθρωποι in meeting the Chorus. We must therefore from the preceding context supply γενόμενοι with ἐν ἐκείνῳ τῷ χορῷ, even though this is a little difficult.

34. Eurybatus was a thief notorious for his cunning, or an Ephesian who had betrayed Croesus to Cyrus; Phrynondas, an Athenian, infamous by reason of his trickery and baseness. Both had become proverbial representatives of all wickedness. Cf. Ephorus in Harpocr. καὶ ἐνεύθεσα τοὺς ποιητοὺς Εὐρυβάτους καλεῖθαί, Suid. s. v. Φρυνώδας: ἐκ τοῦτο τοὺς ποιητοὺς Φρυνώδας καλοῦσιν.
πάντες διδάσκαλοι εἰσὶν ἄρετῆς, καθ' ὧσον δύνανται ἐκα-στος, καὶ οὗδεις σοι φαίνεται εἰναι. ὡσπερ ἄν, εἰ ξητοῖς τῖς διδάσκαλος τοῦ ἐλληνίζεων, οὐδ' ἄν εἰς φανείη, οὐδὲ 328
γ' ἄν, οἴμαι, εἰ ξητοῖς τῖς ἄν ἡμῖν διδάξεις τοὺς τῶν χειροτεχνῶν νεῖς αὐτὴν ταύτην τὴν τέχνην, ἴν δὴ παρὰ τοῦ πατρὸς μεμαθήκασι, καθ' ὧσον οἶός τ' ἴν ὁ πατὴρ καὶ οἱ τοῦ πατρὸς φίλοι ὄντες ὁμότεχνοι, τούτους ἔτι τίς ἄν διδάξεις, οὐ βράδιον οἴμαι εἰναι, δ' Σώκρατες, τούτων 45 διδάσκαλον φανήναι, τῶν δὲ ἁπείρων παντάπασι βράδιον, οὕτω δὲ καὶ ἄρετής καὶ τῶν ἄλλων πάντων. ἀλλὰ κἂν θ εἰ ὀλίγον ἐστὶ τις ὅστις διαφέρει ἡμῶν προβιβάσαι εἰς ἄρετήν, ἀγαπητόν. ὃν δὴ ἐγὼ οἴμαι εἰς εἰναι, καὶ δια-φερόντως ἄν τῶν ἄλλων ἀνθρώπων ὄνησαί τινα πρός

327 38. καὶ: and so, paratactic for ἀστε. Cf. Aesch. Theb. 647 κατὰ ὁ ἀνδρα τόνδε, καὶ πόλιν ἐξεί, Thuc. i. 99 χρήματα ἐτάξαντο, καὶ τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις ηδέτο τὸ ναυτικὸν κτέ. — ὡσπερ κτέ.: marks neither an antithesis to the preceding, nor a step in advance, but only an illustration. — ἄν: see on 318 b.

328 39. οὗτοι εἰς: more emphatic than οὐδεὶς, cf. 335 δ, 343 δ. These particles are freq. separated by preps.
42. οἶος τ' ήν: sc. διδάσκειν from μεμαθήκασι.
44. οὗ βράδιον: anacoluthon, as though οὐδέ γ' ἄν had not preceded. The anacoluthon is caused by the repetition in τούτους ἐτι τίς ἄν διδά-
ζεις.
45. τῶν ἁπείρων: those unskilled in a particular art. For these it is easy to find a teacher, while for the skilled it is difficult. By this example Pro-
tagoras gains a step in the develop-
ment of his argument; unobserved, it forms the transition to his claim that
there are nevertheless special teachers 328 a
in virtue.

46. οὕτω δὲ: after ὡσπερ, see on b 320 d. That ὡσπερ referred back, and not to a following οὕτως, is for-
gotten, as often happens. Sc. οὗ βρά-
διον διδάσκαλον φανήναι. — κἂν: pro-
perly an opt. εἰ should follow, but κἂν εἰ became so much a formula that ἄν sometimes was not regarded in the const. Cf. Mem. 72 c κἂν εἰ πολλαὶ καὶ παντοδαπαί εἰσιν (αἱ ἀρεταί), ἐν γέ τι εἰδος ταύτην ἄνσαι εἰχοναι, Symp. 185 a κἂν εἴ τις ἔξαπασθεὶς, καλὴ ἡ ἀπάτη.

47. ὀλίγον, διαφέρει: are to be taken together. — προβιβάσαι: for the inf., cf. Gorg. 517 b μεταβιβάζειν τὰς ἐπιθυμίας καὶ μὴ ἐπιτρέπειν οὖθεν τού-
των διέφερον ἑκείνοιν in regard to cor-
recting the desires and not indulging
them, these men in no wise excelled those others.

49. ὄνησαί: cf. Rep. x. 600 d εἰ
περ οἶος τ' ήν πρός ἄρετὴν ὕνιναν ἀνθρώ-
πονος.
50 τὸ καλὸν κἀγαθὸν γενέσθαι, καὶ ἄξιως τοῦ μυσθοῦ ὄν πράττομαι, καὶ ἔτι πλείονος, ὡστε καὶ αὐτῷ δοκεῖν τῷ μαθώντι. διὰ ταύτα καὶ τὸν τρόπον τῆς πράξεως τοῦ μυσθοῦ τοιούτου πεποίημαι. ἐπειδὰν γὰρ τις παρ' ἐμοῦ μάθη, ἐὰν μὲν βούληται, δὲ ἐγώ πράττομαι ἄργυριον, ἐὰν δὲ μὴ, ἐλθὼν εἰς ἱερὸν, ὁμόσας, ὦσον ἂν φῇ ἄξια εἶναι τὰ μαθήματα, τοσοῦτον κατέθηκεν.

Τοιοῦτον σοι, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἐγὼ καὶ μῦθον καὶ λόγον εἰρήκα, ὡς διδακτὸν ἀρετὴ καὶ Ἀθηναίοι οὕτως ἤγουνται, καὶ ὅτι οὐδὲν θαυμαστὸν τῶν ἀγαθῶν πατέρων φαύλους νιεῖς γίγνεσθαι καὶ τῶν φαύλων ἀγαθοὺς, ἐπεὶ καὶ οἱ Πολυκλεῖτους νιεῖς, Παράλος καὶ Ξανθίππου τοῦδε ἡλικιώτατι, οὐδὲν πρὸς τὸν πατέρα εἰσὶ, καὶ ἄλλῳ ἄλλων δημιουργῶν. τῶν δὲ οὕτως ἄξιον τούτῳ κατηγορεῖν. ἐτι δὲ ἐπὶ ἄντως εἰσίν ἐπίτιδες. νέοι γὰρ.

XVII. Πρωταγόρας μὲν τοσαῦτα καὶ τοιαῦτα ἐπιδειξά-

328 50. μισθοῦ: cf. 349 a. Arist. Ethic. b
N. ix. i, p. 1164 a 25. διο χος καὶ Πρωταγόραν ποιεῖν· ὅτε γὰρ διδάσκεις ἄδη
ποτε, τιμήσαι τὸν μαθέαν ἐκέλευς ὄνω
δοκεῖ ἄξια ἐπίτασσας, καὶ ἐλάμβας τοσοῦ
τον. He sought thus to avoid the cen
sure cast upon the sophists because
they took money for their instruction.
53. γὰρ: epexegetical, equiv. to
namely.
54. βούληται: for the apod., sc.
catέθηκεν (gnomic aor.). See on 311 d.
55. ἐλθὼν εἰς ἱερὸν: the Greeks,
when an oath was to be peculiarly
solemn, were wont to take it at some
sacred place, as an altar (Andoc.
1. 126 λαθῆμεν τοῦ βωμοῦ ἠμοσεν).
61. The sons of Polycletus are
wholly unknown. Obviously, how-
ever, they with their father are
thought of as well known at Athens.

63. τῶνδε: points to the sons of
Pericles then present. Protagoras
speaks in defence of his pupils, al-
though compelled to admit the truth
of what Socrates has said concerning
them in 319 e.—Protagoras began his
discourse with the commendation of
his own teaching, having previously,
before Socrates and Hippocrates, ex-
tolled the profession of the sophists;
he closes it with a justification of his
course in receiving compensation, and
a complimentary allusion to his pu-
pils. Grote (Plato II. 45 f.) considers
this discourse one of the best parts of
the Platonic writings, as an exposition
of the growth and propagation of
'common sense' among a community.

XVII. 1. ἐπιδειξάμενος: Socrates
humorously refers to Protagoras's
speech as made for display, cf. 347 b.
μενος ἀπεπαύσατο τοῦ λόγου. καὶ ἐγὼ ἐπὶ μὲν πολὺν χρόνουν κεκηλημένος ἔτι πρὸς αὐτὸν ἔβλεπον ὡς ἐροῦντά τι, ἐπιθυμῶν ἄκοινείν· ἐπεὶ δὲ δὴ γῆσθομην, ὦτι τῷ ὄντι πε-5 παυμένος ἐη, μόνις πως ἐμαυτὸν ὑσπερεί συναγείρας εἴπον, βλέπας πρὸς τὸν Ἰπποκράτη. ᾨΩ παί Ἀπολλοδό-ρου, ὡς χάριν σοι ἔχω ὦτι προὐτρεψάς με ὁδε ᾠφικέσθαι· πολλοὺ γὰρ ποιοῦμαι ἀκηκοέναι ᾧ ἀκήκοα Πρωταγόρον. ε ἐγὼ γὰρ ἐν μὲν τῷ ἐμπροσθεν χρόνῳ ἡγοῦμην οὐκ εἶναι 10 ἀνθρωπίνην ἐπιμέλειαν, ᾗ ἀγαθοὶ οἱ ἀγαθοὶ γίγνονται· νῦν δὲ πέπεισμαι. πλὴν σμικρὸν τί μοι ἐμποδῶν, ὃ δῆ- λον ὅτι Πρωταγόρας ῥαδίως ἐπεκδίδαξε, ἐπειδὴ καὶ τὰ πολλὰ ταῦτα ἐξεδίδαξε. καὶ γὰρ εἰ μὲν τις περὶ αὐτῶν τοῦτων συγγένειαη ὁτρών τῶν δημηγόρων, τάχ’ ἀν καὶ 329 15 τοῦτον τοιοῦτους λόγους ἀκοῦσειν, ᾗ Περικλέους ᾗ ἄλλου τινὸς τῶν ἰκανῶν εἰπεῖν· εἰ δὲ ἐπανέροιτο τινά τι, ὤσπερ

2. ἐπὶ μὲν πολὺν χρόνουν: const. with ἐπὶ εἴβλεπον. Cf. 345 e, Legg. i. 646 e ἐπὶ πολλᾶς ἡμέρας.
3. ὃς ἐρούντα τι: Protagoras might have added further remarks quite as relevant as those with which he actually concluded.
4. τῷ ὄντι: in reality; for this dat. of manner, see H. 779 b.
6. ὁ παῖ Ἀπολλοδόρου: cf. 335 d. An address of this kind always has something solemn and formal.
7. ὃς: hither; cf. Photius lex. s.v. καὶ Πλάτων πον κέρχηται ἀντὶ τοῦ δέιφο καὶ ἐνθάδε. Elsewhere it is found with this meaning only in the poets or late authors.
11. σμικρὸν τι: note the irony of Socrates. The little point proves forthwith to be a central point in the investigation.—δηλον ὤτι: see on 324 a, e 19.
12. τὰ πολλά: a touch of sarcasm at the long speech of Protagoras.
13 ff. “A popular orator could also deliver a discourse like that of Protagoras, but, after that, in defending himself, and in entering into the exposition of single points when questioned, he would be as powerless as a book, and would on the slightest question deliver immediately another long discourse, as a brazen pot when struck keeps up a long reverberation.”
—ὡσπερ βιβλία κτῆ.: “They can only make speeches, they cannot defend a position” (ἐρωτάν καὶ ἀποκρίνεσθαι, i.e. διαλέγεσθαι Crat. 390 e). Cf. Phaedr. 275 d δεινὸν γάρ ποι ὑτ’ ἕχει γραφή,


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βιβλία ούδέν ἔχουσιν ούτε ἀποκρίνασθαι ούτε αὐτοὶ ἐρέ-
σθαι, ἀλλ' εάν τις καὶ σμικρὸν ἐπερωτήσῃ τι τῶν ρη-
θέντων ὡσπερ τὰ χαλκία πληγέντα μακρὸν ἥχει καὶ
20 ἀποτείνει, εάν μὴ ἐπιλάβηται τις, καὶ οἱ ρήτορες οὕτω σμικρὰ ἐρωτηθέντες δόλιχον κατατείνουσι τοῦ λόγου. Προ-
tαγόρας δὲ δὴ ίκανὸς μὲν μακρὸν λόγους καὶ καλοὺς εἰπεῖν, ὡς αὕτω δηλοὶ, ίκανὸς δὲ καὶ ἐρωτηθεὶς ἀποκρί-

νασθαι κατὰ βραχὺ καὶ ἔρομενος περιμεναῖ τε καὶ ἀποδέ-

25 ἔσθαι τήν ἀπόκρισιν, ἀδύλιοι ἐστὶ παρεσκευασμέα.
νῦν οὖν, δ Πρωταγόρα, σμικρὸν τινὸς ἐνδέης εἰμι πάντ' ἔχειν, εἰ μοι ἀποκρίνασο τόδε. τήν ἁρετὴν φής διδακτῶν

329 a kal ὡς ἄληθὼς ὄμων ζωγραφία (the art of painting). καὶ γὰρ τὰ ἐκείνης ἐκγόνα ἐστὶ μὲν ὡς ζώντα, εἰὼ δ' ἀνέφη τι, σεμ-

νῶς πάνυ σιγά· ταῦτ' ἐν καὶ οἱ λόγοι· ὅδεις μὲν ἄν ὡς τι φρονοῦντα αὐτοῦ λέ-

γειν, ἐὰν δε τῇ ἐρρ τῶν λεγομένων βουλο-

μενος μαθεῖν, ἐπὶ τι σημαίνει μόνον ταῦτ' ἄν. Cf. also below, 336 ὁ f., 347 e ff.

20. ἀποτεῦνε: freq. intrns. as here. Cf. Gorg. 458 b καὶ νῦν ζωσ τόρρω ἀπο-

tενοῦμεν. More often with τὸν λόγον, μακρὸς λόγους and the like. Cf. 335 e, 336 c, 361 a. — καὶ οὕτω: we should expect οὕτω καί, but thus also Rep.

i. 354 b ἀλλ' ὀσπερ οἱ λίχοι τοῦ αἰεί παραφερομένου ἀπογενόνται ἀρπαξοντες (but just as epics hurriedly taste of every dish successively placed before them), καὶ ἐγὼ μοι δοκῶ οὕτω ὁρμῆσαι (to have hastened by), ix. 585 a ὀσπερ πρὸς μέλαν φαιν ἀποσκοποῦντες, πρὸς τά ἀλυσον οὐτός λύσιν ἀναφρώτες ἀπατῶνται as though regarding gray as white in comparison with black, so regarding the absence of pain as pleasure in comparison with pain, they are deceived.

21. δόλιχον: (from δόλιχος) the long course. "They reply in a speech of endless length." The δόλιχος was

the severest of all the foot-races; in it the length of the stadium was traversed twelve times, at least, and perhaps twenty or even twenty-four times. The Spartan Ladas, victorious in this race, fell dead at the goal. Cf. 335 e τῶν δολιχοδρόμων τρ. Phocion uses a similar figure (cf. Plutarch Phoc. 23) καλῶς πρὸς τὸ στάδιον (παρεσκευασθαὶ δοκοῦν), τὸν δὲ δόλιχον τοῦ πολέμου φοβοῦμαι, so also the comic poet Epierates (Meineke Com. Gr. iii. 366) ἐπεὶ δὲ δόλιχον τοῖς ἔστειν ἐδο ἀπέχει.

23. ὡς αὕτω δηλοὶ: see on 324 a.

25. α': refers to ἐρωτηθείς ἀποκρινά-

σθαι κτ. ἀποκρινί

26. σμικρὸν κτ.: cf. Euthyphro 13 a ἀλλὰ σμικρὸν τινὸς ἐτί ἐνδέης εἰμι. The inf. páντ' ἐχεῖν depends upon ἐνδέης εἰμι, cf. Crat. 432 d ὡς αὐτὸδα-

νεί θαυμάζων αἰὲν ἐνδέωναι αἴεν τὰς (how far the images fall short) ταῦτα ἐχεῖν ἐκείνως ἄν ἐνδέωναι εἰσίν; Lys. 204 e πολλὸν δεῖς τὸ ἔλθος ἀναγίναξεν παῦσι. Since, how-

ever, here the sense is that of páντ' ἀν ἕχομαι, the corresponding cond. form εἰ μοι ἀποκρίνασο τόδε follows.

27. φής: implies assertion, not argu-

ment; asdoes thefollowing πειθόλμην τάν.
PŁATΩΝΟΣ ΠΡΩΤΑΓΟΡΑΣ.

St. p. 329.

έναι, καὶ ἕγω, εἶ ἐπὶ ἄλλῳ τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ, πειθοῖμην ἄν καὶ σοὶ. ὃ δὲ ἔθαύμασα σοι λέγοντος, τοῦτο μοι ἐν e 30 τῇ ψυχῇ ἀποπλήρωσον. ἔλεγες γὰρ ὅτι Ὅ Ζεὺς τὴν δικαιοσύνην καὶ τὴν αἰδώ πέμψει τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, καὶ αὐ τὸλαχῶν ἐν τοῖς λόγοις ἐλέγετο ὑπὸ σοῦ ἢ δικαιοσύνην καὶ σωφροσύνη καὶ ὀσιότης καὶ πάντα ταῦτα ὃς ἐν τι ἐη ἑυληβίδην, ἁρετῇ. ταῦτ' οὖν αὐτὰ διέλθέ μοι 35 ἀκριβῶς τῷ λόγῳ, πότερον ἐν μέν τί ἐστὶν ἢ ἁρετῇ, μόρια δὲ αὐτῆς ἐστίν ἢ δικαιοσύνη καὶ σωφροσύνη καὶ ὀσιότης, ἢ ταῦτ' ἐστίν ἃ νῦν δὴ ἐγὼ ἔλεγον πάντα ὄνοματα a τοῦ αὐτοῦ ἐνός ὄντος. τοῦτ' ἐστὶν ὃ ἐτί ἐπιτοθῶ.

XVIII. Ἀλλὰ ράδιον τοῦτο γ', ἔφη, Ὁ Σώκρατες, ἀποκρινασθαί, ὅτι ἐνός ὄντος, τῆς ἁρετῆς, μόρια ἐστὶν ἢ ἐρωτᾶς. Πότερον, ἔφην, ὁσπερ προσώπων τὰ μόρια μόρια ἐστι, στόμα τε καὶ ρίς καὶ ὀφθαλμοὶ καὶ δότα, ἡ ὁσπερ

329 28. εἶ ἐπὶ ἄλλῳ τῷ: cf. 352 e, b Phaedo 67 b ἐκεὶ ἰκανῶς, ἐπὶ ποὺ ἄλλωθι (i.e. if anywhere), κτῆσασθαι τοῦτο, 63 e εὖ ἐπει, ὅτι, ἐπὶ τὶ ἄλλῳ τῶν τουτοῦτων, διαχωρισάμην (affirm confidently) ἄν καὶ τοῦτο. So almost always. Very rarely has ἐπὶ a verb of its own, as Meno 98 b ἀλλ' ἐπὶ τὶ ἄλλῳ φαίνῃ ἄν εἰδέναι, ὅλγα δʹ ἄν φαίνῃ, ἐν δʹ οὖν καὶ τοῦτο ἐκεῖνον θείρῃ ἄν δʹ οἶδα (this, at any rate, I would put down as one of the things that I know).

c 29. δ' δ' ἔθαύμασα κτ.: cf. Apol. 17 ο muncha 3' αὐτῶν ἐν ἔθαύμασα.

30. τῷ δικαιοσύνῃ, αἰδώ: cf. 322 e δίκην καὶ αἰδὼ.

32. πολλαχοῦ: cf. 323 a e, 325 a.
— If the different virtues form together only one and the same, viz. virtue, this fails to harmonize (αἰ) with the representation that Zeus sent to men σωφροσύνη and αἰδώς as two different virtues. — ἡ δικαιοσύνη κτ.: placed emphatically before ἄσ, cf. Thuc. iii. 5 ο ἂ́ εκ τῶν Ἀθηνῶν πρέσβεις ὡς αὐθέν ἢθον πράξαντες, ἐς πόλεμον καθίσταντο οἱ Μυκηναῖοι.

35. The following argument upon the unity of the virtues is intended mainly to show that Protagoras has maintained their diversity, without having clearly thought out the matter. Socrates’s request looks towards the definition, which would naturally have been given at the outset; see on 320 b.

38. ἐνός ὄντος: repeated from d above.

XVIII. 3. Socrates asks whether the particular virtues differ qualitatively or quantitatively; in their nature, or only in the degree and amount of the virtue contained in them.—πότερον: sc. ταῦτα μόρια ἐστίν.
5 τὰ τοῦ χρυσοῦ μόρια οὐδὲν διαφέρει τὰ ἔτερα τῶν ἑτέρων καὶ τοῦ ἀλλο, ἀλλ’ ἦ μεγέθει καὶ σμικρότητι; Ἐκεῖνος μοι φαίνεται, ὁ Σῶκρατες, ὃς περ τὰ τοῦ προσώπου μόρια ἔχει πρὸς τὸ ὅλον πρόσωπον. Πότερον οὖν, ἢν δ’ ἐγώ, καὶ χειραμβάνουσιν οἱ ἄνθρωποι τούτων τῶν τῆς ἄρετῆς μορίων οἱ μὲν ἀλλο, οἱ δὲ ἀλλο, ἡ ἀνάγκη, ἐὰν πέρ τις ἐν λάβῃ, ἀπαντ’ ἔχειν; Οὐδαμῶς, ἐφη, ἐπεὶ πολλοὶ ἄνδρεῖοι ἔστων, ὄδικοι δέ, καὶ δίκαιοι αὐ, σοφοῖ δέ οὖν. Ἡ στιγμὴ γὰρ οὖν καὶ ταῦτα μόρια τῆς ἄρετῆς, ἐφην ἐγώ, σοφία τε καὶ ἄνδρεια; Πάντων μάλιστα δὴσον, ἐφη.

15 καὶ μέγιστόν γε ἡ σοφία τῶν μορίων. Ἡ ἐκαστὸν δὲ αὖ—τῶν ἐστίν, ἢν δ’ ἐγώ, ἄλλο, τὸ δὲ ἀλλο; Ναι. Ἡ καὶ δύναμιν αὐτῶν ἐκαστὸν ἴδιαν ἔχει, ὃς περ τὰ τοῦ προσώπου; οὐκ ἐστὶν ὄψθαλμος οὗν τὰ δύα, οὐδέ ἢ δύναμις αὐτοῦ ἢ αὐτῆ; οὐδὲ τῶν ἄλλων οὐδέν ἐστιν οὗν τὸ ἐτέρων οὖν τὰ κατὰ τῆς δύναμιν οὔτε κατὰ τὰ ἄλλα. ἂρ’ οὖν οὔτω καὶ τὰ τῆς ἄρετῆς μόρια οὐκ ἔστι τὸ ἐτέρων οὖν.

5. διαφέρει: with anacoluthon; we should have expected ὃς περ τὰ τοῦ χρυσοῦ μόρια (sc. μόρια ἔστι τοῦ χρυσοῦ), οὐδέν διαφέροντα κτὲ. 7. φαίνεται: sc. πρὸς τὴν ἄρετὴν ἔχειν.

9. καὶ μεταλαμβάνουσιν κτέ.: "in addition to the fact of their difference, do men also possess them singly?"

10. ἀλλο: since men possess the object in its entirety, the acc. is used as a sort of cognate acc. Cf. 355e, Apol. 36 b οὐ μεταλαβών τὸ πέρπτον μέρος τῶν ψήφων, Tim. 59 b καὶ γῆς μόριον ὄλγαν καὶ λεπτὸν μετασχόν.

14. σοφία, ἄνδρεια: these complete the list of the five cardinal virtues discussed in this dialogue.

16. ἀλλο: we should have expected τὸ μὲν ἄλλο. Cf. Phil. 56 δ πη ποτὲ διορισάμενον οὖν ἄλλην, τὴν δὲ ἄλλην θεία τις ἐν ἀριθμητικῇ how would you distinguish between the one and the other arithmetic? So often δ δὲ without a preceding δ μὲν (G. 143, n. 2). Cf. 331 a, 331 a, 343 e, 355 e, Theaet. 181 d δὲ δὲ λέγω τούτω εἰδή κινήσεως, ἄλλοις, τὴν δὲ περιφορὰν I say now that there are these two kinds of motion, change, and motion in place, Symp. 207 d οὐδὲποτὲ τὰ αὐτὰ ἔχων ἐν αὐτῷ δωμοὶ ὁ αὐτὸς καλεῖται, ἄλλʼ νέος ἄξι γεγονόμενος, τὰ δὲ ἀπολλύσις for he never retains the same substance, while yet called the same man, but in part he is ever becoming new, and in part he is suffering loss.

17. δύναμιν: force, efficiency, then nature, peculiar quality.
ò τέτερον, οὔτε αὐτὸ οὔτε ἡ δύναμις αὐτοῦ; ἡ δὴ δὴ ὅτι οὕτως ἔχει, εἰ περ τῷ παραδείγματι γε έουκέν; ’Αλλ’ b οὕτως, ἔφη. Καί ἐγὼ εἶπον. Οὕδεν ἄρα ἐστὶ τῶν τῆς 25 ἀρετῆς μορίων ἀλλ’ οἶνον ἐπιστήμη, οὐδ’ οἶνον δικαιοσύνη, οὐδ’ οἶνον ἀνδρεία, οὐδ’ οἶνον σωφροσύνη, οὐδ’ οἶνον ὀσιότης; Οὐκ ἔφη. Φέρε δὴ, ἐφην ἔγω, κοινὴ σκεφτηκόμεθα ποῦς τοιοῦ τι αὐτῶν ἐστιν ἐκαστον. πρῶτον μὲν τὸ τοιώνδε· ἡ δικαιοσύνη πράγμα τι ἐστὶν ἡ οὕδεν πράγμα; 30 ἐμοὶ μὲν γὰρ ὁδεῖν· τί δε σε; Καμοὶ, ἔφη. Τί οὖν; εἰ c τις ἐρωτῇ ἐμὲ τε καὶ σε; ’Ω Πρωταγόρα τε καὶ Σώκρατες, εἶπον δὴ μοι, τοῦτο τὸ πράγμα δ ἀνομάσατε ἀρτί, ἡ δικαιοσύνη, αὐτὸ τοῦτο, δίκαιον ἐστὶν ἡ ἀδικία; ἔγω μὲν ἂν αὐτῷ ἀποκρωμαίην ὅτι δίκαιον· σὺ δὲ 35 τῷ ἂν ψήφων θείον; τὴν αὐτὴν ἐμοὶ ἡ ἄλλην; Τὴν αὐτὴν, ἔφη. ’Ἐστὶν ἄρα τοιοῦτον ἡ δικαιοσύνη οἶνον δίκαιον εἶναι; Φαίην ἂν ἔγωγε, ἀποκρωμόμενος τῷ ἐρωτῶντι. Αὐ οὐκοῦν καὶ σῦ; Ναὶ, ἔφη. Εἰ οὖν μετὰ τοῦτο ἡμᾶς ἐροῦτο, Οὐκοῦν καὶ ὀσιότητα τινά φατε εἶναι; φαίμεν ἂν, 40 ὃς ἐγὼμαι. Ναὶ, ἡ δ’ ὅς. Οὐκοῦν φατε καὶ τοῦτο πράγμα τι εἶναι; φαίμεν ἂν. ἡ οὐ; Καὶ τοῦτο συνεφη.

33. αὐτὸ τοῦτο: in itself; justice in the abstract, as distinguished from the concrete objects which possess the quality. “Justice in itself must be just.” Cf. τοῦτο αὐτὸ τὸ πράγμα below, and 360 c, 1. 3.
36. ἐστίν ἄρα κτῆ.: is a further question of the supposed interlocutor.
37. φαίην: equiv. to συμφαίην, a frequent usage, cf. 332 a.
40, 42. οὐκοῦν, πότερον: these are also words of the supposed questioner. But there is an ellipsis of ei δὲ ἐπανέρωτο, which would show this, and of which ἀγανακτήσαμι ἂν forms the apod.
XIX. Ei οὖν μετὰ τοῦτο εἶποι ἐρωτῶν ἡμᾶς, Πῶς οὖν ὁλίγων πρότερον ἔλεγετε; ἂρ' οὖκ ὀρθῶς υἱῶν κατήκουσα; εἴδοξατέ μοι φάναι τὰ τῆς ἀρετῆς μόρια εἶναι οὕτως ἐχοῦσα πρὸς ἀλλήλα, ώς οὖκ εἶναι τὸ ἐτερον αὐτῶν οἶον τὸ ἐτερον εἴπομ᾽ ἄν ἐγὼγε ὦτ Τὰ μὲν ἄλλα ὀρθῶς ἡκουσας, ὦτ δὲ καὶ ἔμε οἰεὶ εἰπεῖν τοῦτο, παρῆκουσας. Πρωταγόρας γὰρ οὗτος ταῦτα ἀπεκρίνατο, ἔγω δὲ ἡρώτων. εἰ οὖν εἴποι, Ἀληθῆ ἦδε λέγει, ὡ Πρωταγόρα; σὺ φης οὖκ εἶναι τὸ ἐτερον μόριον οἷον τὸ ἐτερον τῶν τῆς ἀρετῆς; σος οὕτος οἶον λόγους ἐστὶ; τί ἄν αὐτῶ ἀποκρίναιο; Ἀνάγκη, ἔφη, ὡ Σώκρατες, ὀμολογεῖν. Τί οὖν, ὡ Πρωταγόρα, ἀποκρινούμεθα αὐτῶ ταῦτα ὀμολογήσαντες, εὰν ἡμᾶς ἐπανέρχομαι, οὔκ ἄρα ἑστὶν ὀσίότης οἷον δίκαιον εἶναι πράγμα, οὐδὲ δικαίοισώμην οἶον ὅσιον, ἄλλα οἶον μὴ ὅσιον, ἡ δ᾽ ὀσίότης οἷον μὴ δίκαιον ἄλλα ἄδικον ἁρᾷ, τὸ δὲ
PLATONOS PROTÁGORAS.

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ἀνόσιον; τί αυτῷ ἀποκρινούμεθα; ἐγὼ μὲν γὰρ αὐτὸς ἦν ὑπὲρ γε ἐμαντοῦ φαίνην ἂν καὶ τὴν δικαιοσύνην ὁσίων εἶναι καὶ τὴν ὁσιότητα δίκαιων· καὶ ὑπὲρ σοῦ δέ, εἰ με ἐψως, ταῦτα δὲν ταῦτα ἀποκρινούμην, ὅτι ητοι ταῦτον γε ἡ ὁσιότητα τῆς δικαιοσύνης ὁσίων καὶ τῆς δικαιοσύνης δίκαιων. ἢ καὶ σοὶ συνδοκεῖ οὕτως. Οὐ πάντως μοι δοκεῖ, ἐφι, ὡ Σωκρατεῖς, οὕτως ἀπλοῦν εἶναι, ὅστε συγχωρήσαι τὴν τε καὶ τὴν δικαιοσύνην ὁσίων εἶναι καὶ τῆς ὁσιότητας δίκαιων, ἀλλὰ τί μοι δοκεῖ ἐν αὐτῷ διάφορον εἶναι. ἀλλὰ τί τοῦτο διαφέρει; ἐφη· εἰ γὰρ βούλει, ἐστό ἡμῖν καὶ δικαιοσύνη νὸσιων καὶ ὁσιότητις δίκαιων. Ἰὴ μοι, ἣν δ' ἐγὼ· οὐδὲν γὰρ δεόμαι τὸ εἰ βούλει τοῦτο καὶ εἴ σοι δοκεῖ ἐλέγχει, ἀλλ' ἐμὲ τε καὶ σέ. τὸ δ' ἐμὲ τε καὶ σὲ τοῦτο

331 conversational style.—To treat μὴ ὁσίων and ἀνόσιον, μη δικαιο καὶ ἢδίκων, as identical, is not, to be sure, strictly logical, since ὁσίων and μὴ ὁσίων, δικαιοιν and μὴ δίκαιον are contradictions, ὁσίων and ἀνόσιων, δίκαιων and ἢδίκων, contraries. Infants and idiots are neither the one nor the other. But as soon as, in the case of a person, one can speak of the quality just, pious, to be not just and unjust is the same thing. The defect in the argument, however, probably occasions the words ἢ δ' τι ὀμοιότατον below.

b 18. καὶ: also. It does not belong with δέ.

20. δικαιότης: rare, here prob. owing to conjunction with ὁσιότης, cf. Gorg. 508a. This ending is a favorite one with Plato; see Lehr's Arist. p. 257. — At first only the likeness of the two concepts is declared. Then, in order to emphasize this statement, the assertion follows that there is no such likeness between either of these concepts and any other.

24. ἀπλοῦν: absolutely true, without exception. — συγχωρήσαι: sc. μέ from the preceding ὑπό.

28. μὴ μοι: see on 318b.

29. τὸ: for the neut. art. with a clause, see G. 141, x. 7. — εἰ βούλει: Socrates often rejects concessions made merely from courtesy, mere conditional assent, because he has to do with truth, with genuine persuasion, not with a momentary exhibition of his own skill and acuteness. He who will find the truth must take into the contest himself and his real belief; cf. 333c.

30. τοῦτο κτέ.: I use this expression 'you and me.' τοῦτο does not refer to what follows (by 'you and me' I mean this).
λέγω, οὖσαν οὕτω τὸν λόγον βέλτιστ' ἀν ἐλέγχεσθαι, εἰ τις τὸ ἐὰν ἀφέλοι αὐτοῦ. Ἀλλὰ μέντοι, ἡ δ' ὅς, προσ- 

ēεικέ τι δικαιοσύνη ὁσιότητι. καὶ γὰρ ὅτι οὐκ ὅττοιν ἀμὴ γέ πῃ προσέοικε. τὸ γὰρ λευκὸν τῷ μέλαιν ἔστων 35 ὅπη προσέοικε, καὶ τὸ σκληρὸν τῷ μαλακῷ, καὶ τάλλα ἀ δοκεὶ ἐναντιώτατα εἴναι ἀλλήλους. καὶ ἀ τότε ἔφαμεν ἀλλήν δύναμιν ἔχεων καὶ οὐκ ἐνια τὸ ἔτερον οἶον τὸ ἐτέ- 

ρον, τὰ τοῦ προσώπου μόρια, ἀμὴ γέ πῃ προσέοικε καὶ ἔστι τὸ ἔτερον οἶον τὸ ἔτερον. ὥστε τούτῳ γε τῷ τρόπῳ 40 κἂν ταῦτα ἐλέγχοις, εἰ βούλοιο, ὅσ ἀπαντά ἔστων ὅμοιὰ ἀλλήλους. ἀλλ' οὐχὶ τὰ ὁμοῖοι τι ἔχοντα ὁμοία δίκαιον ε 

καλεῖν, οὐδὲ τὰ ἀνόμοιον τι ἔχοντα ἁνόμοια, κἂν πάντη σμικρὸν ἔχη. Καὶ ἐγὼ θαυμάσας εἰπὼν πρὸς αὐτῶν, Ἡ γὰρ οὕτω σοι τὸ δίκαιον καὶ τὸ ὅσιον πρὸς ἀλληλα ἔχει, 45 ὥστε ὁμοίοιον τι σμικρὸν ἔχεων ἀλλήλους ; Οὐ πάννυ, ἐφή, οὕτως, οὐ μέντοι οὐδὲ αὖ ὅς σὺ μοι δοκεῖς οἴεσθαι. Ἀλλὰ μὴν, ἐφήν ἐγώ, ἐπειδὴ δυσχερῶς δοκεῖς μοι ἔχεων 332 πρὸς τοῦτο, τοῦτο μὲν ἐάσωμεν, τόδε δὲ ἄλλο ὡν ἔλεγες ἐπισκεφώμεθα.

XX. Ἀφροσύνην τι καλεῖς; Ἐφη. Τούτῳ τῷ πράγματι οὐ πᾶν τοῦναντίον ἔστων ἡ σοφία; Ἐμοιγε δοκεῖ, ἐφη.
Πότερν δὲ ὅταν πράττωσιν ἀνθρωποὶ ὀρθῶς τε καὶ ὕφελμος, τὸτε σωφρονεῖν σοι δοκοῦσιν οὕτω πράττοντες, δ 5 ἡ τούναντίον; Σωφρονεῖν, ἔφη. Οὐκοῦν σωφροσύνη σω- 
φρονοῦσιν; Ἀνάγκη. Οὐκοῦν οἱ μὴ ὀρθῶς πράττοντες ἀφρόνως πράττουσι καὶ οὐ σωφρονοῦσιν οὕτω πράττον- 
tες; Συνδοκεὶ μοι, ἔφη. Τούναντίον ἀρὰ ἔστι τὸ ἀφρό- 
νως πράττειν τῷ σωφρόνως; Ἐφη. Οὐκοῦν τὰ μὲν ἀφρό-
10 νῶς πραττόμενα ἀφροσύνη πράττεται, τὰ δὲ σωφρόνως σωφροσύνη; Ὀμολογεῖ. Οὐκοῦν εἶ τι ἵσχυ πράττεται, ἵσχυρῶς πράττεται, καὶ εἶ τι ἁσθενεῖα, ἁσθενῶς; ἔθοκεί. e 
Καὶ εἶ τι μετὰ τάχος, ταχέως, καὶ εἶ τι μετὰ βραδυ-
τήτος, βραδέως; Ἐφη. Καὶ εἶ τι δὴ ωσαύτως πράττε-
15 ται, ὑπὸ τοῦ αὐτοῦ πράττεται, καὶ εἶ τι ἑναντίως, ὑπὸ 
tοῦ ἑναντίου; Συνέφη. Φέρε δή, ἢν δ' ἐγώ, ἔστι τι κα-
λόν; Συνεχώρει. Τοῦτῳ ἔστι τι ἑναντίον πλήν τὸ αἱ-
σχρόν; Οὐκ ἔστων. Τί δὲ; ἔστι τι ἁγαθῶν; Ἐστων. Τοῦ-
tῳ ἔστι τι ἑναντίον πλήν τὸ κακόν; Οὐκ ἔστων. Τί δὲ;
20 ἔστι τι ὄξυ ἐν φωνῇ; Ἐφη. Τοῦτῳ μὴ ἔστι τι ἑναντίον 
ἄλλο πλήν τὸ βαρὺ; Οὐκ ἔφη. Οὐκοῦν, ἢν δ' ἐγώ, ἐνὶ 
ἀκάστῳ τῶν ἑναντίων ἐν μόνον ἐστὶν ἑναντίον καὶ οὐ 
pολλά; Συνωμολόγει. Ἡθι δή, ἢν δ' ἐγώ, ἀναλογισώμεθα 
tὰ ὀμολογημένα ἡμῖν. ὀμολογηκαμεν ἐν ἐνὶ μόνον ἑναν-
25 τίον ἐσται, πλείω δὲ μή; Ὀμολογηκαμεν. Τὸ δὲ ἑναν-
tίως πραττόμενον ὑπὸ ἑναντίων πράττεσθαι; Ἐφη. Ὀμο-
λογηκαμεν δὲ ἑναντίως πράττεσθαι δ' ἄν ἀφρόνως πρά-
tηται τῷ σωφρόνως πραττομένῳ; Ἐφη. Τὸ δὲ σωφρόνως е

332 4. οὕτω πράττοντες: in acting thus; not a mere repetition of ὅταν πράττο-
σιν. Cf. ὅτι ἄδικε 333 δ. 5. ἡ τούναντίον: i.e. ἀφρόνως πρά-
tειν. 332 23. ἀναλογισώμεθα: think over again, recapitulate. Cf. Rep. x. 618 ε ἀναλογισώμενον πάντα τά νῦν δὴ ἁρ-
θέντα. The more common word for the thought with Plato is ἀνομολο-
γεῖσθαι.
πραττόμενον υπὸ σωφροσύνης πράττεσθαι, τὸ δὲ ἀφρόνως
30 ὑπὸ ἀφροσύνης; Συνεχώρει. Οὐκοῦν εἰ περ ἐναντίως
πράττεται, υπὸ ἐναντίον πράττετι ἂν; Ναὶ. Πράττεται
dὲ τὸ μὲν υπὸ σωφροσύνης, τὸ δὲ υπὸ ἀφροσύνης; Ναὶ.
'Ἐναντίως; Πάνυ γε. Οὐκοῦν υπὸ ἐναντίων οὐτων; Ναὶ.
'Ἐναντίον ἂρ' ἐστὶν ἀφροσύνη σωφροσύνη; Φαίνεται. Μέ-
35 μητσαι οὗν ὅτι ἐν τοῖς ἐμπροσθεν ὁμολογηταί ἢ μὲν ἀφρο-
σύνη σοφία ἐναντίον εἶναι; Συνωμολογεῖς. 'Εν δὲ ἐνὶ μό-
νον ἐναντίον εἶναι; Φημι. Πότερον οὖν, ὥς Πρωταγόρα, λύ-
σωμεν τῶν λόγων; τὸ ἐν ἐνὶ μόνον ἐναντίον εἶναι ἡ ἐκεῖ
ἃν ἐν ὑ ἐλέγετο ἑτερον εἶναι σωφροσύνης σοφία,
40 μόριον δὲ ἐκάτερον ἀρετῆς, καὶ πρὸς τῷ ἑτερον εἶναι καὶ
ἀνόμωσα καὶ αὐτά καὶ αἱ δυνάμεις αὐτῶν, ὅστετε τὰ τοῦ
προσώπου μόρια; πότερον οὖν ἢς λύσωμεν; οὕτως γὰρ οἱ
λόγοι ἀμφότεροι οὐ πάνυ μουσικῶς λέγονται· οὐ γὰρ
συνάδουσιν οὔδε συναρμόττουσιν ἀλλήλους. τῶς γὰρ ἂν
45 συνάδουσιν, εἰ πέρ γε ἀνάγκη ἐνὶ μὲν ἐν μόνον ἐναντίον
eἶναι, πλείω δὲ μὴ, τῇ δὲ ἀφροσύνη, ἐνὶ ὄντι, σοφία ἐναν-

332 33. ἐναντίος; πάνυ γε: repeats, but
with emphasis, what has already been
said. 36. Cf. 332 a.
333 a 38. τὸ: const. with the following
clause. Cf. τὸ εἰ βούλει 331 e, 1. 29.
Similarly τὸ is used with the inf. as
epexegesis of subs. Cf. Phaedo 92 a
ἐάντερ μένη ἢ ἡ ἃ ὅτις, τὸ ἄρμον
μὲν εἶναι ξύνθετον πρῶγμα, 94 b εἰ ὀρθῇ
ἡ ὑπόθεσις ἢ, τῷ ψυχῆν ἄρμον εἶναι.
40. πρὸς τῶν εἶναι: besides being.
Cf. Phaedr. 252 a πρὸς γὰρ τῷ σέβεσθαι
ιατρὸν εὐρίκε μόνον τῶν μεγίστων πόνων
for besides his worship, he has found the
only physician to heal his sharpest pangs,
270 a δ καὶ Περικλῆς πρὸς τῷ εὐφῶς
εἶναι ἐκτήσατο.
41. ἀνόμωσα: pred, sc. ἐλέγοντο εἶναι.
43. μουσικῶς: the comparison of
conflicting statements with discordant
tones, and the reverse, is not uncom-
onmon. Cf. Phaedo, 92 ε οὕτως οὖν σοὶ ὁ
λόγος ἐκεῖνος πῶς ἐξυφαλητεί; καὶ μὴ
πρέπει γε εἰπερ τῷ ἄλλῳ λόγῳ ἡνωθὸν
eἶναι καὶ τῷ περὶ ἄρμονας (and certainly,
if any doctrine should be harmonious,
that should be which relates to harmony),
Lach. 188 ι.
45. ἐνὶ: to this ἀφροσύνη corre-
sponds in the following words; to ἐν,
the noms. σοφία and σωφροσύνη, which
are not ἐν, but πλείω. Plato therefore
must have written πλείω, not the πλεί-
οσι of the Mss.
46. ὄντι: attracted from the fem. ὄν
by the neut. ἐνὶ. Cf. 364 c τὴν ἡδονήν
ὡς ἀγαθὸν ὄν. See H. 610.
47. G yar: is it not so? yap refers back to the preceding conclusion; and ἄλλως πως indicates that a general expression (like οὗτος ἔχει) is to be supplied.—καί: and that, although.

49. τὸ πρότερον: cf. 331 a b. The remarks of Protagoras 331 c-e do not merit notice by Socrates.

53. οτί: in so far as. Cf. 333 d οτί: αἰδιοῦσιν, Parm. 155 e τὸ ἐν — ἄρ' οὖκ ἀνάγκη, οτί μὲν ἔστιν ἐν, οὐσίας μετέχειν ποτὲ, ὃτι δ' οὖκ ἔστι, μὴ μετέχειν αὖ ποτὲ οὐσίας; Symp. 207 d δύναται δὲ ταύτῃ μόνον, τῇ γενέσει, οτί ἀεὶ καταλέστηκε ἐπερον νέον ἀντὶ τοῦ παλαιοῦ and this is possible only in this way, by generation, in so far as it always leaves behind a new in place of the old.

54. ἐγώγε: with strong emphasis, ἐπεὶ . . . ἀνθρώπων being antithetic.—ἐπεὶ: "although"; cf. 333 a.

57. τῶν πολλῶν: not the majority, but referring to the πολλοί above.

60. "It is unimportant who maintains a principle under consideration, provided the principle itself be scrutinized; still, in the scrutiny, the views of those who hold the principle are brought to the test."

XXI. 1. ἐκαλλωπίζετο: pretended δ to be coy. Cf. Phaedr. 236 d παύσαι πρὸς με καλλωπιζόμενος: σχεδὸν γὰρ ἐξω ὃ εἰπὼν ἀναγκᾶσον σε λέγειν. In 317 c above, the sense is to plume himself.

2. δυσχερὴ: cf. 332 a.
"Ithi δή, ἔφην ἐγώ, ἔξ ἄρχης μοι ἀπόκριναι. 5 κοῦσί τινές σοι σωφρονεῖν ἀδικοῦντες; "Εστώ, ἔφη. Τὸ δὲ σωφρονεῖν λέγεις εὗ φρονεῖν; "Εφη. Τὸ δὲ εὗ φρονεῖν εὗ βουλεύεσθαι, ὅτι ἀδικοῦσιν; "Εστώ, ἔφη. Πότερον, ἢν δ’ ἐγώ, εἰ εὗ πράττονσιν ἀδικοῦντες ἢ εἰ κακῶς; Εἰ εὗ. Λέγεις οὖν ἀγαθά ἀττα εἶναι; Λέγω. "Αρ’ οὖν, ἢν 10 δ’ ἐγώ, ταῦτ’ ἐστίν ἀγαθά, ἀ ἐστίν ὡφέλιμα τοῖς ἀνθρώ- 
ποις; Καὶ ναὶ μὰ Δ’ ἔφη, κἂν μὴ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ὡφέλιμα ἢ, ἔγωγε καλῶ ἀγαθά. Καὶ μοι ἐδόκει ὁ Πρω-
ταγόρας ἦδη τετραχύνθαι τε καὶ ἄγωνιὰν καὶ παρατετά-
χθαι πρὸς τὸ ἀποκρίνεσθαι. ἐπειδὴ οὖν ἔωρων αὐτὸν οὐ-
15 τῶν ἐχοντα, εὐλαβοῦμενος ἄρμα ἥρομην. Πότερον, ἢν δ’ ἐγώ, λέγεις, ὁ Πρωταγόρα, ἀ μηδὲν ἀνθρώπων ὡφέλιμα 334 ἐστιν, ἢ ἂ μηδὲ τὸ παράπαν ὡφέλιμα; καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα σὺ ἀγαθὰ καλεῖς; Οὐδαμῶς, ἔφη: ἀλλ’ ἔγωγε πολλὰ οἶδ’

Φλατόνος Προταγόρας.

5, 7. ἔστω: be it so; an attempt to make the unavoidable concession without assent.

7. ἃτι ἀδικοῦσιν: (see on b, 1. 53, above, ἃτι ἀδικεῖ) is here emphatically repeated, as is afterwards ἀδικοῦντες. Thus the attention is held to the question, with reference to the σω-
φρονεῖν ἀδικοῦντα, whether a εὗ φρονεῖν and εὗ βουλεύεσθαι can be thought of in the particular relation to the ἀδι-
κεῖν, and not in relation to something else with which the ἀδικεῖν might acci-
cidentally be associated. By means of the proof that this is inconceiva-
ble, Socrates aims to reach the demon-
stration that σωφροσύνη and δικαιο-
σύνη are one.

tois ἀνθρώποι: naturally added after ὡφέλιμα, although the question under discussion can have reference only to men. But Protagoras seizes upon the words, and, carried away by
his irritation, proceeds to refer ὡφέλιμα to things which can have neither σωφροσύνη nor ἀδικία, even at last to the human body, in distinction from the man himself.

13. ἄγωνιάν: prop. am eager for a fight; then, as feverish anxiety may be connected with this, generally am excited, in inward disquiet. Cf. Charm. 102 ε καὶ ὁ Κριτίας δῆλος μὲν ἢν καὶ πᾶλαι ἄγωνιῶν καὶ φιλοτίμως πρὸς τὸ τῶν Χαμίδην καὶ πρὸς τοὺς παρόντας ἔχων, Lys. 210 ε κατιδών οὖν αὐτὸν ἄγωνιῶν καὶ τεθροφημένον ὑπὸ τῶν λεγομένων. — παρατετάθαι: prop. of soldiers, an army, in line ready for battle; here, like many such terms, transferred to the contest of words; stand in fighting atti-

tude. Socrates observed more and more clearly (cf. 332 a), that Protagoras, vexed and excited, stood ready to break out (as he in fact afterwards does) with a refusal to give further answers.
19. ἰνθρώποις μὲν ἀνωφελῆ ἐστὶ, καὶ σιτία καὶ ποτὰ καὶ 20 φάρμακα καὶ ἄλλα μυρία, τὰ δὲ γε ὀφέλιμα, τὰ δὲ ἰνθρώποις μὲν οὐδέτερα, ἵπποις δὲ, τὰ δὲ βουσὶ μόνον, τὰ δὲ κυσί· τὰ δὲ γε τοῦτον μὲν οὐδενί, δενδροῖς δὲ· τὰ δὲ τοῦ δένδρου ταῖς μὲν ρίζαις ἀγαθὰ, ταῖς δὲ βλάσταις πονηρά, οἷον καὶ ἡ κόπρος πάντων τῶν φυτῶν ταῖς μὲν ρίζαις ἀγαθὴν παραβαλλομένη, εἰ δὲ ἑθέλους ἐπὶ τοὺς πτόρθους καὶ τοὺς νέους κλώνας ἐπιβάλλει πάντ᾽ ἀπόλλυσιν· ἐπεὶ καὶ τὸ ἔλαιον τοῖς μὲν φυτοῖς ἅπασῶν ἐστὶ πάγκακον καὶ ταῖς θρεῖτι πολεμιῶτατον ταῖς τῶν ἄλλων ζῷων πλήν ταῖς τοῦ ἰνθρώπου, ταῖς δὲ τοῦ ἰνθρώπου

30 ἀρωγόν καὶ τῷ ἄλλῳ σώματι. οὕτω δὲ ποικίλον τί ἔστι τὸ ἰγαθὸν καὶ παντοδαπόν, ὡστε καὶ ἐνταῦθα τοῖς μὲν ἕξωθεν τοῦ σώματος ἰγαθόν ἐστι τῷ ἰνθρώπῳ, τοῖς δὲ ἀνωφελῶν, of which it had before been said

559 a οὐδενὶ ἰγαθὸν ἐνοῦσαι δρᾶσιν, αἱ δὲ καὶ τοῦναυτῶν.

22. οὐδέπεπλατέων: since species are spoken of, οὐδέπεπλατέων might have been used (cf. Euthyd. 305d), but whatever is denied of each individual must be denied also of the species. Cf. Dem. xix. 66 and 62.

27 f. τὸ ἔλαιον κτέ.: note the artistic order, exciting surprise and expectation in the listeners.—Cf. Theophr. de causis plant. v. 15. 6 καὶ γάρ ταῦτα (oleum, pix, adeps) φθείρει καὶ μάλασσα τὰ φυτὰ τὰ νεὰ = Plin. N. H. xvii. 234.

31. ἐνταῦθα: in this case, with man’s body.

32. τῶ ἰνθρώπῳ: loosely added, epexeget. of ἐνταῦθα. Regularly, when two dats. are connected, of the whole and of a part, the dat. of the whole precedes. Cf. 339 e, 1. 44, Rep. iii. 407 b ἡ νοσοτροφία (diet in disease) τεκτονίκη μὲν καὶ ταῖς ἄλλαις τέχναις ἐμπόδιον τῇ
ἔντος ταῦτα τοῦτο κάκιστον: καὶ διὰ τοῦτο οἱ ἰατροὶ πάντες ἀπαγορεύουσι τοῖς ἀσθενοῦσι μὴ χρῆσθαι ἐλαῖων,
35 ἀλλ' ἢ ὅ τι συμπεράντω ἐν τούτοις οἷς μέλλει ἐδεσθαι,
ὅσον μόνον τὴν δυσχέρειαν κατασβέσαι τὴν ἔπι ταῖς αἰ-
σθήσεις ταῖς διὰ τῶν ρών γιγανομένην ἐν τοῖς συτίων
τε καὶ ὄφοις.

XXII. Ἐιπόντος οὖν ταῦτα αὐτοῦ οἱ παρόντες ἀνεθορύ-
βησαν ὡς εὐ λέγοι· καὶ ἐγὼ εἶπον· Ὅ Πρωταγόρα, ἐγὼ
τυγχάνω ἐπιλήσμων τις ὄν ἀνθρώπως, καὶ εάν τις μοι μα-
κρὰ λέγῃ, ἐπιλανθάνομαι, περὶ οὗ ἄν ὃ δ λόγος. ὥσπερ
5 οὖν, εἰ ἐτύγχανον υπόκωφος ὄν, ὃν ἄν χρῆναι, εἰ περ
ἐμελλές μοι διαλέξεσθαι, μεῖζον φθέγγεσθαι ἡ πρὸς τοὺς
ἀλλους, οὕτω καὶ νῦν, ἐπειδὴ ἐπιλήσμοι ἐνέτυχες, σύν-
τεμνέ μοι τὰς ἀποκρίσεις καὶ βραχυτέρας ποιεῖ, εἰ μέλλω
σοι ἐπεσθαί. Πώς οὖν κελεύεις με βραχέα ἀποκρίνε-
10 σθαι; ἢ βραχύτερά οὐι, ἐφη, ἀποκρίνομαι ἢ δεῖ; Μηδα-
μῶς, ἦν δ' ἐγώ. 'Αλλ' ὅσα δεῖ; ἐφη. Ναί, ἦν δ' ἐγώ.
Πότερα οὖν ὅσα ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ δεῖν ἀποκρίνεσθαι, τοσοῦτά ε
σοι ἀποκρίνομαι, ἢ ὅσα σοί; 'Ακήκοα γοῦν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ,

334 προσέξει τοῦ νοῦ (the application of the mind) ὧν Lach. 190 b τοῖς ἴδεσι αὐτῶν ἄρετὴ παραγενομένῃ ταῖς ψυχαῖς.
35. μέλλα: for the change of number from ἀσθενοῦσι, see on 319 d.
36. ὅσον μόνον: equiv. to τοσοῦτοι μόνον ὡστε. Cf. Thaeet. 145 a ὅ ὄν ἐσώματικος Θεόδωρος; Theaet. ὅχ., ὅσον γέ με εἰδέναι. — Thus Protagoras's re-
ply to the question δικοῦσί τινες σοι σωφρονεῖν ἀδικοῦντες, ends somewhat
wide of the mark, but gains the applause of the listeners. See on
328 d.

XXII. 2. ὅς: how. Cf. 315 b, l. 35, Crito 43 b πάλαι θαυμάζω αἰσθανόμενος ὡς ἥδεως καθεύδεις.

3. ἐπιλήσμων τις: τις indicates that
the object approximately corresponds
to the word; here somewhat. See on
313 c, l. 22. See II. 702 a.
4. ἐπιλανθάνομαι: cf. 336 d. This, d
which Socrates applies to himself, was
true of the listeners. — περὶ οὗ ἄν
κτῆ.: whatever we are talking about,
i.e. however weighty or trifling the
topic may be. — ὥσπερ οὖν, εἰ κτῆ.: cf. Apol. 17 d ὥσπερ οὖν ἄν, εἰ τῷ ὅντι
ἐξὸν ἐτύγχανον ἄν, συνεγγραφέτε ἐπῆ-
ποι ἄν μοι (you would certainly indulge
me) εἰ ἐν ἐκείνῃ τῇ φωνῇ τε καὶ τῷ
τρόπῳ ἡγοῦν ἐν ὁσπερ οὐπάρεθραμήν
(in which I had been reared), καὶ δὴ καλ
νῦν κτῆ.
οτι συνον τ' ει και αυτος και άλλον διδάξαι περί των
15 αυτών και μακρα λέγειν, εάν βούλη, ουτως ωστε τον λό-
γον μηδέποτε επιλιπεών, και αυ βραχέα ουτως ωστε μη-
δένα σοι εν βραχυτέροις είπείν. ει ουν μέλλεις έμοι διαλεξέσθαι, τον έτερο χρυτ τρόπω προς με, τη βραχυ-
λογία. Ω Σώκρατες, εφη, έγω πολλοίς ήδη εις άγωνα
20 λόγων αφικόμην ανθρώπως, και ει τούτο έποίουν δ συ
κελεύεις, ως ο αντιλέγων εκέλευε με διαλέγεσθαι, ουτω
διελεγόμην, ουδένος άν βελτίων έφανόμην ουδ' αν έγέ-
veto Πρωταγόρου ένομα εν τοις Ελλησών. Καλ έγω —
έγνων γαρ οτι ουκ ήρεσεν αυτως αυτω ταις αποκρίσει
25 ταις εμπροσθεν, και οτι ουκ έθελησοι έκων ειναι απο-
κρινόμενος διαλέγεσθαι — ήγησάμενος ουκέτι έμων έρ-
γων ειναι παρείναι ει ταις συνουσίαις, Άλλα του, εφην,
ο Πρωταγόρα, ουδ' έγω λιπαρός έχω παρα τα σοι δο-
κόντα την συνουσίαν ήμιν γίνεσθαι, άλλ' επείδαιν συ

334 14. καλ αυτος... διδάξαι: paren-

15. μακρα λέγειν κτί.: the sophists
and rhetoricians boasted of their
ability to speak on any subject as
long or as briefly as one desired.
Cf. 329 b, 335 b, Phaedr. 267 b Τισιών δε
Γοργίαν τε εάσομεν ειδειν, o τυντομοι
τε λόγων και ἀπειρα μήκη περὶ πάν-
των ἀνεύρων (invented)? Gorg. 449 c
καλ γαρ αυτα του εν έστιν Δων φημι,
μηδένα αυ εν βραχυτέροις εμου τα αυτα

335 a 19. αγώνα: this conversation then
was not a search for truth, but a con-
test for victory. Cf. Gorg. 456 d.

21. ός... διελεγόμην: added, without
a copula, as an explanatory appos.,
to τούτο επίοιμον. Cf. Rep. ii. 359 c ει
tουνδε ποιησαμεν τη διανοια, δοντες
έξουσιαν επακολουθησαμεν, Meno 71 b

335 b καλ αυτος ουτως έχω, συμπένομαι τοις
πολλαίσ (I share the poverty of the citi-
zens), τούτον τού πράγματος, Gorg. 479 b
κινδυνεύομεν τοιουτῶν τι ποιεῖν καὶ ού την
dίκην φεύγοντες, το διηγειν αυτόν καθο-
ρων those who flee from justice, seem to
do the same sort of thing, (they seem) to
see its painful side. A freq. usage.

22. ουδένος βελτίων: see on 324 d.
— έγένετο κτί.: see on 327 d.

23. άνομα: cf. Apol. 38 c άνομα
ξετε καλ αιτιαν υπε των βουλομένων την
πολυ λοιδορείν, 20 c ου γαρ σου γε ουδέν
των άλλων περιττότερον πραγματευμέ-
νον τοσαντη φημι κατ λόγος γέγονεν,
Xen. An. vii. 3. 19 παρα ξεύθη το σον
άνομα μεγιστὸν ἐστι.

25. έκων ειναι: see on 317 a.

27. άλλα του: in immediate reply to
the declaration of Protagoras above,
hence also ουδ' εγω neither do I.
30 \(\text{βούλη διαλέγεσθαι ώς ἔγω δύναμαι ἔπεσθαι, τότε σοι διαλέξομαι. \ οὐ μὲν γάρ, ὡς λέγεσαι περὶ σοῦ, φής δὲ καὶ αὐτός, καὶ ἐν μακρολογίᾳ καὶ ἐν βραχυλογίᾳ οἶός τ' εἶ συνονοσίας ποιεῖσθαι. \ σοφῶς γάρ εἰ. \ ἔγω δὲ τὰ μακρὰ εἰς ταύτα ἀδύνατος, ἐπεὶ ἐβουλόμην ἀν οἶός τ' εἶναι. \ ἀλλὰ}

35 \(\text{σὲ ἔχρην ἦμιν συγχωρεῖν τὸν ἀμφότερα δυνάμενον, ἵνα συνονοσία ἐγίγνετο. \ νῦν δὲ ἐπείδη οὐκ ἔθελες καὶ ἐμοὶ τις ἀσχολία ἐστί καὶ οὐκ ἂν οἶός τ' ἐήν σοι παραμεῖναι ἀποτείνουτι μακρὺς λόγους — ἔλθείν γάρ ποί μὲ δεῖ — ἐμι. \ ἐπεὶ καὶ ταύτ' ἀν ἰσῶς οὐκ ἄδησες σου ἥκονου.}

40 \(\text{Καὶ ἀμα ταῦτ' εἴπων ἀνιστάμην ὡς ἀπιών. \ καὶ μου ἀνισταμένου ἐπιλαμβάνεται ὁ Καλλίας τῆς χειρὸς τῇ δὲ- α ἐξά, τῇ δ' ἀριστερᾷ ἀντέλαβε τοῦ τρίβωνος τοῦτού, καὶ ἐπεν. \ Οὐκ ἀφήσωμεν σε, ὡς ἱκρατεῖς ἐὰν γὰρ σὺ ἐξέλθης, οὐκ ὁμοίως ἦμιν ἔσονται οἱ διάλογοι. \ δέομαι}

45 \(\text{oὐν σου παραμεῖναι ἦμιν. \ ώς ἔγω οὐδ᾿ ἂν ἐνὸς ἢδιον ἀκοῦσαμι ἢ σοῦ τῇ καὶ Πρωταγόρῳ διαλεγομένων. \ ἀλλὰ χάρωσαι ἦμιν πᾶσιν. \ Καὶ ἔγω εἴπον — ἦδη δὲ ἀνειστήκη ὡς ἐξίων — Ὡν παί Ἰππονίκου, αἰὲ μὲν ἐγωγεῖ σου τὴν}

335 34. \(\text{ἀδύνατος: with acc., cf. Meno c 94 b ἵνα δὲ μὴ ἁλγοὺς ὅτι καὶ τῶν φαντοτάτων Ἀθηναίων ἀδύνατος γεγο- νόναι τοῦτο τὸ πράγμα. — ἐπεί: see on 333 e, l. 54.}

35. \(\text{ἵνα ἐγίγνετο: for secondary tense of indic. in a final clause, express- ing a purpose which cannot be fulfilled, see G. 216, 3; Π. 884.}

36. \(\text{συνονοσία: conversation; cf. 338 c.}

38. \(\text{ἀποτείνουν: see on 329 a.}

39. \(\text{ἐπεί κτέ.: for, if I had time, I should be glad to listen to this also (ταῦτα equiv. to τῶν μακρῶν λόγους). Socrates in Plato is never at a loss to cover his meaning,— in this case, aversion to the long discourses of the}

40. \(\text{sophists,— in terms of expression which are courteous yet perfectly transparent.}

42. \(\text{τρίβωνος: see on 342 c.}

44. \(\text{ὅμοιοις ἐσονται: elnes as well as γλυτεσθαι may be modified by advs. See on 325 b, 1. 22.}

45. \(\text{ὡς: causal; see on 310 e.}

philosophian ágamai, átār kai νῦν ἐπαινῶ καὶ φιλῶ, ὡστε ἐν
50 βουλοίμην ἂν χαρίζεσθαι σοι, εἰ μου δυνατὰ δέοιο. νῦν
δ' ἐστίν ὦστερ ἂν εἰ δεόι μου Κρίσων τῷ Ἰμεραίῳ
ἐπεσθαί, ἡ τῶν δολιχοδρόμων τῷ τῶν ἡμεροδρόμων
diathēν te kai ἐπεσθαί. ἐπομι σὺν ὧν πολύ σου μᾶλλον ἐγὼ ἐμαυτοῦ δέομαι θέουσι τούτοις ἄκολοθεῖν,
55 ἀλλ' ὃυ γὰρ δύναμαι, ἀλλ' εἰ τε δέει θεάσασθαι ἐν τῷ
αυτῷ ἐμὲ τε καὶ Κρίσωνα θέοντας, τοῦτο δέου συγκαθ-εῖναι. ἐγὼ μὲν γὰρ ὄν δύναμαι ταχῦ θεῖν, οὕτος δὲ δύ-
nαται βραδέως. εἰ οὖν ἐπιθυμεῖς ἐμοῦ καὶ Πρωταγόρου ἀκούειν, τοῦτο δέου, ὦστερ τὸ πρῶτὸν μοι ἀπεκρίνατο,
60 διὰ βραχέων τε καὶ αὐτὰ τὰ ἐρωτῶμενα, οὕτω καὶ νῦν ἀποκρίνεσθαι. εἰ δὲ μή, τίς ὁ τρόπος ἐσται τῶν διαλό-
gων; χωρίς γὰρ ἐγών ὕμνην εἶναι τὸ συνεῖναι τε ἀλλήλων
diálegoménous καὶ τὸ δημηγορεῖν. 'Αλλ' ὀρᾶσ, ἔφη, ὦ

335 51. ὦστερ ἂν εἰ: see on 311b.—
Crison had conquered in the Olympic
races, Ol. 83, 84 and 85 (448, 444,
440 b.c.), cf. Diod. xii. 5, 23, 29. In
Legg. viii. 840 a his temperance is
praised.
52. ἐπεσθαί: keep up with.—
dolichodróμον: see on 329 a.—
himerodróμων: couriers, like Phidippides in Nep.
Milt. c. 4 and Ildt. vi. 105. Heme-
rodromos (says Livy xxxi. 24) vo-
cant Graeci, ingens die uno
cursu emetientes spatum.
336 53. diathēn: cf. Theaet. 148c eἰ diathēn, τοῦ ἀκμᾶς τοῖς καὶ ταξιστῶν ἢττῆθα δὲν in a race you had been beaten by a man
full grown and very swift. diathēn te kai is inserted διὰ μέσου (see on 327a), and τῷ depends upon ἐπεσθαί. In many
compounds διὰ expresses a race.
55. ἀλλ' οὖ γὰρ: see II. 1050, 4, d.
56. συγκαθεῖνα: intr., as are many
compounds of ἰέναι. Cf. 338 a, 1, 21,
Thenet. 168 ὢλεφ τῇ διανοίᾳ συγκαθεῖν
δπ ἀληθῶς σκέπει in a spirit genial and
sincerely accommodating, you will search,
Rep. viii. 563a oi δὲ γέρωντες ἐξαγα-
θείνες τοὺς νέους εὑραπελάς τε καὶ
χαριντσαμοῦ ἐμπίπλανται.
62. χωρίς εἶναι: is different in na-
ture or kind. Cf. Soph. O. C. 808 χωρίς
to τ' εἰπεῖν πολλὰ καὶ τὰ καλὰ to say
much and to speak fittingly are different
things, Euthyd. 289 d δήλον οὖν ὦτὶ καὶ
περὶ λόγους χωρὶς ἢ τοῦ ποιεῖν τέχνη
καὶ τοῦ χρῆσθαι evidently, as regards
speeches, the art of making them differs
from the art of using them. So also
dίξα.
63. δημηγορεῖν: harangue, with more
regard for the impression than for the
treatment of the subject.—ὁρᾶσ: either
with or without ὦσ or ὄσ, stands
freq. at the beginning of clauses, like
our you see, i.e. you see for yourself.
Cf. Xen. Hier. i. 16 ἀλλ' ὀρᾶσ: ἐκείνο
65 εξείναι διαλέγεσθαι ὑπὸς βούλεται καὶ σοὶ ὑπὸς ἂν ἂν σοὶ βούλῃ.

XXIII. Τειολαβῶν οὖν ὁ 'Ἀλκιβιάδης, Οὐ καλῶς λέγεις, ἐφι, ὥς Καλλία. 'Πωκράτης μὲν γὰρ ὁδε ὀμολογεῖ μὴ μετείναι οἱ μακρολογίας καὶ παραχωρεῖ 'Πωκράτῳ, τοῦ δὲ διαλέγεσθαι οίνος τ' εἶναι καὶ ἐπιστάσθαι λόγου τε δοῦναι εἰ 5 καὶ δέξασθαι θαυμάζομεν ἂν εἰ τῷ ἀνθρώπω παραχωρεῖ. εἰ μὲν οὖν καὶ 'Πωκράτῳ ὀμολογεῖ φαυλότερος εἶναι 'Πωκράτους διαλεχθῆναι, ἐξαρκεῖ 'Πωκράτει· εἰ δὲ ἀντιποιεῖται, διαλεγόμεθα ἐρωτῶν τε καὶ ἀποκρινόμενος, μὴ ἐφ' ἐκάστῃ ἐρωτῆσαι μακρὸν λόγου ἀποτείνων ἐκκρούων 10 τοὺς λόγους καὶ οὐκ ἑθέλων διδόναι λόγον, ἀλλ' ἀπομηκύνων ἕως ἂν ἐπιλάθωνται περὶ ὅτου τὸ ἐρώτημα ἦν οἱ πολλοὶ τῶν ἀκούοντων, ἐπεὶ 'Πωκράτη γε ἐγὼ ἐγγυνώμαι μὴ ἐπιλήσεσθαι, οὐχ ὅτι παίζει καὶ φησὶν ἐπιλήσμων εἰ

336 out of the way; then, put to one side, frustrate, always with the idea of violence. Here ἐκκρούων τοὺς λόγους means "frustrating the purpose," "defeating the result of the discussion." Cf. Arist. Eth. N. iii. 15 καὶ μεγάλαι καὶ σφοδράλς ὁσί (αἱ ἐπιθυμαί), καὶ τὸν λοιγισμὸν ἐκκρούωσιν, Dem. XL 43 ἦν ἀποδιατηθέντα μου λόγος ἐξ ἀρχῆς με συκοφαντή καὶ τὴν δικήν ταῦτην ἐκκρούρ.

13. οἰχ ὅτι: i.e. οὐ λέγω ὅτι. I do not speak of the fact that; or, in sense, although. Freq. in Plato. See on 319d. — Nothing can ruffle Socrates's courtesy, but Plato puts into the mouth of the impetuous Alcibiades a plain and vigorous statement of what is already in the reader's mind. Prob. Alcibiades was an exception to the οἱ παρόντες ἀνεθοροθήσαν 334 c.
ναι. ἐμοὶ μὲν οὖν δοκεῖ ἐπιεικέστερα Σωκράτης λέγειν·

15 χρὴ γὰρ ἐκαστὸν τὴν ἑαυτοῦ γνώμην ἀποφαίνεσθαι.

Μετὰ δὲ τὸν Ἀλκιβίαδην, ὡς ἐγὼμαι, Κριτίας ἂν ὁ εἰπὼν. Ὅ Πρόδικε καὶ Ἰππία, Καλλίας μὲν δοκεῖ μοι μᾶλα πρὸς Πρωταγόρον εἶναι, Ἀλκιβίαδης δὲ ἄεὶ φιλο-νεικός ἔστι πρὸς ὅ ἄν ὀρμήσῃ. ἢμᾶς δὲ οὐδὲν δεῖ συμ-ε

20 φιλονεικεῖν οὔτε Σωκράτει οὔτε Πρωταγόρα, ἀλλὰ κοινὴ ἀμφοτέρων δεῖσθαι μὴ μεταξὺ διαλύσαι τὴν ἐνυσίαν.

Εἴποντος δὲ αὐτοῦ ταῦτα ὁ Πρόδικος, Καλὼς μοι,337 ἐφη, δοκεῖς λέγειν, ὃ Κριτία· χρὴ γὰρ τοὺς ἐν τοιούτῳ λόγοις παραγιγνομένους κοινοὺς μὲν εἶναι ἀμφοῖν τοῖς διαλεγομένοις ἀκροατάς, ἵσους δὲ μη. ἐστὶ γὰρ οὐ ταὐ-

tόν· κοινὴ μὲν γὰρ ἀκούσαι δεὶ ἀμφοτέρων, μη ὅσον δὲ νεῖμαι ἐκατέρω, ἀλλὰ τῷ μὲν σοφωτέρῳ πλέον, τῷ δὲ ἀμαθεστέρῳ ἔλαττον. ἐγὼ μὲν καὶ αὐτὸς, ὁ Πρωταγόρα τε καὶ Σώκρατες, ἀξιῶ ὑμᾶς συγχωρεῖν καὶ ἄλληλοις περὶ τῶν λόγων ἀμφισβητεῖν μὲν, ἔρίζειν δὲ μη· ἀμφισβητοῦσι μὲν γὰρ καὶ διὰ εὐνοιαν οἱ φίλοι τοῖς φίλοις, ἔρίζουσι δὲ οἱ διάφοροι τε καὶ ἐχθροὶ ἄλληλοις. καὶ οὕτως ἂν καλ-

336 e

19. πρός: on the side of. 24. κοινοὺς κτῆ.: Prodicus gave much attention to the matter of synonyms, ὀρθῶς τῶν ὄνομάτων, as he termed it, and his lecture upon the subject cost fifty drachmas. Cf. Crat. 384 b; Spengel συναγωγὴ τεχνῶν pp. 46–59. Since he attached too great value to this art, as it seems, and was always introducing such distinctions, he here, as 340 a, 358 a d, encounters the raillery of Socrates. For the sake of making a good hit, Plato perhaps goes beyond the reality in his description. κοινὸς and ἵσος were habitually joined with ἀκρο-

337 a

28. ἐγὼ μὲν καὶ αὐτὸς κτῆ.: cf. Prisc. viii. 35 Cicero in Prota-
gora: nunc a vobis, o Protagas- gora et Socrates, postulo, ut de isto concedatis alter al-
teri et inter vos de hujusce-
modi rebus controversyne, non concertetis.
31. δι' εὐνοιαν: with the best of feel-
ing.
337  
34. εν ημιν: before us as judges. See on 355 d; cf. Gorg. 464 d e i δει εν πασι διαγωνιζεθαι υφοποιου τε και ιατρων.

c  37. πολλακις: const. with ψευδο-μένων.

38. ευφραίνοιμεθα: cf. Arist. Top. ii. 6. ο Προδικός δημιουργεῖ τάς ηδονάς εἰς χαρὰν καὶ τέρψιν καὶ εὐφροσύνην, but the distinctions themselves are not specified, and the statement is not sustained by the passage from Prodicus in Xen. Mem. ii. 1. 24 τι λα κεχαρισμένον η σιτίον η ποτῶν ευρισ, η τι αν ιδών η τι άκούσας τερφθείς, η τίνων υφραινόμενος η άπτομένος ηθελίς, τίσι δε παιδικοίς υμιλών μάλιστ' έν ευφραϊνθείς.

40 f. αυτη, αυτο: in sense nearly equiv. to μόνη and μόνη. See on 309 a.

XXIV. 4. συγγενεῖς: it was the cardinal point of the sophist ethic, that positive laws are arbitrary restrictions, imposed upon men by powerful individuals or by the majority, with the purpose simply of putting them down, and of restraining the natural rights of the individual, i.e. those things which he desires and regards as his rights. That Hippias also taught this is shown by Xen. Mem. iv. 4. 14 ff. Plato therefore, in order here to characterize him, makes him express this principle.

5. όμοιον τώ όμοιω: cf. Gorg. 510 b d φίλος μοι δοκεί έκαστος έκάστω εύωι λα άθαντά καλίστα, ὅπερ οι παλαιοί τε καλ' ασφολ λέγουσιν, ο ομοίου τώ όμοίω, Symp. 105 b έλα άκούσας λόγος εὐ εξεί, ό όμοιον όμοίω δελ ελάζει, Lys. 214 b οδοκοί καὶ τοίς τῶν σοφοτάτων συγγράμμασιν εντευθέντα κακὶ αύτὰ λέγοντος, ότι τό όμοιον τώ όμοίω ανάγκη δελ φιλον εύωι; εις δε ποι ὡς καὶ περὶ φύσεως (nature) τε καὶ τού διον (the universe) διαλεγόμενοι καὶ γράφοντες, a description referring directly to Empedocles, but applying equally well to Hippias.
6. νόμος: the sophists often appealed, in support of their view of right, to a passage of Pindar (Frag. inc. 151 Boeckh, 169 Bkg.) νόμος ὁ πάντων βασιλείς θυατών τε καὶ ἀθανάτων ἐγεῖ δικαίων τὸ βιαστότατον ὑπερτάτα χειρὶ (does, and makes just, that which is most violent, with supreme hand), understanding by this the law of nature. Cf. Gorg. 484 b, 488 b. — πολλὰ κτὲ.: often forces unnatural connections, i.e. of ordinary and superior natures in the state.

10. πρυτανεῖον: was originally probably in most Greek cities the public building devoted to the Prytanis, the highest official, where was also the sanctuary of the ἐστία, the sacred state-hearth, so that it formed the heart and centre of the city. Athens therefore is called here and by Theopompus (Athen. vi. 254 b) τὸ πρυτανεῖον τῆς Ἑλλάδος, in the same sense in which a Pythian oracle (Lel. Β. II. iv. 6) called her τὴν κοινὴν ἐστίαν τῆς Ἑλλάδος, Pindar (Frag. 54) Ἑλλάδος ἐρεισμα, Thucydides (A nth. vii. 45) Ἑλλάδος Ἑλλάς, others τὸ τῆς Ἑλλάδος μουσεῖον. — The solemn, pompous, and at the same time flattering style of Hippias's words is doubtless true to the life.

15. Hippias compares himself and the rest of the company to arbitrators, umpires, freely chosen by the contending parties. It is the office of these umpires to persuade both parties (here, Socrates and Protagoras) to moderate their demands and to unite upon some intermediate course. συμβαίνειν and συμβιβάζειν are here the technical expressions (cf. Thuc. ii. 29 ἔννεβιβάζει δὲ καὶ τὸν Περὶδίκαν τῶν 'Αθηναίων). ὅποι is used because συμβιβάζει has a pass. sense. See II. 820. — The peculiar transposition of the words, for ὅπ' ἡμῶν ὁσπερ ὅπο διαιτητῶν, is very freq. in Plato in such comparisons. Cf. Rep. iii. 414 e δεῖ ὡς περὶ μὴντός καὶ τροφοῦ τῆς χώρας ἐν ἔτει διοβελευθεία, vii. 520 e ὅς ἐπ' ἀναγκαίον αὐτῶν ἐκκατοστὸς ἐίσι τῷ ἄρχειν (will take office), viii. 545 e ὥς ὅτι παῖδας ἡμᾶς παισίναμα (viz. τὰς Μοῦσας), Theaet. 170 a ὁσπερ πρὸς θεοῦς ἐχεῖν τοὺς ἐν ἐκκατοστὸς ἀρχείσιν look up to their commanders in such peril as to gods. — As συμβιβάζει in this sense almost always stands absolutely, εἰς τὸ μέσον is most simply connected with συμβιβαζόντων.
PLATO'S PROTAGORAS.

St. p. 338.

συμβιβαζόντων εἰς τὸ μέσον καὶ μῆτε σὲ τὸ ἀκριβὲς 338 τοῦτο ἐδος τῶν διαλόγων ζητεῖν τὸ κατὰ βραχὺ λίαν,
εἰ μὴ ἤδυν Πρωταγόρα, ἀλλ' ἐφείναι καὶ χαλάσαι τὰς
ηῆςας τοῖς λόγοις, ἵνα μεγαλοπρεπέστεροι καὶ εὐσχημονέ-
20 στεροὶ ἦμιν φαύωνται, μῆτ' αὐ Πρωταγόραν πάντα κά-
λων ἐκτείναντα, οὐρία ἐφέντα, φεύγειν εἰς τὸ πέλαγος
τῶν λόγων, ἀποκρύψαντα γῆν, ἀλλὰ μέσου τι ἀμφοτέρους
tεμεῖν. ὦς οὖν ποιήσετε, καὶ πείσθει μοι ῥαβδοῦχον καὶ ἐ

17. λιαν: belongs to ζητεῖν, and
stands at the end of the clause because
it is emphatic.

20. φαίνωνται: come into view, present
themselves. Cf. Euthyd. 288e οἱ
μαί γὰρ τι αὐτοῦ πάγκαλον φαινέται,
ἐπειδὰν ἄρθιναι σπονδάζειν for I think
some great beauty will appear in the two,
when they begin to be in earnest, 294a ὴς
θαυμαστὸν λέεις καὶ ἀγαθὸν μέγα
πεφάνθαι. — As this refers only to Socrates's words, it cannot have ἦμιν
with the Μ.N. ἦμιν is ethical dat. — πάντα
κάλων ἐκτείναντα: (or σθείναι, ἐφέναι,
κινεῖν, ἐκλείνειν), like οὐρία ἐφέναι καὶ
ἀποκρύπτειν γῆ, a nautical expression,
"letting out all the ropes, that hold
and stretch the sails, as long as possible," i.e. setting every sail. Then
figuratively, cf. Schol. on Plato ii.,
p. 466 Bk. παρομοία ἐπὶ τῶν πᾶσι προ-
ἐχθροὶ γὰρ ἐξαίτιο πάντα δὴ κάλων, Αρ.
Ec. 706 νῦν δῆ σε πάντα δει κάλων
ἐξέναι σεαυτῷ, Zenobius ν. 62.

176 (Pythagoras speaks), et quon-
niam magnō feror aequore pleanaque ventis | vela dedi.
ἐφέντα is intr., see on 336a. — πέλα-
453d ὁδὸν καὶ ἡμῖν νεωστέν (must
swim) καὶ πειρατέων σφόσθαι ἐκ τοῦ
λόγου, Symp. 210d ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ πέλα-
γος τετραμμένον τοῦ καλοῦ, Polit. 273d

una μὴ χειμαθείς (tempest-tossed) εἰς
tὸν τῆς ἀνομολύτητος ἀκέραν ὑπὸ το-
πον δὴ, Cic. Tusc. 4, θ stateimne
nos vela facere, an quasi e
porta egredientes paululum
remigare.

22. ἀποκρύψαντα: cause to dis-
ppear, lose from sight. Cf. Thuc. v.
65. ὦ ἐπειδὴ ἐκεῖνοι ἀπέκρυψαν (sc. αὐ-
τοὺς), Luc. V. ii. 38 ἐπὶ δὲ ἀπε-
κρύψαμεν αὐτοὺς, Verg. Aen. iii. 291
protinus aērias Phaeacum
abscondimus arces.

23. τεμεῖν: freq. of the way, course, b
open, take, pursue (like Lat. se care).
Cf. Polit. 262d διὰ μέσου δὲ ἀφαλέ-
στερον ἰέναι τέμνοντα, Legy. vii. 803e
καθάπερ ὡδὶ τέμπτηται. — ὡς: equiv. to
ὁτωσ, elsewhere in prose, only after
ὡς, ὡς απε (see on 326d); yet this use is
also found in Thuc. iii. 37 ὡς οὖν χρῆ καὶ
ἡμᾶς ποιουντα παραινεῖν. — The imper-
ative force of the fut. ind. corresponds
to the assumption and confidence of
Hippias. — ῥαβδοῦχον: it was very
appropriate for Hippias the Elan to
to multiply terms for the directors and
judges of contests, and thus to embel-
hish his discourse. The ῥαβδοῦχον
or ῥαβδοφόροι are seen on all vases in
pictures of gymnastic contests. On
ἐπιστάτης and ῥαβδοῦχος cf. Legg. xii.
949a καὶ γυμνικῶν τε καὶ ἰππικῶν ἀθλων


Finally πρύτανεις, an old word, president, was also doubtless the proper name of the one who arranged the contests. These presidents were selected either by those who instituted the respective games, or by the combatants themselves. In Socrates's words which follow, these methods of selection run into each other.

XXV. 2. τέ: see on 325 b, l. 27.
7. ἥρησεται: the fut. pf. with temporal aug. is very rare.

8. ἀλλὰ δὴ: introduces objections raised by others, like the Lat. at.

Cf. Apol. 37 c ἀλλὰ δὴ φοργῆς τιμήσο-

ma; Crito 54 a ἀλλὰ δὴ τῶν παιδῶν ἐνεκα

βούλει εὖν;

9. ἀδύνατον ὑμῖν: sc. αἱρεῖσθαι βελτίον ἡμῶν, from which then naturally ὦστε ... ἐλέεσθαι would result. In other cases ὦστε at times immediately follows ἔστι, δυνατός, ἰκανός.

Cf. Lys. xx. 24 ὑμῖν δ' ὦν ἢν, ὦστ' εἴδεινα, Plato Phaedr. 269 d τὸ δύνασθαι ὦστε ἀγωνιστὴν τέλεον γενέσθαι, Polit. 295 a ἰκανὸς ὦστε διὰ βίου προστάτευν.

12. τὸ γ' ἐμὸν: for my part, so far as I am concerned. Frequent in Plato.

Cf. Soph. 237 b τὸ μὲν ἐμὸν δι' ἑαυτῆς βούλει τίθεο.
PLATO'S PROTAGORAS.

St. p. 338.

19. λόγον υποσχέτω: render account, i.e. defend his position. Cf. Gorg. 465a toúton de peri ei ámfiaβητεις, étheló υποσχέτω λόγον, Xen. Mem. iv. 4. θ ἄρκει γάρ ὅτι τῶν ἄλλων καταγέλας (for it is enough for you that you ridicule the others) ἔρωταν μὲν καὶ ἐλέγχων πάντας, αὐτὸς δὲ οὖν ἔχει πάντει. 339 ριήνος ποιητών λεγόμενα οἰόν τε εἶναι ξυνιέναι, α' τε ὀρθῶς πεποί-

22. διαφθείρειν: cf. 360a, Symp. 174b ἵνα καὶ τὴν παροιμίαν διαφθείρωμεν μεταβάλλοντες that we may spoil the proverb by changing it.

24. ἐδόκει πάσιν: they offered a facile acquiescence, cf. παύτα ἤρεσε κτε. above.

XXVI. 1. ἡγοῦμαι κτε.: the sophists were the first to make language the object of scientific examination and discussion. This was occasioned by, and in its turn promoted, the exegesis and criticism of the poets, who thus became the favorite theme of conversation in cultivated circles. This appears in Socrates's remarks in 347e, and in the amusing scenes in Ar. Ran. 1099 ff. It was often, however, the sole aim of the sophists, through the pointing out of faults in form or contents, to exhibit their own superiority to these writers. Thus Protagoras censured the inv. in μήν ἄκει δεδε θεα, and the fem. form οὐλομένην (cf. Arist. Poet. 19, Soph. El. 14), and Hippias boasted his knowledge of the poets (cf. 347a, Cic. de Or. iii. 127); see the dialogue Hipp. Mi. and Introd. p. 16 f. Isocrates says xii. 18 τίνες μοι τῶν ἐπιτηδείων ἔλεγον ὡς ἐν τῷ Δυκεϊῷ συγκαθεζόμενοι τρεῖς ἐτέταρτες τῶν ἀγελαίων (common sort of) σοφιστῶν καὶ πάντας φασίκοντας εἰδέναι διαλέγοντο περὶ τὲ τῶν ἄλλων ποιητῶν καὶ τῆς Ἡσιόδου καὶ τῆς Ὀμήρου ποιῆσεως.

3. περὶ ἔπων: this and also ὀρθῶς were probably expressions characteristic of Protagoras, cf. 342a. As to his ὀρθοτεία, so called in Phaedr. 267c, see Introd. p. 4.
5 ηται καὶ ἀ μή, καὶ ἐπίστασθαι διελεῖν τε καὶ ἐρωτόμενον λόγον δοῦναι. καὶ δὴ καὶ νῦν ἔσται τὸ ἐρωτημα περὶ τοῦ αὐτοῦ μὲν περὶ ὄ u περ ἐγώ τε καὶ σὺ νῦν δῆ διελεγόμεθα, περὶ ἀρετῆς, μετεννηγμένοι δὲ εἰς ποίησιν· τοσοῦτον μόνον διοίστει. λέγει γὰρ ποιν Συμώνιδης πρὸς Σκόπαν,

10 τὸν Κρέουτος νῦν τοῦ Θεσσαλοῦ, ὅτι 'Ανδρ' ἀγαθὸν μὲν ἀλαθέως γενέσθαι χαλεπόν, θ' χερσίν τε καὶ ποσὶ καὶ νόῳ τετράγωνον, ἄνευ ψόγου τετυγμένου.


7. νῦν δὴ: ἀρτίως ἡ μικρὸν ἐμπροσθεν, Photius Lex. p. 305, 9, cf. Poll. i. 72, when used with an impf. (otherwise in 349 a). The contrast is marked, as here, by νῦν or νῦν δὲ, cf. 340 b νῦν δὴ εἶπε ... νῦν σκόπει, Legg. iii. 685 e ἡ νῦν δὴ μὲν τούτων περιτυχόντες τοῖς λόγοις οὕτω ταῦτα ἐτίθημεν, νῦν δὲ ἐπιλεξήσθαι or did we a little while ago, coming to these principles, lay them down thus, and now have we forgotten them? the comic poet Magnes (Meineke Com. Frag. ii. 10) εἰπὲ μοι· νῦν δὴ μὲν ἀμώνο μὴ γεγονέναι, νῦν δὲ φῆς; After the interruption, the contrast of the earlier with the later (νῦν ἔσται) could not be expressed by νῦν διαλεγόμεθα (the reading of the Mss.).

9. πρὸς Σκόπαν: "in a poem in honor of Scopas." The Scopadace, a princely family of Thessaly, allied with the Aleuadace, were dynasts in Crannon and Pharsalus. Of this family, Diactorides was among the suitors for the daughter of Clisthenes in Sicyon (Hdt. vi. 127), and a Scopas, according to Diogenes Laërtius, ii. 25, invited Socrates to his residence. Simonides, as Gorgias at a later day, was often the guest of the Scopadace, and composed several poems in their honor. These included an epinician ode (in which he celebrated the Dioscuri, Cic. de Or. ii. 86, Quint. xi. 2. 11 ff.), the poem before us (whether an epinician ode or a scolion see Introd. p. 19), and a threnos when a great part of the family perished, at a triumphal feast, by the fall of the roof of the banqueting hall (Bergk Poet. Lyr. iii. 384*). To meet the ἀποφιά, the criticism of Protagoras, several answers are now ready; namely, the first attempted explanation by Socrates, the one by Prodicus, the second by Socrates, and the barely intended one by Hippias. See Introd. pp. 11 f.

12. τετράγωνον: firm and unchangeable, perfect. This meaning is derived from the use of the Pythagoreans, with whom the number four (τετρακτύς) and the square were symbols of the permanent, perfect, divine. Cf. δοκεῖ δὲ καὶ τοῖς Πυθαγόρειοις (sc. τὸ τετράγωνον) εἰκόνα φέρειν τῆς θείας
tōuτo ἐπίστασαι τὸ ἀσμα, ἢ πάν σοι διεξέλθω; Καὶ ἐγὼ
15 εἶπον ὦτι Οὐδὲν δεῖ· ἐπίσταμαι τε γὰρ καὶ πάνυ μοι
tυγχάνει μεμεληκός τοῦ ἄσματος. Ἐν, ἔφη, λέγεισ. πο-
tερον οὖν καλῶς σοι δοκεῖ πεποιηθέναι καὶ ὀρθῶς, ἢ οὐ;
Pάνυ, ἔφην ἔγω, καλῶς τε καὶ ὀρθῶς. Δοκεῖ δὲ σοι κα-
lῶς πεποιηθέναι, εἰ ἐναντία λέγει αὐτός αὐτῷ ὁ ποιητής;
20 Οὐ καλῶς, ἃν δ’ ἐγώ. "Ορα δή, ἔφη, βέλτιον. 'Αλλ’, δὲ
gαθέ, ἐσκεμμαί ἰκανῶς. Οἶσθ’ οὖν, ἔφη, ὦτι προϊόντος
tοῦ ἄσματος λέγει ποι·
Οὐδὲ μοι ἐμμελέως τὸ Πιττάκειον νέμεται
καίτοι σοφοῦ παρὰ φωτὸς εἰρημένον· χαλέπον
25 φάτ’ ἐσθλὸν ἐμμεναι.
ἐννοεῖς ὦτι ὁ αὐτός οὖντος καὶ τάδε λέγει κάκεινα τὰ ἐμ-
πρόσθεν; Οἶδα, ἃν δ’ ἐγὼ. Δοκεῖ οὖν σοι, ἔφη, ταῦτα

339 όντας (the image of the divine nature)
Proclus on Euclidis Elem. p. 48 G, 
Boeckh Philolaus, 155. When πετρά-
γανος occurs later in the sense of our
passage, it is a play on the verse of
Simonides. So Arist. Rhet. iii. 11 τὸν
ἀγάθον ἄνδρα φάναι εἰναι πετράγανον
μεταφορά· ἄμφω γὰρ τέλεω. Some-
what differently Varro (Pliny N. II.
34. 19) calls the figures (signa) of
Polycleitus quadrata, in contrast to
those of Lysippus. Cf. in qua-
drum redigere.

16. μεμεληκός: cf. Soph. 227 a τῇ
tῶν λόγων μεθόδῳ συγγιαστικῆς ἢ φο-
ριμακοποσίας οὐδὲν ἦττον οὐδὲ τι μάλλον
τυχχάνει μελῶν τοὺς διαλεκτικάς art
concerns itself neither less nor more with
the use of the sponge than with the taking of
physic.—The usual impers. const. of
μέλει is retained in the partic. with
τυχχάνει.

18. δοκεῖ δὲ σοι κτῆ·: this then is
the ἐρώτημα περὶ ἀρετῆς proposed
above.

20. ὀρα: sc. εἰ δοκεῖ καλῶς τε καὶ
sterol πεποιηθαι.

23. νέμεται: equiv. to νομίζεται.
Cf. Soph. O. T. 1080 ἐγὼ δ’ ἐμαυτὸν
παῖδα τῆς Τύχης νέμων, Tr. 483 εἰ τι
τῆν’ ἀμαρτίαν νέμεσις. Thus in prose
form, ὦτι’ ὑν’ ἐμοῦ νομίζεται τούτο παρὰ
Πιττακῷ καίπερ σοφοῦ οὖντος ἀνδρὸς ἐμ-
μελώς (321 ε) εἰρήμεναι· χαλέπον ἐσθλὸν
ἐμμεναι.—According to Didymus, in
the Schol. on Plato ii. 369 Bk., Pitta-
cus, the ruler of Mytilene, uttered the
famous saying, on hearing that Peri-
ander, formerly mild and a friend
of the people, had become cruel.
With Solon’s saying, χαλεπὰ τὰ καλὰ,
which Plato frequently quotes, cf.
Zenobius vi. 38. — Simonides was fond
of quoting the expressions of others,
as of Homer and Stesichorus, Frag.
25 Schn., 53 Bgk.; of Homer, Frag. 60
Schn., 85 Bgk.; of Hesiod, Frag. 32
Schn., 58 Bgk., or of combating them,
as he said of a thought of Cleobulus
of Lindus (Frag. 10 Schn., 57 Bgk.)
διότι ἑρμηνεῖσαι; Φαίνεται έμοιγε. Καὶ ἀμα μέν· τοι ἐφοβούμην μὴ τι λέγοι. Ἀτάρ, ἔφην ἐγώ, σοὶ οὖν διάφορατειν ὁ ταῦτα ἀρμόδιον λέγων, ὅσ γε τὸ μὲν πρῶτον αὐτὸς ὑπέθετο χαλεπὸν εὗαν ἄνδρα ἀγάθου γενέσθαι ἄληθείᾳ, ὁλίγον δὲ τοῦ ποιήματος εἰς τὸ πρῶτον προελθὼν ἐπελάθετο, καὶ Πιττακὸν τὸν ταύτα λέγοντα ἐαυτῷ, ὅτι χα-. 35 λεπόν ἐσθλὸν ἔμμεναι, τοῦτον μέμφεται τε καὶ οὖν ἤης ἀποδέχεσθαι αὐτοῦ τὰ αὐτὰ ἐαυτῷ λέγοντος; καίτοι ὅπως τὸν ταύτα λέγοντα αὐτῷ μέμφεται, δῆλον ὅτι καὶ έαυτόν μέμφεται, ἀστε Ἦτοι τὸ πρότερον ἢ θυτερον οὐκ ὁρθῶς λέγει. Εἰπὼν οὖν ταύτα πολλοῖς θόρυβον παρέσχε 
34 καὶ ἐπανοῦ τῶν ἄκοιντων. καὶ ἐγὼ τὸ μὲν πρῶτον, ε ὁσπερεὶ ὑπὸ ἄγαθον πῦκτον πληγεῖς, ἐσκοτάθην τε καὶ ἰλυγγίασα εἰπόντος αὐτοῦ ταύτα καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἑπιθρυ. 
30 βησάντων ἐπείτα, ὡς γε πρὸς σὲ εἰρήσθαι τάληθη, 

339 μεροὶ φωτὸς ἂν δεῖ βουλᾶ. So Pindar, 
P. iv. 277 and elsewhere, appealed 
to Homer. 
28, 30. ὁμολογεῖσθαι, ὁμολογεῖν: of 
persons ὁμολογεῖσθαι τινι, of things ὁμολο-

gεῖσθαι τινι. Cf. Crat. 416 a καὶ τοῦτο 
γαρ τοῖς ἐμπροσθὲν ὁμολογεῖται, Rep. v. 
457 ε τῶν λόγων αὐτῶν αὐτῷ ὁμολογεῖσθαι.

339 χα: cf. Soph. 258 d εἰς τὸ πρόσθεν ἤπειρα 

339 ἐπείτα (έπειτα) ἐμμένει: I was 

afraid there was something in what he 
said. 
31. οὐ ἐο: quī quidem, cf. 438ε· 

1 ι. 13. See II. 1037, 1. 
32. ὑπέθετο: strictly, lay down a 

principle in order to reason from it, 
then in general maintain. Cf. 361 b 

ὑποθέμενος. Similarly 343 ε ὑπείπτοντα, 

and 359 a ὑποκειμένων. 
33. εἰς τὸ πρῶτον προελθὼν: freq. 

of a road or an investigation; so προέ-

ναι. Cf. Legg. iii. 682 a εἰς ἐτὶ τὸ πρῶτον 

προέλθωμεν ἐτὶ τοῦ νῦν ἐπελθόντος ἡμᾶν 

μήν, Symp. 174 d κελεύειν (Σωκράτη 

προέβαιν εἰς τὸ πρῶτον (forwards), 

Gorg. 497 a καὶ προῆθε γε ἔτι εἰς τοῦ 

πρῶτον, below, 357 d εἰς τὸ πρῶτον ἐπὶ 

ἀμολογήκατε, Soph. 258 ε εἰς τὸ πρόσθεν 

ἐτὶ θητάντες. 
38. τὸ πρότερον: adv. 
39. παρέσχε: called out. 
41. ὁσπερεὶ ... πληγεῖς: a contest 

of opinions is often compared to a 

boxing match, in which stunning 

blows would be received in the face. 
Cf. Euthyd. 303 a ἐγὼ μὲν οὖν ὃσπερ 

πληγεῖς ὑπὸ τοῦ λόγου ἑκείμην ἄφωνος, 
Phil. 22 e ἢσοι γεικεῖ νῦν ἑπον ὑπὲ 

πεπτωκέαν καθαπερεὶ πληγεῖσαι ὑπὸ τῶν 

νῦν δὴ λόγων. 
42. ἰλυγγίασα: cf. Gorg. 486 b ἰλυ-

γγίσαν ἀν καὶ χασμόφο (gape) οὐκ ἐξων 

δὲ τι εἶπος, Lys. 216 c. 
43. σὲ: i.e. the ἐταίρος mentioned 
in the opening of the dialogue, cf. 309 a ff.
PLATO'S PROTAGORAS.

47. παρακαλεῖν: usually δοκῶ μοι (I am resolved) takes the inf. fut. (cf. Theat. 183 a ἀλλὰ μοι δοκῶ οὐ πεισθαῖ αὐτῷ), but the pres. is also used (Phaedr. 230 e ἐγὼ μὲν μοι δοκῶ κατακεῖσθαι Ι. I intend to lie down, Ar. Vesp. 177 ἀλλ' εἰσίν μοι τὸν ὄνομ ἐξάγειν δοκῶ). So here παρακαλεῖν is to be taken as inf. pres. since the action referred to is close at hand. The appeal is repeated after the clause introduced by ὥσπερ.


49. In the preceding sentence, ὥσπερ οὐκ οὐκ εἰς ἐκπέρσι αὐτῷ ὅτι καὶ καλέσασα αὐτόν, ὥσπερ ἔφη ὁ Πρόδικος τὸν Σκάμανδρον πολιορκοῦμεν ὑπὸ τοῦ 'Αχιλλέως τὸν Σμύλεντα παρακαλεῖν, εἰπόντα.

50. φίλε κασίγνητε, σθένος ἀνέρος ἀμφότεροί περ σχῶμεν.

51. ἀτὰρ καὶ ἐγὼ σε παρακαλῶ, μὴ ἡμῖν ὁ Πρωταγόρας τὸν Σμύλεντα ἐκπέρσῃ. καὶ γὰρ οὕν καὶ δεῖται τὸ ὑπὲρ Σμύλεντος ἐπανόρθωμα τῆς σῆς μουσικῆς, ἥ τὸ τε βούλε.

52. σθάι καὶ ἐπιθυμεῖν διαίρεσι ὡς οὐ ταῦτῳ ὦν, καὶ ἀνω δὴ ἔπες πολλὰ τε καὶ καλά. καὶ νῦν σκόπει, εἰ σοι ὑποδοκεῖ ὁ περ ἐμοί. οὖ γὰρ φαίνεται ἐναντία λέγειν αὐτὸς αὐτῷ Σμύλεντης. σὺ γὰρ, ὃ Πρόδικε, προσφέρῃν τὴν σῆν γνώμην· ταῦτον σοι δοκεῖ εἶναι τὸ γενέσθαι.

53. ύπέρ: Socrates's correction of the view of Protagoras will be at once a defence of Simonides.

54. μουσικῆς: used at times by Plato of all intellectual effort and knowledge (cf. Rep. ii. 376 e μουσικῆς δ' εἰπὼν τίδης λόγους but when you say this, do you include literature in music?), esp. poetry and philosophy (cf. Phaedo 61 a ἔς φιλοσοφίας μὲν οὖσας μεγάλης μουσικῆς). Here, somewhat sarcastically, it denotes the knowledge of synonyms, cf. 337 a ff.

55. διαίρεις: Socrates had often heard Prodicus's expositions, see on 341 a, l. 15.
ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ ΠΡΩΤΑΓΟΡΑΣ.

St. p. 340.

60 καὶ τὸ εἶναι, ἡ ἄλλο; "Ἀλλο νῦν Δί", ἐφη ὁ Πρόδικος. Οὐκοῦν, ἐφην ἐγώ, ἐν μὲν τοῖς πρῶτοις αὐτὸς ὁ Συμωνίδης τὴν εαυτοῦ γνώμην ἀπεφήνατο, ὅτι ἄνδρα ἁγαθὸν ἀληθεία γενέσθαι χαλεπῶν εἰη; Ἄληθῆ λέγεις, ἐφη ὁ Πρόδικος. Τὸν δὲ γε Πιττακόν, ἕνεκ’ ἐγώ, μέμφεται οὐχ ὃς οἰσται Πρωταγόρας ταῦτον εαυτῷ λέγοντα, ἄλλ᾽ ἄλλο. οὐ γὰρ τοῦτο ὁ Πιττακός ἐλεγε χαλεπόν, γενέσθαι ἐσθλὸν, ὡσπερ ὁ Συμωνίδης, ἀλλὰ τὸ ἐμμεναί· ἐστὶ δὲ οὐ ταῦτον, ὁ Πρωταγόρα, ὃς φησι Πρόδικος ὁδὲ, τὸ εἴναι καὶ τὸ γενέσθαι. εἰ δὲ μὴ τὸ αὐτὸ ἐστι τὸ εἶναι τῷ 70 γενέσθαι, οὐκ ἔναντία λέγει ὁ Συμωνίδης αὐτὸς αὐτῷ, καὶ ἵσως ἄν φαίη Πρόδικος ὁδὲ καὶ ἄλλοι πολλοὶ, καθ᾽ αὐτὸν Ἡσύοδουν, γενέσθαι μὲν ἁγαθὸν χαλεπῶν εἶναι· τῆς γὰρ ἁρετῆς ἐμπροσθεν τοὺς θεοὺς ἱδρῶτα θεῖαι· ὅταν δὲ τις αὐτῆς εἰς ἁκρὸν ἰκηταί, ῥηιδίην δῆπειτα πέλειν, χαλεπῆν περ ἐοῦσαν, ἐκτήσθαι.

XXVII. Ὁ μὲν οὖν Πρόδικος ἀκούσας ταῦτα ἐπήνευσε με· ὁ δὲ Πρωταγόρας, Τὸ ἐπανόρθωμά σοι, ἐφη, ὁ Σώκρατες,
4. kakón: subst. (without τι) as e Gorg. 518 ε καὶ σον νόμισματον τούτων ἐργάζεται, or in the exclamation of those initiated in the Orphic-Bacchic mysteries (Dem. de Cor. 259), ἐφούν κακών, ἔδρον ἄμενον, and in the common phrases, δεινὸν λέγει (Ar. Lyssistr. 499), γελοιὸν πάσχειν (Rep. vii. 536 b) etc.—mol: for the dat. of the agent, see G. 188, 3; H. 769.

5. ἄμενον . . . ποιῶ: the expression was proverbial, μὴ κακῶν κακός ἰδασκαλία. Cf. Hist. iii. 53 μὴ τῷ κακῷ τὸ κακόν ἑώ, Thuc. v. 65 ἐπεβόησεν ὅτι διανοεῖται κακῶν κακὸς ἰδασκαλι, Soph. A. 362 μὴ κακῶν κακῷ δίδοις | ἄκος πλέον τὸ πῆμα τῆς ἁτης τίθει δο not, adding ill as a remedy to ill, make the worse for thy calamity the greater, the comic poet in Plut. Mor. 523 ε τὸ σάρκιμα τοῦ τῷ νόμον μεῖον ποιεῖ. The const. is an 'epexegetic asyndeton,' as in 339 ε ἀδίκους εἰ, 343 δ ἄμφισβητώτα, 343 ε εἰσόντα . . . ἀποκρινόμενον, 348 καταβεβλημένος ποιεῖσθαι. Although believing ἄνδρι παῖδες μεγατον μέρος εἶναι περὶ ἐπών δεινὸν εἶναι (cf. 339 a), to consider the argument of the poem as a whole, or to refute Socrates by a critical examination and comparison of its parts. Nor again did he cite other passages from his favorite poet, to establish the doctrine of the latter respecting virtue. His method here is the same which he uses elsewhere, cf. 324 a αὐτοῦ σὲ διδάσκει and ὅστις μὴ ὡσπερ θηρίου ἀλογίστως τιμωρεῖται, where, without any scientific treatment of the doctrine of punishment, he falls back upon 'common sense.' This mode of exegesis proved, as it has often done since, to be unsafe, when placed in the hands of an opponent.

12. θεία: cf. 315 ε, 1. 26.—πάλαι: a alludes ironically to Protagoras's claim that the sophist's art was of great antiquity, 316 d. Socrates says that Simonides, like Prodicus, had distinguished synonyms (γενέσθαι, ἐμμεναί).
15 ἐγὼ ἐμπειρὸς διὰ τὸ μαθητής εἶναι Προδικὸν τούτου. καὶ νῦν μοι δοκεῖς οὐ μανθάνειν ὅτι καὶ τὸ χαλέπον τούτο ἵσως οὐχ οὕτω Σμωνίδης ὑπελάμβανεν, ὡσπερ σὺ ὑπολαμβάνεις, ἀλλὰ ὡσπερ περὶ τοῦ δεινοῦ Προδικὸς μὲ οὗτοσι νοοθετεὶ ἐκάστοτε, ὅταν ἐπαυνῶν ἐγὼ ἃ σὲ ἦ ἢ ἡ ἀλ- 20 λον τινὰ λέγω ὅτι Πρωταγόρας σοφὸς καὶ δεινὸς ἐστιν ἀνήρ, ἐρωτᾷ εἰ οὐκ αἰσχύνομαι τάγαθα δεινά καλῶν. τὸ δὲ γὰρ δεινὸν, φησὶ, κακὸν ἐστὶν· οὐδεὶς γοῦν λέγει ἐκάστοτε δεινὸν πλούτου οὐδὲ δεινῆς εἰρήνης οὐδὲ δεινῆς

341 15. ἐμπειρὸς: sc. εἴπα, for with oὐχ ὡσπερ (in the sense of while) the clause with ὡσπερ is always formed independently, preceded by simply oὐχ, while the pred. of the clause with oὐχ, (here ἐμπειρὸς εἶναι) is supplied from that with ὡσπερ. Cf. Ἱμηρ. 179 o oὐχ (sc. εἴπασαν) ὡσπερ Ἀχιλλέα ἐτίμησαν καὶ εἰς μακάρων ἰδίους ἀπέπεμψαν, 180 o oὐχ (sc. οὗτον ἀν ἐγίγνετο) ὡσπερ νῦν τούτων οὔδεν γίγνεται περὶ αὐτῶν it would not be as now, when none of these things is done for him. — Socrates calls himself a pupil of Prodicus also in Crat. 384 b, Μένο 96 d, Charm. 163 d, always with special reference to the synonymic art, yet never without implied ridicule of the consequent pedantry with which Prodicus treated his doctrine. Here Socrates makes sport of him and his hobby, by first alluring him to the explanation of χαλέπον by κακὸν, and then suggesting that Prodicus did this in jest and for the sake of testing Protagoras.

18. ὡσπερ: should have been followed by οὗτω καὶ τὸ χαλέπον ἀδὶ Κεῖον κτέ., but this is postponed by the intervention at some length of the views of Prodicus upon δεινὸς. Here the clause ὅταν . . . λέγω, as though its main verb (νοοθετεὶ) had not already preceded, is followed by another principal verb (ἐρωτᾷ), and then, instead of the expected and postponed clause οὕτω καὶ τὸ χαλέπον κτέ., the clause ἵσως οὕν κτέ. is added with anacoluthon. This intervention of a dependent clause between two main clauses is found also in Homer. Cf. also Plato Theaet. 172 d τοὺς λόγους ἐπὶ σχολῆς ποιοῦνται, ὡσπερ ἤμεις νυνὶ τρίτον ἤδη λόγον ἐκ λόγου μεταλαμβάνομεν, οὕτω κάκεινοι they follow out their reasonings at their leisure, just as we now have taken up a third point, one following naturally from another; so they, etc.

20. σοφὸς καὶ δεινὸς: cf. Theaet. 154 d εἰ μὲν δεινὸν καὶ σοφὸν ἐγὼ τε καὶ εὐ ἤμεν, 173 b δεινὸν τε καὶ σοφὸν γεγονότες, ὥσ ὀνταί, Ατ. Λυκ. 967 ὑπαμένῃς; σοφὸς γ' ἀνήρ καὶ δεινὸς εἰς τὰ πάντα, and frequently thus. On account of its derivation, Prodicus will not allow the use of δεινὸς as a word of commendation (cf. colloquial parallels in Eng.); but his theory makes itself ridiculous in thus opposing the living language.

23. δεινὸν πλούτου κτέ.: cf. Euthyd. b 303 a πουπλὲξ ὥ Ἡράκλεις καλὸν λόγου, Rep. vi. 509 ε Ἀπολλον, δαμονια ὑπερ-
świetias, ἀλλὰ δεινὴς νόσου καὶ δεινοῦ πολέμου
25 καὶ δεινῆς πενίας, ὡς τοῦ δεινοῦ κακοῦ ὄντος. ἢσώς
οὖν καὶ τὸ χαλεπῶν αὖ οἱ Κεῖοι καὶ ὁ Συμωνίδης ἥ κα-
κόν ὑπολαμβάνουσιν ἥ ἀλλο τι δ σὺ οὐ μανθάνεις. ἐρώ-
μεθα οὖν Πρόδικον· δικαίων γὰρ τὴν Συμωνίδου φωνὴν
tούτων ἐρωτῶν. τί ἔλεγεν, ὁ Πρόδικε, τὸ χαλεπὸν Σι-
c 30 μωνίδης; Κακόν, ἔφη. Διὰ ταύτ' ἄρα καὶ μέμφεται, ἣν
δ' ἐγώ, ὁ Πρόδικε, τὸν Πιττακὸν λέγουτα χαλεπὸν
ἐσθλὸν ἐμμεναί, ὥσπερ ἂν εἰ ἦκουεν αὐτοῦ λέγοντος
ὅτι ἐστὶ κακὸν ἐσθλὸν ἐμμεναί; Ἀλλὰ τί οἶει, ἔφη, λέγειν,
ὡ Σώκρατες, Συμωνίδην ἄλλον ἡ τοῦτο, καὶ ὀνειδίζειν τῷ
35 Πιττακῷ ὅτι τὰ ὀνόματα οὐκ ἦπιστατο ὅρθως διαρεῖν
ἀτε Λέσβιος ὄν καὶ ἐν φωνῇ βαρβάρῳ τεθραμμένοις;
Ἀκούεις δή, ἔφην ἐγώ, ὁ Πρωταγόρα, Προδίκου τούδε.
ἐχεις τι πρὸς ταύτα λέγειν; Καὶ ὁ Πρωταγόρας, Πολλοῦ
γε δει, ἔφη, οὐτῶς ἔχειν, ὁ Πρόδικε· ἀλλ' ἐγὼ εὗ ὀἶδ' ὅτι
40 καὶ Συμωνίδης τὸ χαλεπὸν ἔλεγεν ὅπερ ἡμεῖς οἱ ἄλλοι,
οὔ τὸ κακὸν, ἀλλ' ὅ ἂν μη ῥάδιον ἢ ἄλλα διὰ πολλῶν
πραγμάτων γίγνεται. Ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐγὼ ὀμαι, ἔφην, ὁ Πρω-
ταγόρα, τοῦτο λέγειν Συμωνίδην, καὶ Προδίκον γε τούδε

341 Bohlēs. For the gen. of exclam., see G. 173, 3; Π. 761.
28. φωνήν: dialect; so below, l. 36 ἐν φωνῇ βαρβάρῳ, and 346 d, l. 61. Cf.
Phaedo 62 a Ἱπτω Ζεὺς, ἔφη, τῇ αὐτοῦ φωνῇ εἴπὼν (Cebes was a Boeotian).
35. διαφεῖν: this was just Prodicas's art. Cf. 340 a.
36. βαρβάρῳ: the Aeolic dialect might, in the time of Socrates and
Plato, sound so strange to the Athenians, as to be termed, from an exclusive pride in the Attic literary style,
36 ἐκκομοθύντο (were ridiculed) δὲ, φασὶν, οἱ Ἐρετρεῖοι ὡς πολλῷ τῷ ὑ ἐν
tais ὁμιλίαις χρῆμαιν. διὸ καὶ αὐτοῖ, καθὰ καὶ Ὡλείοι, βαρβαρόφωνοι ἐκκα-
λουντο, ὡς ἐν ῥητορικῇ εὑρηται λεξικῇ. In the Cratylus, words and forms of the Aeolic and Doric dialects are
often called ἐξενδα, e.g. 401 b. This judgment might without improba-
bility be ascribed to Prodicus, who naturally spoke Attic, and to Simoni-
des, whose language varied little from the Attic.
39. ἔγῳ εὗ ὀἶδ' ὅτι κτε.: here again d
Protagoras leaves it for Socrates to refute this interpretation by citing other words from the poem. See
below.
εἰδέναι, ἀλλὰ παῖζειν καὶ σοῦ δοκεῖν ἀποτελεῖσθαι, εἰ
45 οἶός τ' ἐσεὶ τῷ σαντοῦ λόγῳ βοηθεῖν· ἔπει ὅτι γε Σμω- e
νίδης οὐ λέγει τὸ χαλεπὸν κακόν, μέγα τεκμηρίων ἐστιν
eὔθυς τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο ῥῆμα· λέγει γὰρ ὅτι
θεὸς ἀν μόνος τοῦτ’ ἔχοι γέρας.
οὐ δῆπον τοῦτο γε λέγων, κακὸν ἐσθλὸν ἔμεναι, εἰτὰ
50 τὸν θεὸν φησὶ μόνον τοῦτο ἀν ἔχειν καὶ τῷ θεῷ τοῦτο
gέρας ἀπένεμει μόνῳ· ἀκόλαστον γὰρ ἃν τινα λέγοι Σι-
μωνίδην Πρόδικος καὶ οὐδαμῶς Κεῖον. ἀλλ’ ἂ μοι δο-
κει διανοεῖσθαι Σιμωνίδης ἐν τούτῳ τῷ ἄσματι, ἐθέλω
σοι εἰπεῖν, εἰ βούλει λαβεῖν μου πείραν ὅπως ἢω, δ’ σὺ 342
55 λέγεις τοῦτο, περὶ ἐπῶν· εὰν δὲ βοῦλῃ, σοῦ ἀκούσομαι.
'Ο μὲν οὖν Πρωταγόρας ἀκούσας μον ταῦτα λέγοντος, Εἰ

341 44. σοῦ: for the prolepsis, see on
313b, l. 19.—δοκεῖν: redundant, as
though οἷμα had not preceded, al-
though it depends upon the latter.
Cf. Soph. 225 δ δοκῶ μὴν τὸ γε ἄμελες
tῶν οἰκεῖων (the neglect of one's own
affairs) γιγνόμενον καλεῖσθαι κατὰ γνώ-
μην τὴν ἐμὴν υἱὸν ἔτερον ἄδολοσχι-
κοῦ (nothing else than garrulity); in
Parm. 165 ε the expression ταῦτα φαι-
νεσθαι πεπονθέναι depends upon the
preceding δοξα, Xen. Hell. vii. 4. 35
ἐνόμιζον τῷ θεῷ οἰκεῖα μᾶλλον ἄν ὁὔτω
χαρίζεσθαι they thought they would thus
the rather please the god.
342 49. οὐ δῆπον: belongs to the whole
following sent. with its internal con-
tradiction emphasized by εἰτα.—
εἰτα: see on 319 d, l. 26. The thought
of Socrates is, that Simonides cannot
first say that it is evil to be good,
and then characterize this as a pre-
rogative solely of the gods. Here
it is immaterial whether Simonides
gives his own thought or only quotes
Pittacus.

50. τοῦτο γέρας: 344 e reads θεὸς
ἀν μόνος τοῦτο ἔχοι τὸ γέρας, but in the
passage before us γέρας is pred. Cf.
Symp. 179 ε ἐωραθήσοιτο δὴ τῶιν ἐδο-
ςαν τοῦτο γέρας οἱ θεοί, Apol. 18 a δι-
καστοῦ μὲν γὰρ ἀτη ἄρετῆ, Ag. Eccl.
658 καγὼ ταῦτην γνώμην ἐθέμην.
52. Κεῖον: the people of Ceos were
renowned for the vigor and purity of
their morals (Brünsted Reisen in Grie-
chenland, i. 63 ff., Bursian, Geog. v.
Griech. ii. 409 f.). In Legg. i. 638 b,
the subjection of the Ceians by the
Athenians is cited as an illustration of
the fact that victory and virtue often
lie with opposite camps.
54. εἰ βούλει λαβεῖν κτέ.: Socrates
now delivers a discourse of considera-
ble length; but the subject excludes
the brevity of question and answer,
and moreover he does this with the
assent of Protagoras and upon the
urgent request of the others (ἐκεινέ-
την πάνω).—δ’ σὺ λέγεις τοῦτο: cf.
338 e as you suggest. Similarly Gorg.
514 e τὸ λεγόμενον δὴ τοῦτο.
of speaking in sentence.

XXVIII. 2. The reflections of the seven wise men upon government and morals, and their efforts to regulate these, were expressed in sententious proverbs. This tendency to put their thoughts into pithy, striking sentences was a characteristic also of the vigorous Spartans. (Plut. 'Aποφθέγματα λακωνικά ii. 208 ff.). Socrates makes use of this, by a keen stroke of wit, to surpass the paradoxical description of Protagoras (316 d), — to which he had already given a thrust (341 a), — by one still more paradoxical, in describing Crete and Lacedaemon, which were in fact strangers to all learning, as the most ancient seats of philosophy. This is also a hit at the imitators of the Spartans.

5. ἡς: Sauppe construes this with ἐκεῖ, citing ὄπων ἡς Rep. iii. 403 e, ἡς οὐδαμὸν ἵν. 592 a, ὃ ἡς Menex. 235 e, and declaring that to connect it with πλείστοι is against the usus loquendi. Still, this latter const. seems a very natural sequence and climax to πλείστῃ τῶν Ἑλλήνων, and is maintained by Stallbaum, Kroschel, and Deuschle, and given in Kr. Spr. 47, 28, 7, where this passage is cited. — σχηματίζοντα: cf. Soph. 268 a ὡς ἀγνοεῖ ταῦτα, ἀ πρὸς τοὺς ἄλλους ὡς εἰςδώς ἐσχημάτισται (he has pretended to know), Tim. Lex. σχηματίζομενος: προσποιούμενος ἢ συνταττόμενος.

7. τοὺς σοφιστὰς: for the incorporation and assimilation of the antec., see G. 154; H. 995. (The article in such cases is more commonly dropped.) Cf. 359 d ἐν οἷς σῷ ἔλεγες τοῖς λόγοις, Πλατ. ὀπ. τότε ἡμιν ἔσται ὃν ἐπιθυμούμενον φρονήσως, Rep. iii. 402 e ὡς αὐτόν ὄσει ὑμιν ὑμῖν παιδεύσειν εἶναι τοὺς φίλακας neither we, nor the guardians whom we say we have to educate.

11. Many Athenians, who hated the democracy and bewailed the decay of morals, hoped to improve matters by an imitation of Spartan ways, and, as usually happens, copied them only externally. They made themselves conspicuous by stern looks, a mustache, a staff and short cloak, and engaged in gymnastics to such an excess, that, contrary to the law of Sparta, they zealously practised boxing. Cf. Ar. Av. 1281 ἑλακυνομάνου ἀπ' ανθρώ- ποι τότε, ἐκομιgrav, ἐπείκων, ἐρρυπην ἑστατέων; all men then had a Laconianama; they wore their hair long, went hungry and dirty, acted like Socrates, Dem. liv. 34 or μεθ' ἡμέραν μὲν ἑκκυροπάκασαι καὶ λακωνίζειν φασὶ καὶ τρίβωνας ἔχουσι καὶ ἀπλὰς ὑποδέδενται who during the day look gloomy and say they live in the Spartan style, wear short cloaks and single-soled shoes, Plut. Phoc. 10 ὅν δὲ τις Ἀρχιβάδης ἐπικαλούμενος Ἀλκα- νισθῆς, πάγωνα τε καθεδέμένος υπερφην μεγεθείς (wearing a beard of monstrous size) καὶ τρίβωνα φορῶν ἄπλας καὶ σκυθρω- πάζων. The same fashion prevailed also, as it seems (ἐν ταῖς πόλεσι), in other cities.

12. ὅτα κατάγωνται: the ears of the boxers bore the marks of the fists covered with thongs (caestus), cf. Gorg. 515 ἡ τῶν τὰ τῶν καταγόντων (sc. τῶν Ἀλκανιστῶν). Hence the name ἀνα- κάταξις a boxer with ears battered by the caestus, which Bekk. Anecd. 116, 32 and Poll. ii. 83 quote from Aristophanes.

13. ἀναβολὰς: the Spartans wore, without any chiton, a very short cloak of coarse stuff, often threadbare (τρίβων); the Cynics also adopted this from Socrates, and it became later the usual philosophic dress. From its being thrown about the shoulders, in which manner of wearing it an artistic effect was sought (cf. ἐπίδειξις ἀνα- βάλλεσθαι Theaet. 175 e), the cloak was called ἀναβόλη.


17. ἐξελασίας: Pericles says in Thuc. i. 144 ἢν καὶ Ἀλκαδαμόνιοι ἐξελα- σίας μὴ ποιῶσι μήτε ἡμῶν μήτε τῶν ἡμετέρων συμμάχων. Schömann Gr. Alt. i. 2018 f.

20. οὐδένα ἔως: cf. Aristotle (in Harpocr. p. 166, 12 Ddf.) οὐκ ἔξειναι φησιν ἀποδημεῖν τοῖς Ἀλκαδαμόνιοις, ἢτοι μὴ ἑθίζωσιν ἄλλων νόμων εἶναι φίλοι. Laws of this kind are laid down also for the ideal state in Legg.
342 xii. 950 d f.—This is the only passage which states the same fact regarding Crete, but the agreement of Spartan and Cretan customs is well known.

22. ἐν ταύταις ταῖς πόλεσι: i.e. in Lacedaemon and the Cretan cities.

24. γυναῖκες: training and custom made the women in Sparta more nearly equal to the men than elsewhere, and their crisp, spirited sayings also were quoted; as of the mother who handed her son his shield, with the words τέκνον ἂ τὰν ἃ ἐπὶ τὰς, cf. Plut. ii. 240 b ff., Λακαιῶν ἀποφθέγματα.

26. ἐὰν γὰρ ἔθελε κτέ.: cf. 324 a, 1. 20.

27. τὰ μὲν πολλὰ: K. F. Hermann reads τὰ μὲν πρῶτα, but not at first simply, but in general, the conversation of the Spartan is plain and unpretending, and only occasionally does his keenness dart forth.

29. οὗτο... λεγομένων: "wherever in the conversation it may chance," i.e. "at some unexpected point in the conversation." — ἐνέβαλε: the aor. here expresses the action as occurring suddenly and all at once. Cf. Rep. x. 609 a ὡκόν ὅταν τῷ τοῦτῳ προσγεννηταὶ ποιηθῶν τε ποιεὶς φ. προσγενέτο, καὶ τελευτῶν ὀλοι διέλυεν καὶ ἀπώλεσε whenever therefore one of these infects anything, it makes the thing infected evil, and finally wholly destroys it, Symp. 188 b (Ἐρως) διαφθείρει τε πολλά καὶ ἢδίκησεν. For the gnomic aor., see G. 205, 2; H. 840. — The comparing of words to darts is not infrequent, cf. Symp. 219 b ἐγὼ ταύτα εἰπὼν, καὶ ἀφεῖς ὡσπερ βελην, τετράσθαι αὐτὸν ὁμοίως, Hor. Sat. i. 4. 79 unde petitum hoc in me jacis?

30. συνεστραμμένων: (opp. to λευμένων) twisted together, like a bow-string, where a slight distension gives great force, concise, pithy. Cf. contorta oratio, compressione rerum brevis (Cic. Brut. 29).
38. The memory of Myson early
became obscure, and Plato alone
numbers him with the seven, al-
though Hipponax (Frag. 45 Bgk.) said
cal Mixos, διὸ ἀπὸ τῶν ἀνείπεν ἄνδρῶν
σφυρονέστατον πάντων. It was not
certainly known whether he was a
native of Etis in Crete, or Chenae on
Mt. Oeta, or Chen in Laconia. That
Plato did not regard him as a Laced-
aemonian, but as a Malian from
Chenae, is clear from the following
Lakedaemonian.

42. τοιαύτην: defined by ῥήματα...
eἰρημένα.

44. ἀνέθεσαν ὑπὲρ: upon pillars of
the pronaos of the Delphic temple
were engraved sayings (L’aus. x. 24.1)
ascribed by Grecian legend to the
seven Sages, and the same spirit per-
vaded the teaching of Apollo and the
wisdom of the Seven (Zeller Philo-
osophie der Griechen i. 82 f.). According
to Plutarch Mor. 385 f, five of them
dedicated to Apollo an Ἔ (i.e. el, thou
art). Diodorus (ix. 9, Ddf.) relates of
Chilon, καθάπερ ἀπαρχάς ποιούμενος τῷ
θεῷ τῆς ἴδιας συνεσιῶς ἐπέγραψεν εἰς τῶν
κλόνα τριά ταύτα: ‘γνώθι σεαυτόν, καὶ ἰδι
δὲν ἀγαν,’” καὶ τρίτον ἐγγὺς, πάρα δὲ ἄτα.’

46. ὑμνοῦσι: see on 317 a.

47. τού δῆ... λέγω: Plato likes to
enliven his discourse by such ques-
tions. Cf. Gorg. 457 e for this same
phrase; Meno 97 e πρὸς τῷ οὖν δῆ λέγω
tαύτα; Phaedr. 255 c πάθεν δὴ τεκμαι-
rόμενος λέγω; Synp. 178 a λέγω δὲ δὴ τῷ
τούτῳ; Apol. 40 b τῷ οὖν αὐτόν εἶναι
ὑπολαμβάνω. So frequently in Demo-
thenes.—ὁτι: not because, but “in or-
der to show that.”—ὁ τρόπος τῆς φι-
lοσοφίας: these words form together
a single conception, upon which τῶν
παλαιῶν, emphasized by its position,
depends. Similarly 345 a ἡ τῆς ἑρα-
πειάς μάθησις. On the other hand,
Lep. i. 329 b ένιοι δὲ καὶ τάς τῶν οἰ-
κείων προπηλακίσεις (continuallous
treatment) τοῦ γῆρως ἄνθρωποι, the words
tάς προπηλακίσεις τοῦ γῆρως are to be
connected, and τῶν οἰκείων depends
upon them.
50 ἐγκομιαζόμενον ὑπὸ τῶν σοφῶν, τὸ χαλεπὸν ἐσθλὸν ἐμμεναι. ὁ οὖν Σιμωνίδης, ἀτε φιλότιμος ὄν ἐπὶ σοφία, ἔγνω ὅτι εἰ καθέλοι τοῦτο τὸ ρήμα, ὡσπερ εὐδοκιμοῦντα ἀθλητήν, καὶ περιγένειοτο αὐτοῦ, ἀυτῶς εὐδοκιμῆσει ἐν τοῖς τότε ἀνθρώποις. ἐἰς τοῦτο οὖν τὸ ρήμα καὶ τούτου ἕνεκα, τούτῳ ἐπιβουλεύων κολοῦσαι αὐτῷ, ἀπαντὸ ἄσμα πεποίηκεν, ὡς μοι φαίνεται.

XXIX. Ἐπισκεψώμεθα δὴ αὐτὸ κοινῇ ἀπαιτεῖ, εἰ ἀρα ἐγὼ ἄληθῆ λέγω. Εὐθὺς γὰρ το πρῶτον τοῦ ἄσσματος μανικόν ἄν φανεῖ, εἰ βουλόμενος λέγειν ὅτι ἀνδρὰ ἀγαθὸν διαγένεσθαι χαλεπῶν, ἐπειτὰ ἐνέβαλε τὸ μέν. τούτο γὰρ 5 5 ὁ νῦν πρῶς ἐνα λόγον φαίνεται ἐμβεβληῆσθαι, ἕαν μὴ τις ὑπολάβῃ πρὸς τὸ τοῦ Πυθακοῦ ῥῆμα ὡσπερ ἐρίζοντα

49. ἴδια: in particular.
51. ἀτε φιλότιμος ὄν: this, as well as ὡσπερ . . . ἀθλήτην below, contains a hit at Protagoras. Cf. 335a.
52. καθέλοι: cf. 344c. So Theocritus xxii. 115 says of Polydeuces, who has vanquished Amycus in a boxing match, πῶς δ’ ἄρ δη Δίως νῦσ ἀθηνάγον (gluttonous) ἄνδρα καθείλει;
55. τούτῳ: some take as depending upon ἐπιβουλεύων, anticipating κολοῦσαι αὐτῷ, but it is dat. of means, “through the making of the poem.” — ἐπιβουλεύων: with the inf. means endeavor stealthily, plan to do a thing unobserved. Cf. Symp. 203b ἡ Πενία ἐπιβουλεύουσα παιδίου ποίησασθαι, Rep. viii. 56c b βιάζω δὴ θανάτῳ ἐπιβουλεύουσιν ἀποκτινώναι λάβρα (τῶν τύφανον). — κολοῦσαι: often has something exalted as its obj., as Hdt. vii. 10. 5 φιλεῖ γάρ δ’ θεῖ τὰ ὑπερέχοντα κολοῦειν. — Protagoras, professing to adhere to the ethical question raised by Socrates, while merely changing its mode of treatment, has raised a wholly different one (cf. 339a b). What Socrates thinks of the value of a discussion of the poets, he indicates below (cf. 347e). Now, therefore, meeting Protagoras on his own ground, and assuming that in the examination of Simonides’s poem a discussion of virtue is the real end, he purposes to find the true doctrine in the poem; and, as the first step, discovers in it a polemic aim. If this is contrary to the view of Protagoras, the latter has full opportunity to refute it (see on 347a).

XXIX. 5. οὔδε . . . λόγον: wholly without reason, with no purpose whatever. See on 328a, 351e. Cf. 344a. — Simonides inserted μέν, which always involves an antithesis, which is found here, acc. to Socrates, between γενέσθαι καὶ ἐμμεναι.
7. λέγοντος τοῦ Πιττακοῦ κτῆ.: epegegetic of πρὸς τὸ τοῦ Πιττακοῦ κτῆ.; hence the asyndeton. See on 340 e.

9. γενέσθαι μὲν: should strictly have been followed by εἰλαν δὲ or διαμένειν δὲ (cf. 344 b, 345 e), but it is followed in 344 a only by οὐ γὰρ εἰλαν κτῆ. with anaclolthon.

11. τὴν ἀλήθειαν: i.e. the word ἀληθῶς or ἀλήθεια. In Greek, as in Latin, words which are referred to merely as words, often conform to the const. of the sentence. Cf. 341 a περὶ τοῦ δεινοῦ, and the freq. τὸ χαλέπον.

13. This style of exegesis should commend itself to Protagoras, for Socrates has borrowed it from him. See on 340 e. “To be sure, the position of the words would generally lead one to construe ἀλαθέως with ἀγαθόν, but this distinction of two kinds of ἀγαθός would indicate a false view, and therefore be unworthy of Simonides.” To make Simonides say, therefore, what it is manifest to Socrates that he should say, is readily accomplished by the convenient change which follows. The argument is ironical.

14. ὑπερβατόν: occurs here for the first time in the familiar grammatical sense. It is found also in Anaxim. Rhet. 30 (p. 60, 24 Sp.) (σαφῶς δηλώςεμεν) ἀπὸ τῶν νομμάτων, ἐὰν μὴ ὑπερβατῶς αὐτὰ τιθημεῖν, ἀλλ' ἂν τὰ ἑξῆμεν ἐξὶς τάττωμεν, [Longin.] περὶ θύσων, chap. 22 τῆς δὲ αὐθής ἰδεάς καὶ τὰ ὑπερβατὰ θετέον· ἐστὶ δὲ λέξεων ἢ νοῆσεων ἢ τοῦ κατ' ἀκολουθίαν κεκυμημένη τάξις (an arrangement varying from the regular order). Here, however, ὑπερβατόν is an adj., and δείκνυς is consider, assume, as δείκνυς following.

15. ὑπειποντα: premise as a starting-point, see on 339 d. Cf. Λεκ. Βισ. 54 f. ἰδεῖν νῦν κατείχω τὸς θεατὰς τῷ λόγῳ, δληγ ἐκφοράς πρώτων ἀυτούς ταῦτα come now, let me declare the argument to the audience, first premising to them some few matters as follows, Dem. de Cor. 60 τούτων ὑφεξώ λόγων, τοσούτων ὑπειπών, xxiii. 53 γεγραφέν, ὡδὲν ὑπειπών, ὅπως ἐν τοῖς ἀποτειλήν, τὴν τιμωρίαν he has proposed private vengeance, without premising under what circumstances one may kill justifiably.

17. εἰπόντα: repeats λέγοντα above, without τὸν μὲν. See on 330 a.
μεναι, τὸν δὲ ἀποκρινόμενον ὅτι Ἡ Ω Πιττακέ, οὐκ ἀληθὴ λέγεις· οὐ γὰρ εἶναι ἀλλὰ γενέσθαι μὲν ἔστιν ἄνδρα ἄγα-344
θόν, χερσὶ τε καὶ ποσὶ καὶ νόῳ τετράγωνον, ἀνευ ψόγου
tετυγμένον, χαλεπὸν ἀλαθέως. οὕτω φαίνεται πρὸς λό-
gον τὸ μὲν ἐμβεβλημένον καὶ τὸ ἀλαθέως ὀρθῶς ἐπ'
esthátw keímevnon. καὶ τὰ ἐπίσθα πάντα τοῦτο μαρ-
tureί, ὃτι οὖτως εἰρήται. πολλὰ μὲν γὰρ ἔστι καὶ περί
25 ἐκάστου τῶν ἐν τῷ ᾠσματι εἰρημένων ἀποδεῖξαι ὡς εὖ
πεποίηται· πάνω γὰρ χαριέντως καὶ μεμελημένως ἔχει· ἡ
ἀλλὰ μακρὸν ἄν εὑρ αὐτὸ ὀυτῶ διελθεῖν. ἀλλὰ τὸν
tύπουν αὐτοῦ τῶν ὀλον διεξέλθωμεν καὶ τὴν βούλησιν,
ὅτι παντὸς μᾶλλον ἔλεγχος ἔστι τοῦ Πιττακείου ρήματος
30 διὰ παντὸς τοῦ ᾠσματος.

XXX. Λέγει γὰρ μετὰ τούτῳ ολίγα διελθὼν, ὡς ἂν εἰ
λέγοι λόγον, ὅτι Γενέσθαι μὲν ἄνδρα ἄγαθον χαλεπὸν ἀλα-
thέως, οὐν τε μέντοι ἐπὶ γε χρόνον τών· γενόμενον δὲ
διαμένειν εν ταύτῃ τῇ ἐξει καὶ εἶναι ἄνδρα ἄγαθον, ὡς

344 19. μὲν: so placed after the
eceding εἶναι that the force of μῆν, in
which it originated, still rings in it.
Cf. 301 ε ὁ τῶν μὲν τηλικοῦτων.
21. πρὸς λόγον: with reason, co-
ordinate with ὀρθῶς. See on 351 ε, 1. 25.

b 28. τύπον: form, general plan, freq.
 contrasted with exact description. Cf.
Rep. iii. 414 α ἔν συνφ. μη δι' ἀληθ
telas, εἴρηθαι to speak generally, without
aiming at exactness, Phil. 61 α πο τοί-
νων ἄγαθον ἣτον σαφῶς, ἢ καὶ τῶν τύπων
αὐτοῦ ληπτέον then we must appre-
 hend the good clearly, or at least get some
general idea of it.
29. ἔλεγχος: pred., the subj. being
ἡ θεωρία.

XXX. 1. λέγει γὰρ: refers to the
words already quoted 339 ε οὐδὲ μοι
ἐμμελέως . . . ἐμμεναι, for after these
came immediately, acc. to 341 ε, ἐς δὲ
ἡ μόνος τοῦτ' ἔχοι γέρας, and then,
evidently, the words ἄνδρα δ' οὐκ ἔστιν
κτέ. Consequently ὄλιγα διελθῶν can
refer only to the lost lines which
stood between the opening words
ἀνδρ' ἄγαθον . . . τετυγμένον and the
words οὐδὲ μοι ἐμμελέως. Protagoras
refers to the same lines, when he says
in 339 ν αὐτὸν δὲ τοῦ ποιήματος εἰς τὸ
πρόσθεν προειλθὼν. — ὡς ἂν εἰ λέγοι λό-
γον: in order to make clear that which
the poet has said, it is converted into
periodic prose. For the same pur-
pose, after using the words ὄλιγα
dιελθῶν, Socrates starts anew with
the opening of the poem.
5 οὖ λέγεις, ὦ Πιττακέ, ἀδύνατον καὶ οὐκ ἀνθρώπειον, καὶ ἀλλὰ θέσις ἂν μόνος τότῳ ἔχοι τὸ γέρας,
ἀνδρα δ' οὖκ ἐστι μή οὐ κακὸν ἐμμεναι,
ὅν ἄμήχανος συμφορὰ καθέλη.

tίνα οὖν ἄμήχανος συμφορὰ καθαρεῖ ἐν πλούσιν ἀρχῆς;
10 ὅτι οὗ τὸν ἰδιώτην· ὀ μὲν γὰρ ἰδιώτης αἰεὶ καθηρηται. ὥσπερ οὖν οὗ τὸν κείμενον τις ἄν καταβάλοι, ἄλλα τὸν μὲν ἐστώτα ποτε καταβάλοι ἄν τις ὥστε κείμενον ποιήσαι, τὸν δὲ κείμενον οὗ, οὔτω καὶ τὸν εὐμήχανον οὖντα ποτε ἄμήχανος ἄν συμφορὰ καθέλοι, τὸν δὲ αἰεὶ ἄμήχανον οὖν ὑπὲρ οὗ· καὶ τὸν κυβερνήτην μέγας χειμῶν ἐπιπεσόν ἄμήχανον ἄν ποιήσει, καὶ γεωργὸν χαλεπῆ ώρα ἐπελθοῦσα ἄμήχανον ἄν θεία, καὶ ἰατρὸν ταῦτα ταῦτα.

15 τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἐσθλὸ ἐγχωρεῖ κακῷ γενεσθαι, ὥσπερ καὶ παρ' ἄλλον ποιητοῦ μαρτυρεῖται τοῦ εἰπόντος

345 5. ὦ Πιττακέ: shows that dir. disc. follows ὅτι.
7. μὴ οὖ... ἐμμεναι: for the double neg. after οὖν ἐστι, see G. 263, 1., n.; II. 1034. See on 352 d. — Socrates for the present passes unnoticed the use of ἐμμεναι instead of γενεσθαι, a distinction which Simonides had not at all in mind. The true thought of the poet, Socrates gives in e below.
8. καθέλη: cf. 343 c.
9. One is tempted to ascribe ἐν πλοίῳ ἀρχῇ to Simonides, but cf. in 344 e the introduction of εἰς γράμματα as an illustrative example, without οὖν or other indication that it is Socrates’s illustration.
10. ἰδιώτην: on the doctrine that the change to a condition presupposes the opposite condition, assumed in this argument of Socrates, cf. Phaedo 70 ε ἀναγκαῖον διὸς ἐστι τι ἐναντίον, μὴ δαμόθεν ἄλλοθεν αὐτῷ γίγνεσθαι ἢ ἐκ τοῦ αὐτῷ ἐναντίον it is necessary that whatever thing has an opposite be generated from no other source than from that opposite.
12. ποτε: to be connected with καταβάλοι, and then with καθέλοι. Cf. 346 a f.
13. τὸν δὲ κείμενον οὗ: repeats for d emphasis what had already been said before ἄλλα. Cf. Parm. 155 d ἐπειδὴ δὲ χρόνου μετέχει τὸ ἐν (since the one partakes of time), ἄρ' οὖν ἀνάγκη καὶ τοῦ ποτὲ (the past) μετέχειν καὶ του ἐπειτα (the future) καὶ τοῦ νῦν, εἴ περ χρόνου μετέχει; Gorg. 521 d οὗ πρὸς χρόνιν λέγων ἄλλα πρὸς τὸ βέλτιστον, οὗ πρὸς τὸ Ἧδιστον.
17 ταύτα ταύτα: in this same way. Cf. Meno 90 d, ταύτα τούτο Symp. 178 e and frequently.
18. γενεσθαι: see on e above. Cf. also e and 345 a b below.
19. ἄλλον ποιητοῦ: Xen. Mem. i. 2. 20 quotes the verse without naming
20 autàr an'hr ágaðòs tote μèv kakovs, ἀλλοτε
d' èsθlòs·

tò dè kakov oûk éyxwreî gevέsθai, ἀλλ' àei èiain ánýgkê. e
òste toû mèn éymìkhavan kai sòfòv kai ágaðov èpeidàv
ámìkhavos sýmforà kathèlì, oûk èstì μ' ōu kakov èmme-

25 ναι· σύ δ' φής, δ' Πιττακέ, χαλεπόν èsthlon èmmevai·
tò δ' èstì gevέsθai mèn χαλεπόν, δυνατόν δ', èmmevai δ'è
adhùvaton.

πράξας μὲν γὰρ εὖ πᾶς ἀνήρ ἀγαθός,
κακός δ' εἰ kakovs.

30 tís oûn eîs γράμματα ἀγαθὴ πράξις èstì, kai tís ándra
ἀγαθóv poièi eîs γράμματα; δήλον òti òtò tòutōn máθη-
sis. tís dè eúpragía ἀγαθóν iatróv poiei; δήλον òti
òtò tòv kamarvntov tîs therapeias máthvns. kakovs dè

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d the author. Perhaps it was an elegiac poet; in any case the poem had a
gnomic character. Sophocles knew the verse, since, in .Ant. 355, he makes
the Chorus say, σφόν tó μηχανέν |
téxnav υπ' èp' èc' έc'hon | πòte mèν kà-
kóv, ἂλλοτε' èp' èc'thòv èrπtov one having
inventive skill in a remarkable degree,
beyond what one would expect, now falls
into disaster, again attains to prosperity.
See Bergk Port. Lyr. iii. 7351.

23. σφόν, ἀγαθόν: in this whole
exegesis Socrates keeps in view his
main argument. Here, as developing
eυμìkhavan, σφόν is inserted as the
characteristic mark of true excel-
lence, and ἀγαθόν in order to empha-
size the contrast with the predicate.

26. τò dè: strictly in relation to this
however, then in fact however, whereas.
Very frequent in Plato. Cf. Apol. 23a

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e uninterrupted being is not required as
the basis of the judgment. Socrates,
however, going beyond the meaning
of the poet, applies the word to the
inward condition, εὖ πράττει one fares
well, kakov πράττει one fares ill, and
thus is able to push the inquiry as to
the cause of this good or ill condition.—μèν: does not fit into the met-
rical scheme (see Introd. p. 18), but
Attic usage allows its insertion here
by Socrates in order to bring out the
thought more clearly.

29. el: sc. ἐπραξέ.
31. η...μάθησις: see on 343b, l.47.

Here Socrates finds his doctrine, that
virtue is knowledge.

33. kakov δὲ kakovs: (sc. πράξας).
Socrates follows the sense, repeating
the words of the poet in order to ex-
plain them. So he says also τò γέρας
344e, while Simonides (341e) has
γέρας, and έξαρκεῖ ἀν 346d for έξαρκεί
δ' ἀν 346e.
κακῶς. τίς οὖν ἂν κακῶς ἰατρὸς γένοιτο; δὴ λογοὶ ὅτι ὃ
35 πρῶτον μὲν ὑπάρχει ἰατρῷ εἶναι, ἐπείτα ἀγαθῷ ἰατρῷ.
οὐτὸς γὰρ ἂν καὶ κακῶς γένοιτο, ἡμεῖς δὲ οἱ ἰατρικῆς
ἰδιῶται οὐκ ἂν ποτὲ γενοίμεθα κακῶς πράξαντες οὔτε
ἰατρῷ οὔτε τέκτονες οὔτε ἄλλο οὐδὲν τῶν τοιούτων· ὅστις
δὲ μὴ ἰατρὸς ἂν γένοιτο κακῶς πράξας, δὴ λογοὶ ὅτι οὔδὲ
40 κακῶς ἰατρὸς. οὖτω καὶ ὁ μὲν ἀγαθὸς ἀνήρ γένοιτ' ἂν
ποτὲ καὶ κακῶς ἢ ὑπὸ χρόνου ἢ ὑπὸ πόνου ἢ ὑπὸ νό-
σου ἢ ὑπὸ ἄλλου τυχός περιπτώματος· αὐτὴ γὰρ μόνη
ἔστι κακὴ πρᾶξις, ἐπιστήμης στερηθῆναι· ὃ δὲ κακὸς
ἀνήρ οὐκ ἂν ποτὲ γένοιτο κακῶς· ἔστι γὰρ ἂεί· ἀλλ' εἰ
45 μέλλει κακὸς γενέσθαι, δεὶ αὐτὸν πρότερον ἀγαθὸν γενέ-
σθαι. ὥστε καὶ τούτῳ τοῦ ἄσματος πρὸς τοῦτο τείνει,
ὅτι εἶναι μὲν ἄνδρα ἀγαθὸν οὐχ οἷον τε, διατελοῦντα c
ἀγαθόν, γενέσθαι δὲ ἀγαθὸν οἷον τε, καὶ κακόν γε τῶν
αὐτῶν τούτων· ἐπὶ πλεῖστον δὲ καὶ ἄριστοι εἰσιν
50 οὖς οἱ θεοὶ φιλῶσιν.

345 37. κακῶς πράξαντες: not attrib. of ἰατρῷ, which would require πρά-
toutes, and ὅστις γὰρ instead of ὅστις δὲ following, but circumstantial par-
tic. of means with ἄν γενοίμεθα.

b 39. ἄν: keeps in view the fact that the prot. ὅστις μὴ γένοιτο has just been
reached as an apod. The first statement is ἡμεῖς, κακῶς πράξαντες, οὐκ ἂν
ἰατρός γενοίμεθα. Then, starting again
with this result, and selecting a single
case, we have ὅστις (equiv. to εἰ τις) μὴ
ἰατρὸς ἄν γένοιτο τε. See GMT. 63, 2.

42. αὐτὴ γὰρ κτέ.: the causes of the
deterioration which are here
mentioned are all of such a sort that loss
of knowledge is occasioned by them.
See on 344 e, l. 23.

c 47. διατελοῦντα: is sometimes joined
with an adj. without ἄν (Isocr. π. 4,
Isae. ν.η. 44, not so elsewhere in Plato).
Here, however, after εἶναι
ἀγαθόν, the ἀγαθὸν is simply repeated,
in order to add the further limitation
dιατελοῦντα (that is, permanently good).
Hence ὅτα would be out of place.

49. ἐπὶ πλεῖστον: contrasted with
diατελοῦντα means for the longest time.
Cf. Thuc. i. 2. 2 τὴν γοῦν Ἀττικὴν ἐκ
tοῦ ἐπὶ πλεῖστον (from the remotest
period) ἀνθρωποί ἀκόιοι οἱ αὐτοὶ ἂεὶ;
vi. 54. 5 καὶ ἐπετήθεσαν ἐπὶ πλεῖστον
dὴ τῶν ὀφειλέτων οὕτω ἀφετήν and these for
the longest time as (i.e. longer than any
other) tyrants practised virtue. So
frequently in Thucydides ἐπὶ πολὺ is
long. Cf. 328 d above.—That the
words belong to the poet is evident
from the loose connection with the
preceding context and the abandon-
XXXI. Tauta te oüv pantà prós ton Pitàkòn eißtai, 
kaî tâ eviónta ge tou àrìmatos éti mållon ðhlôi. ðhòi 
yár.

Tòu nekev ou poi' eýw òtò ìh òjneßðai duvåtvôn 
5 diùhìmenos keveán ès àppraktôn èlpída múirvan 
aiðvûs baleòw, 
panàmìmìon ànthrovèn, èvìnedoûs òsoi kàrptôn 
aiñûmeðà ðhònovs:
èpî dhî mún èvèròw àpapaggelew, 
10 ðhòiûv: ouwò sôródà kai ðî' òlouv tou àrìmatos èpèxèr- 
ètait òtò tou Pitàkôn ðhìmait.
pàntas ð' èpàijnìmi kai filèw 
ekòv òstìs èrðh 
ýhèn aìsìhòv: ð'nágyh ð' ouûde ðheò ìmàçontai.

ING OF THE DEPENDENT FORM.—KAÍ:
connects èpì plëstòtan èì òpìstò. 

XXXI. 2. ðhèiò: sc. pròs tòn Pità- 
kôn eißmêvà. ðhèiò òstì is often const. 
lìke ðhîlòs eìmu, taking the nom. of the 
pàrtic. This case is similar, the par- 
tic. being supplied. Cf. Soph. Ant. 20 
ðhèiòs ñàpò ti kalçàinwva ìpòs for you 
are evidently distressed at something, ib. 
242 ðhèiòs ð' ðà òtì sìmamavn ònòv you 
plainly have some ill news to tell, Eur. 
Med. 548 deîzw sopòs ògeòv, Isocr. xv. 
5 èdèlwvàn ð' ouûtì diakëìmevòi. See G. 
280; II. 981. 

5. keveán: belongs by prolepsis to 
mùirvan aiànov (like múirvan bïov Soph. 
Ant. 896, the allotted portion of life). 
— ès àppraktôn èlpída baleòw: set upon 
the vain hope. Cf. Soph. Tr. 940 ès 
òwv màtaw aìtìa balaì kàkì that with- 
out ground he had laid a grievous charge 
one upon her, Pind. P. ii. 35 eínvà de ìpàpà- 
toposì ès kàkòttav àçèðàvì òlèlòv lawless 
unions plunge men into a sea of troubles. 
7. panàmìmìon ànthrovòv: in appos. 
with tò ìh òjneßðai duvåtvôn. Similar 
345 is the thought of Phaedra's nurse, Eur. 
Hipp. 471 f. all' eì tò plëlw ðhèstà 
tòv kàkòwv ðxèis, | ànthrovòs oðsa kàrta 
ì' èvì pràêias ìn but if you have more 
things good than bad, mortal as you are, 
you surely must be well off. What fol- 
low is like Hom. Z 142 eì ìtì èsì èsì 
ìçèwv, ol ðòvîrûs kàrptôn èlèuvwv, Hor. 
Od. ii. 14. 10 quicunque terrae 
mære vestimur.

9. èpì ð' mún èvèròw: (i.e. èfèwvòw 
ðhî múv) added humorously. Cf. 346 d. 
10. ðhòiûv: repeats the preceding d 
ìpì òpìs ãèpèkètai . . . èpì ìstìs: 
persequitur et quasi hostili- 
ter aggreditur. (Kroschel.) 
12. èpàijnìmi: see on 346 d. 
13. The omission of àv with òstìs 
and the subjv. is an old usage often 
followed by the poets. For the sing. 
referring to a pl. antec., cf. toùtvoc 
òs àv below, also òs àv toùtvoc è. See 
G. 151, n. 2, b; II. 609 a. 
14. ð'nágyh . . . ìmàçontai: prover-
15 καὶ τοῦτ᾽ ἐστὶν πρὸς τὸ αὐτὸ τοῦτο εἰρημένον. οὐ γὰρ οὖτως ἀπαίδευτος ἦν Σμωμίδης, ὡστε τούτους φάναι ἐπαινεῖν, ὡς ἂν ἐκὼν μηδὲν κακὸν ποιη, ὡς ὄντων τινῶν οἱ ἐκόντες κακὰ ποιοῦσιν. ἐγὼ γὰρ σχέδον τι οἶμαι τούτο, ὅτι οὐδεὶς τῶν σοφῶν ἀνδρῶν ἤγειται οὐδένα ἀνθρώ-πον

20 πων ἐκόντα ἐξαμαρτάνειν οὐδὲ αἰσχρά τε καὶ κακὰ ἐκόντα εἰργάζεσθαι, ἄλλ᾽ εὖ ἵσασιν ὅτι πάντες οἱ τὰ αἰσχρὰ καὶ τὰ κακὰ ποιοῦντες ἀκοῦτες ποιοῦσιν. καὶ δὴ καὶ ὁ Σμωμίδης οὐχ ὃς ἂν μὴ κακὰ ποιη ἐκὼν, τούτων φησὶν ἐπαινετὴς εἶναι, ἄλλα περὶ ἑαυτοῦ λέγει τοῦτο τὸ

25 ἐκών. ἡγεῖτο γὰρ ἀνδρὰ καλὸν κἀγαθὸν πολλάκις αὐτοῦν ἐπαναγκάζειν φίλον τινὶ γίγνεσθαι καὶ ἐπαινετὴν, οἶον

346 ἀνδρὶ πολλάκις συμβῆναι μητέρα ἡ πατέρα ἀλλόκοτον

bial. Cf. Legg. vii. 818 ἄλλ᾽ ἔοικεν ὁ τὸν θεὸν πρῶτον παροιμασάμενος εἰς ταῦτα ἀποβλέψας εἰπεῖν (but it is likely that he who at first made the proverb about God had this in mind when he said), ὡς οὐδὲ θεὸς ἄνάγχῃ μῆτοτε φανὴ μαχόμενος, Aesch. Prom. 515 τίς οὖν ἄναγκης ἑστὶν ὁικοστρόφος (guide) Ἑρμ. Μοίραι τρίμορφοι μημονὲς τ᾽ Ἐρηνίνοις. Ποι. τοῦτον ἢρα Ζεὺς ἔστιν ἄθενεῦστερος; Ποίμ. ὀδύκων ἄν ἐκφόγοι γε τὴν πεπραμένην (the appointed fate), cf. Gorg. 515 ε. (cf. 345b) is a peculiarly Socratic thought, founded upon the principle that all morality rests upon knowledge. Cf. 352 δ, 358 ε, Gorg. 509 ε ἡνίκα ὁμολογήσαμεν μηδένα βουλομένον ἄδικεν, ἄλλ᾽ ἐκοντας τοὺς ἄδικοντας πάντας ἄδικεν.

22. καὶ δὴ καὶ: after a general statement lays marked stress on the special case which follows it. Cf. 348 ε, Apol. 18 a. See H. 1042 e.

26. οἶον: as, for example. For the inf. συμβῆναι following the rel. in indir. disc., see GMT. 92, 2, n. 3; H. 947. 27. μητέρα: from Homer down (1 367 μὴτρ ἢδὲ πατρὴ ἢδὲ ἄλλοι πάντες έταροι), in such enumerations μὴτρ commonly stands first. — ἀλλόκοτον: strange, pervers, unnatural. Cf. Rep. vi. 487 δ τοὺς μὲν πλείστος καὶ πάνω ἄλλοκότους γιγαντεύον, ἵνα μὴ παμπονήσου ἐπιμελεῖν the most of them become very strange beings, not to call them utter rogues, Phryn. Bekk. Anecd. 15. 3 κυρίας μὲν οὖν οἱ τὸν νοῦν βεβλαμμέ-νοι καὶ ἐμπληκτοί ἀλλόκοτοι καλοῦνται.
ΠΛΑΤΟΝΟΣ ΠΡΟΤΑΓΟΡΑΣ.

30 καὶ ψέγοντας ἐπιδεικνύοντι καὶ κατηγορεῖν τὴν πονηρίαν τῶν γονέων ἡ πατρίδος, ὥστε αὐτοὺς ἀμελοῦσιν αὐτῶν μὴ ἐγκαλώσων οἱ ἄνθρωποι μηδὲ ὀνειδίζοντο ὧν ἀμελοῦσιν,

35 ἐπικρύπτομαι τε καὶ ἐπανεῖν ἀναγκάζομαι, καὶ ἂν τι ὀργισθούσι τοῖς γονεῖσιν ἡ πατρίδη ἄδικιθέπτει, αὐτοὺς ἐαυτοὺς παραμυθεῖνται καὶ διαλλάττομαι προσαναγκάζοντας ἐαυτούς φιλεῖν τοὺς ἑαυτῶν καὶ ἐπανεῖν. πολλάκις δὲ, οἷμαι, καὶ Σμυνιόδης ἤγησατο καὶ αὐτὸς ἡ τύραννον ὡς τοῖς τῶν τοιούτων ἐπανεῖσαι καὶ ἐγκωμίασαι οὐκ ἕκών, ἀλλὰ ἀναγκαζόμενος. ταῦτα δὴ καὶ τῷ Πιττακῷ εἶ λέγει ὀτι 'Εγὼ, ὦ Πιττακέ, οὐ διὰ ταῦτα σε ψέγω ὃτι εἰμὶ φιλόφωνος· ἐπεὶ

346 29. ὅραν: depends upon ἡγεῖτο.
31. ἀμελούσιν: (accuse them) of neglecting. Pred. partic. after ἐγκαλώσιν, of the class Verbs sentiendi et declara ēndi.
33. μᾶλλον: sc. ἡ κατ' ἄδιαν.
34. ἐπικρύπτεσθαι, ἐπαινεῖν: although these Verbs balance ἐπιδεικνύοντι, κατηγορεῖν above, the former, ἐπικρύπτεσθαι, has for its obj. τὴν πονηράν, the latter, τοὺς γονέας ἡ τὴν πατρίδα.
37. παραμυθεῖσθαι: soothe. It depends, not upon ἀναγκάζομαι, but upon ἡγεῖτο, hence προσαναγκάζοντας is added. Cf. ἐπαινεῖον below. In meaning, it is like allocuī (cf. Hor. Ep. 13. 18 de formis aegrimoniae dulcisibus allocuis). It also has the meanings encourage, console. Cf. Menex. 247 c πατέρας καὶ μη-}

346 40 ὡς τὰς τράπες ἅ ἐξ ἐκεῖνοι παραμυθεῖσθαι ὡς βάστα τὰς φέρειν τὴν ἐμφοράν.
39. ἡγεῖσατο: some have taken this in the sense of think, fit or needful (formerly with the mistaken idea that δέων was omitted), as Phil. 59 a ete καὶ περὶ φύσεως ἡγεῖσατι τις ἔγειρεν. This, however, would require the pres. inf.; the aor. inf. after ἡγεῖσαι and kindred Verbs can denote only past time. Simonides therefore reflected on what he had already done. Yet the words of Pind. I. ii. 6 ἀ Μοῖρα γὰρ ὦ φιλοκερδῆς πῶς τῶν ἡν οὖν ἐγγάρις were generally understood as directed against Simonides for using his art to win money; this was his ἀνάγικν. Cf. Schneidewin Simon. p. xxiv. f.
41. ἀναγκαζόμενος: e.g. by a large e reward, as was the case also with the sophists. — ταῦτα: see on 310 e.
Theogn. 281 ἐφιλφ ἅρ τ’ ἀπάλμνυμα βροτη πάρᾳ πόλλα ἀνέλεσθαί ἐπὶ πάρῳ ποδός, ἡγεῖθαι θ’ ὡς καλὰ πάντα τιθεὶ ἐστιν in the power of wretched mortal to commit many lawless deeds, and to imagine that he directs all successfully, Pind. O. ii. 57 οὗτος ἄνθρωπος μὲν ἑυθάδ’ αὐτίκ’ ἀπάλμνοι φρένες | ποινὰς ἐτίον τῶν, lawless souls suffer at once here on earth their penalties.

45. ἀπάλμνιον: base, wanton. Cf. Theogn. 281 δειλψ γὰρ τ’ ἀπάλμνυμα βροτή πάρᾳ πόλλα ἀνέλεσθαί ἐπὶ πάρῳ ποδός, ἡγεῖθαι θ’ ὡς καλὰ πάντα τιθεὶ it is in the power of wretched mortal to commit many lawless deeds, and to imagine that he directs all successfully, Pind. O. ii. 57 ὦτος ἄνθρωπος μὲν ἑυθάδ’ αὐτίκ’ ἀπάλμνοι φρένες | ποινὰς ἐτίον of the dead, lawless souls suffer at once here on earth their penalties.

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46. ὑγιῆς ἀνήρ: a sound man. This is a pred. after ὃς ἂν ἃς and sums up the preceding preds. Cf. Simonides, Frag. 50 Schn., 37 Bkg. καλῶν πρόσωπων.

49. ἀπειρῶν: equiv. to ἀπειροῦν, ἀπε-πεσόσιον.

52. "Everything, even that which is ordinary, is good, provided only there is nothing base, shameful, connected with it." — τέ: epic use of the particle subjoined to relatives. See G. 151. n. 4; H. 1041.

56. τανάμμοιον κτῆ: the repetition of the following passage, already once treated, suggests that in the order of the poem it may belong here, and have been anticipated above.

58. τούτου γ’ ἐνεκά: if it comes to this. Cf. Phaedo 85 δ ἀλλὰ τούτου γ’ ἐνεκά λέγειν τε χρὴ καὶ ἐρωτάν ὦτι ἀν βούλησθε, Rep. i. 337 δ ἀλλὰ ἐνεκά ἄργυροι λέγε, Polit. 304 ἀ πείπας μὲν τοί-νυν ἐνεκά (if, then, the attempt is what is wanted) φανερὸς ἐσται. — "If I must first find an absolutely blameless man, I shall be able to praise no one."

60. ἐπαίνημι: verba vulgo contracta apud Lesbios semper fere verborum in μικρισι-
onem assumunt. Ahrens Dial. Ael. p. 146. Still, Simonides was certainly not thinking of Pittacus in this; the Doric lyric poets as well used many of these forms.

61. τῇ φωνῇ: alluding to 341 c.

d 63. διαλαβείν: make a division, in the sense of punctuate; of the voice, pause. Isocrates, xii. 17 (διαροώντες οὐκ ὄρθως) and Aristotle Soph. El. 4, p. 166, 25 Bk., say διαρεῖν. In Arist. Rhet. iii. 5 διαστήσαί is so used.

66. Const. νῦν δὲ σφόδρα γὰρ κτέ., but from Homer down (as with ἀλλὰ γὰρ), between νῦν δὲ and the statement introduced by it, there often intervenes the reason for the latter, the final statement usually following the intervening clause with anacoluthon. See on 319 b, 1. 6. Cf. Hom. m 326 νῦν δὲ — ἔμης (notwithstanding) γὰρ κῆρες ἐφεστᾶσαν θανάτῳ — τομεν, Plato Symp. 180 c νῦν δὲ —

ov γὰρ ἐστιν εἰς· μὴ δυντὸς δὲ ἐνὸς (but now, for he is not one; and since he is not one) ὄρθωτερον ἐστι πρῶτου προφηθήναι ὑπὸν (that it is determined beforehand which) δεὶ ἐπαινεῖν.

XXXII. 1 f. Socrates having concluded, it would have been in place for Protagoras to take exception to his interpretation of the poem. Although a portion is lost, it seems clear that the poet is deprecating a too severe judgment of the prince whom he had eulogized, and consequently of himself in giving the eulogy. On the interpretation, see Introd. p. 20.

4. καὶ οὐ: anticipates ἐμοὶ following.

5. ἐπίδειξιν κτέ.: Hippias then is concerned not to discover the true sense of the poem, which cannot be manifold, but to display his own wit in an ingenious exposition.

σάτην πρὸς ἀλλήλων Πρωταγόρας καὶ Σωκράτης, Πρωταγόρας μὲν εἰ ἐτὶ βούλεται ἐρωτάν, ἀποκρίνεσθαι Σωκράτης τὸν ἐτέρων. Καὶ ἐγὼ ἐἴπον Ἐπιτρέπω μὲν ἐγώγε Πρωταγόρα ὁπότερον αὐτῷ ἤδιον· εἰ δὲ βούλεται, περὶ μὲν ἐν ἀσμάτων τε καὶ ἐπών ἐάσωμεν, περὶ δὲ δὲν τὸ πρῶτον ἐγὼ σε ἡρώτησα, ὥς Πρωταγόρα, ἤδεως ἂν ἐπὶ τέλος

15 ἰδοὺ δὲ μιὰ το ἐπιτίθεσις διαλέγεσθαι ὀμοιότατον εἶναι τοῖς συμποσίοις τοῖς τῶν φαύλων καὶ ἀγοραίων ἀνθρώπων. καὶ γὰρ οὕτω, διὰ τὸ μὴ δύνασθαι ἀλλήλους δὲ ἐαυτῶν συνεῖναι ἐν τῷ πότῳ μηδὲ διὰ τῆς ἐαυτῶν φωνῆς καὶ τῶν λόγων τῶν ἐαυτῶν ὑπὸ ἀπαίδευσις, τιμίας ποιοῦσι τάς αὐλητρίδας, πολλοὺς μισθούμενοι ἀλλοτρίαν φωνήν τὴν τῶν αὐλῶν, καὶ διὰ τῆς ἐκείνων φωνῆς ἀλλήλους σύνειων. ὅπου δὲ καλοὶ κάγαθοί συμπόται καὶ πεπαιδευμένοι εἰσίν, οὐκ ἂν ἰδοὺς οὕτ' αὐλητρίδας οὕτε ὀρχηστρίδας οὕτε

347 13. ἐάσωμεν: sc. σκοτείνηθαί from the following σκοτούμενοι. Cf. Alc. I. 113d ἐάσωμεν οὐν περὶ αὐτῶν σκοτούμενοι ὁπότερα συνοίησεν πράξαιν πασσάρῳ passing over therefore the question concerning them, they ask which course will prove profitable if taken.—We expect skotómevá, but the expression is turned on account of the change to dir. discourse.

16. συμποσίοις: this custom is followed in Xen. Symp. 2. 1 ἔρχεται τις αὐτοῖς ἐπὶ κάρων (revel) Συμποσίοις ἀνθρώπως, ἔχων τε αὐλητρίδα ἀγαθῆν καὶ ὀρχηστρίδα (dancing-girl) τῶν τὰ θαυμάτα δυναμένων ποιεῖν καὶ παιδὰ πάνυ γε ἀραιον καὶ πάνυ καλὸς κεφαλάζωντα καὶ ὀρχούμενον. These show their skill during the whole banquet. Plato, however, has as the same view as the one here, when he says Symp. 176c εἰσηγοῦμαι τὴν μὲν ἄρτι εἰσελθοῦσαν αὐλητρίδα χαίρειν εάν, αὐλοῦσαν ἑαυτῇ, ἢ ἂν βούλητα ταῖς γυναιξί ταῖς ἔνδον, ἡμᾶς δὲ διὰ λόγων ἀλλήλους συνεῖναι τὸ τήμερον.

17. ἀγοραῖοι: cf. ἀγοραῖοι νοῦς· ο pneumonia τευκτής καὶ συγφατάδης (vulgar) οὐδὲ περιστοιχάμενοι· οι γὰρ ἄγοραίοι ἀνθρώποι ἀμαθεῖς καὶ ἀπαίδευτοι Bckk. Anecd. 339. 10; Ar. Edf. 218 φωνὴ μιαρὰ, γέγονας κακὰς, ἄγοραῖος εὐ.

25 ψαλτρίας, ἀλλ’ αὐτοὺς αὐτοῖς ἱκανοὺς ὄντας συνεῖναι, ἀνευ τῶν λήρων τε καὶ παιδιῶν τούτων διὰ τῆς αὐτῶν φωνῆς, λέγοντάς τε καὶ ἀκούοντας ἐν μέρει έαυτῶν καὶ κοσμίως, κἂν πάνυ πολύν οἶνον πίσων. οὔτω δὲ καὶ αἱ τοιαίδη συνουσίαι, ἐὰν μὲν λάβωνται ἄνδρῶν, οἷοι 30 περ ἡμῶν οἱ πολλοὶ φασίν εἶναι, οὐδὲν δεόνται ἀλλοτρίας φωνῆς οὐδὲ ποιητῶν, οὔσι οὔτε ἀνερέσθαι οἴον τ’ ἐστὶ περὶ ὧν λέγουσιν, ἑπαγόμενοι τε αὐτοὺς οἱ πολλοὶ ἐν τοῖς λόγοις οἱ μὲν ταῦτα φασὶ τῶν ποιητῶν νοεῖν, οἱ δ’ ἔτερα, περὶ πράγματος διαλεγόμενοι ὁ ἄδυνατος

35 ἐξελέγξας: ἀλλὰ τὰς μὲν τοιαύτας συνουσίας ἔωςι χαίρειν, αὐτοὶ δ’ ἐαυτοῖς σύνεισι δι’ ἐαυτῶν, ἐν τοῖς ἐαυτῶν 348 λόγοις πείραν ἀλλήλων λαμβάνοντες καὶ διδόντες. τοὺς τοιούτους μοι δοκεῖ χρῆναι μᾶλλον μιμεῖσθαι ἐμὲ τε καὶ σέ, καταθεμένους τοὺς ποιητάς, αὐτοὺς δ’ ἡμῶν 40 αὐτῶν πρὸς ἀλλήλους τοὺς λόγους ποιεῖσθαι, τῆς ἀληθείας καὶ ἡμῶν αὐτῶν πείραν λαμβάνοντας. κἂν μὲν βούλη ἔτι ἐρωτᾶν, ἐτοίμος εἰμί σοι παρέχειν ἀπο-

347 25, 27. αὐτοῖς, ἐαυτῶν: the pl. of the refl. is often used for the reciprocal pron., esp. when there is a contrast with others. See G. 146, x. 3; II. 686 b.

28. καὶ αἱ τοιαίδῃ: returns from the comparison, which was introduced by καὶ γάρ οὕτω ἐ.

29. μὲν: no δὲ follows. Of the two contrasted kinds of feast suggested by the comparison, only the one here considered is emphasized by μὲν. Cf. 344 a, 349 d, 361 e.—λάβονται: the συνουσίαι are personified, as Symp. 218 a oἱ ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ λόγοι νέου ψυχῆς μὴ ἄφουσι ὅταν λάβονται when the teachings of philosophy take hold of a young and noble soul. Then, with anacoluthon, those present at the συνουσίαι become the subj., ἀλλὰ ἔσι χαίρειν κτέ.

30. φασίν: Socrates ironically reminds them of Hippias’s expression 337 d, l. 8.

31 ff. See on 343 e, l. 55.

32. ἑπαγόμενοι: cite as authorities. Cf. Hipp. Ma. 289 b ἤ οὐ καὶ Ἑράκλειτος ταῦτα τούτο λέγει, ὅπερ σὺ ἐπάγεις; Rep. ii. 320 e τούτως δὲ πᾶσι τοῖς λόγοις μάρτυρας ποιητᾶς ἕπαγοντα.—αὐτοὺς: see on 325 a, l. 14.


42. παρέχειν: intrans. submit one’s self, used thus esp. of the sick man who delivers himself into the hands of
κρυφόμενος· ἐὰν δὲ βούλη, σὺ ἐμοὶ παράσχεις, περὶ δὲν μεταξὺ ἐπανασάμεθα διεξόντες, τούτοις τέλος ἐπιθεῖναι.

45 Λέγοντος οὖν ἐμοὶ ταῦτα καὶ τοιαύτα ἄλλα οὐδὲν ἀπεσάφει ὁ Πρωταγόρας ὅποτερα ποιήσοι. εἴπεν οὖν ὁ Ἀλκιβιάδης πρὸς τὸν Καλλίαν βλέψας, Ἔ Ω Καλλία, δοκεῖ σοι, ἐφι, καὶ νῦν καλώς Πρωταγόρας ποιεῖν, οὐκ ἐθέλων εἰτε δώσει λόγον εἰτε μὴ διασαφεῖν; ἐμοὶ γὰρ οὐ δοκεῖ· ἄλλο ἦτοι διαλέγεσθω ἢ εἰπέτω ὦτι οὐκ ἐθέλει διαλέγεσθαι, ἵνα τούτῳ μὲν ταῦτα συνειδῶμεν, Σωκράτης δὲ ἄλλῳ τῷ διαλέγηταί ἡ ἄλλος ὡστις ἀν βούληται ἄλλω.

Καὶ ὁ Πρωταγόρας αἰσχυνθεῖς, ὡς γε μοι ἔδοξε, τοὺ τε ὁ Ἀλκιβιάδου ταῦτα λέγοντος καὶ τοῦ Καλλίου δειμένου

55 καὶ τῶν ἄλλων σχεδόν τι τῶν παρόντων, μόνις προύτραπτο εἰς τὸ διαλέγεσθαι καὶ ἐκέλευεν ἐρωτᾶν αὐτὸν ὡς ἀποκρυφόμενος.

XXXIII. Εἶπον δὴ ἐγώ, Ὁ Πρωταγόρα, μη οὖν διαλέγεσθαί με σοι ἄλλο τι βουλόμενον ἢ ἀ αὐτὸς ἀπορῶ ἐκά-

348 the physician. Cf. Gorg. 475 d ἀλλὰ γενναῖος τῷ λόγῳ, ὡσπερ ἰατρῷ, παρέχων ἀποκρίνου, Theaet. 191 a τῷ λόγῳ παρέξομεν ἡς ναυτιώτες πατεῖν τε καὶ χρύσαι δ τι ἣν βουληται like sea-sick passengers, we will submit ourselves to the argument, to trample on us and use us as it will. The refl. is added Apol. 33 b ἀλλ' ὅμοιος καὶ πλούσιος καὶ πέντε παρέχων ἐμαυτόν ἐρωτᾶν, Phaedr. 228 e ἐμαυτόν σοι ἐμμελεταν (to practise on me) παρέχειν οὐ πάνω δεδοκται. Cf. 312 c, l. 3, above.

43. βούλη: sc. παρέχειν, cf. 342 a ἐὰν δὲ βούλη (ἐμὲ ἀκόουν), σοὶ ἄκοό-

σμαι, Phaedr. 229 b καθίζεσθαι ἢ, ἄν βουλάμεθα, κατακλυθήναι.

b 47. Cf. 336 b, l. 1.

51. συνειδῶμεν: τι τινι share knowledge with another, then know a thing of another. Cf. Symp. 193 e εἰ μὴ συνη.

348 δεν Σωκράτει τε καὶ Ἀγάθωνι δεινοῖς οὕτω περὶ τὰ ἐρωτικά.

55. σχεδόν τι: limits the extent of τῶν ἄλλων, which otherwise would be equiv. to τῶν ἄλλων ἀπάντων. Cf. Lach. 190 e σχεδόν τι ἢ περὶ πάντων ἀγαθῶν καὶ πάντως ἐχόντων (ἐπιστήμη). See on 345 d, l. 18. — μάγος: cf. 360 d, l. 67. — προύτραπτο: brought himself. Cf. Hom. Ζ 336 ἐθελον δ' ἄχει προτραπέσθαι (give myself up to grief). μ 381 ὅποτ' ἂν ἐπὶ γαῖαν ἀπ' οὐρανόν προτραποίμην (turned back), Thuc. ii. 52. 2 ἐς διεγρα-

πεν ἐτράπωντα καὶ ἅρων καὶ ὡσὶν they fell into the contempt of things sacred and profane, Plat. Apol. 21 b ἔστειτ ὑπὶ ἔχθησιν αὐτοῦ τοιαύτην τινὰ ἐτράπομην.

XXXIII. Socrates likes to preface critical discussions with an assurance
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St. p. 348.

στοτε, ταῦτα διασκέψασθαι. ἡγοῦμαι γὰρ πάνυ λέγειν τι τὸν "Ομηρον τὸ

5 σὺν τε δ' ἐρχομένω, καὶ τε πρὸ ὣ τοῦ ἐνόησεν.

eὑπορώτεροι γάρ πως ἀπαντέσ ἐσμέν οἱ ἀνθρώποι πρὸς ἀπαν ἐργον καὶ λόγον καὶ διανόημα: μοῦνος δ' εἶ πέρ τε νοῆσῃ, αὐτῖκα περιών ἥτει ὡς ἐπιδείξεται καὶ μεθ' ὅτου βεβαιώσεται, ἐκς ἀν ἐνύχῃ. ὥσπερ καὶ ἐγὼ

10 ἕνεκα τούτον σοι ἥδεως διαλέγομαι μᾶλλον ἢ ἄλλῳ τωί, ἡγοῦμενός σε βέλτιστ' ἂν ἐπισκέψασθαι καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων, περὶ δὲν εἰκός σκοπεῖσθαι τὸν ἐπιεική, καὶ δὴ καὶ περὶ ἀρέτης. τίνα γάρ ἄλλον ἢ σὲ; ὃς γε ὦ μόνον αὐτὸς οἰει καλὸς κἀγαθὸς εἶναι, ὥσπερ τινὲς ἄλλοι αὐ-

15 τοί μὲν ἐπιεικὲς εἰσίν, ἄλλους δὲ οὐ κἀνταντα ποιεῖν.

of this kind, that he is concerned only with the subject in hand. Cf. Gorg. 457 e.

3. λέγειν τι: say something correctly, be right. Here with πάνω, "there is a good deal in what Homer says." Cf. 320 b, 339 e.

5. Cf. Hom. K 224 ff., where Diomedes says, when offering to go out as a spy, σὺν τε δ' ἐρχομένω, καὶ τε πρὸ ὣ τοῦ ἐνόησεν | ὡς παρα κέρδος ἐρ' μοῦνος δ' εἶ πέρ τε νοῆσῃ, | ἄλλα τε οἱ βράσσαν τε νόσος λεπτῇ δὲ τε μήτις, also Symp. 174 d, where Socrates refers to v. 224. We should have expected σὺν τε δ' ἐρχομένω πρὸ ὣ τοῦ ἐνόησαν, but, as though ἐρχομένω had preceded, καὶ follows with a change of construction, so that ἐρχομένω is left as nom. abs. πρὸ ὣ τοῦ stands in transposed order for ὣ πρὸ ὄ τοῦ εἰκόν. to ἐτέροι πρὸ ἐτέρου.

6. ἐσμέν: sc. οὖτως ἔχοντες (sc. σύνδεο ἐρχομένω). Similar to this are clauses like 350 b ἀλὰχρον μὲντὰν εἶν, and those in which we insert an ex-

5 otherwise, as 355 d οὐ γὰρ ἄν ἐξημάρτανεν.—The art. οἱ in the expression ἀπαντεῖς ἀνθρώποι is against Plato's usage, but the insertion of εἰσὶν makes οἱ ἀνθρώποι almost independent of ἀπαντεῖς.

8. επιδείξεται, βεβαιώσεται: can, not shall. Hence the subjv., the reading of most of the Mss., cannot be used. Cf. Eur. Iracl. 46 στοάς ὅτον γῆς πύργον οἰκούμεθα, Dem. de Cor. 16 οὐχ ἐτέρῳ ὦτο κακόν τι δώ

11. ἡγοῦμενοι: explains the preparatory ἕνεκα τούτον. Cf. Theaet. 151 b ταῦτα ἕνεκα τοῦτο ἐμῆκνιν, ὑποτεύχων σε ὀδίνειν τι κυνοῦντα ἐνδιν (sus-

12. καὶ δὴ καὶ: see on 345 e.

13. ὃς γε: see on 339 d.
σὺ δὲ καὶ αὐτός ἀγαθὸς εἶ καὶ ἄλλος οἶδος τ’ εἶ ποιεῖν ἀγαθοῦς, καὶ οὕτω πεπίστευκας σαυτῷ, ὥστε καὶ ἄλλων ταύτῃ τὴν τέχνην ἀποκρυπτομένων σὺ γὰρ ἀναφανδὸν σεαυτὸν ὑποκηρυκέμενος εἰς πάντας τοὺς Ἑλλήνας, σοφι- 349

20 στὶν ἑπονομάσας σεαυτόν, ἀπέφηνας παῦδεύσεος καὶ ἀρετῆς διδάσκαλον, πρῶτος τούτου μισθὸν ἀξιώσας ἀρνυσθαί. πῶς οὖν οὐ σὲ χρὴν παρακαλέω ἐπὶ τὴν τούτου σκέψιν καὶ ἐρωτῶν καὶ ἀνακοινοῦσθαι; οὐκ ἐσθ’ ὀπως οὐ. καὶ νῦν δὴ ἐγὼ ἐκεῖνα, ἀπερ τὸ πρῶτον ἡρώτων

25 περὶ τούτων, πάλιν ἐπιθυμῶ εξ ἀρχῆς τὰ μὲν ἀναμνησθήναι παρὰ σοῦ, τὰ δὲ συνδιασκέψασθαι. ἢν δὲ, ὡς δὲ ἐγὼ μαι, τὸ ἐρώτημα τόδε: σοφία καὶ σωφροσύνη καὶ ἀνδρεία καὶ δικαίουσία καὶ ὀσιότης, πότερον ταῦτα, πέντε

348 16. σὺ δὲ καὶ αὐτός: free resumption of ὑπὸ μόνον αὐτὸς κτε. above. Socrates ironically uses οἰδ’ . . . οἶναι, after the manner of Protagoras, as quite equivalent to εἶ.—ποιεῖν: cf. 318a, 319a, 328b.

17. πεπίστευκας: the perf. here has its true force, expressing the action as complete while still efficient in its result; “you have such confidence in yourself.” Cf. 2 Ep. ad Tim. i. 12 οἴδα γὰρ ὃ πεπίστευκα, where however the verb has a stronger meaning.—ἀλλος: cf. 316c, d. καί belongs to the whole sentence.

349 19. σεαυτόν: (before ὑποκηρυρύζομεν) belongs to ἀπέφηνας.—ὑποκηρυρύζόμενος: lit. have proclaimed by the crier. Cf. Aeschin. iii. 41 ἄλλοι δὲ τινες ὑποκηρυρύζομεν τοὺς αὐτῶν οἰκέτας ἀφίεσαν ἀπελευθέρωσι τὴν ἐλευθερίαν. Here used figuratively, expressing a boastful praise of himself, in which Protagoras indulged.—εἰς πάντας τοὺς Ἑλλήνας: see on 312a.

21. μισθὸν: cf. 328b. The Homeric ἀρνυσθαί had been preserved in the expression μισθὸν ἀρνυσθαί, this commonly taking the derived form μισθαρπεῖν. But many other Homeric words are found in Plato, cf. Senge-buschi Homerica Dissert. i. 122. —The innovation of the sophists, in asking pay for their instruction, must seem, to the high spirit of a free Athenian, an unworthy act of trade. —After the discomfort of Protagoras in 333a b, and the unexpected outcome of the discussion of Simonides’s poem, it would seem that the sophist would hardly have listened with unmixed pleasure to Socrates’s recapitulation of his ample professions, closing with the fact that he was the first to charge a fee; especially when this rehearsal constituted an argument for his doing what he was especially disinclined to do: πῶς οὖν κτε.

25. ἀναμνησθήναι: ironically indicates the fear that he has forgotten some point. Cf. 350c, l. 35 ὀ βαλὸς μνημονεῦεις.

26. ἢν τὸ ἐρώτημα: cf. 329c, l. 35. b
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349 30. ὑπόκειται: the same idea is expressed from the other side in ἔπι... πράγματι above, and πράγματι... ἐπικείσθαι below; cf. in Eng. 'am known under such a name.'

31. ἐκαστὸν: partitive appos. with πρᾶγμα.

40. ὑπόλογον: charged to one's account (cf. ὑπολογίζονται), reckoned against one. Cf. Lach. 180 b μηδὲν τὴν ἡμετέραν ἡλικίαν ὑπόλογον ποιούμενον, Lys. xxviii. 13 oúde ἄδικως τούτων φημὴ ἦν εἰσὶ ὑπόλογον τὴν ἐκείνων φυγήν, Dem. xxxvi. 48 ἄξιοντες μηδὲν ὑπόλογον εἶναι, εἴ ποτε τοῦ σοῦ πατρὸς ἐγένετο.

XXXIV. 2. μὲν: (after μόρια) implies an antithesis, οὐ δὲ ὄνοματα πέντε ἔπι ἐνὶ πράγματι, as indicated in l. 28 above. See on 347 e, l. 29.

3. ἡ δὲ ἀνδρεία: this forms the subject of discussion in the Laches.

7. διαφέροντος: not in 359 b (where other points are repeated freely). This is not so much a strengthening of the superlative, as an emphasizing of ἀνδρειοτάτους above the preceding superlatives. Peculiarly, surpassing all the rest, are they very courageous. Thus also in Tim. 23 επί τοῦ πόλεμον καὶ κατὰ πάντα ἐνομιστάτῃ διαφέροντως, Thuc. viii. 68. 3
Protagoras. Ἐχε δὴ, ἐφηνεν ἐγὼ· ἄξιον γάρ τοι ἐπισκέφασθαι ὁ λέγεις. πότερον τοὺς ἀνδρείους θαρραλέους λέγεις
10 ἡ ἄλλο τι; Καὶ ἵπποι γε, ἐφη, ἔφ' ἂν οἱ πολλοί φοβοῦνται ἵναι. Φέρε δὴ, τὴν ἄρετὴν καλῶν τι φῆς εἶναι, καὶ ὡς καλῶν ὢντος αὐτοῦ σὺ διδάσκαλον σαυτῶν παρέχεις; Κάλλιστον μὲν οὖν, ἐφη, εἰ μὴ μαίνομαι γε. Πότερον οὖν, ἢ σὲ ἐγὼ, τὸ μὲν τι αὐτοῦ αἰσχρόν, τὸ δὲ τι καλῶν,
15 ἡ ὀλον καλῶν; Ὁλον ποι καλῶν ὡς οἶνον τε μᾶλιστα. Οἶσθα oὐν τίνες εἰς τὰ φρέατα κολυμβᾶσθαί θαρραλέοις; 350 Ἐγγογγε, ὅτι οἱ κολυμβηταί. Πότερον διότι ἐπίστανται ἡ δ' ἄλλο τι; Ὅτι ἐπίστανται. Τίνες δὲ ἀπὸ τῶν ἰππῶν πολεμοῦντο τραρμαλέωι εἰσὶ; πότερον οἱ ἵπποι ή οἱ ἄφιπποι;
20 Οἱ ἱπποί. Τίνες δὲ πέλτας ἔχοντες; οἱ πελταστικοὶ ή οἱ μή; Οἱ πελταστικοί. καὶ τὰ ἅλλα γε πάντα, εἰ τοῦτο

349 d παρέσχε δὲ καὶ ὁ Φρύνιχος ἑαυτὸν πάντων διαφερόντως προθυμότατον ἐς τὴν ὀλγαρ- χίαν. Thus in some cases μᾶλλον with the comp.

e 10. ἵπποι, ἵναι: Protagoras follows the etymology; ἵππος· ἀντὶ τοῦ ἵππος, σκληρός, τολμηρός, καὶ δὲ αὐτῶν χωρὶν τῶν πραγμάτων Schol. Ar. Nub. 445. In Symp. 203 d, Eros is described as ἀνδρείος δι καὶ ἓκες καὶ πάντων βολής, reck-
less, and alert.


14. το μὲν τι: not adverbial acc., but nom., as αὐτοῦ shows. So ὅλον.

16. κολυμβῶ: this employment of divers, probably for the recovery of articles which had fallen in, or for the cleaning out of wells, is mentioned also in L och. 193 ε καὶ διὸ τὰν ἐθέλουσιν εἰς φρέαρ καταβαίνοντες καὶ κολυμβῶντες καρπερεῖν ἐν τούτῳ τῷ ἔργῳ, and by

Hesych. κολυμβητάς· τοὺς ἐκ τῶν φρέα- 
των ἀναπόθωσαν τοὺς κάδως. The ἐπιστάται τῶν ἰδιών in Athens had special oversight of the wells and cisterns; an important function, in the meagerness of the water supply.

19. ἀφιπποί: the rare word is explained as ἀπείρος ἔχοντα ἵππηκης by the Schol. on Rep. 1. 335 ε ἄρ' οὖν τῇ ἱππηκή οἱ ἵπποι ἀφιπποῖς (δύναονται ποιεῖν) then by the equestrian art can the horsemen make others bad horsemen?

20. Iphicrates, an able Athenian general in the first half of the fourth century n.c., greatly increased the effectivity of the πελτασταί, although such troops are mentioned before his time. Thucydides, in ii. 29, iv. 28, speaks of Thracian, and Xenophon, in the An- abasis, distinguishes Thracian and Grecian peltasts. Cf. An. i. 8. 5 τὸ Ἑλλη- 
νικὸν πελταστικόν, vi. 5. 26 οἱ Ἑλληνες πελτασται. In vi. 2. 16, the Thracian peltasts of C learchus are distinguished from those which followed Xenophon.
23. αὐτός ... μαθέων: Cf. e, i. 48 below. After αὐτός εἰστι with compns., a second comparison sometimes follows by way of explanation. Cf. Legg. i. 649 a (δόλως) πώντα τὸν ἄνθρωπον αὐτὸν ποιεῖ πρῶτον θεων (good-natured) εὐθὺς μᾶλλον ἡ πρότερον, Hilt. viii. 86 ἐγένοντο μακρὰ ἀμείνων αὐτοὶ ἐωτῶν ἢ πρὸς Ἕβοι, Thuc. vii. 66.

29. τοὺς ἄνδρείος: about the courageous. λέγειν is rarely used thus with an acc., without a following δι or ὡς and a finite verb. Here, instead of ὡς ἁραρλέοι εἰσι, the acc. with the inf. is used. Cf. Symp. 190 c πειράσμα δὴ καὶ τὸν Ἕρωτα εἰπεῖν: ὁ Ἕρως ἔρως ἐστὶν αὐθεντικὸςἡ τινὸς; 178 b Παρμενίδης δὲ τὴν Γένεσιν λέγει, πρώτιστον μὲν κτέ., Plato Phaedo 94 d οἶδαν ποια καὶ ὁμμηρος ἐν Ὀδυςσεία πεποίηκεν, οὐ λέγει τὸν Ὀδυσσεία· στήθος δὲ πλήξας κτέ.
Protagoras might simply have said τοὺς δὲ ἀνδρείους ὡς ὦ θαρραλέοι εἰσὶ, οὐδαμοῦ ἐπέδειξας. He wishes, however, at the same time, to assert that Socrates has not overthrown his position. So, instead of οὐδαμοῦ ἐπέδειξάς, he says οὐδαμοῦ ἐπέδειξαις ὥστι τὸ ἐμὸν ὁμολόγημα ὡς ὦ κ ὥρθως ὁμολόγησα. ἔπειτα τοὺς ἐπιστάμενους αὐτοῦς ἐαυτῶν θαρραλεωτέρους ὄντας ἀποφαίνεις καὶ μὴ ἐπισταμένων ἄλλων, καὶ εὖ τοῦτο οἱ τῇ ἀνδρείᾳ καὶ τῇ σοφίᾳ ταὐτῶν εἰναι. τοῦτῳ δὲ τῷ τρόπῳ μετιὼν καὶ τῇ ἑσυχῇ οὐ πεθεῖς ἂν εἰναι σοφίαν. πρῶτον μὲν γὰρ εἰ οὗτοι μετῖων ἐροῦ με εἰ οἱ ἑσυχοὶ δυνατοὶ εἰσί, φαίην ἂν· ἔπειτα, εἰ οἱ ἐπιστάμενοι παλαίεις δυνατώτεροί εἰσί ἐν τῶν μὴ ἐπισταμένων παλαίεις καὶ αὐτοὶ αὐτῶν, ἑπειδὴν μάθωσιν, ἡ πρὶν μαθεῖν, φαίην ἂν· ταῦτα δὲ ἐμὸν ὁμο- λογήσαντος ἐξείη ἂν σοι, χρωμένῳ τοῖς αὐτοῖς τεκμηρίως courage, only that daring which is accompanied by knowledge can correctly be called courage; from which it follows that courage and knowledge are inseparably connected. When now Plato makes Protagoras say that his statement that the courageous are also daring, has been unfairly turned about by Socrates, this is wholly aside from the point at which Socrates was aiming. By this objection, as well as by his irrelevant illustration, Protagoras shows that he has misunderstood the purpose of Socrates. For this reason Socrates does not follow him, but from another point takes up a new line of proof.

38. τοῦτο: “when you discussed this.”

39. τοὺς δὲ ... ὁμολόγησα: Protagoras himself had drawn and admitted this inference, cf. 350 a.

43. ἐν τούτῳ: in consequence of this, in so far, cf. 324 e.

50 f. Protagoras introduces a singular flaw into his logic. He has admitted (350 a) that οἱ ἐπιστάμενοι τῶν μὴ ἐπισταμένων θαρραλεωτέροι εἰσὶ, and
toûtois, légein ós kata tìn émhn òmologiân h' sofía èstòn
ìsxûs. ègy dé oûdâmouv ou' éntauðha òmologou toûs du-
vatoûs ìsxûrou eiýnai, toûs méntoi ìsxûrou duvatoûs; ou
ýar tautôn eiýnai dûnámiv te kai ìsxûn, allâ tô mèn kai 351
55 ápò èpiostímyas gînvesthai, tìn dûnâmiv, kai ápò mànias
tê kai ápò thymôu, ìsxûn dé ápò fústevo kai èntrófiav
tôn sômatôn. òútw dé kâkê ou tautôn eiýnai thárso
kai anðreiauv. òoste uybâivne toûs mèn anðreivous thar-
raleous eiýnai, mè méntoi toûs ge tharraléous anðreivous
pántas. thárso mèn ýar kai ápò téchnh gînvei anðrhô-
pous kai ápò thymôu te kai ápò mànias, ùsper h' dûnà-

350 that (b) òi tharraléoi óutou (sc. òi ànev
èpiostímyas) ouk àndreioi eisvn, and Soc-
rates has drawn the inference (c) h' sofía òn ìndreia eîh (i.e. èstî). Now,
however, Protagoras declares that ou
èpiostámevoi dûnatiwteroi eisv tawv mè èpi-
ostaménavon, then, omitting the needful
premise ou èneu èpiostímyas dûnatoi ouk
ìsxuropoi eisv, which of course no one
would think of asserting, he would
have Socrates draw the conclusion
h' sofía èstîn ìsxûs.

51. toûtois: does not depend upon
tois autovs, but tois autois toûtois sim-
ply repeats and strengthens toûtof tev
tôpov above.

57. eiýnai: depends, like ou ýar taut-
tôn eiýnai above, upon òmologô.

60 ff. Protagoras attempts to con-
trover the interchange, which he im-
putes to Socrates, of tháros and ìndreia,
by instituting an analogy between
them and the two terms dûnâvsi and
ìsxûs, which like them, if the deriva-
tion of the consequents (gînvesthai Il.
55, 60) is immediate, stand in the
relation of genus and species, viz.::
tháros: ìndreia = dûnâvsi: ìsxûs. The
two antecedents he derives from téchnh
and èpiostímyas respectively, and from
thymôs and mànía in common; the two
consequents, from fústevo, and respec-
tively from èntrófiav tês ùsxûs and èntrófiav tòv sômatos. The difficulty
is to ascertain the exact nature of
these relations asserted to be equal, to
identify the generic marks in both
genus and species, and, in any view,
to harmonize this with his previous
statements. As all anðreiai are thar-
ralkoi, and all ìsxuropoi are dûnati,
the source of ìndreia must be found in
that of tháros, and of ìsxûs in that of
dûnâvsi. But it is difficult, for in-
stance, to indentify fústevo, one source
of ìndreia, with either téchnh or thymôs,
two of the sources of tháros,— leav-
ing mànía out of the question. The te
kai, moreover, connect thymôs so closely
with mànía as almost to force us to take
the former in a bad sense, anger, pas-
sion. Again, it is sufficiently difficult
to identify fústevo, one source of ìsxûs,
with èpiostímyas ou thymôs, sources of dû-
âvsi, but the attempt to identify
with either of these the other source
of ìsxûs, viz. èntrófiav tòv sômatos,
amounts to an absurdity.
μι, ἀνδρεία δὲ ἀπὸ φύσεως καὶ εὐτροφίας τῶν ψυχῶν γίγνεται.

XXXV. Δέγεις δὲ τυπας, ἑφην, ὦ Πρωταγόρα, τῶν ἄνθρωπων ἐν ζήν, τοὺς δὲ κακῶς; Ἐφη. Ἀρ' ὄνν δοκεῖ σοι ἄνθρωπος ἄν εὐ ζήν, εἰ ἄνωμενός τε καὶ ὀξυμωμένος ζή; Όυκ ἑφη. Τί δ', εἰ ἤδεως βιοὺς τὸν βίων τελευτήν 5 σειν, οὐκ εὖ ἀν σοι δοκοί οὔτως βεβιωκέναι; Ἐμοιγ', ἑφη. Τὸ μὲν ἄρα ἤδεως ζήν ἁγαθόν, τὸ δ' ἄγαθος κακὸν; Εἴ περ τοῖς καλοῖς γ', ἑφη, ζήν ἡδόμενος. Τί δή, ὦ καὶ Πρωταγόρα; μὴ καὶ σύ, ὡσπερ οἱ πολλοί, ἤδε' ἀττα καλεῖς κακὰ καὶ ἀνιαρὰ ἁγαθά; ἐγὼ γὰρ λέγω, καθ' ὦ

351 XXXV. 1 f. Socrates is unable to follow the above style of reasoning, and opens another approach.

7. This reply of Protagoras looks as though he intended to make a distinction between higher and lower happiness, or between the agreeable and the good; but he does not carry out any such distinction.

8. μὴ καὶ σὺ κτί.: the common notion of agreeable and disagreeable considers only the moment, the passing feeling of desire and aversion. Thus the agreeable can be viewed as harmful (i.e. in its results) and bad, the disagreeable, as beneficial and good. The sophists regarded it as the best gift of fortune, to be able to enjoy the pleasure of the moment without fear of consequences. Protagoras holds himself aloof from this, and follows the common view; for he does not comprehend the Socratic idea, that the truly agreeable is only that which remains such, i.e. the good, and that only ignorance confounds the transient with the permanent. Plato, however, who in this holds the Socratic view, does not bring out its full contrast with that of Protagoras, since he is concerned only to show the obscurity of the sophist upon the very subject matter of his own teaching.

9. καθ' ὦ κτί.: const. τὰ ἡδέα κατὰ τοῦτο ἁγαθά ἐστιν, καθ' ὦ ἡδέα ἔστι, μὴ εἰ τὶ ἀπ' αὐτῶν ἀποβήκεται ἄλλο. κατὰ τοῦτο καὶ εἰ τὶ ... ἄλλο are contrasted. "According to the concept itself, I mean without reference to outward consequences." The emphasis is thus thrown strongly upon the thought that only the concept itself is to be considered, not the consequences of the concrete reality (cf. 353 d). If, with the inferior Mss., we read ei μὴ τι, a single case only is excepted, in which the ἡδέα are not also ἁγαθά. Cf. Phaedo 77 e, where μᾶλλον δὲ μὴ ὡς ἡμῶν δειδητῶν is added in order to heighten the contrast of ἴσως ἐνὶ τὶς ἐν ἡμῖν παῖς ἄλτειται with the preceding ὡς (ἡμῶν) δειδητῶν, Crito 47 d πειθομένοι μὴ τῇ τῶν ἐπαίδντων δόξῃ, where μὴ with the words following enhances the contrast between that which we do and that which we ought to do (πειθομένοι τῇ τῶν ἐπαίδντων δόξῃ). Cf. also 359 a, ll. 3, 6.
10 ἡδέα ἔστιν, ἀρα κατὰ τοῦτο οὐκ ἄγαθα, μή εἰ τι ἀπ' αὐτῶν ἀποβῆσεται ἄλλο; καὶ αὖθις αὖ τὰ ἀναρὰ ὁσαυτως οὔτως οὐ καθ' ὅσον ἀναρά, κακά; Οὐκ οἶδα, ὥς Ἡώκρατες, ἐφή, ἀπλῶς οὔτως, ὡς σὺ ἔρωτὰς, εἰ ἐμὸν ἀποκριτέον ἔστιν, ὡς τὰ ἡδέα τε ἄγαθὰ ἔστιν ἀπαντά 

15 καὶ τὰ ἀναρὰ κακὰ· ἀλλὰ μοι δοκεῖ οὐ μόνον πρὸς τὴν νῦν ἀπόκρισιν ἐμὸν ἀσφαλέστερον εἶναι ἀποκρίσεως, ἀλλὰ καὶ πρὸς πάντα τὸν ἄλλον βίον τὸν ἔμον, ὅτι ἐστὶ μὲν ἄ τῶν ἡδέων οὐκ ἔστιν ἄγαθα, ἐστὶ δ' αὖ καὶ ἄ τῶν ἀναρῶν οὐκ ἔστι κακά, ἐστὶ δ' α ἔστι, καὶ τρίτων 

20 ἀ οὐδέτερα, οὔτε κακά οὔτ' ἄγαθα. Ἡδέα δὲ καλεῖς, ἢν δ' ἐγώ, οὐ τὰ ἡδονῆς μετέχοντα ἢ ποιοῦντα ἡδονὴν; Πάννυ γ', ἐφή. Τούτῳ τούτων λέγω, καθ' ὅσον ἡδέα ἔστιν, εἰ οὐκ ἄγαθα, τὴν ἡδονὴν αὐτῆς ἔρωτῶν εἰ οὐκ ἄγαθὸν ἔστων. Ὡσπερ σὺ λέγεις, ἐφή, ἕκαστὸτε, ὥς Ἡώκρατες, 

25 σκοπώμεθα αὐτό, καὶ ἐὰν μὲν πρὸς λόγον δοκῇ εἰναι τὸ σκέμμα καὶ τὸ αὐτὸ φαίνηται ἢδ' ὑπὲρ τε καὶ ἄγαθὸν, συν-χωρησόμεθα· εἰ δὲ μή, τότε ἡδ' ἀμφίσβητησόμεν. Πότερον οὖν, ἢν δ' ἐγώ, σὺ βούλει ἡγεμονεύειν τῆς σκέψεως, ἢ ἐγώ ἡγώμαι; Δίκαιος, ἐφή, σὺ ἡγεῖσθαι· σὺ γὰρ καὶ 

351 12-20. One is tempted to believe that this guarded threefold division had actually been made by Protagoras. See on 334 a.

d 16. ἀσφαλέστερον : ἀληθέστερον would have had more ethical weight.

19. Const. ἐστι δὲ (τῶν ἡδέων καὶ ἀναρῶν) ἀ ἔστιν (ἄγαθα καὶ κακὰ).

e 24. Ὡσπερ σὺ λέγεις κτὲ.: Protagoras requests that now also they follow the method for which Socrates has a preference, cf. 348 e, 349 e. σκέμμα is that which is reached by the σκοπέσθαι.

25. πρὸς λόγον: reasonable, in accordance with fact. Cf. 343 d, 344 a, 351 e

Phil. 33 e καὶ εἰσαιδίς εἰποκε disapna, ἐὰν πρὸς λόγον τι γ'. With πρὸς λόγον, cf. κατὰ λόγον, μετὰ λόγον. — The investigation properly conducted is to reach the result that the agreeable and the good appear as one and the same thing, as is indicated by the position of μὲν, δὲ.

27. εἰ δὲ μή: sc. πρὸς λόγον δοκῇ εἰναι κτέ.

29. δίκαιος: sc. εἰ, a rare ellipsis. Cf. Theaet. 143 d soi δῆ οὐκ ἀλήφιστοι πλησιάζοντι (by no means a few resort to you), καὶ δίκαιος· άξιος γὰρ, Gorg.
30 κατάρχεις τοῦ λόγου. ἂρ’ οὖν, ἢν δ’ εὖ, τῇδὲ πη 352 καταφανὲς ἂν ἴμιν γένοιτο; ὥσπερ εἰ τις ἀνθρωπον σκοπῶν ἐκ τοῦ εἶδους ἢ πρὸς ὑγείαν ἢ πρὸς ἄλλο τι τῶν τοῦ σώματος ἔργων, ἱδὼν τὸ πρόσωπον καὶ τὰς χεῖρας ἀκρας εἴποι, ἵθι δὴ μοι ἀποκαλύψας καὶ τὰ στήθη καὶ 35 τὸ μετάφρενον ἐπίδειξον, ἢν ἐπισκέψειμαι σαφέστερον· καὶ ἐγὼ τοιοῦτον τι ποθὼ πρὸς τὴν σκέψιν· θεασάμενος ὡτι οὕτως ἔχεις πρὸς τὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ τὸ ἤδι, ὡς φής, δέομαι τοιοῦτον τι εἰπεῖν, ὦθι δὴ μοι, ὁ Πρωταγόρα, καὶ τόδε τῆς διανοίας ἀποκαλυψόν. πῶς ἔχεις πρὸς ἐπί-
40 στήμην; πότερον καὶ τοῦτο σοι δοκεῖ ὥσπερ τοὺς πολλοῖς ἀνθρώποις, ἡ ἄλλως; δοκεῖ δὲ τοῖς πολλοῖς περὶ ἐπι-
στήμης τοιοῦτον τι, οὐκ ἵσχυρῶν οὐδ’ ἡγεμονικῶν οὐδ’ ἀρχικὸν εἶναι· οὐδὲ ὡς περὶ τοιοῦτον αὐτοῦ οὕτως διανο-
οῦνται, ἀλλ’ ἐνούσης πολλάκις ἀνθρώπως ἐπιστήμης οὐ 45 τῆς ἐπιστήμης αὐτοῦ ἄρχειν, ἀλλ’ ἄλλο τι, τοτε μὲν θυ-
μόν, τοτε δὲ ἴδοιν, τοτε δὲ λύπην, ἐνίοτε δὲ ἔρωτα, πολλάκις δὲ φόβου, ἀτεχνῶς διανοούμενοι περὶ τῆς ἐπι-
στήμης, ὥσπερ περὶ ἀνδραπόδου, περιελκομένης ὑπὸ τῶν ε ἄλλων ἀπάντων. ἂρ’ οὖν καὶ σοι τοιοῦτον τι περὶ αὐ-

351 487 d καὶ μὴν ὅτι γε ὅσος παρρησιάζεσθαι (to speak frankly), αὐτός τε φής καὶ ὁ λόγος ἤρωτε σοι. See on 319 b, 1.6.
352 30: κατάρχεις: pres., because the sense is you are (still) the leader.
31. The apod. of εἰ εἶναι, naturally expected after ὥσπερ (e.g. ἄν γένοιτο), is lost sight of, and instead of it, καὶ ἐγὼ τοιοῦτον τι ποθὼ follows with ana-
coluthon.
33. τὰς . . . ἀκρας: the hands. Пο-
39. πῶς . . . ἐπιστήμην: Socrates is
a still aiming at the relation of courage
to the other virtues, in order to arrive
at this relation through the identity of
40. Const. καὶ (referring to 351 c)
μὴ καὶ σὺ, ὥσπερ οἱ πολλαὶ, κτὲ.) τούτο
(sc. ἐπιστήμη, 357 c) δοκεῖ σοι οὕτωs
(sc. εἶναι οὐ ἔχειν), ὥσπερ κτὲ.
43. τοιοῦτον: pred.
44. πολλάκις: const. with ἄρχειν.
48. This passage is referred to by
b Arist. Eth. N. vii. 2 δεινὸν γὰρ ἐπιστή-
μῆς εὐνοίας, ὡς ἑκτὸ Σωκράτης, ἄλλο τι
c κρατεῖν καὶ περιελκεῖν αὐτὸν (τὸν ἐπι-
στάμενον) ὥσπερ ἀνδράποδον.
50 τῆς δοκεῖ, ἢ καλὸν τε εἶναι ἢ ἐπιστήμη καὶ οἶον ἄρχειν τοῦ ἀνθρώπου, καὶ εάν περ γιγνώσκῃ τις τὰ γαθᾶ καὶ τὰ κακὰ, μὴ ἂν κρατηθῆναι ὑπὸ μηδενὸς, ὡστε ἄλλο ἅττα πράττειν ἢ ἂν ἐπιστήμη κελεύῃ, ἄλλ᾽ ἰκανὴν εἶναι τὴν φρόνησιν βοηθεῖν τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ; Καὶ δοκεῖ, ἐφη,
55 ὅσπερ σὺ λέγεις, ὦ Σώκρατες, καὶ ἁμα, εἴ πέρ τῳ ἄλλῳ, ἀισχρὸν ἐστὶ καὶ ἐμοὶ σοφιάν καὶ ἐπιστήμην μὴ οὐχὶ ἕνα πάντων κράτιστον φάναι εἶναι τῶν ἀνθρωπείων πραγμάτων. Καλὸς γε, ἐφην ἐγώ, σὺ λέγων καὶ ἀληθῆ. οὕσθα οὖν ὅτι οἱ πολλοὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἐμοὶ τε καὶ σοὶ οὐ 60 πείθονται, ἀλλὰ πολλοὺς φασὶ γιγνώσκοντας τὰ βέλτιστα οὐκ ἔθελεν πράττειν ἐξὸν αὐτοῖς, ἅλλ᾽ ἅλλα πράττειν; καὶ ὅσους ἤδε ἐγὼ ἡρόμην ὃ τί ποτε ἁτῆ ἐστὶ τοῦτο, ὑπὸ ἡδονῆς φασίν ἡττομένους ἡ λύπης ἡ ὅν ε ἡν ἔδη ἐγὼ ἔλεγον, ὑπὸ τῶν τούτων κρατουμένους ταύτα 65 ποιεῖν τοὺς ποιοῦντας. Πολλὰ γὰρ οἴμαι, ἐφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, καὶ ἅλλα οὐκ ὅρθως λέγουσιν οἱ ἀνθρώποι. Ἦθελεν 66 δὴ μετ᾽ ἐμοῦ ἐπιχείρησον πείθειν τοὺς ἀνθρώπους καὶ διδάσκειν ὃ ἐστιν αὐτοῖς τοῦτο τὸ πάθος, ὃ φασιν ὑπὸ

352 52. ἂν κρατηθῆναι: represents κρατηθεὶν ἄν, as though preceded by an opt. in the prot., making a milder statement of the case.
53. ὅν: i.e. ἄν, cf. Gorg. 486 e ἄν μοι σὺ ὁμολογήσῃς.
55. εἴ πέρ τῷ ἄλλῳ: cf. 329 b, 1. 28.
56. μὴ οὐχὶ: because ἀισχρῶν ἐστι, ἀνικά ἐστι, ἀισχύνομαι are regarded as neg. expressions. See GMT. 95, 2, ἅ, Rem.—As a teacher of wisdom and virtue, Protagoras must maintain their value; thus Socrates, by associating Protagoras with himself in combating the vulgar view, involves him also in the final conclusion, that all virtue is wisdom.
58. λέγων: connected, as is freq. the partic. in conversation, with a verb used by the previous speaker. Here sc. φόρει, from φησί implied in the words of Protagoras.
65. Protagoras thinks it unprofitable to follow up the idle opinions of ignorant men; see 353 a, l. 75, below.
68. ὑπὸ τῶν ἡδονῶν ἠπταθαί: is pred. of ὃ (cf. 353 a, 354 e, 357 e), but the true character of that which they call ‘being controlled by the passions’ is repeated and appended freely to the rel. clause, καὶ οὐ πράττειν κτέ.
τῶν ἡδονῶν ἡττάσθαι καὶ οὐ πράττειν διὰ ταῦτα τὰ
70 βελτιστα, ἐπεὶ γυγνώσκειν γε αὐτα. ἦσως γὰρ ἄν λεγόν
tων ἡμῶν ὅτι ΟὐΚ ὀρθῶς λέγετε, ὃ ἀνθρωποι, ἀλλὰ
ψευδεσθε, ἔρχοντ' ἄν ἡμᾶς. 'Ω Πρωταγόρα τε καὶ Σώ
κρατες, εἰ μὴ ἔστι τούτο τὸ πάθημα ἡδονῆς ἡττάσθαι,
ἀλλὰ τὰ ποτ' ἐστὶ, καὶ τὰ υμεῖς αὐτὸ φατε εἰναι; εἰπα-
75 τον ἡμῖν. Τί δὲ, ὃ Σώκρατες, δεῖ ἡμᾶς σκοπεῖσθαι τὴν
tῶν πολλῶν δόξαν ἀνθρώπων, οἵ τὰ ἄν τύχωσι, τοῦτο
λέγουσιν; Οἴμαι, ἤν δ' ἐγώ, εἰναι τὰ ἡμῖν τοῦτο πρὸς ὑ
τὸ ἐξευρέων περὶ ἀνδρείας, πρὸς τάλλα μόρια τὰ τῆς ἀρε-
tῆς πῶς ποτ' ἔχει. εἰ οὖν σοι δοκεῖ ἐμμένειν οἷς ἄρτι
80 ἐδοξέων ἡμῖν, ἐμὲ ἡγησασθαι, ἢ οἴμαι ἄν ἐγωγε κάλλιστα
φανερῶν γενέσθαι, ἐποὺ· εἰ δὲ μὴ βούλει, εἰ σοι φίλον,
ἐὼ χαίρεω. 'Ἀλλ', ἐφη, ὀρθῶς λέγεις καὶ πέρανε ὡσπερ
ἡμῖν.

XXXVI. Πάλιν τούνων, ἐφην ἐγώ, εἰ ἔρωντο ἡμᾶς, Τί ε
οὖν φατέ τοῦτο εἰναί, ὃ υμεῖς ἡττω εἰναί τῶν ἡδονῶν ἐλε-
γομεν; εἰπομι' ἄν ἐγωγε πρὸς αὐτοὺς ὑδί. Ἀκούετε δὴ·
πειρασόμεθα γὰρ ἡμῖν ἐγώ τε καὶ Πρωταγόρας φράσαι.
5 ἀλλο τι γάρ, ὃ ἀνθρωποι, φατέ ἡμῖν τοῦτο γένεσθαι
ἐν τοῖς, εἰ οὖν πολλάκις ὑπὸ σῖτων καὶ ποτῶν καὶ ἀφρο-

353 69. ταῦτα: see on 325 a, l. 14.
70. επεὶ γυγνώσκειν: on the inf. by
assimilation after ἐπεί in indir. disc.,
see GMT. 92, 2, n. 3; H. 947. Cf.
Phaedo 109 e.
73. τοῦτο τὸ πάθημα: sc. γυγνώ-
σκοντα τὰ βελτιστα οὐκ ἠθέλειν πράττειν,
ἐχὼν αὐτοῖς, cf. 352 d. — ἡδονῆς: for the
gen. after verbs implying comparison,
see G. 175, 2; H. 749.
74. ἄλλα: now (like at after si); not
infreq. after εἰ. Cf. Phaedo 91 b
εἰ δὲ μηδὲν ἐστι τελευτήσαντι, ἄλλ'
οὖν ἡττον τοῖς παροῦσιν ἀνδῆς ἐσομαι
διωθμένοις, but, if all is ended when
one is dead, I shall at least be less
disagreeable to my friends through
lamentations.
76. δ' τι ἄν τύχωσι: (sc. λέγοντες)
the first thing that strikes them. Cf. Crito
45 d ὃ τι ἄν τύχωσι, τοῦτο πράξωσι.
80. ἦ: const. ταῦτῃ ἐπο, ἦ.
81. εἰ δὲ μη βούλει (ἐμμένειν), ἐὼ
χαίρεω, εἰ σοι φίλον (ἐμὲ χαίρειν έαν).
XXXVI. 5. ἄλλο τι: or ἄλλο τι ἦ; c
equiv. to nonne, cf. Apol. 24 e. See
G. 282, 3; Π. 1015 b.
6. οὖν κτέ.: the particulars of the
... and inf.

15. ὁμώς δεί: see on 326 d, l. 45.—οἱ τί παθῶντα 
κτέ.: the MSS. have ὃ τί μαθῶντα. A difficult passage. Entirely suitable to the context is the thought that in judging whether the agreeable as such is good, the quality of that which is agreeable is of no importance. Now the phrase τί παθῶν (GMT. 109, n. 7, b) has the meaning, what has happened to him, what ails him, therefore? Cf. Ar. Pax 690 (Κρατίδος) ἀπέθανεν, 50' οἱ Δάκωνες ἐνέβαλον. Herm. τί παθῶν; Tryg. ὃ τί; The phrase τί μαθῶν is regarded as having a similar meaning (what put it into his head, with what idea, wherefore?) but G. Hermann (Ar. Νυβ. p. xlvi. ff.) and others rightly replace it everywhere with τί παθῶν. We read then in our passage ὃ τί παθῶντα, and compare with it Apol. 36 b τί ἄξιος εἰμι παθεῖν ἢ ἀποτίσαι, ὃ τί παθῶν ἐν τῷ βίῳ ὕψιστα ἢγον what do I deserve to suffer, or what fine to pay, that I fell into such a condition that I could not keep quiet during my life? and Euthyd. 299 a πολλὰ μέντοι δυκαίτερον ἀν τῶν ὑμέτερον πατέρα τῶποίμα, ὃ τί παθῶν σοφῶν νεῖς οὗτο ἐφύεσ (whatever ailed him to beget such wise sons). We find then as the thought, through whatsoever means and in whatsoever way they cause one to enjoy oneself. With παθῶντα an indef. τῶν (acc. obj.) is understood, by a customary use of the partic.

20. τοὺς πολλοὺς: Protagoras w...
Πρωταγόρας. Οὐκοῦν φαίνεται, ὃ ἀνθρωποὶ, ὑμῖν, ὡς φαμεν ἐγὼ τε καὶ Πρωταγόρας, δι' οὐδὲν ἂλλο ταῦτα 25 κακά ὄντα ἢ διότι εἰς ἀνίας τε ἀποτελευτά καὶ ἂλλων ἴδιονων ἀποστερεῖ; ὀμολογεῖν ἄν; Συνεδοκεί ἡμῖν ἄμφοι. 354 Οὐκοῦν πάλιν ἂν αὐτοὺς τὸ ἑναντίον ἐρόμεθα, Ω ἀνθρωποὶ οἱ λέγουντες αὐ ἀγαθὰ ἀνιαρὰ εἶναι, ἀρα οὐ τὰ τουάδε λέγετε, οἰον τὰ τε γυμνάσια καὶ τὰς στρατεύας 30 καὶ τὰς ὑπὸ τῶν ιατρῶν θεραπείας τὰς διὰ καῦσεῶν τε καὶ τομῶν καὶ φαρμακεῖων καὶ λιμοκτονῶν γιγνομένας, ὅτι ταῦτα ἀγαθὰ μὲν ἑστων, ἀνιαρὰ δὲ; φαίεν ἄν; Συνεδοκεί. Πότερον οὖν κατὰ τόδε ἄγαθὰ αὐτὰ καλεῖτε, ὅτι ἐν τῷ παραχρῆμα ὄδυνας τὰς ἔσχάτας παρέχει καὶ ἀλγη- 35 δόνας, ἢ ὅτι εἰς τὸν ύστερον χρόνον ὑγείαι τε ἀπ' αὑ- τῶν γίγνονται καὶ εὐεξία τῶν σωμάτων καὶ τῶν πόλεων σωτηρία καὶ ἂλλων ἄρχαι καὶ πλοῦτοι; φαίεν ἄν, ὡς ἐγείμαι. Συνεδοκεί. Ταῦτα ἡ ἄγαθὰ ἑστι δι' ἂλλο τι ἢ ὅτι εἰς ἴδιονας ἀποτελευτά καὶ λυπῶν ἀπαλλαγάς τε καὶ 40 ἀποτροπάς; ἢ ἑχετε τι ἂλλο τέλος λέγειν, εἰς ὁ ἀποβλε-
ψαντες αυτὰ ἀγαθὰ καλείτε, ἀλλ᾽ ἡ ἤδονάς τε καὶ λῦ-


πας; οὐκ ἂν φαίεν, ὡς ἐγὼμαί. Οὔτε ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ, ἔφη ὁ Ἐ-


Πρωταγόρας. Οὐκοῦν τὴν μὲν ἤδονὴν διώκετε ὡς ἀγα-


θῶν οὐ, τὴν δὲ λύπην φεύγετε ὡς κακοῦ; Συνεδόκει.


45 Τούτ᾽ ἄρα ἤγείσθ᾽ εἶναι κακοῦ, τὴν λύπην, καὶ ἀγαθόν,


τὴν ἤδονὴν, ἐπεὶ καὶ αὐτὸ τὸ χαίρειν τότε λέγετε κακοῦ


εἶναι, ὅταν μεῖζόνων ἤδονῶν ἀποστερῆ ἢ ὄσας αὐτὸ ἔχει,


ἡ λύπας μεῖζους παρασκευάζῃ τῶν ἐν αὐτῷ ἤδονῶν· ἐπεὶ δὲ


εἰ κατ᾽ ἄλλο τι αὐτὸ τὸ χαίρειν κακοῦ καλεῖτε καὶ εἰς


50 ἄλλο τι τέλος ἀποβλέπαντες, ἔχοιτε ἀν καὶ ἡμῖν εἰπεῖν·


ἄλλ᾽ οὐχ ἔξετε. Οὔτε ἐμοὶ δοκοῦσιν, ἔφη ὁ Πρωταγόρας.


"Ἄλλο τι οὖν πάλιν καὶ περὶ αὐτοῦ τοῦ λυπεῖσθαι ὁ αὐ-


τός τρόπος; τότε καλείτε αὐτὸ τὸ λυπεῖσθαι ἀγαθόν, ὅταν


ἡ μεῖζους λύπας τῶν ἐν αὐτῷ οὐσῶν ἀπαλλάττῃ ἡ μεῖ-


55 ζουσ ἤδονάς τῶν λυπῶν παρασκευάζῃ; ἐπεὶ εἰ πρὸς ἄλλο


ti τέλος ἀποβλέπετε, ὅταν καλήτε αὐτὸ τὸ λυπεῖσθαι


ἀγαθόν, ἡ πρὸς δὲ ἐγὼ λέγω, ἔχετε ἡμῖν εἰπεῖν· ἄλλ᾽ οὐχ ε


ἔξετε. 'Ἀληθῆ, ἔφη, λέγεις, ὁ Πρωταγόρας. Πάλιν τοῖ-


νυν, ἔφην ἐγώ, εἰ με ἀνέροισθε, δ ἀνθρωποί, Τίνος οὖν


60 δὴποτε ἐνεκα πολλὰ περὶ τούτου λέγεις καὶ πολλαχῇ;


συγγιγνώσκετε μοι, φαῖνη ἂν ἐγώγη. πρῶτον μὲν γὰρ οὖ


ῥάδιον ἀποδείξει τί ἐστι ποτὲ τούτῳ ὅ ὑμεῖς καλείτε


tῶν ἤδονῶν ἦττω εἶναι· ἔπειτα ἐν τούτῳ εἰσὶ πᾶσαι αἰ


ἀποδείξεις. ἄλλ᾽ ἐτὶ καὶ οὖν ἀναθέσθαι ἔξεστιν, εἰ πη


yields to the inclination to introduce discussions in the form of an imaginary dialogue, as here, in this supposed conversation with the multitude, to imagine also a second dialogue with them.

63. ἔπειτα: see on 310 c, 1. 18. — ἐν τούτῳ κτ.: on this point the whole argument turns.

64. See on 353 e, 1. 23.
XXXVII. Ός δὲ ταύτα γελοια ἔστι, κατάδηλον ἔστιν, εὰν μὴ πολλοῖς ὀνόμασι χρώμεθα ἄρα, ἤδεί τε καὶ ἀνιαρῷ καὶ ἁγαθῷ καὶ κακῷ, ἀλλ’ ἐπειδὴ δύο ἐφάνη ταύτα, δυνών καὶ ὀνόμασι προσαγωρεύωμεν αὐτά, πρῶτον μὲν ἁγαθῷ καὶ κακῷ, ἐπειτὰ αὖθις ἤδει τε καὶ ἀνιαρῷ. θέμενοι δὴ οὖτω λέγομεν ὅτι Γυγνώσκων ὁ ἀνθρωπος τὰ κακὰ καὶ ἁγαθῷ καὶ κακῷ ἐστὶν, ὦμος αὐτὰ ποιεῖ. εὰν οὖν τις θημάς ἐρήται, Διὰ τὶ; Ὅπως ἔστω, φήσομεν. Τπό τοῦ; ἐκεῖνος ἐρήσεται θημάς. ὥμων δὲ ὑπὸ μὲν ἑδιονῆς οὐκέτι ἔξε-

355 73. λέγετε: after ὅταν λέγητε above, we should have expected here καὶ ὅταν ἀδίσ αὖ λέγητε, but after the long objective clause with ὅταν, the discourse, as is frequently the case, changes to the independent form. For this reason, in order to characterize this second part of what the multitude say as also ridiculous, the words are added, ὅς δὲ ταύτα γελοιά ἔστιν. Cf. 357 c, l. 89.

XXXVII. 2. ἄρα: the previous discussion leads to the result that the use of four words is unnecessary, two being sufficient; since good and agreeable, bad and disagreeable, coincide. ἄρα has its position late in the sentence also in Gorg. 519 b πολλὰ καὶ ἁγαθὰ τὴν πόλιν πεποιηκότες ἄρα ἀπάλλυται.

4. αὐτὰ: i.e. the concepts.

6. οὖτω: belongs to θέμενοι. What follows is the assertion of the multitude (cf. 352 d, l. 60).

8. ἔστω: sc. ὦμος αὐτὰ ποιεῖ.

9. ὑπὸ μὲν ἑδιονῆς: sc. ἐπτωμένος, τὰ κακὰ, γυγνώσκοντα ὅτι κακὰ ἐστὶ, ποιεῖν. Instead of having μὲν followed by its correlative, ὑπὸ δὲ ἄλλοι λεκτόν, we have, with anacolouthon, ἐκεῖνα δὴ κτὲ.
10 eitai eitein· allo gar onoma meteilenfev anti tis hdotis, 
to aghathon. ekeinoi (h apokrinomeva kai legewme, oti 
Httopmev -- TpO tinos; fhssei. ToU aghathou, fhsmev 
n(0 Dia. ayn ouu tychi ou eromevos hmas ubristis ou, ge-
lasei kai erei. 1H gelenoV leginete pragma, ei praitpe d 
tis kakak, gignwskouv oti kakak estin, ou deov auton prat-
tev, ettopmenos upo ton anagathon. 1Ara, fhssei, ouk aXion 
onton nikan ev umin ton anagathoV ta kakak, a aXion; fhs-
somev dhlou oti apokrinomevno, oti Ouk aXion onton. 
oy gar an exymartonenev on favev hipw evina toVn hdo-
20 nvon. Katata ti de, fhssei isos, anaxia esti tagnatha ton 
kakow h ta kakak ton anagathon; h kat allo ti h otan 
ta mev meiws, ta d ev smikrotera h; h pleiw, ta te elatton e 
h; oux eXomev eitein alllo h touto. Dhlou ara, fhssei, 
hti to htopasbhai touto legevete, antl elattonon anagathon 
25 meiws kakak lambranveis. Taunta men ouv outon. metala-
boimen dh ta onomata palin to hip te kai aniaron epit 
tois autois toutois, kai legewmen oti "Anthropos prait-
tevi-tote mev elegovmen ta kakak, von de legwmen ta 
anirpa, gignwskwv, oti anirpa estin, ettopomenos upo ton 
30 hedewn, dhlou oti anaxion onton nikav. kai tis alh 356 
(0 aXia hdon h proS lpithn estin, alh h upeboli a lh-

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355 13. ubristis: inclined to mockery. 
17. ev umin: before you as judges. 
See on 337 b, l. 34. 
19. ou gar an kte.: see on 348 d, l. 6. 
"If the good were equal to the evil, 
or greater, evidently there would be 
no error in choosing it." 
20. anaxia: as that is aXion aVnhs 
which is worth being taken for its 
price, so here to aghathon is anaxion toV 
kakow when it is not worthy to be 
chosen in preference to the bad, while 

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355 d

356 e

356 a

356 v.64), quae igitur potest esse 
indignitas voluptatis ad mo-
lestiam, nisi in magnitudi-
ne aut longitudine alterius 
utrius posita? shows that the
λων καὶ ἐλλειψις; ταῦτα  ὅτι ἡ σετή μεῖζων τε καὶ σμικρότερα
gυγνόμενα ἀλλήλων καὶ πλείω καὶ ἐλάττω καὶ μᾶλλον καὶ
ἵπτον. εἰ γάρ τις λέγει ὧτι Ἀλλά πολὺ διαφέρει, ὥς
35 Σώκρατες, τὸ παραχρῆμα ἢ δὲ τοῦ εἰς τὸν υστερον χρόνον
καὶ ἡδέος καὶ λυπηροῦ. Μῶν ἄλλω τῷ, φαίνει ἂν ἐγωγε,
ἡ ἡδονή καὶ λύπη; οὖ γάρ ἐσθ' ὦτῳ ἄλλῳ. ἄλλῳ ὅπερ τὰ
ἀγαθῶς ἱστάναι ἄνθρωπος, συνθεὶς τὰ ἡδέα καὶ συνθεὶς
tὰ λυπηρά, καὶ τὸ ἐγγὺς καὶ τὸ πόρρω, στήσας εὖ τῷ
40 ἡγοῦ, εἰπ' πότερα πλείω ἔστιν. ἐὰν μὲν γὰρ ἡδέα πρὸς
ἡδέα ἱστή, τὰ μεῖζῳ ἰκὶ καὶ πλείω ληπτεὰ· ἐὰν δὲ
λυπηρὰ πρὸς λυπηρά, τὰ ἐλάττῳ καὶ σμικρότερα· ἐὰν δὲ
ἡδέα πρὸς λυπηρά, ἐὰν μὲν τὰ ἀνιαρὰ ὑπερβάλληται
ὑπὸ τῶν ἡδέων, ἐὰν τε τὰ ἐγγὺς ὑπὸ τῶν πόρρῳ ἐὰν τέ
45 τὰ πόρρῳ ὑπὸ τῶν ἑγγὺς, ταὐτὴ τὴν πράξει πρακτέον
ἐν ἂν ταῦτ' ἐνῆ· ἐὰν δὲ τὰ ἡδέα ὑπὸ τῶν ἀνιαρῶν, οὕτως
πρακτέα· μὴ πὴ ἄλλη ἔχει, φαίνει ἂν, ταῦτα, ὅ ἄνθρωποι;
οἴδ' ὅτι οὐκ ἂν ἔχουν ἄλλοις λέγειν. Συνεδόκει καὶ
ἐκείνῳ. "Ὅτε δὴ τούτῳ οὕτως ἔχει, τόδε μοι ἀποκρίνασθε,
50 φήσω. φαίνεται ὑμῖν τῇ ὃπει τὰ αὐτὰ μεγέθη ἐγγύθεν

356 a false reading of the Mss. ἀνάξια, which arose from the preceding ἀνα-
ξίων, is very old. ἀνάξια is not found as a subst., while DH and AN are
often interchanged.

32. After the subs. ὑπερβολὴ and ἐλλειψις, we should expect ταῦτα  ὅτι ὅτι
τὸ μεῖζῳ τε καὶ σμικρότερα γλυγνεῖται,
but the sentence is const. as though replying to the question καὶ πῶς ἄλ-
λως ἡξια τὰ ἡδέα πρὸς τὰ λυπηρά,
ἄλλη ἡ ὑπερβάλλουσα ἄλληλα καὶ ἐλλει-
ποτα;

35. ἡδο: we should have expected ἡδο καὶ λυπηρόν, but, as the words
stand, we must regard καὶ λυπηρόν,
which follows, as an afterthought.

38. ἄγαθὸς ἱστάναι: good at weigh-
ing.

42. ἐὰν ἃ ἡδέα κτῆ.: to this are
subord. ἐὰν μὲν τὰ ἀνιαρὰ κτῆ., and ἐὰν
δὲ τὰ ἡδέα κτῆ., and to this ἐὰν μὲν,
again, are subord. ἐὰν τε — ἐὰν τε.

44. ἐὰν τε, ἐὰν τε: whether, or. See
H. 1045, 2.

46. ταῦτα: sc. τὰ ἡδέα.

47. πρακτέα: sc. τὰ ἡδέα.

49. ὅτε: causal, qu um, qu ando, since.

50. μεγέθη: objects of any size,
magnitudes. Cf. Phil. 41e ἐν μὲν
ὃπει τὸ πόρρωθεν καὶ ἐγγύθεν ὃραν τὰ
μεγέθη τὴν ἀλήθειαν ἀφανίζειν in vis-
ion, the near and distant seeing of mag-
PLATO'S PROTAGORAS.

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Plato

St. p. 356.

μὲν μείζων, πόρρωθεν δὲ ἐλάττω; ή οὐ; Φήσουσιν. Καὶ
tά παχέα καὶ τά πολλά ὁσαῦτως; καὶ αἱ φωναὶ αἱ ίσαι
ἐγγύθεν μὲν μείζους, πόρρωθεν δὲ σμικρότεραι; Φαίεν
ἀν. Εἰ όν ἐν τούτῳ ἡμῖν ἢν τὸ εὖ πράττειν, ἐν τῷ τὰ
55 μὲν μεγάλα μῆκα καὶ πράττειν καὶ λαμβάνειν, τὰ δὲ σμι-
κρὰ καὶ φεύγειν καὶ μὴ πράττειν, τίς ἂν ἡμῖν σωτηρία
ἐφάνη τοῦ βίου; ἀρα ἡ μετρητικὴ τέχνη ἡ τοῦ φαινο-
μένου δύναμις; ἡ αὐτὴ μὲν ἡμᾶς ἐπιλάνα καὶ ἐποίει ἀνω
τε καὶ κάτω πολλάκις μεταλαμβάνειν ταῦτα καὶ μεταμέ-

60 λειν καὶ ἐν ταῖς πράξεσι καὶ ἐν ταῖς αἱρέσεσι τῶν μεγάλων
tε καὶ σμικρῶν, ἦ δὲ μετρητικὴ ἁκυρον μὲν ἂν ἐποίησε
τούτο τὸ φάντασμα, δηλώσασα δὲ τὸ ἀληθὲς ἡσυχίαν ἐ
ἀν ἐποίησεν ἑχεῖν τὴν ψυχὴν μένουσαν ἐπὶ τῷ ἀληθεί
cαὶ ἐσωσθεν ἂν τὸν βίον; ἄρ’ ἂν ὁμολογοῦει ἀνθρώποι

65 πρὸς ταῦτα ἡμᾶς τὴν μετρητικὴν σοφίαν ἂν τέχνην, ἡ
ἀλλήν; Ἡν μετρητικὴν, ὁμολογεῖ. Τί δ’, εἰ ἐν τῇ τοῦ
περιττοῦ καὶ ἀρτίου αἱρέσει ἡμῖν ἢν ἡ σωτηρία τοῦ βίου,
ὅποτε τὸ πλέον ὑρθὲς ἔδει ἐλεύθας καὶ ὁπότε τὸ ἐλατ-
tον, ἢ αὐτὸ πρὸς ἑαυτὸ ἢ τὸ ἔτερον πρὸς τὸ ἑτερον, εἰτ’

356 multitudes obscures the true proportions,
c Phaedo 111 d καὶ ἀνεάων (ever-flow-

3d 54. ἐν τούτῳ: see on 310 d, 1. 27.

55. μήκη πράττειν: the peculiar ex-

pression is chosen to conform the il-

lustration to the truth to be explained,

namely, that it is knowledge which

must determine us τὰ ἡδα ἢ τὰ λυπηρὰ

πράττειν.

57. ἂν... δύναμις: the (subjective)
impression of the visible world. The pas-
sage is directed against Protagoras's
theory of knowledge. See Introd. p. 3.

58. ἐπιλάνα καὶ ἐποίει: ἂν is not add-
ed, because the ἂν with ἐφάνη above is

still in force. Cf. Phaedr. 229 e ὅκ ἂν

ἀταπεις εἰν’ ἐίτα φαίη, Phaedo 87 e ἂν

ἀγκαίρον μὲν τὰν εἴη... τὸν ἡδη ἐπιδεικ-

νοι, Lys. 208 d ἐφ’ ἁν. πόθεν ἐφ’ ἁν. Λγ.

Ἐγ. 1057 αὐξ ἄν μιχρέατο· χέσατο γάρ.

60. πράξεις, αἱρέσεις: limit both

preceding verbs.


Crito 50 b ἐν γαί γενόμενα δίκαι μηδὲν

ἰσχύσωσιν, ἄλλ’ ὅπ’ ἰδιωτῶν ἁκυροι γί-

νονται.

63. μένουσαν: opp. to ἐπιλάνα above. e

65. τὴν μετρητικὴν: sc. ὁμολογεῖν

ἂν τοὺς ἀνθρώπους σοφ’ ἔν ἡμᾶς πρὸς

tαῦτα.

69. αὐτὸ πρὸς ἑαυτό: i.e. τὸ περίττον

πρὸς τὸ περίττον ὅτ’ ἂν ἀρτίον πρὸς τὸ

ἀρτίον.
70 ἑγγὺς εἰτε πόρρῳ εὖθ, τὸ ἀν ἐσφεξεν ἡμῖν τὸν βίον; ἀρ' 357 ἀν οὕκ ἐπιστήμη; καὶ ἀρ' ἀν οὐ μετρητικὴ τις, ἐπειδὴ περ ὑπερβολῆς τε καὶ ἐνδειασ ἐστὶν ἡ τέχνη; ἐπειδὴ δὲ περιττοῦ τε καὶ ἀρτίου, ἀρα ἀλλὰ τις ἡ ἄριθμητική; ὀμολογοῖν ἂν ἡμῖν οἱ ἄνθρωποι· ἡ οὖ; Ἐδόκουν ἂν καὶ 75 τὸ Πρωταγόρα ὀμολογεῖν. Εἴεν, ὁ ἄνθρωποι· ἐπειδὴ δὲ ἡδονῆς τε καὶ λύπης ἐν ὀρθῇ τῇ αἱρέσει ἐφάνη ἡμῖν ἡ σωτηρία τοῦ βίου οὕσα, τοῦ τε πλέονος καὶ ἑλάττονος, καὶ μείζονος καὶ σμικροτέρου, καὶ πορρωτέρου καὶ ἐγγυτέρω, ἀρα πρῶτον μὲν οὐ μετρητικὴ φαίνεται, ὑπερβολῆς τε καὶ 80 ἐνδειασ οὕσα καὶ ἰσότητος πρὸς ἀλλήλας σκέψις; Ἀλλ' ἀνάγκη. Ἐπεὶ δὲ μετρητικῆ, ἀνάγκη δήπου τέχνη καὶ ἐπιστήμη. Συμφήσουσιν. Ἡτὶς μὲν τοῖνυν τέχνη καὶ ἐπιστήμη ἐστὶν αὐτῇ, εἰσαύθης σκεφόμεθα· ὅτι δὲ ἐπιστήμη ἐστί, τοσοῦτον ἐξαρκεῖ πρὸς τὴν ἀπόδειξιν, ἂν ἔμε δεῖ 85 καὶ Πρωταγόραν ἀποδείξαι περὶ ὧν ἠρεσθ' ἡμᾶς. ἠρεσθε ε δὲ, εἰ μέμνησθε, ἡνίκα ἡμεῖς ἀλλήλοις ὀμολογοῦμεν ἐπιστήμης μηδὲν εἶναι κρεῖττον, ἀλλὰ τὸτε ἀεὶ κρατεῖν, ὅπου ἂν ἐνη, καὶ ἡδονῆς καὶ τῶν ἀλλῶν ἀπάντων· ὑμεῖς δὲ δὴ ἐφατε τὴν ἡδονῆν πολλάκις κρατεῖν καὶ τοῦ εἴδότος 90 ἀνθρώπου, ἐπειδή δὲ ὑμῖν ὤχ ωμολογοῦμεν, μετὰ τὸτο ἠρεσθὲ ἡμᾶς τὼ Πρωταγόρα τε καὶ Ὀκράτατες, εἰ μὴ ἐστὶ τοῦτο τὸ πάθημα ἡδονῆς ἠτάσθαι, ἀλλὰ τί ποτ' ἐστὶ

357 72. ἐστίν: the gen. with εἶναι expresses here the object with which the art has to do.
74. ἂν: const. with ὀμολογεῖν.
77. τοῦ: introduces all the following gens., and also the advs. πορρωτέρω and ἐγγυτέρω. Cf. 356, a 1. 33, where the advs. μᾶλλον καὶ ἕτερον are co-ordinated with μείζων τε καὶ σμικρότερον κτέ. With φαίνεται is to be supplied ἡ σωτηρία τοῦ βίου οὕσα.
80. πρὸς ἀλλήλας: i.e. ἡδονῆς πρὸς λύπην καὶ λύπης πρὸς ἡδονῆν.
85. ἡνίκα: cf. 352 c ff.
88. ὑμεῖς δὲ δὴ κτέ.: does not depend upon ἡνίκα, but stands independently; hence the repetition with anacolouthon of ἐπειδή δὲ ὑμῖν ωχ ωμολογοῦμεν, μετὰ τὸτο ἠρεσθε ἡμᾶς. See on 355 b 1. 73.
91. ὁ Πρωταγόρα κτέ.: cf. 353 a.
PLATO'S PROTAGORAS.

St. p. 357.

καὶ τί ὑμεῖς αὐτό φατε εἶναι; εἴπατε ἡμῖν. εἰ μὲν οὖν a τότε εὐθὺς ὑμῖν εἴπομεν ὅτι Ἀμαθία, κατεγελάτε ἂν 95 ἡμῶν· νῦν δὲ ἂν ἡμῶν καταγελάτε, καὶ ὑμῶν αὐτῶν καταγελάσεσθε. καὶ γὰρ ὑμεῖς ὠμολογήκατε ἐπιστήμης ἐνδείκτῳ ἐξαμαρτάνειν περὶ τὴν τῶν ἡδονῶν αἴρεσιν καὶ λυπῶν τοις ἐξαμαρτάνοντας· ταῦτα δὲ ἐστὶν ἀγαθά τε καὶ κακά· καὶ οὐ μόνον ἐπιστήμης, ἀλλὰ καὶ εἰς τὸ πρόσθεν 100ἐτι ὠμολογήκατε ὅτι μετρητικής. ἥ δὲ ἐξαμαρτανομένη e πράξις ἄνευ ἐπιστήμης ὑπὲρ ποικ᾽ ἀυτοῖς ὑπὸ ἀμαθία ράττεται. ὥστε τοῦτ᾽ ἐστί, τὸ ἡδονῆς ἦττω εἶναι, ἀμαθία ἡ μεγίστη. ἦς Πρωταγόρας οὐδὲ φησὶν ιατρὸς εἶναι καὶ Πρόδικος καὶ Ἰππίας· ὑμεῖς δὲ διὰ τὸ οἴεσθαι ἀλλο τι 105ὁ ἄμαθίαν εἶναι οὔτε αὐτοῖς οὔτε τούς ὑμετέρους πάιδας παρὰ τοὺς τοῦτων διδασκάλους τούσδε τοὺς σοφιστὰς πέμπτε, ὡς οὖ διδακτοῦ  ὑπότος, ἀλλὰ κηδόμενοι τοῦ ἀργυρίου καὶ οὐ διδόντες τούτως κακῶς πράττετε καὶ ἱδία καὶ δημοσία.

XXXVIII. Ταῦτα μὲν τοῖς πολλοῖς ἀποκεκριμένοι ἂν 358 ἡμεῖς. ὑμᾶς δὲ δὴ μετὰ Πρωταγόρου ἑρωτῶ, ὅ Ἰππία τε 357 99. ἐπιστήμης: sc. ἐνδείκτῃ. — els τὸ πρόσθεν: going further, see on 339 d, l. 33.

e 102. τοῦτο: is the subj. ("this of which you ask, namely τὸ ἡδονῆς ἦττω εἶναι"); ἀμαθία ἡ μεγίστη is the predicate.

105. οὔτε αὐτοῖς: sc. ἔρχεσθε. There should regularly follow, οὔτε οἱ ὑμετέροι παῖδες ἔρχονται παρὰ κτέν., but with the second οὔτε the const. changes. Cf. Dem. xxix. 11. 54 ὁ δὲ οὗτος (ὁμόσας) οὗτ᾽ ἐκεῖνος οὗτ᾽ ἐμοὶ δοῦσαι τὸν ἄρκον ἡξιόσαν, xlix. 52 ὁ γὰρ ἡπτοῦ ἄνευ γε σταθμοῦ ἠμέλλεν οὗτ᾽ ὁ ὑποτιθέμενος (παραλήψειθαι) οὗτ᾽ ὁ ὑποτιθεῖς τῶν χαλκὸν παραδώσας for it surely was not likely that the mortgagor would receive the money, or the mortgagor 357 e pay it, without weighing it.

106. τοῦτων: i.e. "of all that leads to ἡδονῆς µὴ ἦττῳ εἶναι." This (τοῦ ἡδονῆς µὴ ἦττῳ εἶναί) is understood with the following ὡς ὁ διδακτὸς ὑπότος.

108. Cf. 318 e, ll. 42 ff. — Socrates, with exquisite irony, supports the custom of the sophists, and his apostrophe naturally pleases them marvellously (cf. 358 a ὑπερφώς).

358 XXXVIII. 1. Socrates has estab. a lished the two theses at which he has been aiming, viz., that the agreeable is the good, and that the understanding rules in man. He now moves on to connect these two principles with
358 the relation of ἀνδρέα to the other virtues. See on 352 b, l. 39, 359 c, l. 19.

3. ἡμιν: “for let us all make the examination together.” Prodicus and Hippias had been invited at the outset 317 d, but Socrates repeats particularly 343 c ἐπισκεψαμέθα δή αὐτῷ κοινή ἀπαντεῖ and 358 d συνεδόκει ἀπαντῶν ἡμιν. By taking the others along with Protagoras, Socrates makes it the more difficult for the latter to break away again before the consummation of the argument, cf. 360 d.

7. διαφερον: see on 337 a, l. 26.

9. εἰκα...ἐνομαζόν: Plato frequently alludes thus to the custom of using various synonyms in invocations of the gods, as πολυωνυμία showed the manifold honor of the deity. Cf. Crat. 400 e ἄστερ εὖ ταῖς εὐχαίς νόμος ἐστιν ἡμῖν εὐχεσθαι, ὦτινες τε καὶ ὑπόθεν χαίρουσιν ὑπομαζόμενοι by whatever names and whence ever they please to be invoked, Sympr. 212 c τοῦτον οὖν τὸν λόγον ὡς ἐγκατειμένον εἰρήσθαι, εἰ δὲ, δὲ ταῦτα καὶ ὡτι χαίρει σὺνομάζω (whatever and however you choose to name it), τοῦτο ὑνομάζει, Aesch. Ag. 160 Zeus, ὡστὶ ποτ’ ἐστίν.—ὅπωθεν...ἐνομαζών: cf. Hom. K 68

10. τούτο κτε.: “use that expression, that word, which pleases you best, in your reply to my question.” Cf. Symp. 212 c.

12. ἐπὶ τούτου: cannot express an aim, the actions directed at this (πλεῖν ἐπὶ Σάμον Thuc. i. 116 and similar expressions are entirely different); but the meaning is that, “the actions belonging in this sphere (viz. of the agreeable and painless life), so soon as the agreeable and the good are one and the same, are noble.” ἐπὶ τούτου can then be compared with ἐπὶ τοῦ σοῦ βίου Phaedr. 242 a and similar passages.—The whole passage α’ ἐπὶ τούτου...ὡφελίμων is somewhat strange. But Socrates wishes to show that no one who knows what is truly agreeable, and is aware that the truly and permanently agreeable is good, will do, or will wish to do, anything that does not bring this pleasure. Hence Socrates concludes that, if the agreeable is good, all actions connected with this are noble, and consequently good and useful. For no one will wish to do anything else than what is good and useful.
πράξεις ἀπασαι, ἐπὶ τοῦ ἀλύπῳς ξῆν καὶ ἡδεως, ἃρ νῦν καλαί; καὶ τὸ καλὸν ἔργον ἀγαθόν τε καὶ ὄφελιμον;

15 Συνεδόκει. Εἴ ἄρα, ἐφην ἐγώ, τὸ ἡδον ἀγαθόν ἐστίν, οὗδεις οὔτε εἰδῶς οὔτε οἰόμενος ἂλλα βελτίων εἶναι ἡ ἄνθρωπος, καὶ δυνατά, ἐπειτα ποιεῖ τάντα ἐξὸν τά βελτίων οὗτο τὸ ἡπτῶ εἶναι αὐτοῦ, ἀλλὸ τι τοῦτ’ ἐστὶν ἡ ἀμαθεία, οὗτε κρείττον ἐαυτοῦ ἀλλο τι ἡ σοφία. Συνεδόκει

20 πᾶσιν. Τί δὲ δή; ἀμαθίαν ἄρα το τοιόνδε λέγετε, τὸ ψευδή ἔχειν δοξάν καὶ ἐφεύσασθι περὶ τῶν πραγμάτων τῶν πολλῶν ἀξίων; Καὶ τούτο πᾶσι συνεδόκει. ἀλλο τι οὖν, ἐφην ἐγώ, ἐπ’ ἂς τα κακά οὗδεις ἐκών ἐχρεται οὗτε ἐπὶ ἂν οὐστει κακὰ εἴναι, οὐδ’ ἐστὶ τοῦτο, ὡς ἐσικεφ, ἐν αὐτῷ τοῦτον. Τί δὲ δή; ἀμαθίαν ἄρα το τοιόνδε λέγετε, τὸ ψευδή ἔχειν δοξάν καὶ ἐφεύσασθι περὶ τῶν πραγμάτων τῶν πολλῶν ἀξίων; Καὶ τούτο πᾶσι συνεδόκει.

25 ἀνθρώπου φύσει, ἐπ’ ἂν οὐστει κακὰ εἴναι ἐθέλειν ἰέναι ἀντὶ τῶν ἀγαθῶν, ὅταν τε ἀναγκασθῇ δυνὸν κακῶν τὸ ἐτερον αἰρεῖσθαι, οὗδεις τὸ μείζον αἰρῆσθαι ἐξὸν τὸ ἔλαστον; Ἀπαντα ταύτα συνεδόκει ἀπασων ἡμῖν. Τί ὅν; ἐφην ἐγώ, καλείτε τι δέος καὶ φόβον; καὶ ἄρα ὡ περ ἐγώ;

30 πρὸς σὲ λέγω, ὁ Πρόδικε. προσδοκιάν τινα λέγω κακοῦ τοῦτο, εἰτε φόβον εἰτε δέος καλείτε. Ἐσικεφ Πρωταγόρας μὲν καὶ Ἰππία δέος τε καὶ φόβος εἴναι τοῦτο, Προδίκῳ ἐ

17. καὶ δυνατά: every one is perfectly conscious that there are deeds better than his own, but which he does not do because they are beyond his power. Thus ἂλλα βελτίων needs the limitation καὶ δυνατά, and this alone gives meaning to the words ἐξὸν τὰ βελτίων. — ἐπιτα: see on 310d, l. 26.

18. ἡπτῶ εἶναι αὑτοῦ: less precise than the former expression ἡδονής ἡπτάσθαι etc., but this marks the unreasonableness of the supposed experience. Cf. 352b ff. — τοῦτο: repeats with emphasis τὸ ἡπτῶ εἶναι αὑτοῦ.

22. ἀλλὸ τι: see on 353c, l. 5.

26. ἀντὶ τῶν ἀγαθῶν: 'brachylogy'; for ἀντὶ τοῦ λέγαι ἐπὶ τὰ ἀγαθα. Cf. Sym. 195c νέος μὲν οὖν ἐστι πρὸς δὲ τῷ νέῳ ἄπαλος (and besides being young, tender), Theaet. 186c καλὸς γὰρ εἷς πρὸς δὲ τῷ καλῷ εὗ ἐποίησε μὲ, Phil. 41c νῦν ὡς τὸ μὲν ἐπιθυμοῦν ἢν ἡ ψυχὴ τῶν τοῦ σώματος ἐναντίων ἔξεων, ἢς ἐπὶ ἐναντίων τῶν τοῦ σώματος ἔξεων it was the soul then, that desired the states opposite to those of the body, Hdt. ii. 134 (Μυκέρνος) πυραμίδα ἀπελιπτετο πολλὴν ἐλάσσω τοῦ πατρὸς ἰ.e. τῆς τοῦ πατρός.
Prodicus's distinction was probably the one made by Ammonius, p. 39 A ὁφὸς καὶ φόβος διαφέρει. Φόβος μὲν γὰρ ἔστι πολυχρώμως κακοῦ ὑπόνοια, φόβος δὲ ἡ παρατήρησις τής ἀρετῆς.

But the distinction is often neglected.

'Ωμολόγει. 'Ιθι δή, ἑφην ἐγώ, ἐπεὶ ἡμῖν, ἐπὶ τί λέγεις
20 ἵτας εἶναι τοὺς ἄνδρείους; ἦ ἑφ' α' περ οἱ δειλοί; ὦνκ
ἐφη. Ὁνκοῦν ἐφ' έτερα. Ναί, ἦ δ' οὐς. Πότερον οἱ μὲν
dειλοί ἐπὶ τὰ θαρραλέα ἔρχονται, οἱ δὲ ἄνδρείοι ἐπὶ τὰ
dεινά; Λέγεται δή, ὁ Σώκρατες, οὕτως ὑπὸ τῶν ἄνθρω-
πων. 'Αληθή, ἑφην ἐγώ, λέγεις· ἀλλ' οὐ τούτῳ ἔρωτω, d
25 ἀλλὰ σὺ ἐπὶ τί φής ἵτας εἶναι τοὺς ἄνδρείους; ἄρ' ἐπὶ
tὰ δεινὰ, ἡγούμενους δεινὰ εἶναι, ἦ ἐπὶ τὰ μή; 'Αλλὰ
tοῦτό γ', ἑφη, ἐν οἷς σὺ ἔλεγες τοὺς λόγους ἀπεδείχθη
ἀρτι, ὅτι ἄδυνατον. Καὶ τοῦτο, ἑφην ἐγώ, ἀληθὲς λέγεις.
ὡστ' εἰ τούτῳ ὅρθως ἀπεδείχθη, ἐπὶ μὲν ὁ δεινὰ ἡγεῖ.
tαι εἶναι οὐδεστὶ ἔρχεται, ἑπειδῆ τὸ ἦττω εἶναι εαυτῷ
εὐρέθη ἀμαθία οὖσα. 'Ωμολόγει. 'Αλλὰ μὴν ἐπὶ ἃ γε
θαρροῦσι πάντες αὖ ἔρχονται, καὶ δειλοὶ καὶ ἄνδρείοι,
καὶ ταύτη γε ἐπὶ τὰ αὐτὰ ἔρχονται οἱ δειλοὶ τε καὶ οἱ
ἄνδρείοι. 'Αλλὰ μεντοί, ἑφη, ὁ Σώκρατες, πάν γε τοῦν.
30 ἀντίον ἐστὶν ἐπὶ ὁ οἳ τε δειλοὶ ἔρχονται καὶ οἱ ἄνδρείοι.

359 19. ἐπὶ δή: a new argument, starting
from the previous concessions. 
Cf. 357 e.
20. οὐκ ὅσ κτ.: here appears the irrelevance of Protagoras's con-
tention in 350 e f. See on 351 b,
l. 61.
22. θαρραλέα: "matters in which one can be θαρραλέος," 
Cf. Rep. v. 450 e τάληθη εἰδότα λέγειν ἀσφαλές καὶ
θαρραλέων, Lach. 194 e (τὴν ἄνδρειαν
φησὶν εἶναι) τὴν τῶν δεινῶν καὶ θαρραλέων
ἐπιστήμην, 198 b.
27. ἐν οἷς ... τοῖς λόγοις: i.e. as 
Socrates had been leading the dis-
cussion. Cf. 351 e, l. 29. On the
const., see on 342 b ὅσ ... τοὺς
σοφιστάς.
28. άρτι: Cf. 358 c, ll. 22 ff.
30. ἑπειδῆ ... οὖσα: several critics
would strike out these words; but
they contain a brief repetition of the
argument to which Protagoras has
just referred. People commonly say
that one sometimes does the evil
knowingly, suffering oneself to be
overcome by ἡδόνη (cf. 352 d ff.,
353 e). But now Socrates has shown
that no one does this, but he who
seems to do it, simply lacks the
proper knowledge of good and evil;
that consequently the ἦττω εἶναι ἡδο-
νής or, as in 358 c, ἦττω εἶναι αὐτῷ
is only ἀμαθία. It is entirely correct
therefore to say here briefly "we can
assert that no man chooses that which
he holds to be evil, because ἦττω
εἶναι αὐτῷ has been shown to be
ἀμαθία.”
33. ταύτη: in this respect.
αὐτίκα εἰς τὸν πόλεμον οἱ μὲν ἑθέλουσιν ἵναι, ο>i δὲ οὐκ ἑθέλουσιν. Πότερον, ἔφην ἐγώ, καλὸν ὶν ἵναι ἢ ἀισχρόν; Καλὸν, ἐφη. Οὕκον εἰ περ καλὸν, καὶ ἀγαθὸν ὁμολογήσαμεν ἐν τοῖς ἐμπροσθεν· τὰς γὰρ καλὰς πράξεις ἀπάσας ἀγαθὰς ὁμολογήσαμεν. Ἀληθῆ λέγεις, καὶ ἤε ἐμούγε δοκεῖ ὃτις. Ὅρθως γε, ἔφην ἐγώ. ἀλλὰ ποτέρους φής εἰς τὸν πόλεμον οὐκ ἑθέλεω ἵναι, καλὸν δὲ καὶ ἀγαθὸν; Τοὺς δειλούς, ἢ δ' ὃς. Οὕκον, ὃν δ' ἐγώ, εἰ περ καλὸν καὶ ἀγαθὸν, καὶ ἤδι; Ἔμολογηται γοῦν, ἔφη. Ἄρ' οὖν γυνώσκοντες οἱ δειλοὶ οὐκ ἑθέλουσιν ἵναι ἐπὶ τὸ κάλλιον τε καὶ ἁμείνων καὶ ἰδιον; Ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῦτο ἐὰν ὁμολογῶμεν, ἔφη, διαφθεροῦμεν τὰς ἐμπροσθεν ὁμολογίας. Τί δ' ὁ ἄνδρειος; οὖν ἐπὶ τὸ κάλλιον τε καὶ ἁμείνον καὶ ἰδιον ἑρχεται; Ἀνάγκη, ἔφη, ὁμολογεῖν. Οὕκον οὖν οἱ ἄνδρειοι οὐκ αἰσχροῖς φόβους φοβοῦνται, ὅταν φοβῶνται, οὐδὲ αἰσχρὰ τάρρῃ ταρροῦσιν. Ἀληθῆ, ἔφη. Εἰ δὲ μὴ αἰσχρὰ, ἃ' οὐ καλὰ; Ἔμολογεί. Εἰ δὲ καλὰ, καὶ ἀγαθὰ; Ναι. Οὐκοῦν καὶ οἱ δειλοὶ καὶ οἱ μιανόμενοι τούναντίον αἰσχροῖς τε φόβους φοβοῦνται καὶ αἰσχρὰ τάρρῃ ταρροῦσιν. Ἐμολογεί. Θαρροῦσι δὲ τὰ αἰσχρὰ καὶ κακὰ δι' ἄλλο τι ἢ δ' ἁγνοιαν καὶ ἀμαθίαν; Οὖτως ἔχει, ἔφη. Τί οὖν; τοῦτο δ' οἱ δειλοὶ εἰσών οἱ δειλοὶ, εἰ δειλίαν ἢ ἄνδρειαν καλεῖς; Δειλίαν ἐγώγ', ἔφη. Δειλοὶ δὲ οὐ διὰ τὴν τῶν δεινῶν ἀμαθίαν ἐφάνησαν ὄντες; Πάνυ γ', ἔφη. Διὰ ταὐτὴν ἄρα τὴν ἀμαθίαν δειλοὶ εἰσών; Ἐμολογεί. Δι' οὗ δὲ δειλοὶ εἰσι, δειλία ὁμολογεῖται παρὰ σοῦ; Συνέφη. Οὐκοῦν ἡ τῶν δεινῶν καὶ μὴ δεινῶν ἀμα-
PLATO'S PROTAGORAS.

St. p. 300.

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THE DELIA ἄν εἰθ; Ἐπένευσεν. Ἀλλὰ μὴν, ἢν δ’ ἔγω, a ἐναντίον ἄνδρεία δειλία; Ἐφη. Οὐκών ἡ τῶν δεινῶν καὶ μὴ δεινῶν σοφία ἐναντία τῇ τούτων ἀμαθία ἑστίν; Καὶ ἐνταῦθα ἐτὶ ἐπένευσεν. Ἡ δὲ τούτων ἀμαθία δειλία; Πάνω μόνις ἐνταῦθα ἐπένευσεν. Ἡ σοφία ἄρα τῶν δεινῶν καὶ μὴ δεινῶν ἄνδρεία ἑστίν, ἐναντία ὑσσα τῇ τούτων ἀμαθία; Οὐκέτι ἐνταῦθα οὕτ’ ἐπιφύεσαι ἡθέλησεν 70 ἐσίγα τε. Καὶ ἔγω ἐπον. Τί δή, ὥ Πρωταγόρα, οὔτε σὺ φής ἃ ἐρωτῶ οὔτε ἀπόφης; Αὐτός, Ἐφη, πέρανον. Ἐν γ’, Ἐφην ἔγω, μόνον ἐρόμενος ἐτὶ σέ, εἰ σοι ὁσπερ τὸ e πρώτον ἐτὶ δοκούσω εἶναι τινες ἀνθρωποί ἀμαθέστατοι μὲν, ἀνθρειότατοι δὲ. Φιλονείκεῖν μοι Ἐφη, δοκεῖς, ὥ 75 Σῶκρατες, τὸ ἐμὲ εἶναι τὸν ἀποκρινόμενον. χαριῶμαι σὺν σοι, καὶ λέγω ὅτι ἐκ τῶν ὁμολογημένων ἀδύνατόν μοι δοκεῖ εἶναι.

300 XI. Οὐτοι, ἢν δ’ ἔγω, ἅλλον ἐνεκα ἐρωτῶ πάντα ταῦτα ἡ σκέψασθαι βουλόμενοι, πῶς ποτ’ ἔχει τὰ περὶ τῆς ἀρετῆς καὶ τὶ ποτ’ ἑστίν αὐτὸ ἡ ἀρετή. οἶδα γὰρ ὅτι τούτου φανεροῦ γενομένου μάλιστ’ ἂν κατάδηλον γένοιτο 361 5 ἐκεῖνο, περὶ οὖν ἔγω τε καὶ σὺ μακρὸν λόγον ἐκάτερος

d 63. ἐπένευσεν: the growing perception of Protagoras that ἀνδρέα and σοφία coincide, and consequently that his position (cf. 349 d) has been completely overthrown, is admirably brought out in his increasing unwillingness to asent.

e 67. πάνυ μόνις: cf. 348 e, l. 56.

71. αὐτὸς πέρανον: in Gorg. 506 e Callicles says to Socrates, λέγε ἃ γαθὲ αὐτὸς καὶ πέρανεν.

74. φιλονείκεῖν: insist pertinaciously, contentiously. Cf. Rep. i. 338 a προσπενείτο δὲ φιλονείκεῖν πῶς τὸ ἐμὲ εἶναι τὸν ἀποκρινόμενον. Here in freer form is the art. with the inf. Cf. Thuc. ii. 53 τὸ μὲν προσταλαμπροθρίων αὐθέντες πράθυμος ἢν, Soph. Phil. 1252 ἀλλ’ αὐθέντο τοῦ σῆ χειρί πελθάμαι τὸ δρᾶν but neither am I persuaded by your hand to act, Plato Soph. 247 b αἰσχύνονται τὸ τολμᾶν ὁμολογεῖν they are ashamed to venture to confess. Thucydides has also the simple acc. in ν. 111. 4 τὰ χειρὶ φιλονείκησαι.

300 XI. 3. αὐτὸ ἡ ἀρετῇ: virtue in itself. See on 330 e, l. 33. Cf. Crat. 411 d αὐτὸ ἡ νόησις τοῦ νέου ἑστὶν ἐστὶς mental perception in itself is an impulse towards the new, Theaet. 146 e ἀλλ’ γνώμαι ἐπιστῆ- μην αὐτὸ 5 τὶ ποτ’ ἑστίν, and so frequently.
πλάτωνος πρωταγοράς.

St. p. 361.

άπετείναμεν, ἕγω μὲν λέγων ὡς οὐ διδακτὸν ἁρετή, σὺ δὲ ὡς διδακτόν. καὶ μοι δοκεῖ ἡμῶν ἡ ἁρτι ἔξοδος τῶν λόγων ὥσπερ ἀνθρωπός κατηγορεῖν τε καὶ καταγελᾶν, καὶ εἰ φωνήν λάβοι, εἰπεῖν ἂν ὅτι ᾿Ατοποῖ γ’ ἐστέ, ὡ Σῶ-

10 κρατές τε καὶ Πρωταγόρα: σὺ μὲν, λέγων ὅτι οὐ διδακτὸν ἐστιν ἁρετή ἐν τοῖς ἐμπρόσθεν, νῦν σειστῷ τάναντι σπεύδεις, ἐπιχειρῶν ἀποδείξαι ὡς πάντα χρῆματα ἐστιν ἡ ἐπιστήμη, καὶ ἡ δικαιοσύνη καὶ ἡ σωφροσύνη καὶ ἡ ἀν-

δρεία, ὁ τρόπῳ μάλιστ’ ἂν διδακτὸν φανεῖν ἡ ἁρετή.

15 εἰ μὲν γὰρ ἀλλο τι ἢ ἡ ἐπιστήμη ἡ ἁρετή, ὡσπερ Πρω-

tαγόρας ἐπεχείρει λέγειν, σαφῶς οὐκ ἢν ἢν διδακτὸν· νῦν δὲ εἰ φανύσηται ἐπιστήμη ὁλον, ὡς σὺ σπεύδεις, ὡ Σῶ-

κρατεῖς, θαμμάσιον ἔσται μὴ διδακτὸν ὄν. Πρωταγόρας

δ’ αὖ, διδακτὸν τότε ὑποθέμενος, νῦν τοῦντιν ἕοικε

20 σπεύδοντι ὅλγου πάντα μᾶλλον φανήναι αὐτὸ ἡ ἐπι-

στήμην· καὶ οὕτως ἢν ἢκιστα εἰδ’ διδακτόν. Ἐγὼ οὖν,

ὡ Πρωταγόρα, πάντα ταῦτα καθορῶν ἢν κἀτ’ ἑρα-

tόμενα δεινῶς, πᾶσαν προθυμίαν ἱκὼ καταφανή αὐτὰ

gενέσθαι, καὶ βουλοῦμην ἂν ταῦτα διεξελθοῦντας ἡμᾶς

6. ἀπετείναμεν: see on 329 a, l. 20, and for the discourses themselves, 319 a f. and 323 e ff.

8. ὡσπερ ἀνθρωπός: Plato not infrequently employs such personifications. The most celebrated is that of the laws, cf. Crito 50 a ff.

10. χρῆματα: with a touch of contempt, everything imaginable. ἐπιστήμη is predicate.


17. ὁλον: nothing more nor less than, absolutely. Cf. 349 e, l. 15, Meno 79 b ἐμοῦ δεθέντος ὁλον εἰπεῖν τὴν ἁρετὴν when I asked you to tell me completely

the nature of virtue, and e εἰρήκως ὃ τι 361 ἁρετή ἐστι τὸ ὁλον, 81 d τὸ γὰρ γῆτειν ἀρά καὶ τὸ μανθάνειν ἀνάμμησις ὁλον ἐστίν.

19. ὑποθέμενος: see on 339 d, l. 32.

12. πάντα χρῆματα: with a touch of contempt, everything imaginable. ἐπιστήμη is predicate.

19. ὑποθέμενος: see on 339 d, l. 32. — ἕοικε σπεύδοντι: equiv. to ἕοικε σπεύ-

dειν. A very common const. in Plato, cf. Apol. 27 a ἕοικε γὰρ ὡσπερ ἀνίγμα ἔννοιαν.

20. πάντα μᾶλλον ἡ ἐπιστήμην: any-thing else rather than knowledge. The real change was not in the position of the disputants, but in the concept of vir-

tue under examination. Socrates had maintained that the sophistic virtue could not be taught; he has proved that the true virtue can be taught. See Introd. p. 23.
25 ἐξελθεῖν καὶ ἐπὶ τὴν ἀρετὴν ὃ τί ἐστι, καὶ πάλιν ἐπισκέψασθαι περὶ αὐτοῦ, εἴτε διδακτὸν εἴτε μὴ διδακτόν, μὴ πολλάκις ἡμᾶς ὁ Ἐπιμηθέος ἐκεῖνος καὶ ἐν τῇ σκέψει αὐτοῦ σφήλη ἐξαπατήσας, ὡσπερ καὶ ἐν τῇ διανομῇ ἡμελησέν ἡμῶν, ὡς φῆς σὺ. ἦρεσεν οὖν μοι καὶ ἐν τῷ μύθῳ ὁ Προμηθεὺς μᾶλλον τοῦ Ἐπιμηθέως. ὃ χρώμενοι ἐγὼ καὶ προμηθούμενοι ὑπὲρ τοῦ βίου τοῦ ἐμαυτοῦ παντὸς πάντα ταῦτα πραγματεύομαι, καὶ εἰ σὺ ἔθελοι, ὡσπερ καὶ κατ’ ἀρχὰς ἔλεγον, μετὰ σοῦ ἀν ἡδίστα ταῦτα συνδιασκοπῇν. Καὶ ὁ Πρωταγόρας, Ἔγω μὲν, ἐφη, ὁ Σώκρατες, ἐπανὸς σου τὴν προβυπίαν καὶ τὴν διέξοδον τῶν λόγων. καὶ γὰρ οὔτε τάλλα οἶμαι κακῶς εἶναι ἄνθρωπος, φθονερός τε ἡκιστ’ ἄνθρωπων, ἐπεί καὶ περὶ σοῦ πρὸς πολλοὺς δὴ εἰρηκα, ὅτι ὅν ἐντυνχάνον πολὺ μάλιστα ἀγαμασίας, τῶν μὲν τηλικοῦτων καὶ πάντω καὶ λέγω γε ὅτι οὐκ ἂν θαυμάζομι, εἰ τῶν ἐλλογίμων γένους ἄνδρῶν ἔπει σοφία. καὶ περὶ τούτων δὲ εἰσαύθις, ὅταν βούλῃ, διέξιμεν· νῦν δ’ ὠρα ἥδη καὶ ἐπ’ ἄλλο τι τρέπεσθαι. Ἀλλ’, ἦν δ’ ἐγώ, οὔτω χρὴ ποιεῖν, εἰ σοι δοκεῖ. καὶ γὰρ ἐμοὶ οἱ περ ἐφην

361 25. ἐξελθεῖν: a rare use, go on from one thing to another. Cf. Thuc. i. 70. 3 κρατοῦντες τε τῶν ἐχθρῶν ἐπὶ πλεῖστον ἐξέχοντα when they conquer their enemies, they push their victories to the farthest extent, Soph. O. C. 981 σοῦ γ’ εἰς τὸ δ’ ἐξελθόντος ἀνόσιον στόμα when you give vent to so unhallowed words.

d 27. πολλάκις: frequent in Plato after μή and εἰ, meaning perchance.

28. "That we may not later, grown wise by misfortune, have to come back to sound views (ἐπιμηθεῖσθαι), but may think out the whole matter clearly beforehand (προμηθεῖσθαι)."


30. ὃ: i.e. Prometheus in the myth. What is related of him Socrates will use as a model.

32. κατ’ ἀρχὰς: cf. 320 b, 335 c, 348 d.

35. διέξοδον: see on 326 a, l. 19. e 39 f. τηλικοῦτων, γένου: Protagoras avails himself of Socrates's modesty (cf. e above) to recover his own position of superiority, as the elder of Socrates, and one who is already famous. Cf. 314 b, 316 c, 317 c, 320 e, 335 a.

41. εἰσαύθις: cf. 347 b, l. 7.

43. ἐφην: cf. 335 c, l. 38.
in Athens saluted those dear to them through their beauty or amiability with the word καλὸς. Sitalces, in his admiration for the Athenians, ἐν τοῖοι τοίχοις ἔγραφ᾽ Ἀθηναῖοι καλοὶ (cf. Ar. Ach. 144). Theramenes throws off as in the 'cottabus' the last drops of the fatal hemlock, exclaiming, Κριτία τῶν ἓστω τῷ καλῷ (see Xen. Hell. ii, 3. 50). Hence the frequent καλὸς upon vases. Socrates in Plato often uses it with mild irony; here it is also a play upon Καλλία.

46. This closing line reverts to 310 a. Hippocrates is not again mentioned, as he early retreated into the background, and has remained there during the entire conversation with Protagoras.
APPENDIX.

I. MANUSCRIPTS AND EDITIONS.

A. MANUSCRIPTS.

Diogenes Laërtius, in his work on the Lives of the Philosophers, III. 61, states that among others Aristophanes of Byzantium (about 225 B.C.) arranged the dialogues of Plato in trilogies, and he enumerates the first five. A second attempt at arrangement was made by Thrasyllos the astrologer, and instructor of Tiberius, who arranged the works of Plato which were supposed to be genuine in nine tetralogies, which Diogenes III. 56 enumerates in full, as follows: —

**TETRALOGIES OF THRASYLLUS.**

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<td>IV.</td>
<td>Alcibiades I.</td>
<td>Alcibiades II.</td>
<td>Hipparchus.</td>
<td>Rivals.</td>
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The Ms. tradition of Plato, as it has come down to us, is based wholly upon the arrangement of Thrasyllos, from which it follows that the source or sources of our Mss. cannot be traced beyond the beginning of our era. The order of Thrasyllos was apparently at once adopted; but we are told that others existed, of which no trace appears in existing Mss.

All extant Mss. of Plato are referred by Schanz to an original collection or Archetypus, which contained the nine Tetralogies of Thrasyllos, then the *Definitiones* and seven spurious Dialogues. This Archetypus appears to have been comprised in two volumes, of which the former contained the first seven tetralogies.
The Mss. derived from this first volume are many, but only the following are of special value as affording the basis of a correct text.

**Codex Clarkianus**, or B. This Ms. is one of several derived from an incomplete copy of the first volume of the Archetypus, comprising only the first six tetralogies. It is named from Edward Daniel Clarke, who in the year 1801 discovered it in the library of a monastery in the isle of Patmos. The writing is upon vellum, in the most exquisite character. At the end, following the dialogue of *Meno*, is a subscription, from which we learn that the Ms. was written in the year 896 A.D., by the scribe John, for the use of Arethas, then a Deacon, afterwards Archbishop of Caesarea. The manuscript was purchased by Clarke and given to Porson. It is now in the Bodleian Library at Oxford, and hence is also termed *Bodleianus*, and designated by the letter B. As an authority, it holds foremost rank among all Mss. of Plato. See Clarke’s *Travels in Various Countries*, Vol. III., and Schanz, *Novae Commentationes Platonicae*, pp. 105–118.

**Codex Venetus T** (Bekker t). This Ms., of uncertain age, is in the Library of St. Mark’s in Venice. It contains the first eight tetralogies, excepting the *Timaeus*. It represents a tradition independent of that of B, but is of special value where we lose the help of Clarkianus, viz., in the seventh tetralogy. See Schanz, *Ueber den Platocodex der Marcus-Bibliothek in Venedig*; also his critical edition of Plato’s works, Preface to Volume IX.

Much inferior in value to the two just mentioned are the following: —

**Codex Crusianus** or *Tubigensis*, of the eleventh or twelfth century. This contains *Euthyphro*, *Crito*, *Phaedo*, *Parmenides*, *Alcibiades I.*, *Alcibiades II.*, *Timaeus*.

**Codex Venetus D** (Bekker II), No. 185, of the twelfth century. It comprises the first four tetralogies, *Clitophon*, and the *Republic*.

**Codex Vaticanus Δ Θ**, Nos. 225, 226. These are two volumes of one Ms. by a single writer, probably of the twelfth century. They contain the first seven tetralogies, the eighth, excepting *Critias*, and the *vodévójéva*.

The three Mss. last mentioned are regarded by Schanz as closely affiliated with B, — all being derived from the Archetypus through a common line of ancestry. In the first six tetralogies, textual criticism rests almost wholly upon this class.

**Codex Parisinus A**, No. 1807, is a copy of the second volume of the Archetypus, and contains the eighth and ninth tetralogies, the *Definitiones*, and the seven *vodévójéva*. For a further description of this Ms., see Schanz in *Rhein. Mus.* xxxiii. (1878) 303–307; on the Mss. previously mentioned and on the whole subject, see also Schanz, *Studien zur Geschichte des Platonischen Textes*, and in Bursian’s *Jahresbericht.*
B. EDITIONS.

a. COMPLETE EDITIONS OF PLATO.

The only edition deserving of notice which was published before this century is

Platonis Opera quae extant omnia ex nova Ioannis Serrani interpretatione.
Henrici Stephani de quorundam locorum interpretatione iudicium, et

The pages and page-divisions (a, b, etc.) of this edition are noted in
the margin of modern editions, and form the recognized standard
for reference.

The text of Stephanus was the vulgate until the appearance of
Platonis Dialogi (Graece et Latine) ex recensione Imm. Bekker. 8 vols.
Berlin, 1816, 1817. This contained a systematic collation of Mss.

Far the best edition with exegetical commentary is
Platonis Opera Omnia. Recensuit, prolegomenis et commentariis illustravit
Godofredus Stallbaum. 10 vols. Gotha and Leipzig, 1835–1877. (The
last editions are the most valuable.)

The most full and accurate critical apparatus is found in
Platonis Opera quae feruntur omnia ad codices denno collatos edidit Marti-
nus Schanz. Leipzig, 1875 ff. (Not yet complete.)

Convenient text editions are: —
Platonis Dialogi secundum Thrasylii tetralogias dispositi. Ex recognitione
C. F. Hermann. 6 vols. Leipzig, 1851–53. (In the Bibliotheca
Teubneriana.)

Platonis Opera edidit Schanz. Editio Minor. (Not yet complete.) Leipzig.

b. SEPARATE EDITIONS OF THE PROTAGORAS.

The most important and convenient editions with commentaries are
these: —

Platonis Protagoras cum prolegomenis et commentariis iterum edidit
Kroschel. Leipzig, 1882. (A revision of the Stallbaum edition.)


Platons Protagoras für den Schulgebrauch erklärt von Bertram. Gotha, 1885. (With simpler commentary.)

With the above may be mentioned (though it has no text): —

Der Protagoras des Plato zur Einführung in das Verständniss der ersten
II. CRITICAL NOTES.

The following embrace the more important of Sauppe's notes upon the text, with some slight additions. The first reading is the one adopted in this edition. B denotes Codex Clarkianus (or Bodleianus). T denotes Codex Venetus T, which is not equally valuable in all dialogues, but has proved particularly useful in establishing the text of the Protagoras. S denotes the reading adopted by Schanz; K that adopted by Kroschel; C that adopted by Cron.

The title Πρωταγόρας is followed in B by ἣ σοφισταὶ· ἐνδεικτικὸς. These additions are usually regarded as the work of a later hand. Schanz brackets only ἐνδεικτικὸς, which is wanting in T.

309 c (ch. i. l. 25). ὑδός: ὑδός S as everywhere. Schanz (vol. xii. p. viii.) quotes the testimony of the Attic inscriptions and of cod. A of the Platonic Dialogues, as showing that Plato wrote the word ὑδός. But in the metrical inscriptions in trochaic metre ὑδός is used (C. I. A. iv. 373 e, i. 374, 397), and also in prose ὑδός is found since the fifth century n.c. (Mitteil. d. Arch. Inst. vii. 320). Since B always has ὑδός, while T varies, ὑδός should prob. be retained.

309 c (i. 26). σοφώτερον: with Ficinus. σοφώτατον B T C. The neut. καλλιον shows that the σοφώτατον of the Mss. cannot designate Protagoras.

310 a (i. 35). πάνυ γε, πολλά: πάνυ γε πολλά S.

312 a (iii. 37). σαυτόν: S K. αὐτόν B T C. In the orators (from Isocrates on) and later writers, the use of the refl. of the 3d pers. for the 1st and 2d pers. in both sing. and pl. is established. In the earlier Attic (Aristophanes), however, and also in Plato, the usage is as stated by Apoll. Synt. p. 195, 25 Bk. ὥ γὰρ φαμέν ἐαυτόν ὑβρισά ἡ ἐαυτόν ὑβρισάς, ἐαυτοῦς δὲ ὑβρίσαμεν. The few exceptional passages, already diminished in number, must on other grounds or can so easily be amended, that they have little weight.

312 d (iv. 15). ἀποκρινοίμεθα: Kroschel regards Bekker's ἀποκριναίμεθα as necessary, but the aor. (311 d, 329 b) and the pres. (331 b, freq. in the inf., 333 d, 334 d, 336 a) are equally correct.

312 d (iv. 16 ff.). τί ἐν ... λέγειν: τί ἐν, εἰ εἴποιμεν ... ὁ Σώκρατες, ἐπιστάτην ... λέγειν; S, but this means "what would you say, if etc."

Madvig conjectures τί ἐν ἀποκρινοίμεθα αὐτῷ; ποιας ἐργασίας ἐπιστάτης; τί ἐν εἴπομεν αὐτὸν εἶναι; ὁ Σώκρατες, ἐπιστάτην ... λέγειν, but the introduction of the answer with the voc. is contrary to Plato's usage, esp. here, where Hippocrates certainly cannot as yet speak with confidence. Still less can Kroschel's arrangement τί ἐν εἴπομεν; Αὐτὸν εἶναι, ὁ Σώκρατες, ἐπιστάτην ... λέγειν be sustained by any similar passages. If, however, before ἥ, which has been added in two
APPENDIX.

late Mss., an interrr. point be placed, giving the meaning or (should we) perhaps (call him) etc., this would seem to involve the least difficulty.

314 a (v. 44). παρά τοῦ κατήλου: [παρά τοῦ κατήλου καὶ ἐμπόρου] S after Hirschig and Hercher. παρά τοῦ κατήλου καὶ ἐμπόρου B T C. Objections to the Ms. reading are (1) elsewhere ἐμπόρος always stands first, (2) here the ἐμπόρος has nothing to do, but only the κάπηλος, (3) the reading should have been τοῦ κατήλου ἢ τοῦ ἐμπόρου, or at least τοῦ κατήλου ἢ ἐμπόρου.

314 c (vi. 5). στάντες: ἐπιστάντες S C; but στάντες can stand precisely as well as ἐπιστάντες above, and ἑστάντες in B has simply arisen from the preceding ἑσταμεν.


315 a (vi. 27). ὅπισθεν οὖ: with Baiter. ὅπισθεν B T, οὐ ὅπισθεν S with some late Mss. οὐ could drop out most easily before η.

315 b (vii. 1, 7). ἕφθα "Ομήρος and ἀστρονομικά: both bracketed by S, the latter prob. correctly.

316 a (viii. 2). θ' ὥ (i.e. Θ ο): δ B, τ ὥ T S.

316 b (viii. 7). μόνω: μόνοι μόνῳ S after Cobet.

316 c (viii. 15). μᾶλιστ' ἄν: with S after Stephanus, C. μᾶλιστα B T.

316 c (viii. 18). καὶ ἵοντα: with B T S. κατὼντα Ast, K, Cobet, and on the margin of T; but καταφεναι means only so down or return.

316 e (viii. 20). ἀπολυπόντας: with Hirschig. ἀπολείποντας B T S C Th. Themistius, p. 347 b ὅτι δὲ οἱ σοφισταὶ οὕτω καλοῦσι τοὺς νέους εἰς τὰς μεγάλας πόλεις ἰόντες καὶ ἐν ταύταις πείσοντες τὰς τῶν ἄλλων συνουσίας ἀπολείποντας καὶ οἶκειων καὶ οἶκειων — οὐκ ἐμὸς οὕτος ὁ μῦθος, ἀλλὰ Πλάτωνος τοῦ σοφοῦ ἀντικρυ τοῖς ἱδαμαίνι οἰς δρτι ἐκινθ, with which Heusde has compared Apol. 20 a.

317 c (viii. 60). εἴμεν: with S. εἴμεν B T, but see Veitch, Greek Verbs, p. 226.

317 d (viii. 64). καθεξομενοὶ: with B S C. καθεξομενοὶ T and perhaps rightly preferred by K.

319 a (x. 1). εἰ περ κέκτησαι: with B T C. εἰπερ κέκτησαι S; but the passages quoted by Schanz, in the preface to vol. xii. p. xviii., show that both the reduplicated and the unre duplicated forms may be regarded as correct after words ending in a consonant. See note on 340 d, l. 75.

319 d (x. 20). περιδικήσεως: [διοικήσεως] S.

321 a (xi. 17). εὑμάρειαν: so C. εὑμαριαν B T S, but see Schanz, preface to vol. ii. 2, pp. viii., x.

321 b (xi. 22). δέμασι: θριξὶ καὶ δέμασι B T. [θριξὶ καὶ] δέμασιν S ('nonnulla intercidisse et θριξὶ e superioribus pro alio nomine illatum esse mihi quidem liquet,' Ast.). Before δέμασι Stephanus would read τόλους καὶ, Baiter ονυξὶ καὶ, but the former would be the same as δέμασι: στερεῖς καὶ ἀνάλωσι, and the latter is inapt since nothing further is said of weapons. θριξὶ is wholly unsuitable, and has simply been repeated from above.
321 c (xi. 29). ἰ' ἀκόσμητον: δὲ ἀκόσμητον Paris. 3017. δὴ ἀκόσμητον T S.
diakόσμητον B.
321 e (xi. 49). ὄστερον: [δὲ ἑπιμηθέα] ὄστερον S. δὲ ἑπιμηθέα ὄστερον B T C.
322 a (xii. 2). διὰ τὴν συγγένειαν: with C. F. Hermann. διὰ τὴν τοῦ θεοῦ
συγγένειαν B T C; these words are bracketed by S after Deuschle. διὰ τὴν
τῶν θεῶν συγγένειαν K.
323 d (xiii. 13). τὰ κακὰ: with Ficinus (h a e c m a l a e o r u m q u e c o n-
t r a r i a), Hier. Müller, Susemihl, K. [τὰ κακά] S. τὰ κακά B T C. This κακά
of the Mss. can be neither in the narrower sense the beautiful, nor in the wider
(equiv. to ἀγαθά) the good. For the opposites ἀγαθά and κακά are under
discussion; ugliness, smallness, weakness are cited only as examples of the κακά,
so that beauty, size, strength can be taken only as examples of the ἀγαθά.
326 b (xv. 32). βέλτιον: after Cobet. βελτίω B T S.
326 c (xv. 35). οἱ μάλιστα δυνάμενοι μάλιστα, μάλιστα δὲ δύνανται: S after
Sauppe. μάλιστα οἱ μάλιστα δυνάμενοι, μάλιστα δὲ δύνανται Heindorf. οἱ μάλιστα
dυνάμενοι, μάλιστα δὲ δύνανται B T.
Although elsewhere ὡς is freq. omitted before preds. (cf. Isocr. iv. 31 ὑπόμνημα
τῆς παλαιᾶς εὐφρενίας ἀπαρχῆς τοῦ σίτου ἀποσέπιμοι), yet, on account of the
preps., κατὰ παράδειγμα cannot be a pred. of κατὰ τούτους, nor can it be
assumed that ὡς has been accidentally dropped after ζήν. Moreover the laws are
not a παράδειγμα. On the other hand, some one may easily have wished to
sum up the following words of Protagoras in the expression κατὰ παράδειγμα,
and have written this beside κατὰ τούτους. Schanz has therefore rightly
recognized the words as a gloss.
327 c (xvi. 23). γ' ἄν: with S after Nattmann, Hirschig, Shilleto, C. γόν B T.
327 c (xvi. 25). οἶον κάν: οἶον καὶ B T S.
327 c (xvi. 26). ἐν νόμοις καὶ ἄνθρωποι: with B T C. ἐν ἐννόμοις ἄνθρωποις S.
The speaker has already in mind the contrast between the ἄνθρωποι and the
Ἀγαμοί soon to be mentioned.
327 d (xvi. 31). οἶονσι: with Athen. v. 218 d. οἶοι περ ὡς B T C. οἶοσ περ
S with Hirschig and Cobet; although the latter afterwards abandons this
conjecture. οἶοι περ ὡς of the Mss. prob. arose from the writing of the gloss
οἶον ὡς over οἶον so that ὡς came over the first syllable of πέρας. The
speaker had no occasion here to add περ to the relative.
327 e (xvi. 38). εἶναι· ὑσπέρ: with S after Heindorf, C. εἴδ' ὑσπέρ B, εἴδ'
ὑσπέρ T. Against Kroschel's proposed ἐθ' ὑσπέρ, on which he compares
335 e, is the asyndeton.
328 a (xvi. 46). δὲ καλί: δὲ B T S.
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328 b (xvi. 49). ὀνήσαι: with S after Dobreec. νοῆσαι B T.
328 b (xvi. 54). βούληται: βούληται, [ἀποδότωκεν] S. βούληται, ἀποδότωκεν B T C. The manuscript reading cannot be sustained by examples like Aesch. Theb. 604 ἢ γὰρ ξυνεισβάς πλοῖον εὐσεβῆς ἀνήρ | μασταίοι θερμοῖ . . . | ἱλολεν, or Phaedo 80 d (ἡ ψυχή) ἀπαλαστομένη τοῦ σώματος εὐθὺς διαπεφύσηται καὶ ἀπόλαλεν.

328 e (xvii. 8). τολλοῦ γὰρ ποιοῦμαι: for this phrase Plato wrote either περὶ πολλοῦ γὰρ ποιοῦμαι, which is preferred by Ast and Cobet, or πρὸ τολλοῦ γὰρ ποιοῦμαι, the conjecture of W. Dindorf (cf. Schneider on Isocrates v. 14).
329 a (xvii. 15). τοιότα  τοιούτοις: so S after Sauppe. τοιούτοις B T C.
καὶ cannot, in consistency with the thought, belong to τοιούτοις, nor, in its present position, can it be connected with Περικλέους, a connection which would have led us to expect τοιούτοις μὲν λόγους τὰ χ’ ἀν καὶ Περικλέους ἀκούσειν.
329 a (xvii. 19). χαλκία: χαλκεῖα S. But the former is the only form that can be sustained.
329 b (xvii. 28). ἀνθρώπων, πειθούμην ἂν καὶ σοι: with Heindorf, S. C.
329 d (xviii. 5). τὰ ἔτερα τῶν ἔτερων: so C. τὰ ἔτερα τῶν ἔτερων ἀλλήλων B T (but in B ἀλλήλων is only inserted by a second hand in a gap). [τὰ ἔτερα τῶν ἔτερων] ἀλλήλων S. See also Kroschel’s conjecture (ἀνθρώπων, καὶ σοι πειθομαί) there is the objection that, while Socrates might gladly be convinced by Protagoras, this still requires a little explanation from the latter.
331 e (xix. 43). ἔχω: with Henneberger. ἔχω τὸ δμοῖον a late Viennese Ms. so C. ἔχει τὸ δμοῖον B T. ἔχω [τὸ δμοῖον] S. The words, if any, following ἔχω, must have been either τὸ δμοῖον ἢ τὸ ἀνθρώπων, or at any rate τὸ ἀνθρώπων referring only to the last member, cf. Phaedo 98 a πῆ ποτε ταῦτ’ ἄρμενον ἄτιν ἐκαστον καὶ ποιεῖν καὶ πάσχειν & πάσχει. To go back to the first member and disregard the second is wholly unnatural. Prob. the addition τὸ δμοῖον has come from the following ὁμοίως τι σμικρόν.
332 b (xx. 5). ἦ τοίνυντον: with Stallbaum, C. ἦ [ei] τοίνυντον [ἐπραττων] S. ἦ ei τοίνυντον ἐπραττων B T. That the Ms. reading is incorrect is seen in the reply σωφρονεῖν.
333 b (xx. 46). πλείω: with Heindorf, S. C. πλείοσιν B. πλείοσι T.
333 c (xx. 50). ποίησομαι: with Heindorf. ποίησομαι B T S C.
333 e (xxi. 13). παρατετάχθαι: B T C. παρατετάθαι S after Th. Kock and Madvig; παρατέθαι however means not to be wearied, but to be completely ex-hausted, half-dead, which Socrates would not here say of Protagoras.
335 e (xxii. 51). τῷ ἤμεραῖῳ: with Groen van Prinsterer and Dobree. τῷ ἤμεραῖῳ [δρομεὶ ἀκμάζοντι] S. τῷ ἤμεραῖῳ δρομεὶ ἀκμάζοντι B T. The words δρομεὶ ἀκμάζοντι of the MSS., in an allusion to a man then so famous, can be nothing else than a later addition. Prob. ἐπεσθαί should also be stricken out.

337 e (xxiv. 4). ημᾶς: so S with Heindorf, C. ημᾶς B T. Hippias cannot wish to exclude himself; moreover the following ημᾶς οὖν αἰσχρὸν κτέ. relates chiefly to what is said here. ημᾶς of the MSS. therefore cannot be correct.

338 a (xxiv. 23). ποιήσετε καὶ πείδεσθε: with a late Ms. ποιήσετε καὶ πείδεσθε B T C. ποιήσατε καὶ πείδεσθε Madvig. ποιήσατε καὶ πίδεσθε S.

339 a (xxvi. 7). νῦν δή διελεγόμεθα: with S after Stallbaum, C. νῦν διαλεγόμεθα B T. Upon νῦν δή (or νῦνθι) — νῦν (or νῦν δέ) see Cobet Var. Lect. p. 233 f., Meineke Com. Gr. ii. 11.

339 b (xxvi. 18). ἐγὼ, καλῶς τε καὶ: S after Bekker. ἐγὼ τε καὶ B. ἐγώγε καὶ τ."A

339 e (xxvi. 42). ἱλιγγίασα: so C. ἱλιγγίασα B T S, but the considerations urged by Schanz in the preface to vol. vii. p. v. seem to sustain ἱλιγγίάν.

341 e (xxvii. 49). ἐτὰ: with a period after γέρας, and οὐ δήπου beginning a new sent., the words express the same thought which Kroschel thinks to bring out by changing ἐτὰ to εἶπερ. εἶπα after partics. is by no means so frequent in Plato as in Aristophanes, from whom O. Bachmann has collected 152 passages, still this is not rare in Plato; see Ast's Lex. s.v.

342 d (xxviii. 24). γνοῖτε: with S. γνοῖτε B T C, see on 317 e.

343 a (xxviii. 43). εἰρημένα· ἄ οὐτοι: with C. F. Hermann. εἰρημένα οὗτοι B T C. εἰρημέν' ἄ οὕτω S. εἰρημένα, ὅτι οὕτω Dieusichle. εἰρημένα, ὅτι K. The remark beginning with ἄ οὐτοι is not an argument to prove the character of the wisdom of the Seven, but, as a description of their course, it confirms the main position of the speaker, cf. 1. 47 below. It is doubtful whether ὅτι is used with the meaning from the fact that. εἰρημέν' ἄ cannot be correct, since a more marked pause is demanded between the words.

343 c (xxix. 15). θέμεν: with S. θείμεν B T C, see on 317 e.


345 c (xxxi. 9). ἐπὶ δὴ μὲν: ἐπεὶθ' ὑμῶν B T, but this the metre will not allow. Bergk has proposed ἐπὶ τ' (or ἐπὶ δ') ὑμῶν (the latter after G. Hermann). But this does not entirely agree with the lyric use of tmesis. Hence the reading adopted in the text. It must be assumed that Plato quoted the words of the poet accurately, without arbitrary change.

346 c (xxxi. 48). φιλόμομος εἰμι: εἰμὶ φιλόμομος B T C. Bergk thinks the words belong not to Simonides but to Plato.

346 d (xxxi. 57). ἐπὶ δὴ μὲν: see on 345 c.

347 d (xxxi. 26). καὶ πεπαιδευμένοι: with Athen. iii. 97 b, c. [πεπαιδευμένοι] S. πεπαιδευμένοι B T.
348 c (xxxiii. 4). The art. with "Ομηρον and the τό after λέγειν τι are both doubtful. Schanz is prob. correct in striking out τόν "Ομηρον, leaving τό with the following lines as subj. of λέγειν. Cf. Λγ. Εγ. 334 οὐδὲν λέγει το σωφρόνως τραφήναι, Plato Phaedo 60 ε ἐνυπνίων τινών ἀποτελέσματα στ ἁνδεί. The art., after the preceding context, cannot be sustained. It is found thus in neither 349 e nor 350 c e, 351 a, 359 b. After these words Protagoras could not have replied καλ νυν γε, and Socrates does not say that the statement οἱ ἀνεύ ἐπιστήμης ἀθαρσίας οὐκ ἀνδρείαι contradicts this, as would be the case if the assertion were οἱ ἀνδρείαι εἰσίν οἱ ἀθαρσίαι.

350 b (xxxiv. 30). θαρραλέους: [τούς] θαρραλέους S. τοῦς θαρραλέους B T C. The art., after the preceding context, cannot be sustained. It is found thus in neither 349 e nor 350 c e, 351 a, 350 b. After these words Protagoras could not have replied καλ νυν γε, and Socrates does not say that the statement οἱ ἀνεύ ἐπιστήμης ἀθαρσίας οὐκ ἀνδρείαι contradicts this, as would be the case if the assertion were οἱ ἀνδρείαι εἰσίν οἱ ἀθαρσίαι.


354 a (xxxvi. 27). ἄν . . . ἐρομέθη: ἄν . . . εἴ ἐρομέθη S. ἄν . . . εἴ ἐρο-μέθη B T C.


356 a (xxxvii. 30). ἀλλὰ δὴ ἀξία: with S. ἀλλὰ ἀξία Schleiermacher. ἀλλὰ ἀναξία B T C and Cicero in Prisc. v. 64.

357 e (xxxvii. 105). οὐτε αὐτοὶ: B T S. οὐτε αὐτοὶ τίτε Madvig. The change οὐτε τίτε αὐτοῖ would be somewhat easier, and λέναι is used much like φοίτᾱν in Lach. 187 a and Rep. i. 328 d. Still the emendation is unnecessary, considering the freedom with which, in similar antitheses, the Greeks left one member to be supplied by the reader or hearer.

358 b (xxxviii. 14). καλαί: with Schleiermacher, C. καλαὶ [καλὰ ἄφθαλμοι] S. καλαὶ καλ ἄφθαλμοι B T. Schleiermacher rightly says, 'as the ἄφθαλμον is immediately given as one of the elements of the καλάν, this would be a case of dialectic confusion such as the Platonic Socrates is not wont to fall into.' Cf. 359 e (xxxix. 37).

358 b (xxxviii. 17). καλὰ δυνατὰ: S with Schleiermacher, C. καλὰ δύναται B T. The words are not necessary, as the thought is contained in ἐξον following (cf. 358 d e); and Ast's proposal, approved by Kroschel, to strike them out, has much in its favor. Still they are not superfluous. For when one has to choose between what one has, and what one knows to be better, it is only when the latter is known to be attainable, that there is a true freedom of choice.

360 b (xxxix. 53). δειλοὶ: with Dobree. δειλοὶ [καὶ οἱ ταρσεῖς] S. δειλοὶ καὶ οἱ ταρσεῖς B. δειλοὶ καὶ οἱ ταρσεῖς Τ. τρασύς is very rare in Plato, and occurs nowhere else in the Protagoras; in 350 b μανθόμενοι stands alone. Hence Dobree has stricken out the words, as a late addition. Plato would have said οἱ θαρραλεῖοι.
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[The references to the Greek text are by chapters and thirds of chapters; to the notes, by chapters and line of text annotated; e.g., VIII. a refers to the Greek text at the first third of ch. VIII.; and XIII. 23 refers to the note on line 23 of ch. XIII.]

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